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Showing 141 to 160 of 291 Records
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1987 (8) TMI 152 - ITAT JAIPUR
Accrual Of Income, Capital Asset, Agricultural Land ... ... ... ... ..... nd Nos. 1 and 2 of the cross-objection filed by the assessee. 8. In the cross-objection, the assessee had also raised the plea that cost of the agricultural land which was taken as on 1-1-1954 at Rs. 3,999 was wrong and that the cost of improvement up to 1970 should have been added and that the computation of capital gain at a figure of Rs. 1,53,515 was wrong and that interest u/s 139(8) should not have been levied. 9. The issue regarding what was the cost and whether the cost of improvement up to 1970 is to be considered for purposes of working out the capital gains tax or not has not been given a finding by the CIT (A) and, therefore, Ground Nos. 2, 3 and 5, as raised by the assessee cannot be said to arise out of the order of the Tribunal. The interest u/s 139(8) is only a consequential matter and since the income has been held to be exempt there would be no levy of interest u/s 139(8). 10. In the result, the departmental appeal and the cross-objection are allowed in part.
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1987 (8) TMI 151 - ITAT JAIPUR
Net Wealth, Debt Owed ... ... ... ... ..... s are the same as in the earlier years the revenue in its cross-appeal agitates the CWT (A) directions-(i) regarding processing and allowing deductions to the extent permissible and ascertained in respect of the claim of Rs. 15,94,214 and (ii) taking the value of plot at M. I. Road, Jaipur Rs. 500 per sq. yd. as on 31-3-1980 in the cross-objection the assessee assails even value at the said rate on the ground that the plot ownership and possession was under litigation. 23. To avoid piecemeal decisions we set aside the assessment for 1980-81 also back to the WTO to be framed de novo on the basis directed for the assessment years 1973-74, 1978-79 and 1979-80. 24. In the result, whereas the assessee s appeals for the assessment years 1971-72, 1972-73 and 1974-75 are dismissed his appeals for the assessment years 1973-74, 1978-79 and 1979-80 as also the parties cross-appeal in respect of assessment year 1980-81 and the related cross-objection for the said year treated as allowed.
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1987 (8) TMI 150 - ITAT HYDERABAD-B
Business Expenditure, Liquor Business ... ... ... ... ..... Andhra Pradesh High Court s decision in the case of Buddala China Venkata Rao and Co. v. CIT 1978 112 ITR 58 was also dealing with the sales-tax liability on the dealer. The other decisions cited like the decisions of the Calcutta High Court in the case of CIT v. Rajeshwari Distributors (P.) Ltd. 1980 125 ITR 618 and the Allahabad High Court in the case of ITAT v. B. Hill and co. (P.) Ltd. 1983 142 ITR 185 also dealing with statutory liabilities arising directly on the dealers. These are not relevant in deciding the issue at the point of time the contractual liability to reimburse the statutory liability arises. 12. In ground No. 7, the department is contesting the finding that the sales-tax liability on refundable deposits would also be an admissible deduction to the assessee. At the time of hearing, Sri Reddy for the assessee conceded that there was no such liability on the assessee. 13. No other point has been pressed. 14. In the result, the departmental appeal is allowed.
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1987 (8) TMI 149 - ITAT HYDERABAD-B
Reassessment, Accrual Of, Capital Gains ... ... ... ... ..... d only by way of damages for injurious effect on the balance of the land belonging to the assessee and it is not related to the transfer of the acquired land. Thus, it cannot be treated as part of the capital gain. 6. We will now take up the departmental appeal. The ground raised relates to the interest for the period 3-9-1965 to 31-3-1966 on the enhanced compensation and on the additional compensation. In Smt. Sankari Manickyamma s case, the A. P. High Court held that the right to receive compensation or interest accrues to the person from the date when the statutorily designated authorities determine the same. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner has only followed the above decision. In our view the above decision squarely applies to the instant case. The District Judge awarded the interest in his judgment dated 18-8-1972 and so it was assessable only in the assessment year 1973-74. 7. In the result, the assessee s appeal is allowed and the departmental appeal is dismissed.
