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Showing 81 to 100 of 190 Records
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1985 (5) TMI 111
... ... ... ... ..... to carry on the business of exhibition of films and is an apparatus and therefore a plant. There is no denial that a cinema building has to conform to certain requirements without which it would not be granted any licence to run it. Further, the cinema building is the basic apparatus without which the exhibition of films is impossible. It cannot be equated with any other building. When a film is exhibited then the entire building needs to be used for housing the people, for screening and for exhibition. Therefore, it is just but right to hold that it is a tool and an apparatus for carrying on the activity and therefore a plant. We respectfully agree with the view of the Third Member, and allow the claim of the assessee that the cinema building is a plant and that depreciation should be allowed at a normal rate applicable to a plant. Since the main ground has been held in favour of the assessee, the alternative grounds become infructuous. The appeal is allowed on these terms.
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1985 (5) TMI 110
... ... ... ... ..... iple enumerated was that a person can not in different capacities with different persons. 16.2 The other case of CIT vs. Budhlal Amolakdas (1981) 129 ITR 97 (Guj), the principle laid down was that the same individual can be a partner in a firm in dual capacity, one for himself and the second as representing the heirs of the deceased partner. 16.3 The Kerala High Court in the case of CIT vs. Kandath Motors (1979) 12 CTR (Ker) 293 (1979) 120 ITR 644 (Ker) have recognised the action by an individual in dual capacity mdash one for himself and another as representative of the heirs of the deceased partner. 16.4 From the above, therefore, the same person could be a partner in a firm in two capacities, when there other partners as well. Therefore, we hold that the partnership deed is very much valid and we direct the ITO to grant the registration to the firm. 17. In the result, the assessee rsquo s appeals for all the year are dismissed and the Departmental appeal is also dismissed.
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1985 (5) TMI 109
... ... ... ... ..... 687 (AP) 6. Telster Advertising Pvt. Ltd. vs. CIT (1979) 8 CTR (Bom) 114 7. Cooperative Marketing Society Ltd. vs. CIT (1983) 34 CTR (MP) 290 (1983) 143 ITR 99 (MP) The Delhi Bench lsquo D rsquo of the Tribunal has also considered the matter of view in the case of Delhi Automobiles Pvt. Ltd. vs. ITO (1984) 10 ITD 839 (Del-Trib). It is the common view taken in all these authorities that the benefit of carry forward of losses is available to the assessee even if he had filed the return within the time prescribed in s. 139(4) of the IT Act. Rather the view taken by the M. P. High Court in (1983) 143 ITR 99 (MP) is that the benefit of carry forward of losses is admissible even in cases where the return is filed under s. 148 read with s. 147 of the IT Act. In these circumstances when a particular section has been interpreted in different manner it would not be of us to take a different view on the subject. We accordingly, find no force in these appeals which are hereby dismissed.
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1985 (5) TMI 108
... ... ... ... ..... ance of Rs. 1,800 out of travelling miscellaneous expenses and repair expenses. Mr. Gargieya submitted that they have been disallowed as there have been no log book and certain expenses not vouched. Mr. Gargieya by referring to pp. 8 and 9, submitted that for petty repairs nobody submits any bill and consider the total quantum of expenditure on repairs which is about 3506 and travelling expenses only Rs. 2,300 and other petty expenses Rs. 5,081, the disallowance is not called for. Mr. Singh submitted that since the expenses are not fully vouched, the assessee is not entitled to any relief. 5. We have heard the parties and considered the material on record. In view of the fact that expenses are not fully vouched and taking into account the totality of the expenditure, we feel that the disallowance is slightly excessive. We allow the assessee a relief of Rs. 800 and the disallowance is restricted to Rs. 1,000 only. 6. In the result, the appeal by the assessee is partly allowed.
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1985 (5) TMI 107
... ... ... ... ..... to use the gas and return the cylinders to the assessee within a period of 30 days. The facts of the case are so patently different that in our view no specific inquiry was necessary into the nature of deposits and the ld. CIT was not right in assuming that the aforesaid judgment of the Hon ble Supreme Court applied to the facts of the present case. 10. We are, therefore, of the view that on none of the three counts the ld. CIT has been able to show that the assessment order was erroneous and prejudicial to the Revenue and, therefore, the order under appeal cannot be sustained. 11. As regards the contention of the ld. counsel for the assessee that the order is based on different grounds than those set-up in the notice issued by the CIT. We are of the view that in view of our above opinion this question is merely of academic importance and we do not think it necessary to express any opinion thereon. 12. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the order under appeal is cancelled.
