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Showing 41 to 60 of 190 Records
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1985 (5) TMI 217
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... ... ..... hatever that the claim for exclusion of the entire period of 11 1/2 months above noted could never be accepted. 10. Shri Kohli contends that the order of Collector (Appeals) should be set aside on the very ground that the Collector had granted no personal hearing to the appellants before rejecting their appeal. We have seen that the appeal was patently barred by time. In the appeal filed before the Collector no reference had been made to any claim for the exclusion under Sec. 14 of the Limitation Act, the prayer made thereunder being only to condone the delay in filing the Appeal. As earlier noted, there was no provision for condonation of delay in the law as it stood at the relevant time. Therefore, we are not impressed with the argument that the order of the Collector (Appeals) should be set aside on the sole ground that it was not preceded by any personal hearing. In view of the above discussion, we confirm the orders of the lower authorities and dismiss this appeal.
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1985 (5) TMI 216
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... ... ..... pply the provisions of the C.P.C. and the decisions thereunder. 9. Indisputably, the Memorandum of appeal as well as the application, had been filed with the knowledge and authority of the Managing Director of the appellant-company as evidenced by the letter of authority in favour of Shri D.N. Tiku, dated 6-6-1984. It is not the contention that he is not the principal officer of the appellant-company. 10. In the premises, without going into any other submission, we are satisfied that the defect in signing the Memorandum of appeal and the application can be cured by requiring the Appellant to make the necessary amendments by getting them signed by the principal officer of the appellant-company and, we accordingly, direct the Appellant to carry out the requisite amendments within fifteen days from the receipt of this order. The Application under R. 11 is, therefore, allowed. The Application for Condonation of Delay in the premises, is infructuous and is, accordingly dismissed.
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1985 (5) TMI 215
Whether these various processes carried out by the petitioner company amount to bringing into existence different and distinct goods, commercially known as such, to attract levy of duty under Section 4 of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944?
Whether the impugned Act is ultra vires of entry 84 of List I of the Seventh Schedule?
Held that:- The conclusion that inevitably follows that in view of the amendment made in Section 2(f) of the Central Excises and Salt Act as well as the substitution of new Item 19 I and Item 22(1) in Excise Tariff in place of the original Items, the contentions of the petitioners cannot be accepted. Section 3 of the Central Excises and Salt Act clearly indicates that the object of the entries in the First Schedule is firstly to specify exciable goods and secondly to specify rates at which excise duty will be levied. Reference has already been made to Rule 56A. Under sub-rule (2) of the Rule 56A, it is expressly provided that a manufacturer will be given credit of the duty which is already paid on the articles used in the manufacture subject to certain conditions. It is stated before us that excise duty will be charged on processed printed material. Processors will be given credit for the duty already paid on the grey cloth by the manufacturer of the grey cloth. In this view of the matter we are of the opinion that the views expressed by the Bombay High Court in the case of New Shakti Dye Works Pvt. Ltd. and Mahalakshmi Dyeing and Printing Works v. Union of India and Anr. (1983 (6) TMI 174 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT) are correct. The views expressed by the Gujarat High Court in Vijay Textiles v. Union of India [1979 (1) TMI 101 - HIGH COURT OF GUJRAT AT AHMEDABAD] in so far as it held that the processed fabrics could only be taxed under residuary entry and not under Item, 19 I or Item 22 of the First Schedule of the Central Excise Tariff cannot be sustained. Appeal dismissed.
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1985 (5) TMI 214
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... ... ..... eason far less a compelling reason to hold that Tobacco Board Act was within the competence of the State Legislature for the reasons indicated in this judgment. Therefore that cannot be any argument for consideration at all. In so far as the High Court directed the refund as indicated before, the appeals by the Government are allowed to that extent and the orders of the High Court are set aside. The other appeals by the parties, are, for the reasons mentioned hereinbefore, dismissed. Parties will bear and pay their own costs throughout. In view of the majority decision, all the civil appeals, special leave petitions and writ petition except civil appeal No. 629 of 1983 (Karnataka Market Fee matters) are dismissed without any order as to costs. Civil appeal No.629 of 1983(I.T.C.) however is allowed and the judgment of the High Court is set aside. There will, however be no order as to costs in this case and any fee realised will not be refunded. Appeals and Petitions dismissed.
