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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 315 Records
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1987 (1) TMI 485 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... ndent-tenant is entitled to the benefit of Section 32-M of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 as amended by Gujarat Act 36 of 1965. This appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed, but, in the circumstances of the case, we direct the parties to bear their respective costs.
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1987 (1) TMI 484 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... parole. To accept this contention would be to destroy the effect of the mandate of the Section. As indicated earlier, the mandate enacted in the Section is a safety valve for a citizen who is robbed of his liberty and to disable the authorities from manipulating the grounds of detention. The Section has to be interpreted literally. No relaxation is permissible. If the original time of 5 days has to be extended, such extension must 'be supported by an order recording reasons. If reasons are not so corded the order of detention will automatically fail. Even if reasons are recorded they have to inspire confidence in the Court and are subject to legal scrutiny. If the reasons are unsatisfactory, Courts would still quash the order of detention. On a consideration of the materials placed before us we hold that the order of detention is bad and we quash the same. Since the petitioner is not in detention there is no need to pass any order to direct his release. Petition allowed.
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1987 (1) TMI 483 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the intimation to the public through the Official Gazette that the Outline Development Plan was available for inspection at the office of the Planning Authority is a sufficient compliance with the requirement of Section 13(4) regulating the publication of the approved Plan and Regulations?
Held that:- In the present case Section 13(4) has prescribed the mode of publication of the Outline Development Plan and the Regulations. Such public notice is required to be given by a publication in the Official Gazette, This is how it was understood by the authorities and everyone else concerned and this is how it was done in the present case. This appears to be a reasonable and a rational interpretation on Section 13(4) and Rule 33 in the setting and the scheme. We are of the view that there was compliance with the requirements of Section 13(4) and Rule 33. We have earlier mentioned that Section 13(1) requires the provisional Outline Development Plan. In the result we find no merit in the appeals which are accordingly dismissed with costs. The judgment of the High Court will now be given effect by the authorities, taking note of the several undertakings given to the High Court and this Court at various stages.
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1987 (1) TMI 482 - SUPREME COURT
Whether by Clause 11 in the first contract, the arbitration clause in FOSFA-20 contract can be said to have been incorporated into the contract?
Held that:- Even assuming that the subject-matters of FOSFA-20 contract and the f.o.b. contract are different, we do not think that any question as to the germaneness of the arbitration clause to the subject-matter would be relevant. It has been found by the learned Judge of the High Court that the Manager of NAFED, who had signed the first contract, was aware of the terms of the FOSFA-20 contract including the arbitration clause contained therein. It is, therefore, manifestly clear that by the incorporation of Clause 11 in the first contract, the appellant intended to incorporate into it the arbitration clause of FOSFA-20 contract. Thus where, as in the instant case, the parties are aware of the arbitration clause of an earlier contract, the subject-matter of which is different from the contract which is being entered into by them, incorporates the terms of the earlier contract by reference by using general words, we do not think there would be any bar to such incorporation merely because the subject-matters of the two contracts are different, unless, however, the incorporation of the arbitration clause will be insensible or unintelligible. In the instant case, the arbitration clause in FOSFA-20 contract will fit in the first contract.
The first contract includes the terms and conditions of supply and as Clause 9 refers to these terms and conditions of supply, it is difficult to hold that the arbitration clause is also referred to and, as such, incorporated into the second contract. Appeal dismissed.
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1987 (1) TMI 481 - SUPREME COURT
Setting aside the conviction of the appellant Balbir Singh under Section 4 of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1985
Held that:- We are constrained to observe that it is highly regrettable that the authorities concerned should have launched a prosecution under the Act in a manner which can be easily termed as cavalier. The Act though intended to effectively deal with terrorists and disruptionists contains drastic provisions for punishing terrorists and disruptionists under Sections 3 and 4 of the Act. Anyone convicted under Section 3(2)(i) of the Act is liable to be punished with death and whoever is convicted under Section 3(2)(ii) of the Act is liable to be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than 5 years but which may extend to term of life and shall also be liable to fine. Whoever is convicted under Section 4 of the Act is liable to be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than 3 years but which may extend to term of life and shall also be liable to fine. Furthermore, against any judgment, sentence or order rendered under the Act, an appeal would lie directly to the Supreme Court and not to the High Court. Having regard to all these features the investigation of cases under the Act has not only to be thorough but also of a high order. In this case we find the investigation to be nowhere near the required standards and likewise the evidence adduced in the case to be far from satisfactory to justify the conviction of the appellant under Section 4 of the Act. The appeal has, therefore, to be necessarily allowed and the conviction and sentence awarded to the appellant set aside.
