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Case Laws
Showing 221 to 240 of 273 Records
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1985 (7) TMI 53 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Appeal To Tribunal, Business Loss ... ... ... ... ..... e assessee as loss arising in the course of the carrying on of the business and as being incidental to the business. The Appellate Tribunal found on the facts and in the circumstances that neither section 36 nor section 37 would apply to the case. The Appellate Tribunal went further and pointed out that The loss, if any, is in the business of banking. Now, it carries on only the business in kuries. So the loss in banking business cannot be claimed as a deduction in computing the profits and gains of the kuries business. We do not find any error committed by the Tribunal. The tribunal has only exhausted all the possible arguments which would have been put forward by the parties. The result, therefore, is that we answer all the three question, in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. A copy of this judgment under the signature of the Registrar and seal of the High Court will be forwarded to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench.
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1985 (7) TMI 52 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Capital Gains ... ... ... ... ..... v. ITO 1981 131 ITR 597 and the plea of the assessee was upheld in the following terms (headnote) Sub-section (2) of section 52 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, can be invoked only where the consideration for the transfer of a capital asset has been understated by the assessee, or, in other words, the full value of the consideration in respect of the transfer is shown at a lesser figure than that actually received by the assessee, and the burden of proving such understatement or concealment is on the Revenue. The sub-section has no application in the case of an honest and bona fide transaction where the consideration received by the assessee has been correctly declared or disclosed by him. In the light of the law settled by the Supreme Court, questions Nos. 2 and 3 are answered in the negative, i.e., against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee. In view of the answer to questions Nos. 2 and 3, question No. 1 need not be answered and is accordingly left unanswered. No costs.
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1985 (7) TMI 51 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... and was not in the knowledge of the petitioner. In these circumstances, it is even inconceivable to contend that the principles of natural justice are violated. On the disallowance of Rs. 5,000 as capital expenditure under the head Repairs to roads and buildings , the Commissioner has found against the petitioner applying the correct legal principles in the determination of the same. Even here also the finding of the authorities is essentially on a question of fact that cannot be upset by this court. Assuming that there is an error of law on this aspect, then also that claim is a trifle amount on which ground only this court should decline to interfere in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution. As all the contentions urged for the petitioner fail, these writ petitions are liable to be dismissed. 1, therefore, dismiss these writ petitions and discharge the rule issued in the cases with costs of the respondents. Advocate s fee Rs. 250.
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1985 (7) TMI 50 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... asset in section 70(2)(i) refers only to a short-term capital asset. The set-off provided under section 70 appears to be itemwise or sourcewise whereas the set-off of the loss under section 71 appears to be headwise. Under section 71(2) it appears that choice has been given to the assessee in respect of loss arising from any other head except capital gain to set off the same either against the entire capital gain or only against its income relating to short-term capital assets. Similar choice has not been made available to an assessee under section 71(3). In any event, two several and separate rights have been conferred on the assessee under sections 70(2)(i) and 71(3) and, in case of any ambiguity, the construction beneficial to the assessee should be adopted. For the above reasons, the question specifically referred for the assessment year 1969-70 is answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. There will be no order as to costs. AJIT KUMAR SENGUPTA J.-I agree.
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1985 (7) TMI 49 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Depreciation ... ... ... ... ..... on. The validity of the action of the Incometax Officer must be judged from the facts as they were at the time when the action was taken. It is not the case of the assessee that at the material time there was any conflict of any judicial opinion on the relevant rule between different High Courts or the matter was pending before the Supreme Court to be resolved and settled by the Supreme Court. On the facts and circumstances of this case, we are unable to hold that there was any debate or doubt or conflict as regards the application of the relevant rule at the material time when the rectification was made. We are, therefore, of the view that the Tribunal fell in error in holding that in the absence of the Supreme Court decision on the point it cannot be said that the point at issue was free from doubt. For the reasons aforesaid, we answer the question in this reference in the negative and in favour of the Revenue. There will be no order as to costs. DIPAK KUMAR SEN J.-I agree.
