|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 181 to 200 of 263 Records
-
1989 (7) TMI 84 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Question Of Law ... ... ... ... ..... case, a partnership, deed was drawn up on March 4, 1978, whereby a new partner was inducted. Registration was not granted by the Income-tax Officer but was then subsequently granted on appeal, by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. The appeal filed before the Tribunal by the Department was dismissed. In paragraph 2 of the order, the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the firm which was formed was genuine. In paragraph 3, it has stated that the partnership deed had been given retrospective effect. In the question which is framed, the decision of the Tribunal with regard to retrospectivity of the partnership deed is not challenged. The only challenge is with regard to the genuineness of the firm. This question is a pure-question of fact and we see no reason to allow this petition. In any case, on a correct interpretation of the partnership deed, the Tribunal has come to the conclusion that it was with retrospective effect and this seems to be in order. Dismissed. No costs.
-
1989 (7) TMI 83 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Question Of Law ... ... ... ... ..... re the owners of the land. During this time, prior to November 15, 1966, an appeal for enhancement of compensation had been filed by the assessee. In the agreement on November 15, 1966, it was provided that the assessee was relinquishing its rights in the said appeal which had been filed.. It was also stated that the appeal would be withdrawn but it seems that the appeal was not withdrawn but the finding of fact is that the amount which was realised on compensation having been enhanced was credited by the assessee to the account of the said society. In other words, the money which was received as a, result of enhancement of compensation went to the coffers of the society and was not retained by the assessee. This means that the said agreement was given effect to. It is a question of fact whether the said agreement was given effect to and this being so, the answer to the question is self-evident. The petition is, therefore, dismissed. No order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
-
1989 (7) TMI 82 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Discount On Bonds, Question Of Law ... ... ... ... ..... uestion No. 1 and in the prayer, which is immediately after paragraph 5, it is stated that the Tribunal should be directed to state the case and refer the aforesaid question for its opinion . No facts with regard to question No. 2 have been indicated nor any contention raised as to why question No. 2 should be referred and nor is there any such specific mention with regard to question No. 2 in the prayer clause. We, therefore, treat this application as being one which seeks reference of only question No. 1. We have heard counsel for the parties and, in our opinion, the aforesaid question No. 1 is clearly a question of law and, therefore, we direct the Tribunal to state the case and refer the following question to this court Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in law in holding that deduction of Rs. 35,79,866 on, account of discount on bonds was an admissible business expenditure in this year ? There will be no order as to costs.
-
1989 (7) TMI 81 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... y, which has been endorsed by the Tribunal, is that the amount of gratuity was paid during the year and further that the system of accounting was cash. Learned standing counsel was unable to point out any material on which the findings recorded by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal about the system of accounting and expenditure relating to gratuity could successfully be assailed. In view of the findings of fact recorded by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, namely, that the system of accounting followed by the assessee was the cash system in respect of the payment of gratuity, question No. 3 must be answered in favour of the assessee and against the Department. We do so accordingly. So far as questions Nos. 4 and 5 are concerned, they do not arise out of the order passed by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal and, therefore, need not be answered. Accordingly, we return questions Nos. 4 and 5 unanswered. The reference is answered accordingly. There shall be no order as to costs.
-
1989 (7) TMI 80 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Question Of Law ... ... ... ... ..... stions of law to this court 1. Whether the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was correct in law in holding that interest paid on loans borrowed by the assessee is not to be apportioned between income from business and income from dividends and that this is fully adjustable against business income only ? 2. Whether the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was correct in law in holding that, for the purpose of deduction under section 80M, it was the gross dividend income that should be considered, especially in view of, the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Distributors (Baroda) Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India 1985 155 ITR 120 ?
-
1989 (7) TMI 79 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Delay In Filing Return, Penalty, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... artment, stressed that as the applicant had earlier defaulted and had not appeared in pursuance of the notice which had been served on him, he was, neither in law nor in equity, entitled to a second notice. We are unable to uphold this contention. It is not default on the part of the assessee which is conclusive or determinative of the controversy. The question is whether the assessee should have been served with a second notice in view of the fact that there has been a long gap in between the first and the second dates of hearing. The assessee could not be expected to go to the office every day and find out the date of hearing of the penalty proceedings. It was for the Department to have served the assessee with the notice when the next date had been fixed. This is a rule of natural justice which had been flouted and not followed. Consequently, we answer the question in favour of the assessee and against the Department. The assessee will be entitled to get Rs. 500 as costs.
