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Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 214 Records
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1987 (5) TMI 336
Compromise and arrangement, Amalgamation ... ... ... ... ..... renchment was allayed. We do not consider it necessary to give any such direction. We have no doubt that the workmen of the respondent company would be paid bonus in accordance with law. No other ground was urged to assail the judgment and order passed by the learned company judge. Since we do not find substance in any of the grounds urged before us, we see no reason to interfere with the order passed by the learned company judge sanctioning the scheme of amalgamation. In the result, this appeal fails and is dismissed. Ad interim relief vacated. No order as to costs. Mr. K. B. Pujara, learned counsel for the appellants, makes an oral application for certificate under article 134A read with article 133(1) of the Constitution of India for preferring appeal to the Supreme Court. In our opinion, this case does not involve substantial question of law of general importance which needs to be decided by the Supreme Court. We, therefore, reject the oral application made by Mr. Pujara.
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1987 (5) TMI 303
Board’s sanction to be required for certain contracts in which directors are interested ... ... ... ... ..... the ad interim order. Learned counsel for the respondents could not point out any provision of law either in the Companies Act or in the Sales Tax Act which made the director liable personally for the amount due from the company nor has been able to cite any authority. Learned counsel for the petitioners, on the other hand, relied on the judgment of D. S. Tewatia J. in Civil Writ No. 2010 of 1976 (Kundan Singh v. Moga Transport Co. P. Ltd.) decided on April 5, 1983, 1987 62 Comp Cas 600 (P and H), wherein it was held that neither in the company law nor in the Industrial Disputes Act is there any provision making the managing director personally liable for recovery of the dues against the limited company. It is, therefore, apparent that both the courts below because of misconception of law acted illegally in exercise of their jurisdiction in declining the prayer for issue of ad interim injunction. This petition is accordingly allowed and the impugned order reversed. No costs.
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1987 (5) TMI 294
Demand - Wire or wire rod ... ... ... ... ..... (Appeals) calls the thicker wire a wire rod but there was no such thing in the tariff - only wire. Even if the article was a wire rod, the tariff at the time recognised only wire, and the wire rod paid duty as wire. 3. When such is the case, the Central Excise cannot demand duty again by assessing an article as wire when it has already been assessed as wire once. 4. It is only after the 1983 Item 25 that wire rod was given a heading separate from wire. This legalises a levy on wire drawn from duty-paid wire rod since the new duty had not been paid before. 5. In these circumstances, I do not agree with the learned counsel for the department that there was a manufacture and so duty must be charged on the wire. There is no sanction for this in law then. Manufacture must be understood as manufacture that creates a new excisable goods that had not been created or charged to duty before. 6. I accordingly adjudge that the wire was not dutiable again under the same description wire.
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1987 (5) TMI 293
Return of duty paid goods ... ... ... ... ..... ackages but were returned in opened packages. Secondly, we find that the exemption Notification 43/75-CE dated 1-3-1975 fixed concessional rate of duty for aluminum circles for all producers. There does not appear to have been a further concessional rate for small scale sector or cottage sector of the industry. In the circumstances, we find that the provision of Rule 173L (3) (i) did not come in the way of respondents getting the refund under that Rule. 2. In the consequence, we can find no fault with the impugned order-in-appeal. This appeal is, therefore, dismissed.
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1987 (5) TMI 292
Penalty and confiscation ... ... ... ... ..... use of steam in the said manner. Shri Sridharan contended that in pursuance of this correspondence the respondents had filed their classification list dated 9-4-1973 claiming exemption from payment of duty under Notification 127 of 70 and 128 of 70 and that it was in accordance with the approval granted on the said classification not permitting duty free clearances that the respondents had been clearing their goods without payment of duty. He therefore submitted that since the respondents had been acting in pursuance of lawful permission granted the order regarding confiscation of goods so removed and imposition of penalty was not justified. 5. In view of the above facts which are not controverted we hold that the order for confiscation and imposition of penalty was not justified. We therefore further hold that no grounds have been established to interfere with the order of the Appellate Collector. This appeal is accordingly dismissed and notice dated 21-8-1980 is discharged.
