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1989 (11) TMI 328
... ... ... ... ..... dictating the judgment, leaned counsel for the petitioner prays that the time granted for issue of the transfer certificate is very short, and the College is also being closed for Christmas from 22-12-1989. He also states that he should be granted sufficient time to enable him to move the Supreme Court. Neither of the reasons given by the learned counsel for the petitioner is sufficient to grant the prayer made by him. We have already referred to the fact that the College has been deliberately delaying the issue of transfer certificate from 27-11-1989 onwards. Hence, the petitioner does not deserve any extension of time as prayed for. It is also rightly pointed out by learned counsel for the students that if they have to join other colleges, it has to be done before the next semester begins. It is well known that the next semester begins in the first week of January, 1990. Hence, we reject the prayer for a larger time for issue of transfer certificates. 68. Order accordingly.
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1989 (11) TMI 327
... ... ... ... ..... proceeded to analysis the case of the complainant in the light of all the probabilities in order to determine whether a conviction would be sustainable and on such premises arrived at a conclusion that the proceedings are to be quashed against all the respondents. The High Court was clearly in error in assessing the material before it and concluding that the complaint cannot be proceeded with. We find there are specific allegations in the complaint disclosing the ingredients of the offence taken cognizance of. It is for the complainant to substantiate the allegations by evidence at a later stage. In the absence of circumstances to hold prima facie that the complaint is frivolous when the complaint does disclose the commission of an offence there is no justification for the High Court to interfere. 5. We, therefore, allow the appeal, set aside the impugned order and direct that the proceedings before the Magistrate shall be restored and disposed of in accordance with the law.
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1989 (11) TMI 326
... ... ... ... ..... f these private accounts as explained by the Production Supdt. are different. In any case as held by the Collector that during the period February 1985 to June 1985 production in R.G. 1 is greater than that shown in the private records, it will, therefore, be too far fetched to conclude that the production as shown in private records though for different purposes is not included at all in the R.G. 1. For such a conclusion some more evidence is required regarding consumption of raw material or sale of such goods alleged to have been produced in excess by the appellants. Obviously such evidence is lacking. In the circumstances, we cannot hold that the production shown in the private records has not been included at all by the appellants in their R.G. 1 and has thus been clandestinely removed. Accordingly, the demand of duty to the tune of ₹ 7,77,460.93 and imposition of penalty to the tune of ₹ 60,000/- are not sustainable. 9. Appeal disposed of in the above terms.
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1989 (11) TMI 325
... ... ... ... ..... n the process of crushing and that this is erroneous. This is a very narrow reading of the Tribunal’s order. The Tribunal has not only given a finding that the powder is secured by a mere process of crushing but also that the crushed product was not a new product. This is essentially a finding of fact. We, therefore, dismiss the appeal.
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1989 (11) TMI 324
... ... ... ... ..... ame to believe that the sum of ₹ 1,50,000 had escaped assessment by reason of the omission of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment. The Supreme Court observed "It is true that the ITO could have made further enquiry into the matter but the facts that he did not make any further enquiry does not take the case out of s. 34(1)(a) particularly when the assessee had failed to place truly and fully all the material facts before him" If the ITO had formed the requisite belief that the assessee had not fully and truly disclosed all the material facts at the time of assessment, the ITO had jurisdiction to reopen the case. The belief may be formed on the basis of materials found on investigation subsequent to the assessment proceedings. 12. In that view of the matter the question referred is answered in the negative and in favour of the Revenue. There will be no order as to costs. BHAGABATI PRASAD BANERJEE, J. I agree.
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1989 (11) TMI 323
... ... ... ... ..... accused persons have challenged the impugned order at a very belated stage and only after creating a lot of impediments in the progress of the case. Of course for an application under Section 482 Cr. P.C. there is no limitation. I am of the view that when there is no limitation for filing an application, the application should be filed within a reasonable time. A revision petition challenging an order can be filed within 90 days from the date of the order. An application under Section 482, Cr. P.C. should also be filed within a reasonable time, so that the progress of the case is not disturbed at a belated stage. I am of the view that period of 90 days which is at par with a revision petition should be treated as reasonable and if any application under Section 482, Cr. P.C. is filed beyond the period of 90 days, the petitioner should explain the cause of the delay. 9. In the circumstances discussed above, there is no merit in the Criminal Misc. case and the same is dismissed.
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1989 (11) TMI 322
... ... ... ... ..... ad also considered a similar issue in CGT v. C.S. Patil 1989 180 ITR 97 and held that reduction in shares of erstwhile partners in allotment of shares to new partners in the course of reconstitution of the firm will not give rise to taxable gift if the new partners contributed capital to the firm. Such contribution of capital amounted to adequate consideration. It was the goodwill of the firm itself which attracted new capital and therefore, capital contributed by the new partner constituted adequate consideration not only in respect of the right to share future profits but also in respect of the property in the goodwill. In Addl. CGT v. A.A. Annamalai Nadar 1978 113 ITR 574 the Madras High Court held that when there was capital contribution by the new partners inducted into the partnership firm, there was no element of gift. 6. We consider that the assessment to gift-tax is not justified in the facts and circumstances of the case. The same is annulled. The appeal is allowed.