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1987 (8) TMI 148 - ITAT HYDERABAD-A
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... ... ..... leviability of penalty and so the provisions of sec. 263 cannot be invoked. Against the decision of J. K. D Costa s case a Special Leave Petition was preferred before the Supreme Court and it was dismissed by the Supreme Court in CIT v. J. K. Da Costa. No doubt, contrary view has been taken by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Addl. CIT v. Indian Pharmaceuticals 1980 125 ITR 373, Addl. CIT v. Kantilal Jain 1980 123 ITR 874 and Addl. CWT v. Nathoolal Balaram 1980 125 ITR 596. 4. We prefer to follow the decisions of the Delhi High Court and the Rajasthan High Court referred to above. The Special Leave Petition preferred against the decision of J. K. Da Costa case has also been dismissed by the Supreme Court. 5. We are of the view that the order of the Commissioner to the extent of directing the Income-tax Officer to initiate penalty proceedings under sec. 271(1) (a) cannot be sustained. Accordingly, we set aside his order to that extent. 6. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
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1987 (8) TMI 147 - ITAT HYDERABAD-A
Investment Allowance, Mining Business ... ... ... ... ..... d Bench B of the Tribunal held that the assessee is entitled to investment allowance under section 32A. In our view the ratio laid down in the above cases would squarely apply to the instant case. The decision of the Supreme Court in Chowgule and Co. (P.) Ltd. v. Union of India 1981 Tax LR 2929 referred to by the Commissioner of Income-tax in his order is clearly distinguishable as that is a case where after mining operations the blending of ore was done in the course of loading through mechanical ore handling plant. The question arose whether it amounted to manufacture or process of ore. It is on those facts it was held that it amounted to processing of ore. The facts of that case are entirely different from the facts of the instant case and that decision has no application. We hold that assessee in the instant case is entitled to investment allowance under section 32A of the Act. We cancel the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax. 5. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
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1987 (8) TMI 146 - ITAT DELHI-E
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... ... ..... 10. Next is the appeal of the assessee for the asst. yr. 1981-82. Through very lengthy grounds the only issue agitated by the assessee is about the relief admissible to it in respect of the disallowance of Rs. 8,597 respect of the disallowance of Rs. 8,597 made by the ITO out of scooter, car travelling and conveyance expenses of Rs. 34,387. 11. We have heard the parties and read the relevant paragraph of the order of the CIT(A). The CIT(A) has clearly stated that the disallowance of 1/4th would only relate to car expenses amounting to Rs. 15,642 and the amount that could be disallowed would be only Rs. 3,910 as against Rs. 8,597 disallowed by the ITO. However, he calculated the reduction wrongly at Rs. 1,236. The correct relief that should have been allowed would amount to Rs. 4,687. The assessee is, therefore, entitled to additional relief of Rs. 3,451. We grant further relief of that amount to the assessee. 12. The appeal of the assessee for the asst. yr. 1981-82 succeeds.
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1987 (8) TMI 145 - ITAT DELHI-E
Income From Other Sources, Deduction ... ... ... ... ..... hen the authority of the Hon ble Supreme Court is available to us, no reference to another forum is in our opinion necessary. Accordingly, we reject the assessee s request in this respect. 8. The assessee s learned counsel had requested for adjournment of the case after he had advanced his arguments and placed the aforesaid order of the Tribunal on record, because he found that he was not in a position to meet the said case law. The case was taken up out of turn at his specific request making the other advocates whose cases were listed prior to his case wait. The learned counsel made his submissions in full and when he found that he was not in a position to answer the authority of Bai Bhuriben Lallubhai s case which was pointed out to him he sought adjournment. It was not considered proper to grant adjournment at this stage when the appeal had been argued by the counsel in the circumstances indicated above. 9. In the result we dismiss the present appeal field by the assessee.
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1987 (8) TMI 144 - ITAT DELHI-E
Penalty, False Estimate, Failure To Pay Advance Tax ... ... ... ... ..... investigation on facts. This issue was not raised before the authorities below. Therefore, at this stage, we reject this contention outright, as without investigation of facts, it cannot be decide and having not been raised earlier, the assessee is not entitled to do so at this stage. 21. Considering the entirety of the facts and the circumstances of the case and each of the reason that we have assigned for holding that the penalty is imposable. We are of the opinion that the penalty at the rate or 15 per cent of the shortfall is justified. The ld. CIT (A) has retained the penalty on Rs. 7,74,470 which comes to 15 per cent of the shortfall. In doing so, he has, of course, given different reasons. However, for the reasons that we have assigned, we uphold this quantum of penalty as imposable upon the assessee u/s. 273(a) of the Act. 22. In view of what is stated above, we find that the appeal of the revenue as well as of the assessee has to be dismissed. 23. Appeals dismissed.
