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Case Laws
Showing 181 to 200 of 273 Records
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1985 (7) TMI 93 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
Tyre Cord Warp Sheet ... ... ... ... ..... sheets would not be liable to excise duty because this would amount to a double duty on the same product. In fact, it is the case of the second respondent in the impugned order dated 15th October, 1982, that despite the rubberisation, the rubberised tyre cord warp sheets continue to be cotton fabrics for the purposes of duty. Now, admittedly the original cotton tyre cord warp sheets were liable for excise duty and such duty was paid. So if, as held by the second respondent, the said warp sheets continue to be cotton fabrics, a fresh classification for the purposes of excise duty is not called for and if duty is charged on the same product, naturally it will be a double taxation on the same product. This obviously the respondents were not entitled to do. And on this ground also the petitioners are bound to succeed this petition. 18. In the result, this petition succeeds and consequently, the rule is made absolute in terms of prayers (a), (b) and (c). Costs by the respondents.
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1985 (7) TMI 92 - SUPREME COURT
Whether sub-section (2) of Section 3 and Section 4 of the Act and Rule 6 of the Cess Rules were ultra vires?
Whether the notices issued by the authorities were valid on the ground that no machinery had been provided for the levy of the cess during the relevant period?
Held that:- the delay in appointing the Collector under the Act does not relieve the appellant of the liability to excise duty in respect of the period during which the Collector was not appointed.
The only relief therefore to which the appellant can be entitled in the present appeal would be an order restraining the respondents from taking any penal action against the appellant for not furnishing monthly returns during the period in which no Collector had been appointed under the Act. It seems, however, that counsel for the respondents stated in the High Court during the hearing of the writ petition that no penal action would be taken against the appellant for not furnishing monthly returns within the period mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section 8 of the Act. We take it that the concession remains binding on the respondents, and it is not necessary for us to pass any express order in that regard. The appeal is dismissed.
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1985 (7) TMI 91 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Advance Tax, Interest Payable By Government, Regular Assessment ... ... ... ... ..... ad not been adverted to either by the Calcutta High Court or by the Gujarat High Court. We are, therefore, unable to subscribe to the view held in those decisions on the construction of the section. In conclusion, we state that the liability of the Government under s. 214, as it stood before the amendment in 1984, to pay interest on the advance tax paid is limited to the period up to the date of the first assessment under s. 143 or under s. 144 and on the amount found to be in excess on that date and interest is not enhanced on reduction of tax liability by a revised order. We accordingly answer the first question in the negative and in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. In the view we have expressed and in the light of the answer to the first question, the second question does not survive to be answered. A carbon copy of this judgment under the signature of the Registrar and seal of the High Court would be sent to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench.
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1985 (7) TMI 90 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Delay In Filing Return, Month, Penal Interest ... ... ... ... ..... I am in respectful agreement with the views expressed in these cases. For these reasons and for the very reasons stated by the High Courts of Madras and Calcutta, with respect, I regret my inability to subscribe to the views expressed by the High Court of Allahabad in Laxmi Rattan Cotton Mills case 1974 97 ITR 285. Section 139(8) of the Act read with rule II 9A of the Rules empowers the ITO to levy interest for not less than a month only and not for period of 30 days as in the present case. In this view, the levy of interest by the ITO was unauthorised and illegal. On this short ground, the order made by the ITO is liable to be quashed without examining all other contentions urged by both sides in support of their respective cases. In the light of my above discussion, I hold that the impugned order is liable to be quashed. I, therefore, quash the impugned order. Rule issued is made absolute. But, in the circumstances of the case, I direct the parties to bear their own costs.
