|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 81 to 100 of 283 Records
-
1989 (2) TMI 275
Rectification of Mistake ... ... ... ... ..... see under the Act on 20-9-82, and consequent dismissal of the rectification application, I do not feel called upon to pronounce upon the other question raised by the learned Counsel for the Respondent. 6. The Reference Application G/Ref/147/86 arising out of the impugned order of the Tribunal filed by the Collector of Central Excise, Cochin, sets out the same issue as question of law viz. whether the firm M/s. Swaminathan and Sons was in existence at the relevant time or not. In view of my findings on fact with reference to evidence that no such firm was in existence and on the contrary the licensing authority had granted a licence under the Act in Licence No. 78/GOLD/82 in the name of two individuals viz. Selvarajan and Ramanujam on 15-7-82 which was also renewed subsequently for the year 1983 to 1985. I do not find any question of law arising out of the impugned order of the Tribunal meriting reference. In this view of the matter, the Reference Application is also rejected.
-
1989 (2) TMI 274
Gold (Control) - Licence ... ... ... ... ..... at no application for the renewal of a licence to carry on business as a dealer shall be rejected unless the holder of such licence has been given a reasonable opportunity of presenting his case and unless the Administrator is satisfied that the application for such renewal has been made after the expiry of the period specified therefor. A plain reading of Section 27(6)(b) and Rule 3(a) does not disclose any discretion for condonation to the statutory authorities where such application has been made beyond the expiry period specified therefor. In any case having already given the finding that the rejection of the application under Rule 3(ee) is valid, we do not feel called upon to give a detailed finding on the further ground for rejection under Rule 3(a) with reference to the contention put-forth in this regard by the parties herein. In this view of the matter we find no reason to interfere with the order passed by the Collector (Appeals). The appeal is, therefore, rejected.
-
1989 (2) TMI 273
Import General Manifest to be amended only when incorrect or incomplete not otherwise ... ... ... ... ..... iscability under Section 111(d) thereof. The Supreme Court decision in the case of Gramophone Co. of India Ltd. v. B.B. Pandey (AIR 1984 SC 667) is also supportive of this view. TheSupreme Court in that case interpreted the meaning of ldquo import rdquo occurring in Section 53 of the Copyright Act, 1957 with reference to the definition of the term ldquo import rdquo in Section 2(23) of the Customs Act, 1962 and held that the meaning of import in Section 53 of the former Act was exactly the same as defined in the Customs Act. The Supreme Court accordingly held meaning of import included importation for transit across India and any such goods whose import is prohibited in India would become confiscable under the Customs Act, 1962 even in the case of goods in transit. Therefore, on a total consideration of the evidence on record, we find that the orders passed by the lower authorities in this case are well founded and these orders are accordingly upheld and the appeals rejected.
-
1989 (2) TMI 272
Appeal if not filed by department effect orders ... ... ... ... ..... ent could be only called in question by directing the proper officer to file an appeal before the Collector (Appeals) and not by instituting an independent and separate penal proceedings by way of re-adjudication as it were, more particularly in the context of the admitted fact that the very assessing authority viz. the Superintendent of Central Excise himself had not only the powers of assessment but also the power to impose penalty under Rule 173Q by issue of a show cause notice. It should not be forgotten that after all the powers which the Superintendent of Central Excise is exercising under Section 33 of the Act and under Rule 173Q of the Rules are quasi-judicial powers clothing the aggrieved person with a right of appeal before the competent appellate authority. We, therefore, hold for the reasons set out above that the imposition of penalty is not sustainable under law and in this view of the matter we set aside the impugned order appealed against and allow the appeal.
-
1989 (2) TMI 271
Adjudication - Demand ... ... ... ... ..... the ground that the appellants are not entitled to the benefits of Notification No 174/84 The appellants also admittedly joined issue with the Department only on the limited question that the duty suffered by the inputs should be set off against the appellant rsquo s duty liability when the appellants had been permitted to avail proforma credit in terms of Rule 56A of the Rules. Therefore, we hold that the issue in regard to the manufacture does not arise for consideration in the present appeal and it is open to the appellants to urge the question if it is permissible in law in other proceedings. Therefore without expressing any opinion on the merits of the issue, in view of the fact that the basic issues raised by the appellants in the reply to the Show Cause Notice have not been considered by the original authority, we set aside the impugned order appealed against and remit the matter for reconsideration by the original authority in the light of our observations made above.