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1987 (5) TMI 289
Classification ... ... ... ... ..... ree. But one has one rsquo s work cut out to understand how ldquo goods not elsewhere specified rdquo is a fitter heading than ldquo Zinc plates, sheets rdquo , especially when these zinc plates and sheets are prominently specified elsewhere. 3. The department says these processes were incidental and ancillary to completing the product. What product? The zinc sheets/plates or the goods not elsewhere specified? If the former they have wrecked their own case. If the later then also they were wrecked it just the same because being processes incidental or ancillary to completing the goods not elsewhere specified, the department should have waited for duty till there incidental and/or ancillary processes are over and the excisable product (Item 68) is completed. But if the ldquo incidental/ancillary rdquo processes are seen as creation of a new product, then they are not incidental or ancillary, but main processes. 4. The department rsquo s case is completely unsound and so fails.
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1987 (5) TMI 285
Manufacture ... ... ... ... ..... tries in a commercial transaction, for compensation and full payment. There is no law for deeming a man to be a manufacturer, unless he is really a manufacturer. The so-called process of deeming is largely a fiction because one cannot find the materials of which it is to be Worked. But when one man is ldquo deemed rdquo to be a manufacturer of something, another man made, you will always find that the first man set up the second man so he can fool the law out of something. He would, if we scrutinized him closely, be discovered to be not a deemed manufacturer at all, but the very manufacturer himself, a vast difference. Let me restate there is no such creature as a man deemed to be a manufacturer either he is one or he is not - there is no half-way house. 7. I can see no merits in the appeal and I ban the treatment of M/s. Aurofood as the makers of the cans. M/s. Indian Metal Industries are the makers of the cans and they alone are answerable for the manufacture of those cans.
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1987 (5) TMI 284
Remission of duty on goods ... ... ... ... ..... 6. The learned Counsel, however, made a point when he said that the Collector imposed a penalty under Rule 173Q and this rule is not applicable because he demanded duty under Rule 196. This rule has its own provisions in case of breach of these rules. They are forfeiture of the security deposit under Rule 192, and confiscation of the excisable goods and the goods manufactured from such goods Breach of these rules must be understood to refer to breach of rules of Chapter X . Rule 173Q covers offences by a manufacturer, producer or a licensee of the warehouse. M/s. Ashok Leyland is none of these in respect of goods received by them under Chapter X. Therefore, the penalty under this rule cannot be imposed for the breaches that the factory is accused of. The penalty is therefore set aside. 7. The Tribunal however, will not interfere with the payment of the duty said to have already been made on the goods that were held by the Collector to be unaccounted for in Chapter X premises.
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1987 (5) TMI 283
... ...
... ... ..... e business of Atul Products since the transactions between them were on a principal to principal basis. 5. Though the concept of ldquo related person rdquo , in terms, is not present in the Notification No. 120/75, we have necessarily to keep the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court with reference to Section 4 in the aforesaid judgment in determining whether there is any commercial, financial or other relationship between the assessee (Graphite India Limited) and the buyer (Carbon Corporation). From this point of view, it cannot be said that former has a financial relationship with the latter. Even if, for argument rsquo s sake, it is to be assumed that there exists a financial relationship, the department has to establish that the invoice price has been influenced by that relationship. In the present case, the department has not done that. 6. In the circumstances, the orders of the lower authorities must be held to be incorrect and are set aside. The appeal is allowed.
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1987 (5) TMI 282
Appeal - Condonation of delay ... ... ... ... ..... ards the aspect of limitation it is urged that the appellants are a small manufacturer and are not conversant with Central Excise Rules and Regulations. 3. When the matter was called on today the appellant was not represented in the court but they had filed a communication to the effect that they might be heard at Calcutta or otherwise the appeal might be decided in their absence on merits. We have heard Shri K.C. Sachar, Departmental Representative for the respondent. 4. We agree with the appellants that the Appellate Collector could have and should nave given them an opportunity to make good the deficiency in court fee stamps. However, this lapse would not, by itself, come to the rescue to the appellants because the appeal was indisputably barred by limitation and the Appellate Collector had no power at the relevant time to condone the delay in submission of the appeal beyond the prescribed period of three months. As such we uphold this order and dismiss the present appeal.
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1987 (5) TMI 273
... ...
