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1985 (7) TMI 345
... ... ... ... ..... ate Act. The benefit, which can be claimed by the dealer under section 8(2A) can be only in respect of the goods, which is exempt from tax generally or is subject to tax generally at the rate which is lower than 4 per cent. The conclusion of the Division Bench of the Board that the aforesaid proviso of section 5 of the Act is applicable, is correct and when this is the case, the concessional rate on the sale of bardana will be applicable to the assessment under the CST Act. In this view of the matter, the Board in special appeal was right in holding that the rate of tax applicable to the sale of bardana would be 2 per cent and 1 per cent according to rate of tax imposable on the goods packed therein instead of 3 per cent and no illegality has been committed by it. The application under section 15(2)(b) of the Act, which has been heard as a revision under section 15 of the Act as substituted by the Amendment Act, is dismissed without any order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1985 (7) TMI 344
... ... ... ... ..... tax paid imported foreign liquor could not be taxed again, is essentially a finding of fact. The Board of Revenue held that there was reasonable ground for the assessee for holding a bona fide belief that the imported foreign liquor was tax paid in a sense and could not be taxed again at the last point of sale in the State. In view of the circumstances and the facts on the record, on which the decision of the Board of Revenue is based, it cannot be held that a question of law arises out of the order of the Board of Revenue dated December 21, 1978, setting aside the penalty imposed upon the assessee under section 16(1)(i) of the Act. As no question of law arises out of the order of the Board of Revenue, this revision petition has no merit and is dismissed, as under the amended provisions of section 15(1) of the Act a revision petition is maintainable in this Court only on a question of law involved in the case. The parties are left to bear their own costs. Petition dismissed.
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1985 (7) TMI 343
... ... ... ... ..... been borne in mind by the High Court and interim order of this magnitude had been granted for the mere asking......... It is clear that the Supreme Court has reiterated in this case the basic principles which should govern the grant or otherwise for an ex parte interim order and has laid down in this case, as in its earlier decisions, that mere existence of a prima facie case would not justify the grant of an interim order without taking into consideration the question of balance of convenience as well. This decision, in our opinion, does not lay down, as was canvassed by the learned standing counsel that while entertaining a petition under article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court was not empowered to grant an ex parte interim order or that in matters involving public revenue, an ex parte interim order should never be granted. We find no merit in the objection of the learned standing counsel to the grant of an interim order of the nature made by us. Petition allowed.
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1985 (7) TMI 342
... ... ... ... ..... hides and skins, nothing is stated about the attack on the inclusion of the opening stock of raw hides and skins. In the counter-affidavit filed in the writ appeal, there is no explanation on these aspects. Therefore, we are inclined to remand the matter for a limited purpose. The respondent/assessing officer, after giving a reasonable opportunity to the assessee on the two points, namely, inclusion of opening stocks of raw hides and skins and regarding higher value of local purchases of raw hides and skins, is directed to pass orders in accordance with law. 14.. In the above view, we set aside the order of the learned Judge and also the impugned order of the respondent to a limited extent as indicated above with liberty to the respondent to pass a fresh order of assessment in accordance with law and also in the light of the observations made in this judgment. Consequently, the writ appeal is allowed and the matter is remitted for a limited purpose. No costs. Appeal allowed.
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1985 (7) TMI 341
... ... ... ... ..... ision Bench of the Board of Revenue. The Board did not proceed to decide the question which is now sought to be raised on behalf of the department before us. It is, therefore, clear from a perusal of the order passed by the Division Bench of the Board of Revenue that the question which is now sought to be raised before us, was not raised before the Division Bench of the Board of Revenue, nor was it decided by it, and so it cannot be said to arise out of the order of the Division Bench of the Board of Revenue. We, therefore, uphold the preliminary objection raised by the learned counsel for the respondent-assessee, and as no such question was raised before the Division Bench of the Board of Revenue, we are unable to allow the department to raise such a question before this Court under the amended provisions of section 15 of the Act. The reference application, having been treated as revision petition, is accordingly dismissed, but with no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1985 (7) TMI 340
... ... ... ... ..... he second appeal. Therefore, normally though under section 38(6) of the State Act the assessment had become final, but in view of the provisions of the Central Sales Tax Act read with section 19(1) of the State Act, in our opinion, if the conditions mentioned in section 19(1) of the State Act exist, the assessing authority gets the jurisdiction to make reassessment. 10.. The question referred to this Court is, therefore, answered in favour of the department and against the assessee. Our answer therefore is That, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was not justified in holding that reassessment under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, read with section 19(1) of the M.P. General Sales Tax Act was not lawful in view of the provisions of section 38(6) of the M.P. General Sales Tax Act even though the issue on which reassessment was made was not present before the Tribunal in the second appeal. The reference is disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs.
