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Showing 201 to 220 of 291 Records
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1987 (8) TMI 91 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
Import Licence relating to zip fasteners ... ... ... ... ..... rom clearing the goods. 4. Mr. Talyarkhan drew my attention to a judgment of our High Court in the case of Lokash Chemical Works v. M.S. Mehta, Collector of Customs (Preventive) Bombay and others, reported in 1981 E.L.T. 235 (Bom.). I accept the proposition as set out in the said judgment. The policy cannot have the force of a statute. The licence which has been issued, according to law, gives a right to the petitioners to import the item as mentioned in the said licence. There is no violation of any of the terms of the licence, nor is there any prohibition with regard to the import of the said goods. 5. In the result, the petitioners must succeed and, I therefore, pass the following order Rule is made absolute in terms of prayers (a) and (b). I further direct that the Bond executed in favour of the Collector of Customs stands discharged forthwith and the same be returned to the petitioners within a period of two weeks from today. However, there will be no order as to costs.
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1987 (8) TMI 90 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Detention Order - Strictures against detaining authorities ... ... ... ... ..... tion thereof. As and when such orders were challenged in the court of law, the detaining authority normally failed to furnish the adequate material which prompted them to initiate the action or explain the delay in passing such orders and its service on the detenu. The law on this subject almost stands settled. It appears that the detaining authority by himself or his subordinates does not point out the settled propositions at the time of filing the counters, with the result that almost 90 per cent of their orders are set aside. I hope that in future the detaining authorities will apply their mind to the settled law before adverting to take action against the detenu and take appropriate steps to defend the stand by filing proper counter-affidavits. 16. As a result of the above discussion, I accept the petition and quash the order of detention. The petitioner be set at liberty forthwith unless required to be detained under the orders of any other competent court or authority.
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1987 (8) TMI 89 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
Refund - Duty paid under mistake of law ... ... ... ... ..... of an officer of not less than the rank of an Assistant Collector, the same has been passed on to any buyer or consumer. In other words, a manufacturer should be entitled to claim such a refund, if he has not passed on the burden to any consumer. I only hope, the Government would seriously ponder over this problem with speed and in all earnestness, as any neglect has only the consequential result of double drain of the consumers. 10. Having regard to the judgments as mentioned above, I must necessarily allow the present petition. I, therefore, pass the following order ORDER 11. Rule made absolute in terms of prayers (a) and (b)(ii), but the amount of refund shall be Rs. 4,41,498.42 (Rupees four lakhs forty one thousand four hundred ninety-eight and forty two paise). However, the interest thereon shall be at the rate of 12 per cent per annum from the date of the petition till payment. The payment to be made within 8 (eight) weeks from today. There will be no order for costs.
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1987 (8) TMI 88 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
Valuation - Durable and returnable packing ... ... ... ... ..... after giving to the appellants an opportunity to meet the allegations in the show cause notice, inter alia, by production of evidence. The order shall be passed after considering the evidence, if any, and the contentions of the appellants. The appropriate authority shall consider whether the wooden cases are returnable applying the test laid down by the Supreme Court in the judgment aforementioned. 11. The appellants have deposited a sum of Rs. 30,000/- in this court to the credit of this appeal pursuant to an interim order therein. The respondents have not withdrawn any part thereof. For the period of 12 weeks the amount and interest, if any, accrued thereon, shall continue to remain deposited in court. Then, in the event that the appropriate authority confirms the demand for the full amount or part thereof, the respondents shall be at liberty to withdraw from the court the amount so confirmed. The balance amount may be withdrawn by the appellants. 12. No order as to costs.
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1987 (8) TMI 87 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the proviso to Section 71(1) of the Gold Control Act also relates to primary gold?
Held that:- There will be no difficulty in not confiscating the primary gold under the proviso, for after such release the owner of primary gold will not be entitled to retain possession of the same, but will have to dispose it of or convert the same into ornaments. Therefore do not agree with the view expressed by the Division Bench of the High Court that the proviso to Section 71(1) of the Gold Control Act does not relate to primary gold. The Division Bench was greatly influenced by the fact that in view of Section 8(1) of the Gold Control Act, the possession of primary gold cannot be retained by any person. But, as already discussed above, such an interpretation is not possible to be made of the proviso to Section 71(1). The interpretation that we have put on Section 71(1) will not run counter to the provision of Section 8(1), in view of the fact that although the primary gold is not confiscated, it will not be allowed to be possessed by the owner, but has to be disposed of by him or converted into ornaments in the manner as mentioned above or as directed by the Administrator by his said order dated 30-7-1976. Appeal allowed.