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1987 (1) TMI 480 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Mandla Petroleum Agencies 1986 19 VKN 308, wherein it has been held The sale of the stock of the motor spirit which has suffered tax under the M.P. Sales of Motor Spirit and Lubricants Taxation Act, 1957, will be exempt from the levy of the tax under the M.P. General Sales Tax Act, 1958, on the stocks held by the dealer/non-applicant on or after August 1, 1972 and the provisions of section 54 of the M.P. General Sales Tax Act, 1958, will be applicable for claiming exemption on sales of stock of motor spirit on or after August 1, 1972. The third question is also concluded by a decision of this Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Project Automobiles 1978 42 STC 279 1978 11 VKN 262 that the sale of second-hand car will not be covered by the term business of the dealer in motor spirit and lubricants. 4.. The questions are answered accordingly. There shall be no order as to costs in the circumstances of the case. References answered accordingly.
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1987 (1) TMI 479 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... General Sales Tax (Amendment) Act, 1983 (Act No. 35 of 1983) which has come into force on November 15, 1983 by which section 19A has been added giving power of reassessment in certain cases to Commissioner despite the order of any court or Tribunal which has become final provided the order is erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue. However, this amendment has no application to the present case as the order of reassessment was passed by the assessing authority on August 27, 1974 and that of the Tribunal on February 13, 1979, much before the amendment came into force. 4.. Therefore, the question is answered in favour of the dealer by affirming the order of the Tribunal holding that the reassessment of the dealer under section 19(1) was not legal as the order in the earlier second appeal had become final regarding assessment of tax on packing material. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1987 (1) TMI 478 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ssessment proceedings when the relevant Act by substantive charging provision levies tax as well as penalty. The Central Act contains specific provisions for penalty. These are the only provisions for penalty available against the dealers under the Central Act. The learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the decision arrived at by the Tribunal is correct and does not require any reconsideration. On a careful and anxious scrutiny of the entire facts of the revision cases before us together with the arguments advanced by either side in these revisions, we are inclined to hold that the Tribunal is correct in its decision regarding rayon yarn waste and staple fibre waste are not liable to be taxed under the Central Sales Tax Act, especially when there is no definition of the word business available in the Central Sales Tax Act during the relevant time. Accordingly, these tax revision cases are dismissed with costs (one set). Counsel s fee Rs. 500. Petitions dismissed.
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1987 (1) TMI 477 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the case, when scrutinised clearly, established the character of wilful suppression of the material facts by the respondent which justifies the imposition of penalty as per section 12(3) of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959, which we have extracted supra. On a careful perusal of the entire facts, we are inclined to allow this tax revision case. Accordingly, we restore the imposition of penalty as levied by the assessing authority, which in turn was confirmed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. We set aside this part of the judgment of the Tribunal, namely, the cancellation of penalty and restore the penalty as imposed on the respondents herein by the assessing authorities. Though no one appeared for the respondents nor the respondents appeared in person in the instant case before, yet we feel that we have to necessarily award costs. Therefore, the tax revision case is allowed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 500. Petition allowed. Page No 224 VATLaws Copyright 2013
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1987 (1) TMI 476 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... annot be challenged, that does not mean that the mistake having arisen in the order of the assessing officer could be attributed to the order of the Tribunal. On account of merger, the mistake arising in the order of the assessing officer cannot be shifted to the order of the Tribunal. I, therefore, agree with the Tribunal that there was no mistake in the Tribunal s order dated 28th March, 1980. The matter can be seen from another angle also. Section 21 of the Act, 1948, enables the assessing authority to reopen the assessment if the assessing authority has reason to believe, inter alia, that the assessment has been assessed to tax at a rate lower than that at which it is assessable under this Act. So, the remedy is embedded in section 21 of the Act. It furnishes a clue that in the circumstances of the case no application can be made under section 22 to make the assessment at a higher rate. For the reasons, the revision is dismissed. No order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1987 (1) TMI 475 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e issued by the assessee s main office at Madurai on 5th December, 1978, the delivery note issued by the assessee in favour of the main office at Madurai on the same date and the debit note issued by the assessee to the K.S.R.T.C. all bear the same engine number. This clearly shows that counsel for the Revenue is not correct in contending that the goods did not move from Madurai to Trivandrum against specific orders placed by the K.S.R.T.C. 8.. In the circumstances the sale of the bodies of the buses to the K.S.R.T.C. was effected by the assessee for and on behalf of its principal office at Madurai in the course of inter-State trade, and the turnover in respect of such transaction is not exigible to sales tax under the Act. 9.. Accordingly we affirm the decision of the Tribunal in so far as the sale of the bus bodies is concerned, and the revision petition to that extent is dismissed. In the circumstances of this case, we make no order as to costs. Petition partly dismissed.
