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Case Laws
Showing 101 to 120 of 291 Records
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1987 (8) TMI 251 - CEGAT, MADRAS
Possession custody or control of gold ... ... ... ... ..... no hesitation to hold that the charge of contravention under Section 8(1)(2) has been brought home against the appellant who is proved by evidence on record to have abetted the commission of an offence in respect of the gold in question and in such a situation, in my opinion, the order of the original authority is correct and is sustainable in law. Be that as it may, under the impugned order the penalty has been reduced by bringing the offence under the mischief of Section 75 of the Act. At this stage, Shri Meerasahib, the learned counsel for the appellant, makes a fervent plea for reduction on the ground that the appellant is in abject poverty without any job and has been a victim of circumstance. It was urged that the appellant was in jail for one and a half months in connection with this case. Taking these factors into consideration, I reduce the penalty from Rs. 1,000/- to Rs. 500/- (Rs. Five hundred). Except for the above modification, the appeal is otherwise dismissed.
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1987 (8) TMI 250 - CEGAT, MADRAS
Proforma credit - Credit taken correctly on inputs ... ... ... ... ..... that point of time, it does not appear to us that the credit becomes liable to be disallowed subsequently, because the finished goods are subsequently exempted from duty. If this be the position, recourse to Clauses (v) and (vi) of sub-rule (3) would not help the Revenue. 23. No other provision has been brought to our notice which would justify the taking back of the credit in a case of this nature. It is no doubt an unusual case. It may be that Government by oversight omitted to provide for cancellation or taking back of the credit in such a case. But so long as no such provision exists, and when it has not been shown or even alleged that there was any irregularity either at the time the credit was taken or at the time it was utilised, we do not think the Department has the authority to take back the credit. We think the Collector (Appeals) was right in taking the view that he did and in setting aside the Assistant Collector rsquo s order. We accordingly reject this appeal.
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1987 (8) TMI 249 - CEGAT, MADRAS
Semi-finished goods ... ... ... ... ..... ether in the light of the amended Tariff description it would be correct to regard the impure carbon dioxide sold by Coromandel Fertilizers to the present appellants as ldquo semi-finished goods rdquo , in respect of which the facility under Rule 56B would be admissible. This would inter alia involve the question whether the impure carbon dioxide could be considered as classifiable under Item 14H. It is not possible for us to examine this question, because there is no material relevant to it in the order of the Collector, nor has it been examined by him. In these circumstances, we consider that the proper order to make in this case would be to set aside the Collector rsquo s order dated 19-12-1981 and remand the issue to the present Collector. The Collector should consider the matter afresh on its merits, but will be guided by our observations in regard to the interpretation of Rule 56B, with reference to the question of sale. 19. The appeal is disposed of in the above terms.
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1987 (8) TMI 248 - CEGAT, BOMBAY
Questions as to admissibility of confessional statement ... ... ... ... ..... s of natural justice or not. As a matter of fact, during the hearing of the appeals no specific plea regarding the denial of principles of natural justice was taken up. When that being the case, it cannot be said that point at Serial No. 5 arises out of the order of the Tribunal. On this ground also that question cannot be referred to the High Court. 16. The question at Serial No. 6 is not specific. It is general in nature. It requires consideration of all the materials placed before the Tribunal. In the guise of a Reference Application, the applicants cannot seek review of the judgment earlier passed or request this Bench to sit in judgment over the order earlier passed. There is also no basis for the contention that there was no evidence to impose penalty on the applicants. For all the reasons stated above, we hold this question also cannot be referred to the High Court. 17. In the result and for the reasons set out in the preceding paragraphs, we reject these applications.