-
1989 (7) TMI 78 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Appeal To Tribunal, Power To Remand ... ... ... ... ..... horities after the order of remand, it is to be considered in the proper perspective inasmuch as the authorities concerned cannot take steps beyond the scope of the order of remand. If the order of remand is open and the authorities concerned, after remand, can exercise the jurisdiction in accordance with law, there is nothing for this court to regulate such action but at the same time, this court observes that if the scope of remand is limited, after remand, the authorities cannot enlarge the same and make an assessment beyond the scope of the order of remand. The authorities concerned, after remand, are certainly entitled to proceed in accordance with law, but limited, if there is any order of the appellate authority permitting the authorities concerned to proceed in the light of the directions made therein. With this observation, the writ petition is disposed of and the rule is also disposed of and the interim order, if any, is vacated. There will be no order as to costs.
-
1989 (7) TMI 77 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Agricultural Holding, Estate Duty, HUF ... ... ... ... ..... ed that the application dated March 14, 1973, is, in fact, a copy of the plaint in the suit filed for partition of agricultural land by the deceased s son (accountable person). It is not a document of family settlement. The case before the tax authorities throughout proceeded on the finding that the application dated March 14, 1973, was a family settlement, or in any case, a partition suit filed on the basis of the so-called family settlement. In the document forwarded to this court along with a supplementary statement of the case, there is no mention nor is there any claim about any family settlement. Whether there was, in fact, any family settlement or not, has also not been examined by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. For what has been stated above we return the reference unanswered. The Tribunal will dispose of the appeal, after considering and examining the case in the light of what has been stated above and in accordance with law. There shall be no order as to costs.
-
1989 (7) TMI 76 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Question Of Law ... ... ... ... ..... es of the case, the Tribunal was justified in remanding the case to the Income-tax Officer for fresh assessments We allow this application and direct the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal to draw up the statement of case and refer the aforesaid question of law for the decision by this court.
-
1989 (7) TMI 75 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Search And Seizure, Writ Petition ... ... ... ... ..... and some other silver and gold ornaments were also found but they were not seized. It may be stated that we had already ordered the return of the account books on the, petitioner s furnishing photostat copies thereof. Consequently, though we are of the opinion that the authorisation under section 132(1) of the Income-tax Act was not in accordance with law and, therefore, the search and seizure of the assets cannot be said to be in accordance with law, even then, the proceedings have been dropped against the petitioner and have been started against her husband, Shri R. K. Singhal, by virtue of the powers of the Income-tax Officer/Assessing Authority under section 132(7) of the Income-tax Act and the order under section 132(5) of the Income-tax Act has been made against him and steps have been taken by the authorities in accordance with law, the valuables, etc., cannot be ordered to be returned to the petitioner. The writ petition is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs.
-
1989 (7) TMI 74 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... f law to this court. It is contended, by learned counsel for the petitioner that the aforesaid questions of law did arise from the order and that it could not be said that the same were questions of fact. There is merit in the contention of the petitioner s counsel that the aforesaid questions can be regarded as questions of law but the answer to the said questions is self-evident in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the respondent s own case, Mrs. Sheila Kaushish v. CIT 1981 131 ITR 435. That was an appeal filed by the respondent in the present case and the contention of the respondent was that the value should be determined by applying the basis of standard rent. The Supreme Court accepted this contention. In view of the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court, it is clear that the answer to the proposed questions is self-evident and, therefore, this petition cannot succeed. In view of the aforesaid, the petition is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
-
1989 (7) TMI 73 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Appeals, Revision, Surtax ... ... ... ... ..... enforcement. Thus, looking to the approach of the apex court of the country for appreciating the position of law correctly as to the question of merger, there is no doubt that, once an appeal has been preferred and the appellate authority has passed an order, there is nothing left for any authority which passed the initial order to reopen the same in the manner sought to be done as in the instant case. The questions raised in this case have been clearly answered by stating that by applying the test of merger, there is nothing left for the respondent authority to issue the impugned notice and to initiate the proceedings. Appreciating the facts and laws as placed before this court, there is no bar and/or impediment to grant the reliefs to the petitioner as prayed for. For the foregoing reasons, the writ petitions are allowed. The rules are made absolute. The impugned notice(s) and/or the proceedings thereto and thereunder are hereby quashed. There will be no order as to costs.
-
1989 (7) TMI 72 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Delay In Filing Return, Penalty, Reasonable Cause, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... 72 had been rightly waived in the case of C. L. Khunnah. The answers to the questions are as under (i) In favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. (ii) 1. The penalty under section 18(1)(a) for the years 1969-70 to 1970-71 had been rightly waived in the case of C. L. Khunnah 2. The penalty for the year 1971772 had been rightly cancelled by the Tribunal in the case of C. L Khunnah as he was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the return in time in respect of that year. 3. The decision of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was not vitiated by the fact that the Department had not questioned the cancellation of the penalty imposed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in the case of M. C. Khunnah inasmuch as each case has a separate identity. 4. We do not consider it appropriate to answer this question inasmuch the answers given by us to the other questions Are complete in themselves. We, consequently, return this question unanswered. We make no, order as to costs.