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1987 (1) TMI 474 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... urisdiction. That being so, the appellant having chosen his forum and having submitted to the jurisdiction of the authorities in the State of Andhra Pradesh cannot legally file this petition in this Court and challenge the legality of those orders. The judgments cited before us by Sri Shantharaju have no applicability to the facts of the case in hand and are clearly distinguishable. In this view of the matter, we hold that for the reasons, viz., (1) that no cause of action at all has arisen in the territory over which this Court has jurisdiction and (2) that the appellant chose his forum and submitted to the jurisdiction of the authorities in the State of Andhra Pradesh, the writ petition filed by the appellant is not legally maintainable in this Court. The view taken by the learned single Judge is unexceptionable and does not call for any interference. 9.. For the reasons recorded above, the appeal fails and is dismissed, but without any order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1987 (1) TMI 473 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ed out, no such material is available for us to conclude that there was any wilful suppression of the taxable turnover warranting a penalty under section 12(3). Therefore, the order of the Tribunal imposing penalty is not sustainable and accordingly we set aside the penalty and allow the tax revision case. On a careful and anxious scrutiny of the entire facts in the instant case before us, we do find that there is absolutely no real basis for rejection of the accounts maintained by the revision petitioner herein, and there is also no ground warranting for a best judgment assessment . In view of the decision arrived at by us with regard to this aspect, we do not find any necessity to discuss the second point raised on behalf of the revision petitioner. In the result, we allow the tax revision case and set aside the order of the assessing officer as confirmed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Tribunal. Under the circumstances, there is no costs. Petition allowed.
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1987 (1) TMI 472 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... uch as Deputy Commissioner (C.T.) v. M. Murugesan and Bros. 1985 58 STC 143 (Mad.) has considered the decision of the Supreme Court in Ashok Service Centre v. State of Orissa 1983 53 STC 1, we are of the view that the suo motu restoration of the penalty imposed by the assessing authority, by the Board, is correct and in accordance with law. The absence of either the words all the provisions of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act or the word penalty in section 3(2) of the Surcharge Act, cannot be a ground to hold that all the provisions of the General Sales Tax Act, 1959, are not applicable to the Sales Tax (Surcharge) Act, 1971. Hence we hold that the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant in this regard is not sustainable. We hold that the provision in section 3(2) of the Surcharge Act would apply to all the provisions of the Sales Tax Act. 11.. In the result, we dismiss the appeal with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 500 (rupees five hundred only). Appeal dismissed.
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1987 (1) TMI 471 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... maintainable. It was argued on behalf of the Revenue that, under sub-rule (4) of rule 8A of the Central Sales Tax (Uttar Pradesh) Rules, 1957, the case be sent back to the assessing officer with the direction that he may afford an opportunity to the assessee to rectify the minor omissions or defects occurring in the forms H. This would have been done, if there were any omission or defect of such a nature as to render the assessee ineligible for claiming the exemption. For a defect of trivial nature, having no adverse effect on the claim of exemption, I find that there will be no justification to send the matter back. For reasons, I hold that the assessee covered by the proviso to subsection (1) of section 6 of the Act, is entitled to exemption on the sales effected to the exporters. All the revisions are, therefore, allowed. There will be no order as to costs. Let a copy of this order be sent to the Tribunal to pass an order under section 11(8) of the Act. Petitions allowed.