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1985 (5) TMI 213
Principles of natural justice - Held that:- Appeal allowed. The highest bidder whose bid was rejected on the ground that the bid did not represent the market price, was not given an opportunity to raise his own bid when privately a higher offer was received. If the allegations made in the letter influenced the decision of the Chief Minister, fair-plan in action demands that the appellant should have been given an opportunity to counter and correct the same. Application of the minimum principles of natural justice in such a situation must be reading the statute and held to be obligatory. When it is said that even in administrative action, the authority must act fairly, it ordinarily means in accordance with the principles of natural justice variously described as fair play in action That having not been done, the grant in favour of the fourth respondent must be quashed.
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1985 (5) TMI 212
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... ... ..... essing authority under rule 38-D. (underlining is mine) 9.. In P.K. Ahmed s case 1985 58 STC 213 ILR (1985) 1 Kar 1285, as already stated, this Court on identical facts, held, that in view of rule 43(2) of the Karnataka Sales Tax Rules, it is not mandatory to serve notices on all the erstwhile partners of the dissolved firm. 10.. The two cases deal with different situations, viz., recovery and assessment. The view of this Court in P.K. Ahmed s case 1985 58 STC 213 ILR (1985) 1 Kar 1285 so far as procedure for assessment is concerned, is binding on me. No case is made out to apply Suligavi s case 1980 46 STC 335 (Kar) (1980) 2 Kar LJ 141 to the facts of the present case. 11.. In view of the clear provisions of rule 43(2) of the Karnataka Sales Tax Rules, the assessment made in this case is not invalid and the contentions of the petitioner to the contrary are rejected. 12.. Writ petitions are accordingly dismissed. No costs. Rule issued is discharged. Writ petitions dismissed.
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1985 (5) TMI 211
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... ... ..... the petitioner. It has also been alleged that the petitioner No. 1 could make an application for revision if it was not satisfied with the order of security. In my opinion, the contention of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner must be upheld in the facts of this case. It cannot be said that the demand of security in the facts of this case was entirely unlawful. Moreover, it is essentially a question of fact. It has not been stated why the petitioner has not adopted the statutory remedy. It is not a case of inherent lack of jurisdiction. It is only the respondents who could have passed order regarding the declaration forms. If the order is a conditional order the order may be erroneous but is not without jurisdiction. The assessee has not given any explanation in the affidavit-in-reply why it has not availed of the statutory remedy. The writ petition, therefore, fails and is dismissed. The interim order is vacated. There will be no order as to costs. Writ petition dismissed.
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1985 (5) TMI 210
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... ... ..... ew that for the reasons expressed by the Division Bench in Palaniappan and Co. s case 1973 31 STC 387 with which we are in respectful agreement, we find it difficult to subscribe to the views expressed by Venkatadri, J., in Jamal Mydeen s case 1968 22 STC 45. 13.. On the foregoing discussion, it follows that under contracts of sale, the assessee extracted latex and sold the same to others which on any view cannot be treated as agricultural income but has to be treated only as sales exigible to tax under the Act. On this view, we do not consider it necessary to examine the scope and ambit of the definitions occurring in section 2(1)(a), (b), (c), (i) and (j) and the explanation to section 2(1)(k) of the Act relied on by Sri Sarangan and express our views. 14.. As the only contention urged for the assessee fails, these appeals are liable to be dismissed. We, therefore, dismiss these appeals. But, in the circumstances of the cases, we direct the parties to bear their own costs.
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1985 (5) TMI 209
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... ... ..... ed for industrial purposes, then they would be taxable under the general entry as electrical goods. In view of the above reasoning, our answers to the questions can now be set out. As fas as the question referred to us at the instance of the Commissioner of Sales Tax is concerned, we hold that only electric motors of between 3 to 7.5 horse-power are exempt from the levy of sales tax falling within the ambit of entry No. 17 of the Third Schedule of the Delhi Sales Tax Act, 1975. As far as the question referred at the instance of the assessee is concerned, we hold that electric motors are covered by entry No. 15 of the First Schedule of the Act unless they are used for industrial purposes when they fall under entry No. 27 of the notification dated 21st October, 1975. In case the motors are covered by entry No. 15, the effective tax is 10 per cent by reason of the other notification dated 21st October, 1975. We think a fair order is that the parties should bear their own costs.
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1985 (5) TMI 208
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... ... ..... ion 4AA of the West Bengal Sales Tax Act, 1954. Cancellation of eligibility certificate for good and sufficient reasons does not envisage cancellation on any other consideration but on the basis of the conditions laid down in the notification. In that view of the matter, the order passed in Revision Case No. 34/81/82 dated 24th August, 1981, and the order dated 17th February, 1981, are quashed and set aside. I however direct the respondent-authority to consider the matter afresh in accordance with the observations made herein upon affording an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. Since long time has elapsed, such consideration is to be effected within a period of 8 weeks from the date of communication of this order. In the view aforesaid, the sales tax authority is further directed to consider the application for issuance of declaration forms along with matter as directed. The application for issuance of declaration form is also accordingly disposed of Petition allowed.