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1985 (7) TMI 89 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d submit that the proviso to S. 40 of the Act would come into play only if the Agrl. ITO is to treat the assessee as in default and that as on date, there is no indication as to whether any coercive steps are being taken concretely, except the assertion of the petitioner to the effect that such steps are being taken by the respondent. It is needless to state that the import of the proviso to s. 40 of the Act as well as the decision of this court, referred, to above, will be kept in mind by the respondent if in fact he should take any concrete steps to treat the assessee as in default in spite of the appeal being undisposed of. Apart from making this position clear, there is no need to issue a writ of certiorarified mandamus as prayed for in the writ petition to quash the impugned order rejecting the prayer for stay and further directing the respondent to grant absolute stay of collection of the tax. Subject to the above observations, this writ petition is dismissed. No costs.
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1985 (7) TMI 88 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Information, Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... Act, 1961, did not empower the Department to make reassessment for the assessment year 1968-69, as it has done. Consequently, both these references are answered in favour of the assessee as under Misc. Civil Case No. 192 of 1981 Answer to reframed question No. 1 On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, there was no justification for the Tribunal to hold that the income-tax authorities were right in initiating proceedings under section 147(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Answer to question No. 2 This question does not arise in view of the answer to question No. 1. Misc. Civil Case No. 198 of 1981 Answer to question No. 1 On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, there was no justification for the Tribunal to hold that the income-tax authorities were right in initiating proceedings under section 147(b) of the Income-tax Act 1961. Answer to question No. 2 This question does not arise in view of the answer to question No. 1. Parties shall bear their own costs.
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1985 (7) TMI 87 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Assessment, Firm ... ... ... ... ..... which was a decision on the construction of this provision prior to this amendment. It was held that, in such a situation, there was merely a change in the constitution of the firm during the accounting year, to be governed by s. 187 and it was not a case of succession governed by s. 188 of the Act, and that the income earned by the firm before such change is to be clubbed with the income, earned after such change and a single assessment is to be made on the firm for the entire accounting period. The question referred in the present case have, therefore, to be answered accordingly, following the decision of the Full Bench. Consequently, the reference is answered against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue, as under (1) The Tribunal Was justified in holding that on the death of one of the partners, there Was only a change in the constitution of the firm and (2) only one, assessment Was required to be made for the entire accounting year. There will be no order is to cost.
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1985 (7) TMI 86 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Exemptions, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... High Court in CWT v. Nand Laljalan 1980 122 ITR 781 and distinguished the view taken by the Madras High Court in the case of Purshothamdas Gocooldas v. CWT 1976 104 ITR 608, which has been relied on by the learned standing counsel for the Revenue.. We see no reason to take any contrary view than the one taken by this court in Narsibhai Patel s case 1981 127 ITR 633 and, with respect, we may add that we are unable to persuade ourselves to follow the view expressed by the Madras High Court in Purushothamdas Gocooldas case 1976 104 ITR 608., Consequently, the question referred is answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue as under The Appellate Tribunal was not correct in law in holding that the assessee was not entitled to have a deduction of Rs. 44,000 representing the value of his interest in the house property owned by the firm in accordance with rule 2 of the Wealth-tax Rules read with section 2(m) of the Wealth-tax Act. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1985 (7) TMI 85 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Assessment, Firm ... ... ... ... ..... section 187(2), the decision of this case is not governed by the view taken in the Full Bench case. The other case referred to was Ayodhya Prasad Parmeshwaridas v. CIT 1985 156 ITR 554 (MP), wherein the above amendment, which came into force with effect from April 1, 1975, was noticed and the case was remanded to the Tribunal for a fresh decision in the light of the said amendment. It is sufficient to say that the applicability of the newly added proviso to section 187(2) in the present case being an admitted position and the logical consequence thereof being also not in controversy, it is unnecessary to make any such remand in the present case. As a result of the aforesaid discussion, this reference is answered against the Revenue and it is held that the Tribunal was justified in law in confirming the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner directing the Income-tax Officer to pass two separate assessment orders for the two periods. There will be no order as to costs.