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1985 (7) TMI 339
... ... ... ... ..... Court over the subordinate courts. 3.. The next argument advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners is on the merits of the case, namely, relating to the prosecution pending before the 25th Metropolitan Magistrate, Bombay. In support of his argument that the prosecution should be resorted to as a last resort, he cited the decisions reported in P.K. Haji Gulam Mohideen Sahib v. Commercial Tax Officer, Salem 1966 18 STC 346 and Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P. v. Radhakisan 1979 43 STC 4 (SC). He further contended that the prosecution launched against the petitioners in the first instance without exploring the other remedies available under the Act is liable to be quashed. This is a matter which shall be gone into by the court having jurisdiction. Therefore, in view of my conclusion that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the abovesaid petitions, I direct the office to return the above petitions filed by the petitioners for presentation before a proper court.
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1985 (7) TMI 338
... ... ... ... ..... n sub-rule (2) of rule 66 cannot be said to be beyond the rule-making power. As against this Mr. Bhagwati Pershad, learned counsel for the petitioner, states that applications for revision have specifically been mentioned under item (p) of sub-section (2) of section 26 wherein no time-limit has been provided. It is his contention that provision wherein limitation has been laid is not for carrying out the purposes of the Act. In my view the submission is misconceived. The rule has been framed for carrying out the purposes of the Act. The application seeking revision having been provided in sub-section (3) of section 20 the time within which it has to be filed must specifically be laid down. This is also the requirement of subsection (2)(r) of section 26. By sub-rule (2) of rule 66 this is exactly what has been achieved. I hold that the rule is intra vires and is also legal. No other point was urged. In the result the writ petition fails and is dismissed. No order as to costs.
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1985 (7) TMI 337
... ... ... ... ..... ld that the gowar churi or korma was not cattle feed and so ceased to be exempt from payment of tax under entry 9 of the Schedule appended to the Act. Mr. Rajendra Mehta, the learned counsel, informed that that case has not been correctly decided and that it has been challenged in revision under section 15 of the Act as substituted by the Amendment Act. We are not inclined to express any opinion about the correctness or otherwise of the decision in Mahaveer Industries s case 1985 RRD 239. Suffice it to say that it is not applicable to the case on hand. In view of the discussion made hereinabove, the Board was right when it held the gowar churi, being a cattle feed, is exempt from the payment of tax as per entry 9 of the Schedule under section 4(1) of the Act. The application under section 15(3A) which has been treated as revision is, therefore, dismissed and the order of the Board dated 16th February, 1979, is affirmed. There will be no order as to costs of this application.
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1985 (7) TMI 336
... ... ... ... ..... e fully applicable to this case. We, therefore, hold that the supply of cement bags by the non-petitioner to the contractor for price for being utilised in the execution of the contract constituted sale within the meaning of section 2(o) of the Act and thus, this turnover attracted liability to tax. The reference is accordingly disposed of as a revision. The revision is allowed and the orders, annexure B dated 31st July, 1965, of the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals), Udaipur, annexure C dated 3rd December, 1971, of the learned single Member of the Board and annexure D passed by the Division Bench of the Board in special appeal are set aside by which it was held that the transactions did not constitute sale and the order, annexure A, dated 1st May, 1964, passed by the Assistant Commercial Taxes Officer, Udaipur, holding that the transactions constituted sale is restored. As nobody has appeared on behalf of the non-petitioner, there will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1985 (7) TMI 335
... ... ... ... ..... d in those sections. While respectfully following Assessing Authority s case 1981 48 STC 239 (SC) we are of opinion that no penalty could be imposed under section 10A of the Central Sales Tax Act on the dealer-assessee although diesel and mobile oil were imported on the strength of C forms and were utilised in processing marble stones which belonged to other persons on job-work basis. In view of the aforesaid authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court, it is not necessary to notice other authorities or to make a further probe in the matter. The Board of Revenue, in its order dated 25th October, 1978, passed in special appeal, in our opinion, was right and justified in coming to the conclusion that the penalty was not imposable under section 10A of the Central Sales Tax Act on the ground that the goods were imported on the strength of C forms. The petition under section 15(2)(b) of the Act heard as revision is dismissed without any order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1985 (7) TMI 334
... ... ... ... ..... wever, like to clarify that though compulsory acquisition of property would exclude the element of mutual assent which is vital to a sale, the learned judges were, with respect, not right in holding in Chittar Mal Narain Das v. Commissioner of Sales Tax 1970 26 STC 344 (SC) that even if in respect of the place of delivery and the place of payment of price, there could be a consensual arrangement, the transaction will not amount to a sale. Therefore we are clearly of the opinion that these cases are governed by the decision of the Supreme Court in Vishnu Agencies (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer 1978 42 STC 31 (SC). The writ petitions are accordingly dismissed. The learned counsel for the petitioner makes an oral application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. In our opinion no substantial question of law of general importance which requires to be considered by the Supreme Court arises in these cases. The oral request is therefore rejected. Writ petition dismissed.