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1985 (5) TMI 207
Winding up – Exclusion of certain time in computing periods of limitation ... ... ... ... ..... undry Electric Supply Corporation Ltd. v. A. Nageswara Rao 1956 26 Comp. Cas. 91 (SC) AIR 1956 SC 213 and Sri Narain v. Liquidator, Union Bank of India 1923 ILR 4 Lah. 109 AIR 1924 Lah. 53, but, unfortunately, none of these cases dealt with the question before me. It is, therefore, unnecessary to dilate on these cases. The petitions are, by and large, based on the ground of deemed inability of the companies to pay the claims which became barred by time during the pendency of the petitions even though in one or two petitions there is the additional ground of commercial insolvency but the additional ground in no case goes beyond the use of that expression and it was not seriously disputed that the real ground on which the company was sought to be wound up was the deemed inability to pay the claims which have, during the pendency of the petitions, become barred by time. In the result, the petitions fail and are hereby dismissed leaving the parties to bear their respective costs.
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1985 (5) TMI 206
Winding up – Overriding preferential payments ... ... ... ... ..... as not sufficient. The bank would, therefore, be deemed to have waived its right as hypothecatee and was satisfied with a simple money decree. The bank having filed a suit for the recovery of money and having failed to make a claim on the security, any claim on the security or the sale proceeds thereof would now be barred under Order 2, rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, with the result that the bank has no subsisting claim on the machinery or any part of the sale proceeds thereof and must rank as an unsecured creditor along with the other creditors of the company and prove its claim before the official liquidator at the appropriate time. See Official Assignee of Bombay v. Chimniram Motilal, AIR 1933 Bom. 51 and Official Assignee of Bombay v. Abdul Hayee, AIR 1933 Bom 437. The bank is itself to blame for the course that it chose to adopt. The claim of the bank accordingly fails and the application is hereby dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their respective costs.
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1985 (5) TMI 191
Maida subjected to Central Excise duty ... ... ... ... ..... lf, appellants were entitled to refund of duty collected on Maida. Accordingly, they claimed a refund of duty amounting to Rs. 8,532/-, paid during the relevant period. In support of their claim, the appellants have filed a copy of judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Miscellaneous Case No. 164 of 1971 of Flour and Food Ltd., Indore v. Union of India and Others. On identical facts, the High Court had admitted the Writ and ruled that the petitioners were entitled to the refund claimed by them. 4. emsp On a query from the Bench, Shri K.D. Tayal, learned SDR, stated that he had no comments, in view of the judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh. He also stated that it did not appear that there was any contrary decision by any other High Court available in favour of the Department. 5. emsp In view of the foregoing facts, and in respectfully submitting to the judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, we allow the appeal with consequential relief to the appellants.
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1985 (5) TMI 190
Rectification of mistake ... ... ... ... ..... order has been passed? Then everybody will discover things he forgot to say, and will demand to be heard again and orders passed will be redrafted, repassed and reissued. Or, as is made out here that this application does not relate to the order clearly passed, a new order will be passed more favourable to the applicant or the other side, and never mind if it acts contrary to the order already passed. 14. I am not able to see the logic of the argument. The application was made under Section 35C(2) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. To pass an order on this application, is to pass an order that modifies/enlarges/subtracts from the order of 6-7-1984. Even to reject it, is to imply that the bench can accept it, if it so thought fit. 15. I repeat that no bench can hear such an application to modify an order passed by another bench, not even to reject it, when that bench can still assemble and meet. I raised this at the beginning of the hearing. I therefore, pass no order.
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1985 (5) TMI 189
Copper strips ... ... ... ... ..... case A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 922 1978 (2) E.L.T. ( 336) (SC). It was also argued that the Revenue had filed appeal to the Supreme Court against the Bombay High Court decision in the Shakti Insulated Wires case. Shri Verma, while agreeing that the Bombay High Court decision fully covered the issue in the present appeal, stated that no concession be attributed to the respondent with respect to the appeal. 5. There is no dispute that the Bombay High Court decision duly covers the issues involved in this appeal and would be applicable to the same. The Bombay High Court decision has held that insulation would not make strips liable to duty again under T.I. 68 C.E.T. The decision, as already stated, has been followed by the Tribunal in another case. 6. Relying upon the Bombay High Court decision, we hold that copper strips falling under T.I. 26-A (2), after insulation, would not be liable to duty again under T.I. 68 C.E.T. The demand against the appellants is set aside and appeal allowed.