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1989 (11) TMI 321
... ... ... ... ..... at S. 69(2)would have no application. In the light of the decisions relied on by learned Counsel Mr. E. Padmanabhan, and which had been referred to above; such a distinction would not be available to salvage a suit of this nature, which is hit by the mandatory requirements of S. 69(2) of the Act. In this context, Shreeram Finance Corpn. v. Yasin Khan, requires to be referred to. It was held therein that a suit hit by S.69(2) is not maintainable, becaue it is a mandatory requirement. 11. In the concluding stage, learned Counsel Mr. Rajagopalan, would submit that the plaintiff is not now seeking for withdrawal of suit, and that he would continue to conduct the suit by taking other points, which are available to it in law. Therefore, the Court below is directed to restore the suit on its file and dispose of, based on whatever other legal and factual contentions that may be raised by respective parties. 12. Hence, this revision petition is allowed. No costs. 13. Revision allowed.
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1989 (11) TMI 320
... ... ... ... ..... unless the Court permits the production of affidavit. 16. In the case of Smt. Sudha Devi V. M. P. Narayanan, AIR 1988 SC 1381, Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the affidavits are not included in the definition of evidence in Section 3 of the Evidence Act and can be used as evidence only if for sufficient reasons the Court passes an order under O. 19 Rules 1 and 2 C. P. C. Thus, the affidavits produced before the Court below cannot be read as evidence to prove the facts. 17. There is no other material on record to substantiate the case of the plaintiff. Any decree based solely and wholly on the affidavits filed before the Court cannot be treated as a decree based on evidence and it may fall within the purview of nullity. 18. In the result, I accept this revision petition and set aside the order dated 13-5-88 passed by the Court below in execution case No. 43 of 1981 and the objections are allowed. Court shall proceed according to law in the suit. 19. No order as to costs.
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1989 (11) TMI 319
... ... ... ... ..... ase to an Advisory Board under the appropriate law. Fn either case the appellant's case having not been referred to an Advisory Board the detention order cannot be said to have remained in force after the statutory period. It is, therefore, not necessary to go into the validity or otherwise of the grounds of detention. 30. In the result we set aside the impugned Judgment of the High Court and hold that the detention order ceased to be in force after 12 days of making thereof and even if it was in force it ceased to be in force for failure to refer the appellant's case to the Advisory Board within the time prescribed by law; and accordingly, we quash the same. The appeal is accordingly allowed. 31. After the Judgment was finalised, another affidavit on behalf of the respondents affirmed by one belonging to the office of the Advocate-on-Record has been circulated. This affidavit is not acceptable. Even if it was accepted it would not affect the ultimate legal position.
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1989 (11) TMI 318
... ... ... ... ..... the 2nd of November 1883, the suits were in time. If it was not till the 8th of January 1884, they were too late. Their Lordships think that Khetter Mohun, as well as Gobind Rani, became a party, as plaintiff, on the 2nd of November 1883, and that the suits therefore are not barred by lapse of time. 5. Their Lordships will humbly advise Her Majesty that the appeals ought to be allowed, that the decrees of the Subordinate Court and the High Court ought to be reversed, and that the suits should be remanded to the High Court with a direction that they should be tried on the merits by the Subordinate Court, and giving the parties leave to raise such issues and to adduce such evidence as they may be advised, and that the costs which have been incurred in the Subordinate Court should abide the results of the suits, and the costs which have been incurred in the High Court be paid by Bungsi Buddan Saha Das. The respondent, Bungsi Buddan Saha Das, will pay the costs of these appeals.
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1989 (11) TMI 317
... ... ... ... ..... e, under which the purchaser would be liable to pay the amount of excise duty to rise dealer. And, on this reasoning, it would make no difference whether the amount of excise duty is included in the price charged by the dealer or is shown as a separate item in the bill. In either case, it would be part of the 'sale price'. 39. The Supreme Court again in the case of Mc Dowell Co. Ltd. v C.T.O, approved the above enunciation of the law in the case of Hindustan Sugar Ltd. (Supra). 40. This Court in Khardah Co. Ltd. v. Union of India 1983 ELT 2159, Gontermann Peipers (India) Ltd. v. Addl. Secy to the Government of India 26 ELT 471, Calcutta Paper Mills Mfg. Co. v. CEGAT 25 ELT 939 and Dilichand Shreelal v. Collector of Central Excise 26 ELT 298 held that the amount of refund due to the assessee cannot be withheld on the ground of unjust enrichment. 41. For the reasons aforesaid, this application must be allowed. The Rule is made absolute. Let appropriate writs be issued.