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1985 (7) TMI 84 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Firm, Registration ... ... ... ... ..... arlier assessment years, when they too were partners. The position remained the same till April 30, 1974, and with the retirement of these lady partners, the case of the assessee-firm for registration became stronger, as one of the factors which weighed with the Income-tax Officer for refusing registration, viz., that several partners were ladies, no longer exists. Moreover, the finding on this question is basically one of fact, as pointed out in the earlier decision of this court in CIT v. M. P. Bidi Leaves and Co. 1983 144 ITR 487. Following that decision, this reference also must be answered in favour of the assessee. Accordingly, the reference is answered in favour of the assessee as follows On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the assessee-firm was entitled to renewal (continuance) of registration/registration under section 184/185 for the year under consideration. Costs shall be paid by the Department to the assessee. Counsel s fee, Rs. 200, if certified.
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1985 (7) TMI 83 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Delay In Filing Return, Penalty ... ... ... ... ..... equal to two per cent. of the tax for every month during which the default continued but not exceeding in the aggregate 50 per cent. of the tax . By the amendment brought about in the year 1974, instead of the words tax payable , the words tax assessed were substituted. A Division Bench of this court in CIT v. Mangat Ram Kuthiala 1978 111 ITR 823, while interpreting the said provision held that the said amendment has been made retrospective and has to be deemed to have always been in force. The same view was reiterated in CIT v. Patram Dass Raja Ram Beri 1984 148 ITR 120, and it was held that the amount paid under provisional assessment under section 23B of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (now section 141 of the Income-tax Act, 1961), cannot be deducted for calculating the penalty. These references thus stand concluded by the abovenoted two decisions of this court and are accordingly answered in the negative, i.e., in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. No costs.
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1985 (7) TMI 82 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Application For Registration, Firm ... ... ... ... ..... at for this purpose, the Tribunal could either itself take the explanation and any further material produced by the parties as evidence or direct the departmental authorities to give a fresh finding after taking into account the entire material including that produced by the parties for this purpose. Such a course not having been adopted by the Tribunal before Teaching the above conclusion, the same will have to be done now. Consequently, the reference is answered in favour of the assessee as under On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was not justified in reversing the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) and in restoring the order of the Income-tax Officer under section 184(4) of the Income-tax Act rejecting the assessee s application in limine without giving an opportunity to the assessee to explain the circumstance relied on against it for the first time. However, in the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
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1985 (7) TMI 81 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Limitation, Writ ... ... ... ... ..... o justification for this court to interfere with the same. When the petitioner approached this court challenging the very notice, this court had stayed the proceedings. In this view, Sri Rao prays for 45 days time from this day for filing objections before the IAC. In the circumstances that had developed, it is proper to grant the time sought for by Sri Rao. In the light of my above discussion, I hold that this writ petition is liable to be rejected. I, therefore, reject this writ petition. But, the petitioner is granted 45 days time from this day for filing its objections before the IAC who on receipt of the same will proceed to decide the matter in accordance with law and is also bound to examine every one of the pleas to be urged by the petitioner on merits. Writ petition is disposed of in the above terms. But, in the circumstances of the case, I direct the parties to bear their own costs. Let this order be communicated to the first respondent within 15 days from this day.
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1985 (7) TMI 80 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Delay In Filing Return, Interest ... ... ... ... ..... that in computing the interest payable under the above section, the sum of Rs. 3 lakhs paid by the assessee voluntarily should be deducted from the amount of tax payable on the total income of the assessee as determined on regular assessment ? Sections 207, 208, 209 and 211 impose liability on an assessee to pay income-tax in advance where his income exceeds the minimum prescribed under s. 208. In the case before us, the assessee, in the absence of any notice under s. 210, itself made an estimate of its income and paid a part of the tax in advance. The said amount has been treated and credited as tax paid. On the above facts, we do not find any justification for the hypertechnical stand taken by the ITO. Interest should not have been charged on an amount paid on account of advance tax on estimate and credited as such. The question referred is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. The assessee is allowed the costs of this reference. G. N. RAY J.-I agree.