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1987 (1) TMI 470 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tely, it was held ............ On looking at the matter from a broad perspective, we are inclined to agree with the Additional Tribunal that the transactions relating to disposal of scrap and new parts which were no more necessary for the business of the assessee did not constitute business and the assessee could not be treated as a dealer in respect of such transactions. 6.. In view of the fact that the unserviceable materials were sold by the petitioner, the decision of this Court reported in 1983 53 STC 329 (State of Orissa v. Orissa Road Transport Company Ltd.) directly applies. The question, therefore, is to be answered in favour of the assessee. 7.. In view of the answer of this question in favour of the assessee, the dispute raised in the writ application becomes academic and is not required to be examined. Accordingly, the writ application is dismissed. 8.. The parties shall bear their own costs in the three proceedings. H.L. AGRAWAL, C.J.-I agree. Order accordingly.
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1987 (1) TMI 469 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... io decidendi of that case apparently proceeds on the basis as to whether the old car which was sold, had been purchased for a private use or for use in connection with the business of the assessee. That was the ratio decidendi of the other two cases also, namely, the cases of Bhopal Sugar Industries Ltd. 1981 48 STC 45 (MP) and Sajjan Mills Ltd. 1985 59 STC 116 (MP). 8.. In the instant case also, it is not the case of the assessee that the staff car which had been sold by it, had been purchased for personal use. It was a staff car meant for use of the officers of the assessee in connection with the assessee s business. In view of the aforesaid decisions, the sale of the said staff car would obviously fall within the amended definition of the term business . 9.. Question No. (iii) referred to us is, therefore, answered in favour of the department and against the assessee. In view of their divided success, the parties shall bear their own costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1987 (1) TMI 468 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 985 60 STC 213, 266 (SC). The above observation is, in our view, applicable with equal force to the consideration of the question whether timber logs are consumed in the manufacture of other goods solely because they are cut into rafters, planks, and the like. The answer must necessarily be in the negative. The decision of this Court in Kuttirayin and Co. v. State of Kerala 1976 38 STC 282 1976 KLT 442 is, on this point, impliedly overruled by the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Orissa v. Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. 1985 60 STC 213. The Tribunal has, in our view, correctly applied the principle stated by the Supreme Court to the facts of this case. 2.. In the light of what is stated by the Supreme Court, we hold that the goods in question are not articles different from timber logs and are therefore not liable to be taxed in terms of section 5A(1)(a). The tax revision case is accordingly dismissed. The parties will bear their respective costs. Petition dismissed.
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1987 (1) TMI 467 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d in the writ petition. Moreover, the grounds taken cannot be decided divorced from the facts arising in each assessment year separately. The facts have to be considered and findings recorded thereon. The petitioner has already availed the remedy of appeals, which are pending and it would not be a proper exercise of jurisdiction to quash the orders aforesaid under article 226 of the Constitution. The enormity of the amount involved would not, in the circumstances of the present case, be a ground by itself to invoke article 226 of the Constitution. The petitioner can approach the Commissioner of Sales Tax, Lucknow, and make a request to him for a direction of early disposal of all the appeals and also for such administrative orders as it may be advised to do with regard to recovery. Subject to the above, this writ petition is dismissed summarily. A copy of this order shall be supplied to the petitioner within three days on payment of the requisite charges. Petition dismissed.
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1987 (1) TMI 466 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... that in view of the amendment to the relevant provision, which empowers the Deputy Commissioner to revise only where the assessment order is found to be prejudicial to the Revenue, the order passed by the Commissioner impugned in the appeal could be sustained. We find no force in this contention. Admittedly the amendment came into force only in July, 1985, whereas the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner, revised by the Commissioner, was in May, 1983, when the unamended provisions were applicable to the case. It is not the case that the amended provision has any retrospective effect. In this view, in setting aside or revising the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner on the sole ground that he had no power in that behalf, the Commissioner has acted illegally and without proper application of mind in regard to the real legal position. In that view we allow the appeal quashing the impugned order passed by the Commissioner. No costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 200. Appeal allowed.
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