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1987 (8) TMI 86 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
Automobile Switches ... ... ... ... ..... taken into account. He submitted that the matter cannot be concluded on the basis of the certificates issued by the dealers. I think, the test is still as to how these products are commercially known. I posed the question to Mr. Shah at the stage of arguments whether these products are available at the Lohar Chawl or at Opera House. At the Lohar Chawl, we have a market for ordinary electrical lights and fittings, whereas at Opera House we have a market for spare parts of automobiles. It is at Opera House, we get these switches and not at Lohar Chawl. That should be the test in a matter of this type. 8. In the result, the petitioners succeed and I pass the following order ORDER 9. Rule made absolute in terms of prayers (a) and (b) of the petition. The bank guarantees given to the Department do stand discharged and the same be cancelled and returned to the petitioners within a period of six weeks from today. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
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1987 (8) TMI 85 - SUPREME COURT
EXEMPTION GRANTED UNDER NOTIFICATION TO CONVERTED TYPES OF PAPER...OBTAINED BY ONE SIDE OF PAPER SUBJECTED TO PRINTING OF COLOUR — FLOCK PAPER MANUFACTURED BY APPLYING ADHESIVE EMULSION COLOURED WITH DYES TO ONE SIDE OF PAPER AND SPRINKLING FLOCK — WHETHER SUCH PAPER SUBSEQUENTLY VARNISHED OR GLAZED IMMATERIAL FOR GRANT OF EXEMPTION UNDER NOTIFICATION NO.68/76-CE DATED MARCH 16, 1976.
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1987 (8) TMI 84 - SUPREME COURT
Export promotion - Duty Exemption Scheme for import of raw materials ... ... ... ... ..... demand on both scores appears to be excessive. Keeping the facts and circumstances of the case in view, we direct the penalty to be reduced to Rs. 25.000/- as against Rs. 1,00,000/- and Rs. 30,000/-as against Rs. 1,20,000/-. Similarly, the redemption fine imposed under Section 111(d) is reduced to Rs. 2,00,000/- as against Rs. 6,50,000/- and Rs. 2,50,000/- as against Rs. 10,20,000/-. Counsel for the appellant has made a solemn statement before us that the entire imported goods would be utilised for export under the existing contract. In case this undertaking really works out then the appellant should be entitled to exemption from duty under the Scheme. In case the appellant works in terms of the undertaking, he would not be liable to duty in regard to the import made otherwise duty as leviable under the Act shall be payable. The appeals are disposed of with the aforesaid directions. No costs. The appellant undertakes to pay the fine and the redemption fine within six weeks.
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1987 (8) TMI 83 - SUPREME COURT
Clarification of the judgment Dr. Balbir Singh v. Municipal Corporation, Delhi [1984 (12) TMI 64 - SUPREME Court]
Held that:- When at a different stage, additional construction was raised on the property already valued, the market value of the land was not to be taken into account as it had already been considered while fixing the valuation of the pre-existing construction. The Corporation did not challenge the correctness of the decision but only wanted clarification. Since the matter has been directly decided and there is absolutely no ambiguity, an application of this type on behalf of the Corporation does not lie. We were told by Mr. Salve, learned counsel for Common Cause, that their application had emanated when the Corporation wanted to act contrary to the judgment of this court in regard to this category of constructions. Later on, the Corporation wanted the cover of a clarificatory order of this court for the procedure adopted by it for reflecting the market value of the land more than once in situations appertaining to this category.
On our finding that this court has categorically decided that the market value of land is not to be added over again, there is no ambiguity which requires clarification. We decline to make any clarificatory order as there is no necessity. Petitions dismissed.