-
1989 (2) TMI 270
Duty Liability ... ... ... ... ..... rm upto this date rdquo . Apart from this, the legal position in terms of the Transfer of Properties Act is that the dues from the previous firm is always the first charge on the immovable property of the firm and in view of this position, the Department even now is not de-barred from taking steps for the recovery of the amount due from the erstwhile firm and its partners in accordance with law. In any case the demand for the period 1985-86 from the appellants rsquo firm is not well-founded and this demand of duty from the appellants is therefore set aside. As regards the penalty, the appellants have pleaded that it is dis-proportionate having regard to the duty involved. Considering the fact that the appellants themselves have come forward initially with their declaration about their manufacturing activity, there is some ground for reducing the quantum of penalty which is accordingly reduced to Rs. 5,000/- (Rupees Five thousand). The appeal is disposed of in the above terms.
-
1989 (2) TMI 254
Appeal - MODVAT Credit ... ... ... ... ..... e Act. The lower appellate authority has not enhanced the quantum payable by the appellant under the impugned order. The lower appellate authority merely decided the issue before him as to whether the impugned order of the Assistant Collector before him was legally valid, competent and within jurisdiction, and gave a finding on consideration of the relevant materials that the order of the Assistant Collector impugned before him was without jurisdiction, incompetent and non est. In such a situation, it was indicated that consequentially it would follow that the order passed by the Superintendent in the context of the case would hold good. Therefore, the lower appellate authority has not passed any order enhancing the quantum to the detriment of the appellant and such a situation does not arise in the present appeal at all. Therefore, on consideration of the entire matter before us, we are of the view that there is no merit in the appeal and the appeal is accordingly dismissed.
-
1989 (2) TMI 251
Distinction between ‘Board’ and ‘Paper’ ... ... ... ... ..... uo ble Supreme Court that if all details were given in the classification list and the Revenue had assessed the same, subsequent modification by Revenue was effective prospectively and not retrospectively. In the present case, correct declaration was not given in the classification lists. Therefore, the classification lists could be reopened retrospectively. The ratio of the judgment of the Hon rsquo ble Supreme Court is not applicable to the facts of the present case. Similarly, the decisions reported in 1987 (12) ECR 283 (Tribunal) and 1988 (35) E.L.T. 681 (Tribunal) are also not applicable in the case before us as the facts are distinguishable. 19. In view of the foregoing discussions, we find no infirmity in the impugned order. Consequently, we uphold the same and dismiss the appeal. 20. The penalty of Rs. l lakh imposed on the appellants is not excessive considering the gravity of the offence and the amount of duty involved. We do not, therefore, interfere with the same.
-
1989 (2) TMI 250
Appeal - Pre-deposit of duty ... ... ... ... ..... therefore required to be set aside. 3. Shri C.P. Arya, the learned SDR, also agrees that there is no demand issued in pursuance of the Assistant Collector rsquo s order dated 29-12-1986 quantifying the amount of duty involved. 4. After hearing both sides, we observe that in this case the prior deposit for entertaining the appeal on merits would arise only when the appellants are told as to how much they are required to deposit in terms of the order of the lower authority. Admittedly in this case no such quantification has been done by way of demand issued separately or indicated in the order itself. Hence the appellant cannot be expected to make his own calculations for making the deposit, which may or may not be acceptable to the department. Hence the Collector rsquo s order rejecting the appeal for non-deposit of the duty amount is not sustainable. We, therefore, set aside the said order and remand the case to the Collector (Appeals) for considering their appeal on merits.
-
1989 (2) TMI 249
... ...
... ... ..... stions are referred to the Hon rsquo ble High Court of Delhi - (a) Whether the Tribunal was legally competent, in the facts and circumstances of the case and on the questions in appeal of the applicants before it, to give a finding of lack of bona fides of the applicants, when the original authority had given a finding of no mala fides? (b) If the answer to the question (a) above is in the negative, would the penalties on the applicants would still be sustainable on the basis of other findings for contravention of Section 55 read with Rules 11 and 13 of the Gold (Control) Act, 1968? 5.7 Following documents are enclosed - (i) Three orders-in-original Nos. 4/88 dated 12-2-1988,10/88 dated 22-4-1988 and 1/88 dated 4-1-1988 passed by the Collector (Adjudication), Central Excise, New Delhi (ii) Three Orders-in-appeal Nos. A-226/88-NRB, A-227/88-NRB and A-228/NRB all dated 26-7-1988 passed by the Tribunal and (iii) Reference applications of the three applicants before the Tribunal.