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1987 (8) TMI 247 - CEGAT, BOMBAY
Spares for motor vehicles ... ... ... ... ..... will confer a far greater advantage to the Export Houses than what even actual users for which the policy has been made would get. This in short was the substantive plea of the learned SDR as well. In view of the aforesaid discussion I agree with learned Member (T) that the orders of the lower authorities are required to be confirmed. FINAL ORDER The point of difference between the 2 Members of this Bench was referred by the President in terms of Section 129-C of the Customs Act to the third Member Shri P.C. Jain who has since recorded his finding. In terms of Section 129-C, this appeal is required to be disposed of on the basis of the majority opinion. In majority view, the orders passed by the Dy. Collector of Customs and the Appellate Collector of Customs are found to be correct in law and are accordingly confirmed and the appeal of M/s. R.K. Motors (India), Bombay is ordered to be rejected. Sd/- (K. Gopal Hegde) Member (Judicial) Sd/- (K. Dilipsinhji) Member (Technical)
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1987 (8) TMI 228 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Excess gold seized from business premises of dealer ... ... ... ... ..... ., not expressly mentioned elsewhere. In the instant case, the Collector who adjudicated the case had found that the seized excess gold ornaments were not accounted for in the statutory records. Likewise, the Issue Vouchers No.42 to 48 issued from 16.5.82 to 23.5.82 involving a quantity of 25.750 grams were not entered in the statutory records. Unaccounted gold ornaments were also found. Thus, under these, circumstances, the imposition of penalty under Section 74 of the Gold (Control) Act, cannot be assailed. 9. In the facts and circumstances of the case we also find no justification to reduce either the amount of redemption fine or the amount of penalty. 10. In the light of the foregoing discussions the appeals are dismissed being devoid of any merits. As regards the Cross Objections no separate order is required to be passed as the same are nothing but in the nature of reply to the grounds taken in the appeal. The same shall be deemed to have been disposed of by this order.
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1987 (8) TMI 227 - CEGAT, BOMBAY
Condonation of delay ... ... ... ... ..... been explained by stating that the Consultant who was entrusted to prepare the appeals could not do so due to the serious ailment of his mother. On consideration of all the facts, we are unable to accept Shri Pal rsquo s contention that there is inaction and wanton delay on the part of the appellants. As has been laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Anantnag 1987 (28) E.L.T. 185, the Courts are required to take a very liberal approach in the matter of condonation of delay. The Court had cautioned that the liberal approach which the Supreme Court has been taking had not permeated to the lower authorities. The Court has also observed non-deliberate delay should not be made a ground to reject a substantial cause. Taking a pragmatic approach, we are satisfied that the delay was not deliberate. There was no culpable negligence or mala fide on the part of the applicants and as such, we allow all these applications condone the delay and direct that the appeals be admitted.
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1987 (8) TMI 226 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Seizure of wrist watches for non-payment of duty ... ... ... ... ..... e really so small that wastage does occur during the process of assembly. Learned adjudicating authority has gone wrong in not comparing the wastage in the appellant rsquo s unit with the wastage occurring, if any, in some other units of similar size and similar methods of assembly. Instead of making an effort towards comparison, the learned adjudicating authority has completely ignored the plea of the appellant as rightly pointed out by Mrs. Archana Wadhwa. A demand of duty cannot be fastened on the appellant merely on surmises and unwarranted assumptions. Supreme Court rsquo s ruling relied upon by the learned Advocate is very apt in the facts and circumstances of this case. Accordingly, the demand of duty is set aside. 7. emsp In view of the aforesaid discussion on the two points involved, penalty of Rs. 10,000/- imposed on the appellant is also liable to be set aside and I order accordingly. In sum, the appeal is allowed in full with consequential relief to the appellant.
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1987 (8) TMI 225 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Pre-budget stock ... ... ... ... ..... t) 1986 (26)-E.L.T. 85 (Tribunal) and submitted that in view of this decision pre-budget stocks manufactured at a time when they were exempt from duty would not be liable to duty if cleared after introduction of the budget. 3. emsp Shri Chakraborti, JDR while maintaining that the classification and rate of duty would be as in force on the date of clearance and removal of goods from factory, agreed that the decision squarely covered the issue involved in the present appeal and that the decision was in favour of the manufacturer. 4. emsp On going through the decision, we find that in a similar situation the Tribunal following an earlier decision in Castrol Ltd. Calcutta v. Collector of Central Excise, Patna 1985 (21) E.L.T. 333 (Trib.) held that pre budget stock exempt at the time of manufacture would not attract duty liability even if cleared at a time when goods had become liable to duty. Following the decision, we allow the appeal with consequential relief to the appellants.
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1987 (8) TMI 224 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Gold dealer’s licence - Renewal of ... ... ... ... ..... has defined the term ldquo turnover rdquo for the purpose of the said Rule. This explanation further lays down that the turnover of not more than 50 gms. per month in the preceding 12 months may not be considered too low if there are sufficient reasons for an average monthly turnover of lower than 50 gms. It is apparent that the respondent had been manufacturing ornaments for other dealers and therefore, his turnover with persons other than licensed dealers was nil. It is not as if the respondent was not doing any significant business in gold for the purpose of which this condition in Rule 3(ee) appears to have been laid down before renewing the licence. It can, therefore, be stated that the respondent rsquo s turnover with persons other than licensed dealers was nil on account of sufficient reasons. The alternate condition laid down in Rule 3(ee) can also be said to have been fulfilled in the case of the respondent. 8 In view of the foregoing discussion, appeal is rejected.