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1987 (8) TMI 82 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Jurisdiction To Levy Penalty, Penalty ... ... ... ... ..... eletion of sub-section (2) of section 274 by the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1975, the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner is divested of the jurisdiction of the Income-tax Officer under section 271(1) of the Act and on such divestiture, the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner ceased to have jurisdiction to proceed under section 271 of the Act. After the amendment that came into force on April 1, 1976, the authorities competent to impose penalty are those mentioned in section 271 of the Act. The change of forum is a matter of procedure and the Amendment Act is retrospective in regard also to matters pending before the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner. For the aforesaid reasons, we answer the question referred in the negative, that is, against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee. The parties will suffer their respective costs. A copy of this judgment under the seal of this court and the signature of the Registrar will be forwarded to the Tribunal as required by the law.
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1987 (8) TMI 81 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Depreciation, Unabsorbed Depreciation ... ... ... ... ..... Shah, learned advocate appearing for the Revenue. From the above discussion, it becomes clear that the point at issue is mainly covered by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Jaipuria China Clay Mines (P) Ltd. 1966 59 ITR 555. But that apart, even if two views are possible, we would be inclined to accept the view which would enhance the purpose of providing for carrying forward the unabsorbed depreciation of the previous year(s). As we have pointed out earlier, the real object of permitting the carrying forward of the unabsorbed depreciation by creating a legal fiction is to benefit the tax-payer who has earned the allowance which has remained unabsorbed and if this objective is to be achieved, we think the view which has commended to us must prevail. For the aforesaid reasons, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.Accordingly, the reference stands disposed of with no order as to costs.
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1987 (8) TMI 80 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Educational Institutions, Exemptions ... ... ... ... ..... poses of education and it has no motive of profit in the same. A bare reading of section 10(22) of the Act will show that what is required for exemption is that the educational institutions should exist solely for the purposes of education and not for the purpose of any profit. In our considered opinion, the assessee-trust fulfils the necessary requirements as laid down in section 10(22) of the Act. Consequently, the reference is answered as under 1. Answer to question No. 1. Reference is answered against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue by holding that the trust is not a part and parcel of Agarwal Shiksha Samiti and is a separate legal entity for assessment under the income-tax law. 2. Answer to question No. 2 Reference is answered against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee by holding that the Tribunal was not justified in holding that the assessee-trust was not an educational institution within the meaning of section 10(22) of the Act. No order as to costs.
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1987 (8) TMI 79 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Sale Of Property Of Defaulter ... ... ... ... ..... it is somewhat surprising that the reserve price should have continued to be the same at the second sale despite the vital difference between the two sales referred to above. It is also doubtful whether the difference between the prices of Rs. 14,33,000 and Rs. 13,01,000 fetched at the two sales adequately reflects the impact of that condition, considering particularly that the reserve price had been fixed at Rs. 13,79,000 even for the first sale. But these doubts apart, we think the sale of February 27, 1987, should be set aside for the simple reason that it was a fresh sale and should have been conducted after drawing up a fresh proclamation of sale and after the prescribed period of notice. We, therefore, order accordingly. The sale of February 27, 1987, is set aside and the respondents are directed to conduct the sale of the property afresh in accordance with the statute and the rules. The writ petition is allowed but there will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1987 (8) TMI 78 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Inclusions In Total Income, Total Income ... ... ... ... ..... of technical or professional qualifications, in the sense that he has got expertise in such profession or technique. If by the use of that expertise in the profession or technique, the person concerned earns salary, then the latter part of the proviso is also satisfied. We concur with the said observations. The question as to whether Smt. Soonoo Sorabji (Mrs. Sorabji Dorabji) had sufficient technical or professional knowledge and experience is ordinarily a question of fact. As the final fact-finding authority, the Appellate Tribunal has found that she has such technical or professional knowledge and experience. It has not been shown that the said finding is in any way irrational or unsustainable. In the circumstances, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative, against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee. A copy of this judgment under the seal of this court and the signature of the Registrar will be sent to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench.
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1987 (8) TMI 77 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Limitation, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... ourt in A. Gupta Trust Estate v. CWT 1984 148 ITR 366. The various decisions on which learned counsel for the parties have placed reliance including the decision of the Supreme Court in Hukumdev v. Lalit Narain, AIR 1974 SC 480, have all been considered in the case of A. Gupta Trust Estate 1984 148 ITR 366 (Gauhati). Since we are in respectful agreement with the view taken in that case and in view of what we have already indicated above, we do not find it necessary to discuss those cases. In view of the foregoing discussion, our opinion to the question referred to us, therefore, is that section 5 of the Limitation Act, applies to an application under section 27(3) of the Wealth-tax Act. The application made in the instant case under section 5 of the Limitation Act may now be listed before the appropriate Bench of this court at Indore along with our opinion at an early date. Under the circumstances of the case, however, the parties shall bear their own costs of this reference.
