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1987 (8) TMI 418
... ... ... ... ..... Supreme Court reported in 1977 39 STC 30 (Girdhari Lal Nannelal v. Sales Tax Commissioner, M.P.). On scrutiny of the said decision, we do not find any application of the said decision to the present case. The finding of the Tribunal and subordinate authorities is an inference of fact derived from facts found. It does not give rise to any question of law. The Member in the order of reference has made some observation in favour of the dealer but it appears to be wrongly appreciated and therefore, the first question under reference being wholly unjustified, the reference in that regard must be held to be misconceived. 5.. Once the finding of fact that the assessee suppressed purchases from the accounts is accepted, the determination of the turnovers by enhancing the same cannot be said to be unjustified and no question of law arises out of the order. 6.. The reference is accordingly discharged and the application is dismissed without any order for costs. Application dismissed.
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1987 (8) TMI 417
... ... ... ... ..... e the payment of amount of interest which he is liable to pay under the statute. Under such circumstances the Honourable Supreme Court in Haji Lal Mohd. Biri Works v. State of U.P. reported in 1973 32 STC 496 held Argument has also been advanced by Mr. Sen that the interest on arrears of sales tax could not be realised for the period during which the recovery of sales tax was stayed. We find it difficult to accede to this contention because there is nothing in the language of section 8(1-A) of the Act which prevents the running of interest because of the operation of any stay order. Indeed, the liability to pay interest is created by the statute and the Sales Tax Officer has no discretion to grant any exemption from the payment of interest. In view of the clear provisions of the General Sales Tax Act and the judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court, there is no merit in this petition which is hereby dismissed with costs which are assessed at Rs. 500. Writ petition dismissed.
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1987 (8) TMI 416
... ... ... ... ..... s, the learned Additional Government Pleader does not support the view taken by the Deputy Commissioner. It is, therefore clear that the revision petition is pending and it was not, therefore, proper for the department to initiate revenue recovery proceedings in respect of the liability which is the subjectmatter of the revision petition. The notice issued under section 22 of the Revenue Recovery Act as well as the proceedings initiated under that Act are quashed. The Deputy Commissioner is directed to decide the revision petition filed by the petitioner-appellant. It is also expected that the Deputy Commissioner will not repeat this stand in such of the revision petitions that are pending before him after remand because the orders of the Tribunal are binding on him. The appeal is accordingly allowed. The order of the learned Judge is set aside. The writ petition is also allowed. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. Writ appeal and writ petition allowed.
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1987 (8) TMI 415
... ... ... ... ..... ional Forest Officers to determine the liability of the petitioners afresh in accordance with the terms and observations made by the Supreme Court as quoted above. 4.. The impugned demand notices in all the present writ applications except O.J.C. No. 869 of 1980 are annexure 3 series and annexure 4 series in O.J.C. No. 869 of 1980. Since the demands are to be re-examined, we direct the respective Divisional Forest Officers to determine the liability of the petitioners afresh under the provisions of the Orissa Sales Tax Act in the light of the observations of the Supreme Court referred to above, viz., as to whether any fresh demand is exigible or not so far as the petitioners are concerned and thereafter take such steps as may be available under law. Till the matter is re-examined, all the demand notices in question shall remain in abeyance. 5.. All the writ applications are accordingly disposed of, but without any order as to costs. Writ applications disposed of accordingly.
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1987 (8) TMI 414
... ... ... ... ..... he obsolete machinery had rightly been assessed. 28.. As regards coal ash, in our opinion, the Tribunal has rightly held that coal is converted into coal ash after it is burnt in boilers and that in this way, coal undergoes a manufacturing process before becoming coal ash and is in fact a by-product of coal so that coal and coal ash cannot be treated as exactly the same goods. 29.. In view of the foregoing discussion, our answer to the question referred to us in these three cases is that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that unserviceable items of stores which comprised discarded assets like scrap, dyes, chemicals, broken iron hoops, obsolete machinery, coal ash, etc., were exigible to tax. In other words, our answer to the aforesaid question is in the affirmative in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. In the circumstances of the case, however, there shall be no order as to costs. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1987 (8) TMI 413
... ... ... ... ..... deration and can be considered by the second appellate authority. 9.. In the instant case, as seen above, the stage of hearing the appeal on merits had not reached at all. The appeal was rejected summarily by the first appellate authority on the ground of non-deposit of the requisite amount of tax, notwithstanding the fact that several opportunities were given to the applicant in this behalf. In other words, it is a case where the appeal was not admitted at all. 10.. In view of the foregoing discussion, our answer to the question referred to us is that on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in rejecting second appeal of the applicant and in rejecting the contention that notwithstanding non-payment of tax, as directed, he be heard on merits. In other words, the aforesaid question is answered in the affirmative against the assessee and in favour of the department. There shall be no order as to costs. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1987 (8) TMI 412
... ... ... ... ..... revision application filed and pending before the Additional Commissioner, Commercial Taxes, against the order of the Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes rejecting the application for renewal of the eligibility certificate within four weeks from the date of communication of this order. So long as the revision application is not disposed of, the respondents are directed not to make any assessment for the periods involved in the pending application for the renewal of the eligibility certificate. The sum of Rs. 10,000 which was directed to be deposited by the petitioner, shall be deposited by the petitioner with the Commercial Tax Officer who shall adjust the sums if upon the assessment being made, any demand is raised. All parties shall act on the signed copy of the operative part of this judgment and order on the undertaking of the Advocate on record for the petitioner to apply for and obtain a certified copy of the judgment and order made herein. Application allowed.