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1987 (8) TMI 223 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
... ...
... ... ..... the Show Cause Notice. 11. emsp It also deserves to be mentioned here that a show cause notice is not an empty formality. In terms of Section 79 of the Gold (Control) Act, as reproduced above, it was the duty of the Adjudicating Authority to propose the penalty and to inform the appellant firm of the grounds on which the penalty is proposed and then to give the appellant firm a reasonable opportunity of making a representation in writing against the proposed imposition of penalty. But in the instant case, all these mandatory requirements were not fulfilled. 12. emsp Since we have agreed that no show cause notice in terms of Section 79 of the Gold (Control) Act was given to the appellant firm, we do not think it necessary to deal with the other arguments of the learned counsel for the appellant on merits. 13. emsp In the result, the appeal is allowed. Penalty imposed upon the appellant firm is set aside. The amount of penalty, if paid, be returned to the appellants forthwith.
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1987 (8) TMI 222 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Tariff Advice/Trade Notice ... ... ... ... ..... essment order in W.P. 596 of 1981, the Collector has squarely placed reliance on trade notice and has levied excise duty on wet grinders under Item 33C of Central Excise Tariff. Therefore, the contention that the writ petitions are premature and not maintainable against trade notice cannot be accepted. 25. emsp In the light of the foregoing discussion, I hold that the wet grinder falls outside the scope of Item 33C of the Central Excise Tariff. I answer the question posed at the outset accordingly. In view of the above conclusion, there is no need or necessity to formally quash the impugned trade notice as this decision is binding on the assessing authorities. However, the impugned order of the assessing authorities in W.P. 596 of 1981 is set aside and the writ petition is allowed. All the other writ petitions are dismissed on the ground that no formal absolute rule nisi need go quashing the trade notice for reasons already given, I direct the parties to bear their own costs.
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1987 (8) TMI 221 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
CLAASIFICATION ... ... ... ... ..... they perhaps perceived this as the best method. 10. emsp However, there is a true objection from the appellants rsquo side that there was no suppression or fraud and that, therefore, the time limit under section 11-A can run for only six months. It runs for six months from the relevant date - in this case, the date of submission of the RT-12 rsquo s. The demand shall be worked out only for all those RT-12 rsquo s which were submitted within six months before the issue of the notice of demand. The central excise in their appeal (appeal No. Ex. 3039/83-B1) speak of ldquo the normal time limit of 7 months and 7 days is applicable from 19th March, 1982 . There is no such normal time limit. The time limit is only six months from the relevant date. If any RT-12 was filed within six months from the issue of the show cause notice that RT-12 falls within the time limit if not, outside it. 11. The two sides shall act and complete action in accordance with the discussions written above.
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1987 (8) TMI 218 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Insecticides and pesticides ... ... ... ... ..... also finds place in description as pesticides. All this leaves no room for doubt that repellents, even though they might not actually kill insects or pests, would still be treated as insecticides or pesticides. Shri Gupta had referred without challenge to inclusion of DEET a repellent in the Schedule to the Insecticides Act. This would further support the respondent rsquo s case that a repellent even though not included in the Schedule to the Insecticides Act could still be treated as insecticides or pesticides within the meaning of the notification, if the same is, by those dealing with it, understood to be an insecticides and pesticides. The benefit of the exemption could not be denied to the respondents on the only ground that the products were not included in the Schedule to the Insecticides Act, 1968. 11. For the aforesaid reasons, we find no merit in this appeal and dismiss the same though for reasons slightly different from those found by the lower Appellate authority.
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1987 (8) TMI 217 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Customs duty ... ... ... ... ..... d goods, they become so leviable with the withdrawal, etc., of the said notification at any time before the actual clearance of the goods for home consumption rdquo . We are inclined to respectfully follow the Calcutta High Court rsquo s judgment. In the present case, the date of entry inwards of the vessel by which the goods were imported was 1-1-1979. It is not the appellant rsquo s case that the Bill of Entry for clearance of the goods for home consumption was presented after the date of entry inwards of the vessel by which the goods were imported. In terms of Section 15 of the Customs Act, therefore, the date of entry inwards of the vessel, namely 1-1-1979, was the relevant date for determining the applicable rate of duty. On 1-1-1979, the pre-existing Exemption Notification No. 25, dated 31-1-1978 was not in force, it having lapsed on 31-12-1978. In the circumstances, we hold that the impugned order is correct and we uphold the same. Consequently, we dismiss this appeal.