-
1989 (2) TMI 248
Export - Of ready-made garments ... ... ... ... ..... k down. 22. Mr. S.K. Kaul, appearing for the petitioners in CW 3503/87 confined his attack to the validity of OTS only. He submitted that Government of India was merely a distributing agency of quota under bilateral agreements entered with various countries and its charging of premium may perhaps even infringe those agreements and may be even against the principles of Public International Law. Because, of the view which we have taken with respect to charging of premium we, however, need not go into the question raised by Mr. Kaul. 23. Now, charging of premium is so inextricably linked with other conditions given in Clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) of para 7 of Public Notice No. 28-ETC(PN)/87 issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Commerce and dated 15th October, 1987 that whole of these clauses have to be struck down. We so order. 24. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed and the rule is made absolute. Petitioners will be entitled to costs. Counsel rsquo s fee Rs. 1,000/-.
-
1989 (2) TMI 247
Jurisdiction ... ... ... ... ..... n of the Special Bench and obtained the judgment. That being so, the appellants/applicants after having submitted to the jurisdiction of the Special Bench and obtained the decision (though not favourable) cannot now say that the questions of law proposed by them do not relate, among other things, to the determination of any question having a relation to the rate of duty of excise for purposes of assessment. 9. In the result, after taking into consideration the overall picture of the case and the Order No. 434/88-D dated 14-6-1988 under reference passed by this Tribunal alongwith the pleadings in the case, we have no hesitation in holding that the proposed questions of law relate, among other things, to the determination of questions having a relation to the rate of duty of excise and, therefore, not referrable to the High Court in terms of Section 35G of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. Consequently, the Reference Application in hand is rejected being not maintainable.
-
1989 (2) TMI 246
MODVAT - Proforma Credit ... ... ... ... ..... be considered to have substantially complied with the requirement under Rule 56-A. Hence, we are of the view that there is no justification for denial of the proforma credit only on the ground that fresh permission has not been obtained by the succeeding company in terms of sub-rule (2) of Rule 56A. Though the two judgments cited by the learned Advocate related to non-production of D-3 declaration, the judgment of the Bombay High Court cited by him 1988 (17) ECR 17 relates to a case where even the application for proforma credit has not been given. In this view of the matter, we conclude that in the case of this type denial of proforma credit on this technicality is not called for and also legally not tenable. Since we have already decided the appeal on the basis of the fact and law made out in issue at Sl. No. (1)(e) above, it is not necessary for us to go into merit of the other issues. Accordingly, we allow the appeal and direct the consequential relief to the appellants.
-
1989 (2) TMI 245
Goods used for special industrial purposes ... ... ... ... ..... ed in 1984(17)-E.L.T.-205 (Tribunal) 1987(31)-E.L.T.-970(T) and 1987(31)-E.L.T.-411(T), which have been relied upon by the learned Departmental Representative. In all these cases it was held by the Tribunal that there is no time-limit for demanding duty under Rule 196 of the Central Excise Rules. In this case, the duty was demanded under Rule 196 read with B-8 bond executed by the appellants. We do not find any justification for taking a different view in this regard. We hold that there is no time-limit for demanding duty under Rule 196 read with the Bond executed by the assessee. In the circumstances, the demand for duty in this case is not barred by limitation. 9. The same view was taken by this Tribunal earlier in a similar case of Food Corporation of India v. Collector of Central Excise, reported in 1988(36)-E.L.T.-639(T), which has not been cited by either party before us. 10. In the result, we uphold the impugned order of the Collector (Appeals) and dismiss this appeal.
-
1989 (2) TMI 244
Pharmaceutical products - Ayurvedic medicines ... ... ... ... ..... ry item or otherwise although a plea is there from the Collector in the grounds of appeal that the goods are assessable under Tariff 1704. 37. We observe that once the tablets are held to be not a medicament falling under Chapter 30, the next item which falls for consideration is 1704.90. We observe from the interpretative rules for interpretation of the Central Excise Schedule, which are statutory in nature that under the interpretative Rule 4, the tablets will fall within the ambit of interpretative Rule 4. The said rule, for convenience of reference is reproduced below ldquo Goods which cannot be classified in accordance with the above rules shall be classified under the heading appropriate to the goods to which they are most akin. rdquo 38. In view of the above, we allow the appeal of the Revenue in the above terms. Any recovery to be made will have to be in terms of the assessment of the goods in terms of Tariff heading 1704.90 subject to the other provisions of the law.