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1985 (5) TMI 106
Business Disallowance ... ... ... ... ..... t of those funds. As Shri Radhakrishnamurthy for the department pointed out, the capital and reserves are already locked up in various types of fixed assets and current assets. The advance had been made towards the end of the accounting year. The liquid funds of the assessee were only their bank overdrafts. So, it seems to us that the advance could have come only from the borrowed funds. It was submitted that the advance could be considered as having been made out of the current sales receipts. The current sales receipts are first to be considered in the goods account. The assessee perhaps might have had a case if the result in the accounting year was a positive figure of profit. But, as we find from the profit and loss account, the assessee had actually suffered a loss. So, it is not possible to say that the amount was advanced out of current profits either. We will, therefore, uphold the finding of the ITO on this point also. 20. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed.
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1985 (5) TMI 105
Business Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... The finding of the Court which was in his favour is that he continues to be a partner. Now, whether the firm consists of 7 or 8 partners, makes no difference for the running of the business. None of the assets of the business are affected. Therefore, in the prayer made out by Shri Krishnamurthy and granted by the Court, we do not see any material to hold that the business of the firm is affected. Even on the question of dissolution, that is only a step taken to ascertain the correct share of Shri Krishnamurthy in case he is to leave the firm. It is not his prayer that the business should be wound up. Apparently, it is open to the continuing partners to manage the affairs of the firm. Therefore, it cannot be said that the expenditure incurred is for the preservation of the assets of the firm or even for effective and smooth running of the business. We, therefore, agree with the authorities that the expenditure is not allowable. 19. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed.
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1985 (5) TMI 104
Advance Tax, Assessment Year, Financial Year, High Court, Original Assessment ... ... ... ... ..... sory jurisdiction it acts in order to find out whether that High Court has taken different views on the question of law involved before it. They must consider the decisions of all the High Courts and if there is a divergence of judicial opinion on the question of law or two conceivable opinions are possible on it, they must hold that the mistake is not apparent from the record,... There is no decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court on this aspect. When two views are possible, the view favourable to the assessee should be adopted as held by the Supreme Court in CIT v. Vegetable Products Ltd. 1973 88 ITR 192. 5. In view of the conflicting decisions, we are of the view that the issue involved in this case is a debatable one and there is no mistake apparent which could be rectified by invoking section 154. Thus, the Commissioner (Appeals) was justified in cancelling the order dated 24-1-1984 made by the ITO under section 154. 6. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed.
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1985 (5) TMI 103
... ... ... ... ..... long to the assessee. It belongs to the smaller HUFs of Onkar Nath and Kishan Chand. This finding cannot be said to be perverse or the like. From the material on record it also comes out that Onkar Nath and Kisan Chand purchased the property in their individual capacity. They have thrown the property into their respective HUFs. Under the Hindu law individual property can be thrown into the common stock voluntarily. So the property in question is the property of the smaller HUFs of Onkar Nath and Kishan Chand as discussed above. Onker Nath and Kishan Chand purchased this property and subsequently they sold it as co-owners representing their respective HUFs thus the capital gain was earned by the respective HUFs of Onkar Nath and Kishan Chand and not he bigger HUF (the assessee). Since the ld. AAC as given all the details, we do not think it necessary to state those facts again. 7. For the reasons discussed above there is no substance in the appeal. Accordingly it is dismissed.
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1985 (5) TMI 102
Export Market Development Allowance ... ... ... ... ..... e above we notice that the Commissioner (Appeals) relied on Amar Dye Chemicals Ltd. s case to deny the assessee s claim. Therefore, we find no occasion to interfere with the order on the point. The assessment is rejected on ground No. 3 also. 14. Shri G. C. Sharma, senior advocate appearing for the appellant, sought the Bench s permission to withdraw ground Nos. 4 and 4.1. The permission having been granted, these grounds are dismissed as withdrawn. 15. As far as additional grounds are concerned, these are identical, but for the figures. Therefore, making our order of even date in the assessee s own case in IT Appeal Nos. 1143 and 1826 (Delhi) of 1979 as the basis we allow the assessee s ground No. 1 and rejects ground Nos. 2 and 3. The other part of decision in respect of the assessment year 1975-76 shall also govern this year s assessee appeal. It may be mentioned here that there is no cross-appeal for the revenue. 16. In the result, the assessee s appeal is partly allowed.