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1987 (8) TMI 411
... ... ... ... ..... the Gazette on 25th November, 1986) it might not have been possible to ascertain the measure or the value of the goods used in the execution of the works contract for determining the turnover on which tax had to be paid this has not been shown to be such a case and therefore there is no force in the contention that though the Act had been amended, and the charging section enjoined payment of tax, the dealer was not liable to pay the tax because the amended rules has not been published till 25th November, 1986. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that there is no merit in either of the contentions raised by the petitioners. We are also of the opinion that the decision of the Division Bench in Padmaja Commercial Corporation s case 1987 66 STC 26 (AP) on the points canvassed before us lays down the correct position in law. The result, therefore, is the writ petitions are dismissed, however, without any order as to costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 300, in each. Writ petitions dismissed.
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1987 (8) TMI 410
... ... ... ... ..... is cotton fabrics within the meaning of entry 7, Schedule III of the Act. The Revenue has come up in revision. 2.. We heard counsel for the Revenue, Mr. Divakaran Pillai. It was argued that the earlier decision of this Court reported in Ateesee (AgroIndustrial Trading Corporation) case 1978 41 STC 1 and Varma Industrials Limited case 1981 47 STC 43 (Kar) require reconsideration. It is agreed that the aforesaid decisions are applicable to the instance case. We are of the view, that in view of the earlier decision of this Court in Ateesee (AgroIndustrial Trading Corporation) case 1978 41 STC 1 and Varma Industrials Limited case 1981 47 STC 43 (Kar), the Appellate Tribunal was justified in law in holding that PVC cloth (rexine) is cotton fabrics, exempted from tax under entry 7, Schedule III of the Act. 3.. We are of the view that no reconsideration of the earlier decision of this Court is called for. This tax revision case is without merit. It is dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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1987 (8) TMI 409
... ... ... ... ..... ing to Shorter Oxford English Dictionary has, inter alia, the following meaning A flexible tube or pipe for conveying water or other liquid where it is wanted. 5.. Steel pipe obviously cannot be a flexible tube or pipe. In our opinion, hose pipes including their fittings would obviously fall within entry 56(ii) of Part II of Schedule II of the Act. This being so, the residuary entry, namely, entry No. 1 of Part VI of Schedule II, would not be attracted. 6.. In the result, our answer to the question referred to us in each of these two cases is that the Board was not justified in concluding that hose pipes and fittings were covered by entry No. 1 of Part VI to Schedule II and not under entry 56(ii) of Part II of Schedule II of the Act. In other words, our answer to the question referred to us is in the negative in favour of the department and against the assessee. In the circumstances of the case, however there shall be no order as to costs. Reference answered in the negative.
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1987 (8) TMI 408
... ... ... ... ..... thorised to assess the petitioner who comes within his jurisdiction for the years 1984-85 and 1985-86. Therefore, the jurisdiction of officers depends upon the allocation of cases depending upon the area over which such jurisdiction is conferred under section 3-B of the Act. In view of the order passed by the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes under section 3-B conferring the jurisdiction to assess the petitioner for the two years in question and that jurisdiction having been conferred on the Commercial Tax Officer, XII Circle, Bangalore, the question is whether the petitioner-assessee has any choice to be assessed by the Commercial Tax Officer having jurisdiction over his new place of business, i.e., Ulsoor? In my opinion, the jurisdiction is decided in accordance with section 3-B of the Act by the Commissioner. In this case such an order having been issued, there is no reason to interfere with the same, and the writ petition is accordingly dismissed. Writ petition dismissed.
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1987 (8) TMI 407
... ... ... ... ..... estion referred to us, suffice it to say that if the question referred to us had been whether the appeal preferred by the assessee was within limitation or beyond limitation, it could perhaps with some justification be argued that the aforesaid question was impliedly involved. However, keeping in view the specific nature of the question which has been referred to us, it is not possible to take the view that the aforesaid question is also involved. 12.. In view of the foregoing discussion and in view of the decision of this Court in the case of Harlal Vaishya 1983 53 STC 271 1982 JLJ 73, our answer to the question referred to us is that on the facts and circumstances of the case the Tribunal was justified in dismissing the second appeal holding that the date of presentation and not the date of posting is material for consideration of the limitation of the appeal. 13.. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1987 (8) TMI 406
... ... ... ... ..... learned Additional Government Pleader also could not derive much assistance from that decision. The other decision relied on by the learned Additional Government Pleader is reported in Govindji Punshi v. Tahsildar 1986 62 STC 399 (Kar). On the facts we find that the assessment order was made on the firm, but it was dissolved subsequently. It was held that the recovery proceedings can be initiated against each of the erstwhile partners or their legal representatives. That is also a well-settled position with which there can be no quarrel. There is no direct decision dealing with the question which we have now considered. We have already given our reasons for holding that the appellant could not be considered to be a defaulter for making her liable for payment of the penalty under section 24(3) of the Act. 12.. For the foregoing reasons, we allow the writ appeal, set aside the demand and make the rule absolute. There will, however, be no order as to costs. Writ appeal allowed.