... ... ..... he view that after-sale service beyond the warranty period cannot be included in the assessable value. 15. ensp With regard to the other aspects namely installation charges, transportation charges I agree with the findings of my learned brother. I also agree with the findings of my learned brother that in any event the demand should be restricted to six months. In the result the appeal is partly allowed. 16. ensp Order per I.J. Rao, Member (T) . -I have with great respect gone through the orders of my learned brothers. I have also very carefully gone through the orders of the Tribunal in Collector of Central Excise, Bhubaneshwar v. Konark Television Ltd. (Order No. 68-75/87-A, dated 3rd Feb., 87) 1988 (33) E.L.T. 481 (Tribunal) and the relevant portions of the Supreme Court rsquo s judgment in the Union of India v. Bombay Tyres International. In view of the facts of the present matter, I agree with the orders of Shri Harish Chander, Member (J) as expressed in paras 14 and 15.
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1987 (5) TMI 272
Investigation and Inquiry ... ... ... ... ..... not be applied to the facts of the present case. From the mere fact that the partners of Ram Kumar and Co. and the partners of Satyanarayana Textiles were related to each other, it would be wrong to draw a conclusion, on that ground only, that the two concerns were but a single legal entity. 7. emsp In view of the above conclusion, we hold that the decision of the lower authorities that the appellants were the manufacturers of the fabrics woven on the powerlooms, though these powerlooms were owned by and registered in the named of the various firms who received their supply of yarn from Ram Kumar and Co., is not correct. We, therefore, further hold that the demand for payment of duty from the appellants on the fabrics woven and cleared by the weaving firms was not tenable. In view of the above conclusion, it is unnecessary to consider the other contentions regarding limitation etc. 8. In the result, this appeal is allowed and the orders of the lower authorities are set aside.
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1987 (5) TMI 271
Classification ... ... ... ... ..... liable to duty only at the coloured stage and if they are so removed from the factory. Learned Representative rsquo s plea that duty in the instant case has already been paid once at the uncoloured stage is of no consequence because that was paid under the contention of the department that duty at the coloured stage was leviable under a separate Tariff Item 68 of the CET and therefore, the department had perhaps demanded duty earlier at the uncoloured stage as well under Item 15-A. In any case, any wrong practice adopted by the department in the face of provisions of Rule 9 cannot confer any benefit to the assessee. We, therefore, hold in line with the Tribunal rsquo s earlier Order No. 4 and 5 dated 6-1-1986 that the goods would be classified under Item 15-A(1)(ii) and the duty on the coloured polystyrene compound would be charged at the time of removal of those goods on the value of coloured compound subject to limitation of 6 months as already held in the aforesaid order.
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1987 (5) TMI 264
Demand - Set off of duty ... ... ... ... ..... notification for the reason given above, time limit prescribed under Section 11A will apply. (See 1983 ECR 2047 Finolex Cables v. Collector of Central Excise, Pune). We therefore, do not find any infirmity in the order of the Collector (Appeals) wherein he has left the issue of applicability of shorter limit of six months or five years depending upon whether the appellant had applied or not for benefit of notification in respect of refractories. So far as the appeal No. 103/83-B1 filed by the appellants against the order of Collector of Central Excise is concerned, we allow the same partially and extend the relief to the extent it has been allowed by the Collector (Appeals) in the impugned order before us in the other appeal. We observe that the appellants have not filed any cross-objection or appeal against this order of Collector (Appeals) and therefore, it has to be presumed that they have no grievance against this order so far as the extent of relief allowed is concerned.
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1987 (5) TMI 263
Classification ... ... ... ... ..... dy shown dyes used not only in textile dyeing but also those used in colouring petroleum products, soap, plastics, etc. fall within the expression lsquo S.O dyestuffs rsquo and, therefore, they fall under Item 14D. It is not necessary that a product should be capable-of being used for dyeing of textile in order to be within the purview of Item 14D CET. rdquo ldquo 23. Summing up, we hold that the products under consideration, which are variously described as oil or spirit soluble colours or solvent dyes are lsquo synthetic organic dyestuffs rsquo within the meaning of Item 14D of the rdquo Central Excise Tariff Schedule. rdquo 7. In view of these findings of the Tribunal in the above cited precedent, the appellants, manufacture Nigrosine, which is admittedly synthetic organic dyestuff, would merit classification under Item 14D of the Central Excise Tariff, even though, it is not used in the dyeing process of fabrics. I agree with brother Gulati that appeal should be rejected.