-
1989 (2) TMI 233
Manufacture - Excisable goods ... ... ... ... ..... ould not, in our opinion, detract from the finding we have already recorded that the subject goods had not reached the stage of fully manufactured goods ready for marketing. 7. Smt. Zutshi submitted that the goods were liable to be charged to duty and relied, for this purpose, on the Tribunal decision in Collector of Central Excise, Kanpur v. Hindustan Scientific Glass and Fancy Glassware Works and Another -1985 (21) E.L.T. 195. In that case, the goods were lsquo Bhagar rsquo on scrap or broken glass. The Tribunal found that lsquo Bhagar rsquo was an item regularly bought and sold fetching considerable value. It was on the basis, inter alia, of this consideration that the Tribunal found that lsquo Bhagar rsquo was an excisable article. In the present instance, there is no such evidence before us. 8. In the light of the foregoing discussion, we hold that the subject broken poles were not liable to be charged to excise duty. We uphold the impugned order and dismiss this appeal.
-
1989 (2) TMI 232
Value of clearances ... ... ... ... ..... utilising for the manufacture of the end product in the other unit. It has to be held that the manufacturer in this case is carrying out the manufacture of the end product in relation to which power has been used, since both the units belong to him. We observe that the notification has to be interpreted in the context of the manufacturing activities carried out by a manufacturer, may be in one unit or more than one unit belonging to him, and their nexus of the same with the finished goods manufactured in any of his two unit in respect of which the benefit of exemption is claimed. 6. In view of this, we hold that the goods manufactured in the Wadala unit have to be held to be not eligible for exemption under Notification No. 179/77. 7. In the above view of the matter, we hold that the order of the Collector (Appeals) is not maintainable in law and we allow the appeal of the Department and uphold the demand. The cross-objection is dismissed, it being in the nature of comments.
-
1989 (2) TMI 231
Exemption - Valuation on the basis of invoice price ... ... ... ... ..... obligations having a bearing on the price of the goods and whether there are any extra commercial considerations which may have influenced the prices at which the appellants sold the goods. 34. In view of the above, we observe that the Collector (Appeals) mis-directed himself in examining the issue in the context of Section 4(4)(c) and Section 4(l)(a) Proviso (iii) rather than examining the matter in the light of the terms of the Notification 120/75. We, therefore, set aside the order of Collector (Appeals) and remand the matter to the Collector (Appeals) for de novo examination in the context of our observations above. 35. We observe that the Collector (Appeals) has allowed the appeal of the Revenue without going into the aspect of the time bar and particularly when findings of fact by the Assistant Collector had not been challenged in the grounds of appeal before him. He is directed to pass reasoned order in this regard also. 36. The appeal is, therefore, allowed by remand.
-
1989 (2) TMI 230
... ...
... ... ..... e Tribunal condoned the defect considering the facts and circumstances of the case. In the case reported in 1986 (23) E.L.T. 270 (Tribunal), the appeal was filed without verification and subsequently the defect was rectified. It was held by the Tribunal that the appeal ran from the date of the filing and not from the date of rectification. Having due regard to the aforesaid decisions and considering the facts and circumstances of the present case, we hold that the defect found in the original set of appeals filed by the appellant-applicant rsquo s is rectifiable, and we allow the rectification done by them by filing the second set of appeals duly signed by the principal officer of the company. In view of this finding, no delay in filing the appeals is involved and hence, no application for condonation of delay is required. 5. The preliminary objection raised by the learned S.D.R. is disposed of in the above terms. 6. The stay applications will come up for hearing on 3.3.1989.
-
1989 (2) TMI 229
Stay/Dispensation of pre-deposit of duty ... ... ... ... ..... the principle enshrined in that Notification has been reintroduced by Notification No. 217, dated 2-4-1986 and this Notification also came to be issued during the period covered by Retrospective Legislation. Hence prima facie we are satisfied that the status quo ante as was prevalent prior to 1-3-1986 in respect of captively consumed goods within the factory was not to be disturbed, notwithstanding rescinding of Notification 118/75, because of the Retrospective Legislation giving retrospective effect to the Notification No. 217, dated 2-4-1986. Since we are prima facie satisfied that the authorities below have not applied the Retrospective enactment properly we grant an unconditional stay as to the prior deposit of duty demanded. 5. ensp It was also pleaded by Shri Karnik that despite the stay application being heard, the goods have been ordered detention. In view of the unconditional stay granted, they may approach the appropriate authority for getting release of the goods.
........
|
