Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 81 to 100 of 263 Records
-
1989 (7) TMI 223
... ... ... ... ..... o duty. Applying the ratio of the judgment it will be seen that since Ayurvedic medicines are specified in Item No. 14E though for the purpose of exclusion, they would not fall under Item No. 68 CET. It was evidently to overcome the effect of the above judgment that an explanation was inserted in Item No. 68 CET by the Finance Bill, 1980, reading as follows - ldquo Explanation - For the purposes of this Item, goods which are referred to in any preceding Item in this Schedule for the purpose of excluding such goods from the description of goods in that Item (Whether such exclusion is by means of an Explanation to such Item or by words of exclusion in the description itself or in any other manner) shall be deemed to be goods not specified in that Item. rdquo As such the respondents rsquo contention that the subject goods did not attract duty either under Item No. 14E or No. 68 is correct and is upheld. 12. In the result, the impugned order is upheld and the appeal is dismissed.
-
1989 (7) TMI 222
Modvat Credit ... ... ... ... ..... d 22-5-1986. Nor it is the case of the department that from the details available in this letter, it is not possible to find out the nature of the input or the finished product where it will be used. Since the essential ingredients namely the input to be used and the finished product, where if is to be used are clearly spelt out in their letter dated 22-5-1986, rejecting this letter outright as not a declaration appears to us to be a rigid and narrow view of the matter. No doubt, this letter talks of deemed credit for market purchase of scrap all the same it also indicates the nature of input namely iron and steel scrap which will be used in the specified finished product covered by the MODVAT scheme. When such an input declared is brought under regular gate pass, the duty indicated as per the gate pass is to be allowed credit. We, therefore, allow the appeal with consequential relief. Since we have decided the issue on merits, there is no need to go into the time bar aspect.
-
1989 (7) TMI 202
Right to appeal ... ... ... ... ..... tated before us during the course of hearing that the Collector, Rajkot, acting under the orders of the Central Board of Excise and Customs, filed an appeal against one of the impugned orders (Rajkot), as provided by law. The Collector has a right to file a similar appeal against the other order also (Bombay). That appeal filed as a matter of statutory right shall be heard and the merits of the case shall be examined. At the time of our hearing the appeal was not yet received but it was stated to have been received today. The hearing of that appeal may be subject to the legal requirement of 45 days rsquo time to the other party. Subject only to this, the merits of this matter shall be gone into as soon as possible. Therefore, HPF cannot have a grievance that by their appeals being dismissed in limine, their interests have been permanently injured. 49. emsp With these observations, we dismiss both the appeals as not maintainable. The two Miscellaneous Applications are allowed.
-
1989 (7) TMI 201
Manufacture - Yarn ... ... ... ... ..... y the customer should after the application of the manufacturing process by the job worker, not lose, its essential identity entirely, but should retain its essential identity subject to the effects of the manufacturing process is carried out.... ldquo The only broad guideline for the applicability of the notification would be that the process applied by the job worker should not be in the nature of manufacture in its primary sense and the resultant product should not be so completely distinct as to lose the original identity itself. rdquo 18. emsp So it can be seen from the above excerpts that what has been held by the Tribunal is that the article should not lose its identity. In light of the judgment in the case of Aditya Mills Ltd. (supra), in the present appeals, the article loses its identity. So, this argument of Sh. Bharucha is not correct. So, we pass the following final order - All these five appeals are allowed and impugned order of Collector (Appeals) is set aside.
-
1989 (7) TMI 200
Appeal - Condonation of delay ... ... ... ... ..... e for delay in presenting the appeal, would not justify the Court in exercising its discretion under S. 5. It is, however, a matter for the Court to consider in each case whether the effect of illness, as proved, is such as afforded sufficient cause for the failure to present the appeal within the time prescribed by the law. The onus lies on the applicant to satisfy the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within time. rdquo In the matter before us, the applicant after filing the affidavit and the medical certificate has discharged his onus and the revenue has not filed any contrary evidence in this regard. Accordingly, we are of the view that there was sufficient cause in the late filing of the appeal. 6. emsp Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case and the legal position discussed above, we hold that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause in the late filing of the appeal. The delay in the filing of the appeal is condoned.
-
1989 (7) TMI 199
... ... ... ... ..... e of the Show Cause Notice then it cannot be said that still that order would have no force of law and would not come into operation, as long as the same was not communicated to the party concerned, because communication of the order is merely an administrative act and the failure to inform passing of such order would not take away the affect of such order. In the instant case also the order has been passed in pursuance to the Show Cause Notice after hearing the party and non-communication of such an order for whatever reason, will not take away its affect. In view of this, we hold that the order dated 6-9-1978 passed by the Review Bench is final and conclusive and hence, the appeal is not maintainable. 7. emsp In view of the foregoing decision on the substantial point of law involved in this case and the respondent succeeds on the first point itself, it is futile to go into other pleas urged by the learned Consultant for the respondents. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.