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1985 (5) TMI 101
Assessment Year, Fixed Deposit, His Net Wealth ... ... ... ... ..... deleted. The matter was considered by the order of the Tribunal to which a reference has been made earlier, and this question is considered in paragraph No. 18 onwards of the Tribunal s order. It may also be mentioned that the reference application on this question was also rejected. In this view of the matter the departmental ground relating to these shares in Hindustan Garments Ltd. has to be rejected. It may be mentioned that these grounds are common in the assessment years 1971-72 to 1978-79. Later on these shares have actually been transferred in the name of those agriculturists through a compromise decree before the High Court. This will cover all the grounds in all the appeals concerned. Thus, on the first issue the matter is decided against the assessee in all the years whereas on the other issues the grounds taken by the department were rejected. 21. In the result, the appeal in IT Appeal No. 1664 (Delhi) of 1983 is allowed and the other appeals are allowed in part.
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1985 (5) TMI 100
Assessment Proceedings, Assessment Year, Jurisdiction To Impose Penalty, Original Assessment, Penalty For Concealment, Penalty Proceedings, Reassessment Proceedings, Reference To IAC
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1985 (5) TMI 99
Time Limit For Completion ... ... ... ... ..... time barred. The following observations of the Delhi High Court in the case of Sudhir Sareen at page 449 support our above view Section 153 prescribes the normal period of limitation. Under the said Explanation, a period not exceeding 180 days would be permitted to the revenue to complete an assessment, in addition to the normal period, if an action under section 144B is taken by the department. The period excluded is between the date on which the ITO forwards the draft order to the assessee and the date on which the directions are received by the ITO from the IAC.... The matter will, therefore, have to be set aside to the learned Commissioner (Appeals) for considering the assessee s appeal on merits in accordance with law, on the basis that the assessment order had been passed by the ITO within the time prescribed by law. 5. In the result, the appeal filed by the department is allowed. The cross-objection filed by the assessee fails for statistical purposes and is dismissed.
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1985 (5) TMI 98
Income From Undisclosed Sources ... ... ... ... ..... . The learned ITO has discussed this point in detail. We agree with the reasoning given by the ITO. 10. We agree with the contention of the revenue that the account books maintained by the assessee were not reliable. The stock registers relied by the assessee and also produced before the Tribunal for verification were also not found reliable because they were not maintained regularly. Even they were not regularly signed by the appropriate authority. Many papers in the said stock registers are lying unused. So the account books including the stock registers maintained by the assessee are not reliable. 11. Looking to the aforesaid facts and evidence on record coupled with the hard facts of life, we are of the view that the addition of Rs. 1,68,410 made by the ITO is to be sustained. The finding of the learned Commissioner (Appeals) to the contrary is not correct. 12. This para is not reproduced here as it involves a minor issue. 13. In the result, the appeal is allowed in part.
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1985 (5) TMI 97
HUF Property ... ... ... ... ..... eld in that case that the assets which are received on partition by a member of an HUF, who has no male issue at the time belongs to him absolutely although they are capable of being owned by an HUF, consisting of him and his son or sons that may be born or adopted subsequently. It was held that on the death of the sole coparcener, the entire property passed. We are, therefore, of the view that the order of the learned Appellate Controller does not call for any interference. In the said decision of the Hon ble Allahabad High Court, reference was also made to the decision of the Patna High Court in Hanumanmal Periwal v. CWT 1968 67 ITR 320. The Patna High Court had held that the assets that are received on partition by a member of a HUF, who has no male issue at the time belongs to him absolutely although they are capable of being owned by a HUF, consisting of him and his son or sons that may be born or adopted subsequently. 6. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed.