-
1989 (7) TMI 71 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Question Of Law ... ... ... ... ..... w is in consonance with the law laid down by the various High Courts in CIT v. A. Rm. A.L.A. Arunachalam Chettiar, AIR 1932 Mad 433, CIT v. Badridas Ramrai Shop 1939 7 ITR 613(Nag), CIT v. Angara Satyam 1959 37 ITR 230 (AP), Ayyasami Nadar and Bros. v. CIT 1956 30 ITR 565 (Mad), Vadilal Ichhachand v. CIT 1957 32 ITR 569 (Bom), Dayabhai Girdharbhai v. CIT 1957 32 ITR 677 (Bom) and Waman Padmanabh Dande v. CIT 1952 22 ITR 339 (Nag). In Brij Mohan v. CIT 1979 120 ITR 1 (SC), the Supreme Court has also laid down that penalty is imposed on account of the commission of a wrongful act and it is the law operating on the date on which the wrongful act was committed which determines the penalty. In view of the aforesaid decisions, the question referred is answered in the affirmative, i.e., against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee, and it is held that the Tribunal was justified in taking the view which it has taken. The reference is answered accordingly.. No order as to costs.
-
1989 (7) TMI 70 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Bonus, Business Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... nt petition has been filed. In our opinion, the answer to the aforesaid question is self-evident. It cannot be disputed that the payment of bonus is clearly linked and related to the carrying on of the business. It is not in dispute that on April, 2, 1974, an agreement was entered into between the respondent and the workers which resulted in payment of bonus. The liability to pay the bonus, therefore, arose on that date. This being so, the respondent could have claimed deduction only in that previous year which was relevant to the assessment year 1975-76. Even if the assessee s concern and the business were taken over by Tiger Locks Ltd., the assessee continued to exist and its income was being taxed. The bonus must be in respect of the year in which the business was being carried on by the assessee though the liability arose after the business has been transferred. In our opinion, the answer to the aforesaid question is self-evident. The petition is, accordingly, dismissed.
-
1989 (7) TMI 69 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ter excluding from the gross payment the cost of materials supplied to the assessee by the Government in accordance with the terms of the contract ? The controversy arising in this question has already been decided by the Supreme Court in Brij Bhusan Lal Parduman Kumar v. CIT 1978 115 ITR 524. We, accordingly, answer the question in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the Department.
-
1989 (7) TMI 68 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Question Of Law ... ... ... ... ..... s transferred directly or indirectly . What is the meaning and effect to be given to the words assets transferred ... indirectly is important. Would it contemplate the creation of a trust by an assessee for the benefit of grandchildren is to our mind a question which requires the interpretation of section 64(1)(vi). In our opinion, the following questions of law arise and the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal is directed to refer and state the same to this court 1. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was correct in law in holding that the provisions of section 64 ( 1 ) (vi) were not applicable to the case of the assessee ? 2. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was correct in law in holding that no part of the income derived by the trust was includible in the hands of the assessee under the provisions of section 64(1)(vi) ? The petitioner will be entitled to costs.
-
1989 (7) TMI 67 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Assessment, Deduction, Firm, Interest Paid By Firm To Partner ... ... ... ... ..... not be disallowed under section 40(b) of the Income-tax Act when they were partners in the assessee-firm on behalf of their respective Hindu undivided families ? This question has been decided by a Full Bench of this court in CIT v. Nitro Phosphetic Fertilizer 1988 174 ITR 269 (All). We follow the Full Bench decision and answer the question in the negative in favour of the Department and against the assessee.
-
1989 (7) TMI 66 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Question Of Law ... ... ... ... ..... tly, we direct the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal to prepare a statement of the case and to remit the same to the High Court for its opinion. Other questions raised in grounds (ii) to (v) are only different aspects of the same question. We, therefore, reject the application of the petitioner for calling for the statement with regard to questions Nos. (ii) to(v).
-
1989 (7) TMI 65 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Determination Of Principal Value Of Property, Estate Duty, Property Passing ... ... ... ... ..... ). Both of these decisions are those of our High Court. Shri Bharatji Agarwal strenuously contended that the first question has not been correctly decided by this court and as such requires reconsideration. We are not inclined to accept this submission. The controversy sought to be raised by him is fully discussed and wholly covered. It is not case where a reference should, be made to a larger Bench. As, in our opinion, both Govind Prasad s case 1981 127 ITR 642 (All) and Badri Vishal Tandon s case 1976 103 ITR 468 (All) have rightly been decided, we do not consider it a fit case for making a reference to a larger Bench. So far as question No. 2 is concerned, to that also the same line of argument applies. The reference is decided against the assessee. The first question is answered in favour of the Department and against the assessee whereas the second question is also decided in favour of the Department and against the assessee. The Department will be entitled to its costs.
....
|