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1985 (7) TMI 79 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t to grant relief to the petitioner. Both the eminent counsel with their rich experience in income-tax law practice are unable to find a way out to help the petitioner as the Act stands at present. In my humble view, a way out had to be found to grant relief to the petitioner and others in similar circumstances. But, how that should be done is for Government and Parliament to decide. In order to enable the Government to examine this aspect and initiate necessary remedial measures, I consider it proper to forward a copy of this order to the Government. In the light of my above discussion, I hold that these writ petitions are liable to be dismissed. I, therefore, dismiss these writ petitions and discharge the rule issued in the cases. But, in the circumstances of the cases, I direct the parties to bear their own costs. Let this order be communicated to the respondents and the Secretary to Government, Ministry of Finance, Govt. of India, New Delhi, within 10 days from this day.
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1985 (7) TMI 78 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Lottery Winning ... ... ... ... ..... ons of the Act do not extend to their limits. But from this, it cannot be inferred that since ss. 194B and 276B do not extend to them, the receipts by an Indian resident in foreign countries on the basis of winnings from lotteries, would still continue to have the character as receipts of a casual and non-recurring nature. Accordingly, we hold that the Tribunal committed an error of law in holding that the assessee s winnings from lottery in Sikkim (foreign country at the relevant time) were of a casual and non-recurring nature and did not constitute his income chargeable under s. 5(1)(c) read with ss. 10(3), 56(2)(ib) and 2(24)(ix) of the Act. Accordingly, we answer the first question in the negative, i.e., in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. In view of our answer to question No. 1 and because of the fact that detailed arguments were not addressed on question No. 2, question No. 2 is left unanswered. The reference stands disposed of with no order as to costs.
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1985 (7) TMI 77 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Application For Registration, Firm, Procedural Law, Registration ... ... ... ... ..... right of a party to remove the defect in following the procedure prescribed for obtaining a right or a privilege. The procedural law is always to be construed and applied in a manner so as to make it hand-maid to the cause of justice, and it cannot be treated as a substantive provision so as to defeat the rights of the parties. In our opinion, the contention advanced on behalf of the Revenue would have been perfectly justified, if there had been no partnership in existence in the relevant accounting year, or by a subsequently drawn instrument of partnership after the close of the accounting year, by some fiction, the partnership is brought into existence. As observed above, it is nobody s case. In that view of the matter, we are of the opinion that this reference should be accepted and we answer both the questions in the negative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. However, having regard to the facts of this case, there should be no order as to costs.
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1985 (7) TMI 76 - KERALA HIGH COURT
House Property, Vacancy Allowance ... ... ... ... ..... it is clearly wrong. The reasons advanced by the Division Bench for not agreeing with the reasonings in Govindarajulu Chetty s case 1973 87 ITR 22 (Mad) which is based on the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Thiagaraja Chetty s case 1953 24 ITR 525 (SC) are not convincing. A detailed discussion about the other decision of our High Court in George Paul Puthuran s case 1980 126 ITR 168 (Ker) referred to in the reference order does not call for any consideration in depth, inasmuch as that merely follows the decision in Jairam s case 1979 117 ITR 638 (Ker) and dissents from the contrary view expressed by the Allahabad High Court in Virendra Singh s case 1979 118 ITR 923. The result, therefore, is that we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. A copy of this judgment under the signature of the Registrar and seal of the High Court would be sent to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench.
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1985 (7) TMI 75 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Change In Shareholding, Closely Held Company, Company, Depreciation, Depreciation And Development Rebate, Developement Rebate
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1985 (7) TMI 74 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d decision under articles 133 and 134A of the Constitution on the ground that the questions decided by us raise substantial questions of law of general importance which need to be decided by the Supreme Court. On the theory of merger, extent of merger, the true scope and ambit of section 264 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, that are involved in this case, there is diversity of opinion among the various High Courts in the country which frequently arose and they have not so far been set at rest by the Supreme Court of India. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the questions raised in this case are substantial questions of law of general importance and the same needs to be decided by the Supreme Court of India. In the result, we allow the application made by the respondent and grant a certificate of fitness to appeal to the Supreme Court under articles 133(1) and 134A of the Constitution and direct the Registrar to issue the necessary certificate in that behalf to the respondent.
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