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1989 (11) TMI 316
... ... ... ... ..... now raised by the learned Counsel is rejected. Order on Oral Application (Under Art. 134-A of the Constitution of India) Shivashankar Bhat, J. Oral applications are made under Art. 134A of the Constitution seeking certificate of fitness to file appeal before the Supreme Court. We have followed the decisions of the Supreme Court and applied the principles stated therein and therefore we are of the view that these matters do not involve any substantia question of law of general importance requiring consideration by the Supreme Court. The oral applications are, therefore, rejected. A very persistent plea is made before us for an interim order of stay at least for a few days so that, parties may approach the Supreme Court. Having upheld the impugned Rules and in the background of our finding that the existing licensees are saved during this excise year, we do not think that it is proper to gram the interim prayer of the petitioners; hence i, is rejected. 51. Petitions dismissed
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1989 (11) TMI 315
... ... ... ... ..... excess realised by her, which was available for taxation." Aggrieved by this order, the Revenue preferred an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal After hearing the parties, the Tribunal observed as follows ".... The Revenue has not challenged the finding of fact given by the learned CIT(A) that the real value of the shares was less than the face value. In view of this, the conclusion has been reached by him in accordance with the direction of the Tribunal referred to above. The Revenue had accepted the said order of the Tribunal. The CIT(A) had, therefore, no alternative but to do as he was directed by the Tribunal." 3.We fail to see how the Tribunal has committed any error of law. Moreover, the question whether the shares have been correctly valued or not has not been raised on referred. 4.In the circumstances, the question is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. There will be no order as to costs. Bhagabati Prasad Banerjee, J. I agree.
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1989 (11) TMI 314
... ... ... ... ..... case indicate that the respondent's plea is a clear after-thought and is baseless. The absence of existence of any jurisdictional fact not having been proved by the respondent-tenant even after objecting to recovery of possession on expiry of the period of limited tenancy there was no ground to refuse restoration of possession to the landlord. More than twice the period of the limited lease has expired even after the date of expiry of the lease. We see no reason to delay any more the relief due to the landlord. Consequently, the appeal is allowed. The impugned orders passed by the Rent Controller, Rent Control Tribunal and the High Court are set aside and the landlord's application for recovery of possession is allowed. The respondent-tenant shall also pay ₹ 2,000 as costs to the appellant-landlord in addition to an amount equal to that calculated on the basis of the monthly rent for the entire period till the date of restoration of possession. Appeal allowed.
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1989 (11) TMI 313
... ... ... ... ..... ppellant's appointment without giving any notice or opportunity to him. It is an elementary principle of natural justice that no person should be condemned without hearing. The order of appointment conferred a vested right in the appellant to hold the post of Tax Inspector, that right could not be taken away without affording opportunity of hearing to him. Any order passed in violation of principles of natural justice is rendered void. There is no dispute that the Commissioner's Order had been passed without affording any opportunity of hearing to the appellant therefore the order was illegal and void. The High Court committed serious error in upholding the Commissioner's Order setting aside the appellant's appointment. In this view, Orders of the High Court and the Commissioner are not sustainable in law. We accordingly, allow the appeal and set aside the Order of the High Court as well as the Commissioner. There will be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.
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1989 (11) TMI 312
... ... ... ... ..... gment and order of the Tribunal, we are of the opinion that the Tribunal was right in the conclusion arrived at. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. No costs.
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1989 (11) TMI 311
... ... ... ... ..... ard the learned lawyers. We find no merit in this appeal. The appeal is dismissed.
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1989 (11) TMI 310
... ... ... ... ..... be permitted to raise at this stage a new plea when all along, in the earlier proceedings in the High Court, the case has proceeded on the footing that the IOC had been having and continues to have current account facilities. The third aspect to which I would like to make a reference is that we have principally based out decision only on the facts in regard to the sales to Parekh Automobiles Ltd. We are told that there are a number of suits, other than those before us today, which are pending at various stages in which various pleas have been raised, I would only like to make it clear that we express no opinion regarding the factual position in those cases and those cases will have to be disposed off in the light of the legal position set out in our judgment. Except for the above clarifications I have nothing to add to what my learned brother Mukharji, J. has said and I respect- fully agree with his conclusion that the appeals must fail and are dismissed. Appeals dismissed.
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1989 (11) TMI 309
... ... ... ... ..... tual. In cases where such agreements are made the terms are supposed to have been negotiated between the consumer and the Board, and unless specifically assigned, the agreement normally would have affected the consumer with whom it is made, as was held in Northern Ontario Power Co. Ltd. v. La Roche Mines Ltd., 1938 3 All ER 755. For the foregoing reasons we have no hesitation in holding that the agreement was reasonable and valid and it was not determined with the disconnection of supply to the respondent firm by the Board on 28th September, 1981 but only accordingly to the stipulations in clause 9(b) of the agreement as discussed above. The liability to pay the minimum guaranteed charges, therefore, continued till the determination of the contract. The Board was, therefore, entitled to submit the bills and make the demand on that account, and recover the same according to law. In the result, the impugned judgment is set aside and the appeal is allowed. No order as to costs.
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