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1987 (8) TMI 143 - ITAT DELHI-C
Appeal To Appellate Tribunal, Delay In Filing Appeal ... ... ... ... ..... as laid down guidelines in such matters for condonation of delay. When we apply these guidelines, we find firstly, the delay is inordinate. It extends over a period of more than one year. Secondly, the explanation given by the assessees and the averments made by the C. A. in his affidavit dated 11-8-1987 do not reflect the factual position and in fact, important dates like the receipt of the order of the AAC made u/s. 35 on 31-12-1985 and the receipt of the copy of the appeal memo filed by the revenue before the Tribunal though known to the assessees apparently have not been placed before us. Therefore, when we consider the explanations of the assessees on the entirety of the facts and circumstances of the case along with the guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court for condonation of delay in such matters, we find ourselves unable to reach a satisfaction that the delay was due to sufficient cause. We, therefore, reject the appeals as barred by limitation. Appeals dismissed.
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1987 (8) TMI 142 - ITAT DELHI-C
Deduction, Investment In National Savings Certificates ... ... ... ... ..... ssessee that the Assistant Director of Small Saving Development has issued a letter, in which it has been projected that on maturity, amounts of 7 - years National Saving Certificates (IV-VII issues) if reinvested in 6 year National Savings Certificates (VI-VII issues), they will qualify for deduction u/s 80C of the Income-tax Act, However, we have not been shown as to on what authority such a letter has been issued by the said authority. It is possible that he may not have got necessary authority for issuing that letter. In any case no circular or notification of the CBDT have been shown to exist, justifying he issuance of such a letter by the Assistant Director to the investing public. We, therefore, cannot take cognizance of such a letter while interpreting the provisions of he statute. 12. In view of what is state above, unfortunately for the assessee, we are of the opinion that the deduction could not be allowed in the manner claimed. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.
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1987 (8) TMI 141 - ITAT DELHI-B
Condonation Of Delay ... ... ... ... ..... nite terms. The periods specified have got to be certain, ascertainable and never vague and ambulatory. The very purpose of the legislation would be defeated in this way. Further the wording of the power as I have indicated earlier, does not lend support to any view other than the view that the power of the Tribunal to condone the delay is a further period not exceeding 30 days from the period of 60 days referred to in sub-section (1) of section 256. Since these words do not permit or bear any other interpretation and the meaning of this expression is very clear to me, I feel that the view taken by the learned Judicial Member cannot be supported or justified. I therefore agree with the view expressed by the learned Accountant Member and hold that the Tribunal s power to condone the delay is limited to a period of 30 days after the initial period of 60 days were over and not beyond. 5. The matter will now go back to the regular Bench for disposal according to majority opinion.
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1987 (8) TMI 140 - ITAT DELHI-B
Business Deduction or Loss ... ... ... ... ..... oss on the first day of the accounting period though the relevant event had taken place 10 days prior to the close of the accounting period. Thus in any case, this loss could not be allowed to the assessee in this assessment year. 10. While we are considering this issue, we may observe that there has been no finding by the revenue authorities whether the credit or debit as a result of devaluation was in respect of funds which were of revenue account or on capital account. The treatment has been as if that issue was of no importance in this case. The assessing officer has already observed that on the occurrence of actual loss, the same was to be allowed to the assessee and in view of this finding also, the assessee-company does not stand to lose particularly in view of the fact that it has been incurring huge losses or unabsorbed depreciation, which have merely to carried forward. We, therefore, uphold the order of the CIT (Appeals). 11. In the result, the appeal is dismissed.
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1987 (8) TMI 139 - ITAT DELHI-A
Question Of Fact ... ... ... ... ..... l. It cannot be said on the facts of this case that the ITO had not examined the evidence and then completed the assessments in haste and hurry. All the findings recorded by the Tribunal in its order go to justify the improper exercise of jurisdiction by the CIT u/s. 263 and that the findings recorded by the Tribunal were pure findings of fact. 4. In my view, therefore, those findings of fact do not give rise to any question of law. As I have already mentioned in the beginning, that there is a difference of opinion between my learned brothers only with regard to question No. 1 and in my opinion, and for the reasons mentioned above even that question is a pure question of fact and not a mixed question of law and fact requiring reference to the Hon rsquo ble High Court for its opinion. Therefore, these reference applications are liable to be rejected. 5. The matter will now go before the Regular Bench to pass the final order in accordance with the opinion for the majority view.
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1987 (8) TMI 138 - ITAT DELHI-A
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... ... ..... here was no reasonable cause for not being able to file the return for the asst. yr. 1976-77 in time, the appellants do not get any assistance from the appellants do not get any assistance from the contention that the return for the asst. yr. 1977-78 could not be filed unless the return for the asst. yr. 1976-77 had been filed. Incidentally it may be pointed out that so far as the asst.yr.1977-78 is concerned, in the first return filed on 28th March 1979, the income returned was Rs. 5,250 which was revised to Rs. 16,140 when the revised return was filed on 22nd March, 1980. The assessment was however, completed on an income of Rs. 48,590 by the ITO which got reduced as a result of the appeal, to Rs. 18,890. Here also the assessee failed to establish the existence of the reasonable cause for the delay. Therefore, we find no reason to interfere with the penalties imposed by the ITO and confirmed by the learned AAC in first appeal. 6. The appeal therefore fail and are dismissed.