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1985 (7) TMI 48 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Developement Rebate, Ship ... ... ... ... ..... x Act, 1961, which of course permits the amortisation of capital expenditure, inter alia, for preparation of feasibility report under specified conditions. In other words, the Legislative development indicates that under the specified conditions, the Legislature has thought it fit to permit the set-off of capital expenses against revenue receipts over a number of years. It is not intended to supersede any other provision in the income-tax law under which the expenditure is allowable as deduction against profits. We are emphasising it for limited purpose to indicate as to how the Legislature has tried to intervene and see that such nature of expenses may not be treated as virtually personal expenses, if certain conditions are specified. In that view of the matter, therefore, we have to answer question No. 3 in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, there would be no order as to costs.
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1985 (7) TMI 47 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... r in mind what the Supreme Court has observed per curiam in CIT v. S. P. Jain 1973 87 ITR 370 at p. 372, since this would otherwise expose the taxpayers as well as tax collectors to the vagaries of protracted litigation. As the Tribunal has failed to consider each and every fact for and against the assessee and did not give its finding in respect of the evidence which has been adduced, nor has it considered, as it ought to have, the reasoning which compelled the Appellate Assistant Commissioner to reach the findings, we think that the grievance of the assessee before us that the findings are vitiated has great force. In the circumstances, therefore, we intend to adopt the course suggested by the Supreme Court in CIT v. Indian Molasses Co. P. Ltd. 1970 78 ITR 474 and leave the questions unanswered so as to enable the Tribunal to rehear the appeal and dispose of the same according to the correct principles of law. Reference is disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs.
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1985 (7) TMI 46 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Capital Gains ... ... ... ... ..... us owner of the property acquired it are variously used by the legislature to denote the same idea and the reference is intended to be made only to the cost of acquisition of the property regardless of the question whether it was capital asset or non-capital asset at the date of acquisition. (emphasis supplied) We do not think, therefore, that the first contention Urged by Mr. Patel can be sustained. As regards the alternative contention, we find ourselves unable to go into the question since no question has been referred to us though the Tribunal, while dismissing the appeal, has directed the Income-tax Officer to consider the benevolent circular issued by the Central Board of Direct Taxes. The alternative contention urged before us, therefore, is not capable of being examined here. The result, therefore, is that we answer both the questions in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. There would be no order as to costs in this reference.
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1985 (7) TMI 45 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Company, Disallowance, Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... rectors for the services rendered by them for securing finances for the company to the extent of Rs. 30 lakhs. Both the decisions relied on by the learned counsel for the Revenue are, therefore, distinguishable on facts and are of no avail in this case. Having considered the provisions of section 40A(2) and section 40(c)(i), we are of the opinion that the Tribunal was right when it held that the reassessment and disallowance made on the basis of section 40A of the Act are not justified. In view of this, it is not necessary for us to make a probe in regard to question No. 2 for considering the alternative contention of the assessee. The result is that question No. 1 is answered in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. It is not necessary to give a decision on question No. 2. In the circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs. Let the Tribunal be informed of this order in accordance with section 260(1) of the Act.
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1985 (7) TMI 44 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... at regard as well. Reference to the case of CIT v. Khoday Eswarsa and Sons 1972 83 ITR 369 (SC), where it was held that it was for the Revenue to show that there had been any deliberate default on the part of the assessee for imposition of penalty is entirely misplaced. That is a case prior to the introduction of the Explanation to section 271(1)(c) of the Act. That case, therefore, has no relevance for the present case before us. For the reasons stated above, we are of the view that the Tribunal erred, in law in setting aside the penalty levied under section 271(1)(b) of the Act. The question referred to us is, therefore, answered in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. Let a copy of this judgment be transmitted to the Tribunal under the signature of the Registrar as soon as possible in terms of section 260(1) of the Income-tax Act read with rule 15, Chapter XII-A of the Patna High Court Rules.