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1985 (5) TMI 188
Import - Of carbon steel re-rollable scrap ... ... ... ... ..... ithin 90 days of the passing of this order make arrangements for the supply of the carbon steel re-rollable scrap required by the petitioner in his industries from indigenous sources either through SAIL or through one of the steel plants of SAIL. The arrangement for the supply of the indigenous raw material should be communicated to the petitioner within 90 days for the supplies for the next one year as compensatory for the period AM-1984. If the respondents are unable to effect the supplies from the indigenous sources in this country, then the respondents shall issue a direct import licence within two months after 90 days to the petitioner for carbon steel re-rollable scrap to the extent of the assessed capacity of the consumption of the petitioner less the quantity already received by the petitioner. The import licence for 600 MT already issued to the petitioner be returned within two weeks from today. On the facts and circumstances of the case, I make no order as to costs.
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1985 (5) TMI 184
Value of clearances ... ... ... ... ..... to the rate specified in such Act in respect of such goods. Our this view finds support from the decision of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Asst. Collector of Central Excise, Rajahmundry v. Andhra Pradesh Paper Mills Ltd., Rajahmundry 1987 (32) E.L.T. 684 (A.P.) 5. As for the plea of limitation it is seen that while in the price list the respondents did not include duty element, the same was collected from the customers. This came to be detected by the Revenue during scrutiny of respondents records. We fail to see how in the state of things the respondents could urge that shorter period of limitation would apply for raising demand against them and the demand should be restricted. 6. There could be no doubt that the impugned order is in contravention of Explanation referred to above. It must therefore be set aside. We therefore set aside the impugned order and allow the appeal and restore the order passed by the Assistant Collector of Central Excise. The appeal is thus allowed.
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1985 (5) TMI 181
Refund claim lodged in time ... ... ... ... ..... ted as continuation of the original claim. Accordingly, I hold that the appellant had filed the refund application within the statutory period as provided under Section 27(1) of the Customs Act, 1962. The subsequent refund application is in continuation to the earlier refund Application dated 25th January, 1982 which was filed within time. Accordingly, I hold that the original refund application filed by the appellant was within time and the subsequent Application dated 10th January, 1985 was continuation to the original claim and further clarifies the refund claim and quantities the amount of Rs. 14,809/-. The revenue has not computed the refund amount at Rs. 14,809/-. Accordingly, I remand the case to the Assistant Collector, Manifest Clearance Department with a direction to compute the correct amount of refund and pay to the appellant within three months from the date of this order after making necessary verification as to its payment. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
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1985 (5) TMI 178
Excess Production Scheme ... ... ... ... ..... However, after a reply from the appellants this show cause notice was amplified calling upon the appellants to show cause as to why base clearance fixed should not be refixed. It is seen that the show cause notice for demand with reference to base clearance as 2,27,787 kgs. under the Rules was issued on 23-11-1978 and further amendment of the same calling upon the appellants as to why the base clearance fixed earlier should not be revised can be considered only in the nature of corrigendum to the said show cause notice. We, therefore, hold that the show cause notice issued on 23-11-1978 is the relevant one for the purpose of time limit for raising the demand. Inasmuch as the facts regarding the change in the ownership of the firm before the base clearance was fixed, were within the knowledge of the departmental authorities, the demand can be limited only to six month period to the issue of this show cause notice. The appeal is therefore, partially allowed in the above farms.
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1985 (5) TMI 177
Refund claim ... ... ... ... ..... stances the non-compliance with Chapter X Procedure in entirety does not vitiate the appellants claim. In that case also as in the present case it had become difficult for the appellant claimants to follow Chapter X Procedure and they had to go in for the refund procedure. The Tribunal agreeing with the appellants argument in that case held condition which was impossible to comply with because of action of Revenue should be taken to have been dispensed with so long as there has been substantial compliance with the requirement of Chapter X Procedure on facts. Keeping the aforesaid in mind and the fact that it is not shown or suggested that Propylene is not duly accounted for or it has not been used for starting up as claimed by the appellants, there would appear no reason to reject the appellants claim for refund. The same must be accepted. 16. ensp As a result of aforesaid discussion we set aside the impugned order, accept the appellants claim for refund and allow the appeal.
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