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1987 (8) TMI 137 - ITAT DELHI-A
Amount Borrowed Or Repaid On Hundi ... ... ... ... ..... nt Member that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner should find out whether the document was a hundi or not, is a correct direction and the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner has rightly been set aside. For this it is not necessary for me to express any opinion on the other question regarding the establishment of the source of money being the decisive factor for not applying the provisions of section 69D. The learned Judicial Member has not held that the document in question was a hundi and even then it could not be the subject-matter of consideration for an assessment under section 69D. His order has proceeded on his finding that the document was not a hundi. As I have stated above, I do not agree with the reason given for this finding. I, therefore, agree with the final conclusion recorded by the learned Accountant Member in paragraph 6 of his order. 12. The matter will now go back to the Bench for passing an order in accordance with the majority of the opinions.
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1987 (8) TMI 136 - ITAT COCHIN
Business Expenditure, Export Business ... ... ... ... ..... anything therein except the factor of delay which can be translated in terms of interest as indeed it has been done. thus, the basis of the claim is only interest. Its true character is only interest. It is not like insurance claim where the risk retains its character and the money paid by the insurer is only a cover for the risk. In that case the risk remains the risk Whereas in this case the claim of interest remains such from the beginning to the end. The assessee s letter dated 31-1-1983 to the Income-tax Officer also calls it interest for delay. The assessee s representative has relied upon, inter alia, the following authorities (1) CIT v. Nav Bharat Nirman (P.) Ltd. 1983 141 ITR 723 (Delhi). (2) Popular Kuries Ltd. s case. In our view they are not relevant because in the present case we have found that the claim regarding risk has no substance. We also agree with the reasoning of the CIT (Appeals). Therefore, we confirm the CIT (Appeals) s order and reject this appeal.
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1987 (8) TMI 135 - ITAT COCHIN
Penalty, Concealment Of Income ... ... ... ... ..... y would have been imposed in that year. Furthermore, the Explanation is intended to get over this difficulty. Regarding the argument that something more is necessary than merely the Explanation, what more is required than the glaring fact that in the very next year such a large sum as Rs. 2,50,000 has been found credited in the partner s accounts ? The cases relied upon by the learned representative are not applicable since they were decided before the introduction of the aforesaid Explanation. The assessee had raised the plea of limitation, but the learned CIT (Appeals) has effectively dealt with it. It was the assessee s contention in the grounds of appeal that the penalty proceedings were initiated only on 31-12-1985, but the CIT (Appeals) has stated that they were initiated at the time of passing the assessment order on 28-12-1984. This has not been denied by the assessee s representative. 7. In the result, we confirm the order of the CIT (Appeals) and reject this appeal.
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1987 (8) TMI 134 - ITAT COCHIN
Rubber Estate ... ... ... ... ..... d it, they would not be entitled to the subsidy. Thus, the nexus between the subsidy and agricultural operations are proximate. Therefore, it is agricultural receipt. 9. We may now consider some of the alternative arguments of Mr. John. He submitted that in case the subsidy is treated as revenue receipts assessable to income-tax, then, the expenditure to earn the subsidy should be allowed. According to him, since the assesses has to incur expenditure for the development, this subsidy has to be set off against that expenditure. He submitted that for the first year the expenditure incurred is Rs. 1,64,406 and for the second year Rs. 2,63,263. We find considerable force in his submission. If the subsidy is to be treated as revenue receipts assessable to central income-tax, these expenditure must be set off against the same. However, since we have held that the subsidy is not taxable revenue receipt, this question would not arise now. 10. In the result, the appeals are dismissed.
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1987 (8) TMI 133 - ITAT CHANDIGARH
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... ... ..... alongwith the return there was no material to justify any claim for exemption. Therefore, the order of the AAC holding that the ITO should have rectified his original orders is prima facie bad. The same is accordingly set aside. We may, however, point out that this would be otherwise a very hard case for the assessee if for any reason she failed to claim the exemption in question. She should not be deprived of her rights altogether merely for some reason or the other she omitted to make this claim. To our mind, it would be the fittest case for the CWT to exercise his powers under s. 25 of the WT Act and grant appropriate relief to the assessee because this is a case of extreme hardship where the assessee would be losing her valuable right due to her inadvertence or slip. We are, therefore, confident that the CWT will grant her necessary relief. With these remarks, we accept the appeals and set aside the order of the AAC in question. 7. In the result, the appeals are allowed.
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