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1987 (8) TMI 216 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Rectification of mistake apparent from the record ... ... ... ... ..... oth under old Section 4 and new Section 4. It did not refer, while making these observations, to the details of the wording in old Section if and new Section 4. In fact, in para 33 the Supreme Court goes on to set out the differential features between old Section 4 and new Section 4. Further, the reliance placed by the learned SDR on a decision of the Karnataka High Court in 1978 E.L.T. J.564 is also well taken. All this shows that it is a debatable point of law whether stray sales for the purpose of determining the wholesale price at the time and place of removal is to be ignored or not in terms of new Section 4. Accordingly, as held by Hon rsquo ble Supreme Court in the case of T.S. Balaram v. Volkart Bros. such a debatable point of law cannot be rectified through an application for rectifying the mistake apparent from the record. Case law relied upon by the learned Advocate for the applicant in this connection is, therefore not relevant. Hence ROM application is dismissed.
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1987 (8) TMI 201 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Demands - Period of limitation ... ... ... ... ..... appellants for export they cannot be treated as the goods exported by the appellants for purpose of levy of duty etc. We are satisfied that this conclusion is correct. The goods have been cleared for home consumption only by the appellants since their clearances were for sale to purchasers within the country and it is these purchasers who are said to have subsequently exported the goods. We are, therefore, satisfied that the claim of the appellants for exclusion of the quantum of such clearances, for purpose of exemption under the Central Excise notification, was not available. 8. emsp We therefore hold that the Additional Collector was correct in quantifying the excess clearances as were liable for duty. 9. emsp In the result the order of the Additional Collector is substantially confirmed except to the extent of modifying the demand for duty to exclude therefrom the clearance between 4-4-1979 to 10-4-1979. The appeal is thus dismissed except to the limited extent abovesaid.
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1987 (8) TMI 200 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Promissory estoppel ... ... ... ... ..... xported or required to be imported. In fact Mr. Desai points out that under the licence as revalidated, the petitioners would be entitled to import 175.5 metric tonnes of Palm Kernel Oil and 702 metric tonnes of Palm Stearine. This has been mentioned in fact in the correspondents particularly in the letter dated July 11, 1984. 17. In the result, the petitioners must succeed. I, therefore, pass the following order Rule is made absolute in terms of prayer (a). There would also be an order in terms of prayer (b) with following modifications, that is to say, that the petitioners would be entitled to import 175.5 metric tonnes of Palm Kernel Oil and 702 metric tonnes of Palm Stearine under the revalidated licence instead of inedible tallow from the said licence. I direct that the respondents should revalidate the licence in accordance with the order passed herein within a period of two weeks from today. However, in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
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1987 (8) TMI 199 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Yam and Twine ... ... ... ... ..... point that in case as a result of processing a new product with a distinct name and character and end-use emerges, the same would be assessable to duty notwithstanding whether it fell under the same Tariff Item. We observe that the lower authorities have not examined the matter in detail but have only examined the issue as to whether the goods would be assessable under T.I. 68 or T.I. 18-II (i)(a). Following the ratio of the decisions of the Hon rsquo ble Bombay High Court and of the Tribunal in the case of Fancy Spun Yarn referred to supra we hold nylon twine falls under Tariff Item No. 18-II(i)(a). The next question for consideration is whether as yarn, any further duty is required to be paid on the twine. Lower authorities have had no opportunity to examine this aspect of the matter and for this limited purpose of examination of the issue by the lower authorities, we hold that it is a fit case for remand. The appeal is disposed of in the above terms and allowed by remand.
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1987 (8) TMI 198 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Duty paid under provisional assessment ... ... ... ... ..... orter such amounts of duty as might have been found to have been collected in excess as a result of such final assessment. For this purpose, no refund application was required to be preferred by the importer under Section 27. This Section does not come into the picture at this stage. It does so only if, even after adjustment of duty in terms of Section 18(2), the importer considers that a further amount is due to be refunded in which event he has to make a claim as enjoined in Section 27. 15. While we express no opinion on the correctness or otherwise of the rates of duty claimed by the appellants, we set aside the orders of the lower authorities and remand the matter to the Assistant Collector for de novo consideration on the merits of the classification and applicable rate of duty. Such determination will, however, proceed on the basis of our finding that the initial assessment was provisional and not final. 16. Appeal allowed by way of remand with the aforesaid directions.
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