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1987 (5) TMI 262
manufacture ... ... ... ... ..... iculars of such Troughs. The Appellate Collector rejected the Appeal of the Appellant against a demand of Rs. 90,942.65 issued by the Superintendent, Rourkela. 2. When the Appeal was taken up, Shri H.L. Verma submitted that the Order-in-Appeal could not be sustained because Notification No.75/67, dated 20-5-1967 would not apply. 3 Shri S.P. Kampani, Consultant, drew our attention to Order No. 694 to 711/86, dated 4-11-1986. He submitted that an identical issue has been considered by the Tribunal in the above appeals and the same ratio would apply to this Appeal also. 4. We have held in the orders cited above, following similar earlier orders of the Tribunal and held that the Troughs were made from scrap and were entirety used and consumed in the manufacture of ingots and merged with the ingots in the same way as the rest of the steel m E.L.T.ing scrap. Applying the ratio of that decision, we hold that the present Appeal cannot be sustained. The Appeal is, therefore, rejected.
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1987 (5) TMI 261
Classification ... ... ... ... ..... n, stated that it is a covered matter and the Tribunal has ruled in the case of Collector of Customs, Bombay v. The Atul Products Ltd., Bulsar and The Atic Industries Ltd., Valsad 1984 (20) E.L.T. 147 (Tribunal) that the goods of the type imported by the appellants are assessable under Item 29.01/45(1) CTA. He conceded that the ratio of the judgment cited is squarely applicable to the facts of this case. It is seen from the judgment that in that case Naphelene which is a chemically defined organic compound has been held to be assessable under Item 29.01/45(1) CTA and not Chapter 27 as claimed by the appellants. The learned JDR for the Department has stated that in view of the judgment of the Tribunal, the appellants have no case. 4. We observe that the ratio of the judgment of the case cited (supra) is applicable to the facts of this case and following the same we hold that the goods are assessable under Item 29.01/45(1) as held by the lower authorities and reject the appeal.
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1987 (5) TMI 260
Shaft for bowl mill ... ... ... ... ..... ed that the refund amount claimed by them remain the same as the rate of duty under Heading 84.56 and under the exemption notification was the same. 2. The learned Representative of the department did not oppose the refund claim in terms of exemption Notification No. 350/76-Customs, but requested that the matter may be remanded to the Assistant Collector for verification whether the appellants had fulfilled all the conditions of the exemption notification or not, such as, the end-use certificate. The appellants also agreed to this course of action. 3. On careful consideration, we hold that in principle the claim of the appellants is tenable under exemption Notifn. No. 350/76-Customs. We set aside the lower orders and remand the matter to the Assistant Collector for sanction of the claim in terms of the exemption notification after the appellants have satisfied him that they have fulfilled all the other conditions of the said notification. The appeal is allowed in these terms.
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1987 (5) TMI 259
Classification ... ... ... ... ..... consider the subject pieces as not cut to shape and size after their formation. However, it does appear that when one reads the two Headings 71.02 and 71.03, the inference is inescapable that synthetic diamonds are covered by the latter Heading because it is more specific and, in terms, mentions synthetic precious or semi-precious stones. In this view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the subject goods are correctly classifiable under Heading No.71.03. 6. Notification No.l31-Cus. dated 1.7.1977, exempts inter alia synthetic industrial diamonds falling within Chapter 71 from basic duty of customs in excess of 40 ad valorem. The notification is applicable to the subject goods in view of our finding that they fall under Chapter 71. 7. The result is that the appeal is allowed and the goods are ordered to be classified under Heading 71.03 of the Customs Tariff Schedule with benefit of Notification No. 131-Cus. dated 1.7.1977 and with consequential relief to the appellants.
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1987 (5) TMI 258
Classification ... ... ... ... ..... capes, road sweeper lorries, snow-ploughs, spraying lorries, crane lorries, search-light lorries, mobile workshops and mobile radiological units), but not including the motor vehicles of Heading No. 87.02. 87.07 Works trucks, mechanically propelled, of the types used in factories, warehouses, dock areas or airports for short distance transport or handling of goods (for example, platform trucks, fork-lift trucks and straddle carries) tractors of the type used on railway station platforms parts of the foregoing vehicles. A simple perusal of the headings reproduced above clearly indicates that the goods fall under Heading 87.07. The judgments cited by both the parties do not help them. It is a settled law that the imported goods are to be assessed under a heading which is most specific and appropriate to the imported goods. Accordingly, we do not find any merit in the appeal and hold that the goods fall under Heading 87.07 of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975. The appeal is rejected.
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