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1987 (8) TMI 405
Whether 'gudakhu' is covered by the expression, 'tobacco' as defined in section 2(c) of the Additional Duties of Excise (Goods of Special Importance) Act, 1957 which was substituted with effect from July 1, 1967, by Notification No. 21278-F dated June 6, 1967 and is exempted from tax under the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947?
Whether 'gudakhu' is not taxable under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 during the period 1967-68 as per the provision contained in section 8(2A) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. "gudakhu" is a product which falls within the exemption covered by serial No. 35 of the Schedule to the Orissa Sales Tax Act and that the High Court is right in holding that the assessees in these appeals are entitled to that exemption.
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1987 (8) TMI 397
Whether the respondent herein M/s. Kasturi Lal Har Lal is liable to the State of Uttar Pradesh for payment of the Central sales tax in respect of the transactions of sale of coal?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. In this case, the subsequent sale if there be any in U.P. did not occasion the movement of the goods. It is therefore, not subject to inter-State sales tax.
In that view of the matter we are of the opinion that the Sales Tax Officer in U.P. was not the appropriate authority either to impose or collect the duty on inter-State sale. The High Court was right in the view it took
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1987 (8) TMI 388
Powers of central government to prohibit appointment of sole selling agent ... ... ... ... ..... received the clarification and report of the Registrar of Companies, Gujarat, which strengthened the case of the applicant company. Now, it is well-settled that the court, while exercising jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution of India, would be slow to interfere with an executive decision relating to economic matters and must allow certain freedom to the executive. Therefore, I do not think I need go into the question whether reimbursement for previous periods ought to have been permitted by the Company Law Board or not, because it involves decision on disputed questions of fact and though the Company Law Board has granted the reimbursement on grounds of equity, it has done so after fully considering its financial impact on the applicant company as well as the sole selling agent. Thus, assuming there are some technical and minor defects in the order, in my opinion, the order cannot be set aside on that ground. In the result, the petition is dismissed with costs.
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1987 (8) TMI 379
Shares - Power To Issue of at Discount, Right to obtain copies and inspect trust deed ... ... ... ... ..... ged stamp duty under article 54A of the Schedule to the Act. We have made a liberal approach in adopting the well-known rule of construction, the rule of beneficial construction. Debenture is a means of raising funds by any one but generally by companies in the interest of trade, commerce and industry. Trusts equally play an important role in the same field as well as in other fields. It is best expressed by quoting from Reeton on Trusts The trust is one of the most important, and flexible, institutions of modern English Law, being rivalled in this respect only by the modern limited liability company. To some extent, moreover, the functions of these two great institutions may overlap. Many associations and organisations (including schools outside the state system) exist under trust deeds, but their objects could be carried out as effectively if some of the more active members of the governing body were incorporated under the Companies Acts, and indeed, this sometimes occurs.
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1987 (8) TMI 371
Compromise and arrangement, Amalgamation ... ... ... ... ..... ct the public at large. In the circumstances, the scheme modified as aforesaid is sanctioned. There will also be an order in terms of prayers (b), (c), (d ) and (e). The complaint filed by the Bharatiya Kamgar Sena against Geoffrey Manners and Co. Ltd., referred to above, may be decided on merits. The company to pay to the Regional Director, Company Law Board, the costs of this petition fixed at Rs. 300. Company Petition No. 658 of 1986 is on behalf of John Wyeth (India) Ltd., the transferor company. There will be the same order as above in this petition, save and except that no directions are required in this petition regarding the complaint pending before the Industrial Court since this complaint is not on behalf of the workers of John Wyeth (India) Ltd. On the application of Bharatiya Kamgar Sena, the operation of this order is stayed for a period of two weeks. Bharatiya Kamgar Sena to give 48 hours notice to both companies of any application that may be preferred by them.
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1987 (8) TMI 362
Court - Jurisdiction of, Meeting and Proceedings - Power of Company Law Board to Order Meeting to be Called, Quorum for meeting
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1987 (8) TMI 353
... ... ... ... ..... a, 1984 (17) E.L.T. 306 (Madras) in which a similar issue came to be considered by the High Court. The Court held that the expression lsquo bond rsquo occurring in Clause (c) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 20 connotes a customs bond and not an excise bond. The court further held that the demand raised by the customs authorities in terms of Clause (c) of the proviso to Section 20(1) (in circumstances similar to the present case) could not be sustained. No contrary decision of another High Court has been placed before us. In accordance, therefore, with the practice of this Tribunal to follow the ratio of the judgment pronounced by a High Court, when no contrary judgment is placed before it, we respectfully follow the ratio of the Madras High Court judgment. The result would be that the customs authorities were not entitled to levy and collect customs duty equal to excise duty leviable on the goods. The appeal is allowed with consequential relief to the appellants.
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