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1985 (5) TMI 96
... ... ... ... ..... ily settlement each party takes a share in the property by virtue of the independent title which is admitted to that extent by the other parties. It is not necessary, as would appear from the decision in Rangasami Gownden, AIR 1918 PC 196, that every party taking benefit under a family settlement must necessarily be shown to have, under the law, a claim to a share in the property. All that is necessary is that the parties must be related to one another in some way and have a possible claim to the property or a claim or even a semblance of a claim on some other ground as, say, affection. 9. Looking to the aforesaid facts and the ratio of the decisions in the cases referred to above, we are of the view that the settlement of dispute in the family was bona fide and genuine, under the circumstances the provisions of s. 4(1)(c) are not attracted. The finding of the CIT(A) to the contrary is not correct Accordingly the additions are deleted. 10. In the result the appeal is allowed.
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1985 (5) TMI 95
... ... ... ... ..... ll. Senior Carves India Ltd. vs. CBDT (1980)14 CTR (Del) 47 (1979) 120 ITR 172 at 179 (Del), Lungi India Co. (P) Ltd. CBDT (1980) 14 CTR (Del) 53 (1980) 121 ITR 141 (Del). Hotel Engineers (P) Ltd. vs. CBDT (1979) 120 ITR 696 at 704 (Del) favour the assessee. The assessee, as such, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case is held to be entitled to weighted deduction in lieu of export market development allowance under s. 35B of the Act in relation to activities in which he was engaged in the accounting period relevant to the assessment year under appeal and under the law as it stood on the statute book in the assessment year under appeal. If any further fortification is required, then the ratio of the decision of our own High Court viz. Hon ble Delhi High Court in the case of E. P. W. D Costa and Anr. vs. Union of India (through CBDT) (1980) 121 ITR 751 (Del) is in point. Ground Nos. (ii) and (iii) taken by the Revenue before us also fail. The appeal stands dismissed.
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1985 (5) TMI 94
... ... ... ... ..... yderabad Race Club were charitable in nature and whether the club was entitled to exemption under the provisions of s. 5(1) (i) of he WT Act, 1957. That point is not under consideration before us in the present case. The point that is before us is as to whether a members rsquo club would fall within the charging section of the WT Act or not and we would hold on the basis of pre-ponderant judicial opinion as available in the above mentioned four decision of the Hon rsquo ble Bombay, Gujarat, and Calcutta High Courts that a members club does not fall within anyone of the three entities which are chargeable to wealth-tax under the provisions of s. 3. we would, therefore, reverse the finding of the lower authorities on the point. 5. Since we are holding that Jiwaji Club,Gwaliorwas not liable to wealth-tax. We do not consider it necessary to adjudicate upon the quantum of net wealth which has been assessed by the lower authorities. 6. The appeals filed by the assessee are allowed.
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1985 (5) TMI 93
... ... ... ... ..... e property by virtue of the independent title which is admitted to that extent by the other parties. It is not necessary, as would appear from the decision in Rangaswami Gounden v. Machiappa Gounden AIR 1918 PC 196, that every party taking benefit under a family settlement must necessarily be shown to have, under the law, a claim to a share in the property. All that is necessary is that the parties must be, related to one another in some way and have a possible claim to the property or a claim or even a semblance of a claim on some other ground as, say, affection. 9. Looking to the aforesaid facts and the ratio of the decisions of the cases referred to above, we are of the view that the settlement of dispute in the family was bonafide and genuine. Under the circumstances the provisions of section 4(1)(c) are not attracted. The finding of the Commissioner (Appeals) to the contrary is not correct. Accordingly, the additions are deleted. 10. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
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1985 (5) TMI 92
... ... ... ... ..... ted that in the CIT (A) order, 1979-76 has been mentioned as the first assessment year. When we go through the relevant paragraph in the CIT (A) order, which is No. 9, we find, it is mentioned therein .....Since in this case admittedly the initial asst. yr. 1975-76 commenced on 1st April, 1975, the five assessment year in which the relief would be admissible would end with the asst. yr. 1979-80 commencing on 1st April, 1979 and end on 31st March, 1980. There is a confusion in the above observation and the learned counsel for the assessee made a statement at Bar that for 1975-76 no s. 80J relief was available to the assessee. Under the circumstances, we accept the contention raised by the assessee in its C. O. that when s. 80J relief has been allowed for the first time for asst. yr. 1976-77 it is to continue for five years and the assessee is entitled to its claim for asst. yr. 1980-81, under consideration. 10. In the result, cross objection of the assessee is partly allowed.
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