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1985 (7) TMI 43 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Change Of Law, Penalty ... ... ... ... ..... tion. In the case of registered firm and an unregistered firm, by virtue of section 271(2) of the Act, there is no difference for the purpose of imposition of penalty while that distinction exists in the two different capacities which were being considered by the Supreme Court in the case before it. The ratio of the Supreme Court decision is, therefore, not applicable to the present case, to which section 271(2) of the Act applies on account of which that decision is distinguishable. Consequently, this reference is answered against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue as under (i) The Tribunal was justified in holding that the persons that constituted the association of persons and the firm were the same and there was no difference in the identity of the persons sought to be assessed. (ii) The Tribunal was justified in holding that the Income-tax Officer had jurisdiction to impose the penalties. The reference is answered accordingly. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1985 (7) TMI 42 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Application For Revision, Finding Of Fact ... ... ... ... ..... o the petitioner himself. I have already pointed out above that the Tribunal has held as a fact that the applicant could know on March 20, 1969, by perusing the cause list that the date was fixed for order on April 7, 1969. The Tribunal has also held as a fact that the Deputy Commissioner passed order on March 20, 1969, fixing the case for orders on April 7, 1969, immediately after the arguments were heard and so the Tribunal took the view that the applicant could know the date on March 20, 1969. Under such circumstances, the Tribunal has given findings of fact against the petitioner and the findings of fact are binding on this court. In view of my findings as above, I hold that the Tribunal was right in holding that the petition for revision was barred by limitation. The question is, therefore, answered against the petitioner and in favour of the opposite party. However, in the peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties will bear their own costs. UDAY SINHA J.--I agree.
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1985 (7) TMI 41 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Company, Super Profits Tax ... ... ... ... ..... not that he shall make as many orders as he likes. It is elementary that the Income-tax Officer is bound to drop the proceedings where no super-tax is payable by the assessee and in this case it has been done by the Income-tax Officer. Further, the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, expressly provides for initiation of subsequent proceedings in certain matters, to wit section 34 of the Act. There is no such provision in section 23A of the Act and, therefore, if an order passed by the Income-tax Officer under this section is prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue, it can be rectified only by the Commissioner of Income-tax under section 33B of the Act and, hence, it must be held that no such power is intended to be given by the Legislature to the Income-tax Officer or his successor under section 23A of the Act. Following the said decision, we answer the question referred in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. There will be no order as to costs. G. N. RAY J.-I agree.
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1985 (7) TMI 40 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... living with his father voluntarily for the sake of his own convenience and, therefore, section 23(3)(a) is not attracted. On the same facts, a reference relating to the assessment years 1969-70 to 1972-73, which was Misc. Civil Case No. 115 of 1977 decided on March 19, 1982, has been answered against the assessee taking the view that the assessee was not entitled to exemption under section 23(3) of the Act. Following that decision, which is reported as Shikarchand Jain v. CIT 1982 140 ITR 552, this reference also has to be answered against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue. Consequently, the aforesaid questions are answered as follows (i) The Tribunal was right in holding that the Income-tax Officer was justified in reopening the assessment under section 147(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. (ii) The Tribunal was justified in holding that the assessee was not entitled to exemption under section 23(3)(a) of the Income-tax Act 196 I. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1985 (7) TMI 39 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Advance Tax, Appeal To AAC ... ... ... ... ..... mmissioner in regard to waiving of interest for the period beginning from April, 1973, to the date of assessment. The question is also answered in the affirmative. Question No. (2) In view of the answers given by us to question Nos. (1) and (3), it follows that the Tribunal was justified in holding that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner had not exceeded his jurisdiction when he entertained the appeal on the question of levy of penal interest and further gave a direction for waiving of interest from April, 1973, to the date of assessment. The order passed in appeal by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner cannot be said to be in excess of his jurisdiction. This question is, therefore, answered in the affirmative. Questions Nos. (1) to (3) are, therefore, answered in the affirmative. i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. There will be no order as to costs of this reference. Let the Tribunal be informed of this order as required by section 260(1) of the Act.