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1985 (7) TMI 333
... ... ... ... ..... lty by the assessing authority was not justified, and the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) as well as the Board in revision and special appeal were right in holding that actual seizure is necessary under section 22(6)(b) of the Act before imposing penalty. The view taken by the Board in the aforesaid decisions referred to above appears to us to be correct and for that matter the order dated 16th April, 1979 passed by the Board dismissing the appeal against the order dated 4th August, 1978 passed by the learned Member of the Board is correct. The reference application which has been heard and treated as revision under section 15 of the Act as substituted by the Rajasthan Sales Tax (Amendment) Act, 1984 is, therefore, dismissed, as in our opinion the question of law involved in this case has been correctly decided by the Board in its appellate order dated 16th April, 1979 and calls for no interference by this Court. It is accordingly dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
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1985 (7) TMI 332
... ... ... ... ..... the State, which was purchased on the basis of form S.T. 17, there was full compliance of it, and the Board was, therefore, justified in holding that the declaration has not been misused by the dealer-non-petitioner when the cotton seeds were sold outside the State. The assessing authority had imposed the penalty on the ground that the dealer-non-petitioner has misused the declaration made in form S.T. 17. We have already held that the ginned cotton and the cotton seeds are two different commodities. In this view of the matter, no valid exception can be taken to the order of the Division Bench of the Board dated 21st December, 1978, passed in revision. For the aforesaid reasons, we maintain the order dated 21st December, 1978 of the Board, set aside the penalty levied under section 16(1)(k) of the Act by the CTO and this application, which has been treated as revision under section 15 of the Act as substituted by the Amendment Act, is dismissed without any order as to costs.
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1985 (7) TMI 331
Whether a coconut (neither tender nor dried but a ripened cocount with or without husk) is a "fresh fruit" or a "vegetable" so as to earn exemption from the levy of sales tax under G.O. No. 1764 dated April 5, 1960 as amended on December 22, 1960 issued under the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act? 1959?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. It is well-settled that it is for the assessee who claims exemption to adduce evidence that a particular article is an exempted item and if he cannot or if he fails to do so, then the Revenue may proceed on its basis. In such a situation, the assessee should have such an opportunity. We cannot foreclose such an opportunity. We cannot categorically say that ripened coconut could never be considered to be "vegetable". But in this case the assessee has adduced no evidence.
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1985 (7) TMI 330
Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the sale of wheat products against permits issued by the District Food and Supplies Controller, Chandigarh, is liable to be taxed under the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. Answer the question referred in the affirmative, in favour of the Union Territory of Chandigarh and against the respondent. This Court came to the firm conclusion that notwithstanding the conditions imposed by the statutory framework within which the dealer operated the transactions effected by it must clearly be regarded as sales.
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1985 (7) TMI 318
Authorised dealers in foreign exchange ... ... ... ... ..... fending articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution, it can shy not be contended that the challenge should also be restricted to these grounds based on public order, morality and health. A legislation beyond the legislative competence cannot derive support under this article on the ground that it is a legislation relating to public order, morality and health and affecting the right to administer properties of a religious institution. This point is absolutely baseless and has to be rejected. In the result, these original petitions fail and they are dismissed with costs of respondents Nos. 1 and 2, one set each. Immediately after the judgment was pronounced, counsel for the petitioners made an oral request for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. We do not find any substantial question of law of general importance which requires to be decided by the Supreme Court involved in these original petitions. Hence, leave declined. ------------------------- See 1985 58 Comp. Cas. (St.) 116.
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1985 (7) TMI 309
Articles of association, Company when deemed unable to pay its debts, Winding up - Appointment and powers of provisional liquidator, Powers of tribunal on hearing petition
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1985 (7) TMI 299
Winding up - Avoidance of transfer, etc., after commencement of ... ... ... ... ..... hat the impugned transactions were bona fide and they are fair, just and reasonable. In that view of the matter, therefore, I am of the opinion that the applicant company should be and is permitted to recognise and register the transfers according to the transfer applications in question. It is further directed that the applicant company shall register the transfers as applied for by the transferor company and the transferee companies before me. The applicant company is, therefore, directed to register M/s. Harit Investment Co. (P.) Ltd., M/s. Haren Investment Co. (P.) Ltd., M/s. Krishna Kumar Investment Co. Pvt. Ltd. and M/s. Gokulesh Investment Co. (P.) Ltd. as transferee-holders of 1,000 shares each of Siddhpur Mills Co. Ltd., according to their transfer applications executed between them and their transferor company, namely, M/s. M. P. Spinning and Weaving Mills Pvt. Ltd. Company Application No. 133 of 1982 is, therefore, disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs.
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1985 (7) TMI 291
Remuneration of directors ... ... ... ... ..... e original resolution fixing maximum remuneration at Rs. 15,000 per year came into force on June 12, 1980. The second resolution passed increasing the maximum to Rs. 30,000 was only made on December 30, 1982, i.e., more than one year from the date on which the earlier resolution came into force. Therefore, there are no merits in this case. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.
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