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1987 (8) TMI 76 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Mutual Benefit Association ... ... ... ... ..... ssible to state that a person derives income by trading with himself, it is not possible to consider that the income derived from transactions between members inter se possessed the character of income of a non-mutual benefit concern. It is difficult to subscribe to the view canvassed by learned counsel for the Revenue that the 19 members in the case of the assessee should be held to be carrying on business with themselves in order to derive income of Rs. 48,000 odd. On the facts and circumstances above stated, we are equally of the view that the appellate authorities below were justified in coming to the conclusion that the assessee is a mutual benefit association and its income is not liable to be taxed. We are supported in the above view taken by the decision of this court in Addl. CIT v. Secunderabad Club 1984 150 ITR 401. We, accordingly, answer the question in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1987 (8) TMI 75 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Appeal To AAC, Assessment, Regular Assessment ... ... ... ... ..... ment. We are unable to agree. The Legislature is fully aware of the decisions to the contrary effect of several High Courts. If the intention of the Legislature is to nullify the effect of the contrary decisions in this regard, it would have provided for retrospective operation of the Explanation. On the other hand, the Legislature deliberately makes the Explanation effective only from 1985-86 assessment onwards. We see no reason why we should hold that the same position prevails for the assessment year 1976-77 in the present case. We reject the contention of learned standing counsel in this regard. We accordingly answer question No. 1 referred to us in the negative, that is to say, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. With regard to the second question, we have already answered it in the affirmative, that is to say, against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee in para 4 . As none appeared on behalf of the respondent-assessee, we make no order as to costs.
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1987 (8) TMI 74 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... bleness of the amount were not taken notice of by the Tribunal. It did not also refer to the assessee s claim which was severely commented upon by the Commissioner of Income-tax, namely, that the workers could not have worked for 24 hours round the clock for the entire month of December, 1980, in which the extra payment of over Rs. 8 lakhs was said to have been made. In view of the above, we are clearly of the opinion that question No. 1 also does arise out of the Tribunal s order. In a situation like the one with which we are faced in this case, a Division Bench of this court has expressed a similar view in CIT v. J.K. Synthetics Ltd. 1988 169 ITR 267 . For what has been stated above we allow these applications and direct the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Allahabad Bench, to draw up a statement of the case and refer the questions of law set out earlier in this order for the opinion of this court. The Revenue shall be entitled to one set of costs which we assess at Rs. 200.
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1987 (8) TMI 73 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n (2) of section 274 only in respect of the references made to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner and pending with the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner prior to April 1, 1976. The Tribunal has not applied this test for deciding the question of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner s jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Tribunal was not justified in deciding the question of jurisdiction except on the basis of this test. The Tribunal is, therefore, required to decide the question afresh on the basis indicated above and with advertence to the above observations. Consequently, the reference is answered in favour of the Revenue by holding that the Tribunal was not justified in deciding the question of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner s jurisdiction to impose penalty with reference to the date of initiation of penalty proceedings by the Income-tax Officer instead of the date of reference of the matter by the Income-tax Officer to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner. No costs.
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1987 (8) TMI 72 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Jurisdiction To Levy Penalty, Penalty ... ... ... ... ..... come-tax Officer to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner and the only dates mentioned are March 1, 1978, as the date of show-cause notice given by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner and March 23, 1978, as the date of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner s order imposing penalty. Obviously, the Tribunal did not decide this point on the basis of the date of reference, which really is the determining factor for deciding the point. The Tribunal shall, therefore, decide the matter afresh on this basis. Consequently, the reference is answered by holding that the Tribunal was not justified in deciding the matter of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner s jurisdiction to levy the penalty by an order dated March 23, 1978, except on the basis of the date on which the reference was made by the Income-tax Officer to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner. The Tribunal is, therefore, required to decide the matter afresh with advertence to the above observations. No order as to costs.
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