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1985 (7) TMI 38 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Accounting Year, Application For Registration, Firm Registration, Income Tax ... ... ... ... ..... hat because a five-year period is stated in annexure B, that has to be reckoned from December 22, 1965, and when it is done, the previous year has to be excluded from the time the deed was in force cannot hold good from the very recital of the document. The decision of the Madras High Court, relied on by the Tribunal, in M.R. Raju Chettiar v. CIT 1963 48 ITR 737 states If this arrangement was in existence at the commencement of the relevant account year, the subsequent execution of an instrument during the course of the accounting year gives the firm the character of a firm constituted under a deed of partnership throughout the accounting year. For the foregoing reasons, we answer the question referred to this court in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. A copy of this judgment under the signature of the Registrar and the seal of this court would be sent to the Kerala Agricultural Income-tax and Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, Ernakulam.
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1985 (7) TMI 37 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... dealing with the exercise of right conferred by the Act and the ratio in that case does not really bear on the point. Whatever be the circumstances in which the petitioner s declaration was received on January 1, 1976, that has hardly any relevance to decide whether that was made before January 1, 1976, or on or before December 31, 1975. In the absence of a provision for condonation of delay, the Commissioner cannot condone the delay, whatever be the circumstances in which that delay occurred. If the Commissioner had no power to condone the delay, this court also cannot exercise that power and extend the period of limitation. On any view, the impugned order of the Commissioner does not call for my interference. As all the contentions urged for the petitioner fail, this writ petition is liable to be dismissed. I, therefore, dismiss this writ petition and discharge the rule issued in the case. But, in the circumstances of the case, I direct the parties to bear their own costs.
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1985 (7) TMI 36 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
"Expenditure" In S. 40A, Business Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... the meaning of section 40A(3) of the Act. Question No. 3 referred to us by the Tribunal is, therefore, answered in the affirmative, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. In view of our answer to question No. 3, we are of the opinion that question Nos. 1 and 2 need not be answered because in the face of the answer given by us to question No. 3, their answers in the affirmative or negative, i.e., for or against the assessee or the Revenue, as the case may be, is not of much consequence, for, in any case, the amount involved will not be deductible in the computation of income under the head Profits and gains of business or profession . We, therefore, do not consider it necessary to give our decision on question Nos. 1 and 2. The reference is accordingly disposed of. In the circumstances of the case, we leave the parties to bear their own costs of this reference. The Tribunal may be informed of the judgment given by us today as required by section 260(1) of the Act.
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1985 (7) TMI 35 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... . Ltd. 1977 107 ITR 172 (Guj). In view of these decisions, it has to be held that the damages paid by the assessee to the military authorities in the three assessment years as mentioned above are allowable as business expenditure under section 37(1) of the Act. In view of my discussions above, I hold that the Tribunal has not taken a correct view of law in disallowing the claim of the assessee relating to the recoveries from the bills in the three assessment years in question. I accordingly hold that the Tribunal was not correct in holding that the sums of Rs. 13,375, Rs. 12,314 and Rs. 1,594 in the assessment years 1968-69, 1969-70 and 1970-71, respectively, were not allowable as deductions in computing the income of the assessee. The common question referred for the three assessment years in question is accordingly answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. In the peculiar circumstances of the case, parties will bear their own costs. UDAY SINHA J.-I agree.
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1985 (7) TMI 34 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Cash Credits ... ... ... ... ..... opportunity to process this evidence. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the findings of the Tribunal are clearly vitiated, since it has not discharged its obligation which has been prescribed by law, as explained by the Supreme Court. The result is that there are no valid findings before us to answer the question which has been referred to us. In the circumstances, therefore, we decline to answer the question. This reference is accordingly disposed of. Having regard to the facts of the case, there would be no order as to costs. We hope and recommend that having regard to the fact that the questions relate to the assessment years 1963-64 and 1964-65, the Tribunal will adjust its order after hearing the appeal afresh, without remanding the matter to the authorities below and if it thinks fit to do so, it may fix time-limit. We hope and recommend that the Tribunal shall adjust its order by deciding the appeal afresh within three months from the receipt of this order by it.
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