-
1989 (7) TMI 198
Classification ... ... ... ... ..... hotography and chemistry rsquo i.e. lsquo photo chemistry rsquo and lsquo polymer chemistry rsquo rsquo and the lsquo film moulding technology rsquo . The use of ultra violet rays and chemically treated plastic sensitive plate and negatives are all aspects of photography. 12. ensp The Item 84.34 as discussed earlier and as can be seen by reading its explanatory notes, referred to items of printing technology. In the photo printing, the process of printing technology is also utilised. In the instant case, there is no printing done but only reproduction of the image with the use of ultra violet rays and negatives on the chemically treated plastic sheets. A close scrutiny of the methods employed in the imported process reveals the use of photographic principles. 13. ensp The photographic items are classified under Item 90.10. The imported processor is rightly classified under Item 90.10 of the Customs Tariff. Hence, the appeal is liable to be dismissed and the same is dismissed.
-
1989 (7) TMI 197
... ... ... ... ..... ce in terms of Rule 10 show cause notice for recovery of any duty could be made within six months from the date of clearance of such incentive sugar. Since no such data is available on record we are constrained to remand the matter to the original adjudicating authority and decide it in the light of the above observations on the question of limitation of the show cause notice. 9. emsp Incidentally, we observe that the respondents had taken a plea to keep the proceedings in abeyance pending a decision of the Central Board of Excise and Customs which had been examining the matter at the behest of the Indian Sugar Mills Association. As already mentioned above, the Assistant Collector did not keep the matter in abeyance. It is quite possible that the clarification might have been issued since then. If there are any general instructions of the Board in this respect benefit of the same should also be extended in these remand proceedings. 10. Appeal is thus allowed by way of remand.
-
1989 (7) TMI 184
Grant of cash assistance and/or replenishment licences on export of onions ... ... ... ... ..... the relevant time i.e. the date of export has to be determined in accordance with the date of the bill of lading and not the date of the mate receipt. It is, however, open to the respondents to consider the genuineness of the bill of lading and to find out whether the same was issued on the date shown therein or was ante-dated. In case the shipping documents and the bill of lading are found to be in order the petitioners are certainly entitled to the benefit of cash assistance and/or import replenishment licences as provided in the policy. 7. For the reasons recorded above, the rule is made absolute and the impugned orders dated 25-5-1978, 22-2-1979, 29-8-1979 and the review order dated 26-12-1979 are hereby quashed. The respondent No. 2 will consider the application of the petitioners afresh in the light of the observations made above. The application should be decided by respondent No. 2 within six months from today. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.
-
1989 (7) TMI 181
Demand - Warehoused goods ... ... ... ... ..... e consumption has been passed. This ratio squarely applies to the facts of the present case. 8. The judgment of the Delhi High Court in the Sialkot Industrial Corporation case (supra) was on the issue of remission of duty on the ground of pilferage of goods. The Court, after examining the provisions of the Act and referring to case law, held that it was difficult to construe Section 23(1) as covering all kinds of loss or destruction but excluding loss by pilferage. This judgment has no application to the facts of the present case since the issue was not one relating to Section 23(2) of the Act. 9. In the result, we hold that the appellants, having properly exercised their right to relinquish their title to the goods in terms of Section 23(2) of the Act, were not liable to pay the duty on the goods. It follows that they were also not liable to pay the interest thereon. We, therefore, set aside the impugned order and allow the appeal with consequential relief to the appellants.
-
1989 (7) TMI 178
Actual Cost, Additional Depreciation, Computing Depreciation, Investment Allowance, Plant And Machinery
-
1989 (7) TMI 175
Assessment Year, Estimated Income, Failure To Pay Advance Tax, False Estimate, Penalty For Concealment
-
1989 (7) TMI 173
... ... ... ... ..... been properly investigated into by the authorities below by using some cogent material in which they have failed. In these circumstances, the value fixed by them has to be discarded. Now the question before us is as to what value could be given to these lands as on 13th May, 1981. Without altogether excluding the element of some guess and taking into account all the relevant factors such as cost of the purchase of the property, the date of the gift document and the subsequent sale of the properties by the donees, taking a reasonable view, which is neither too conservative nor arbitrary, the value of the lands could be fixed at 8 times the value of their acquisition over a period of two years and 9 months (approximately) it would mean that the land cost would come to Rs. 32,800, to be equally divided in the case of each of two donees. 9. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed. As against a value of Rs. 3,59,460 the value of the gifted property is determined at Rs. 32,800.
-
1989 (7) TMI 172
... ... ... ... ..... n the earlier years which were not present in the relevant assessment year. He failed to prove this finding. 9.1 In view of the above matter, we are not able to accept the reasoning of the ITO to change the mode of assessment. We are not able to share his view that the books of accounts of the assessee, maintained this year, do not have apparent defects. The defects are patent and most serious defect is, as we have said, non-recording of any closing stock and for work-in-progress. In the above circumstances, we feel the estimate of profit at a flat rate method as adopted in earlier years in the same circumstances, should also apply in this assessment year under appeal. 10. Though we cannot accept the change in mode of assessment but in view of Department s finding that in this year a large amount of expenses claimed are unestablished, we feel the rate of profit should be estimated at 12 1/2 per cent subject to depreciation and interest. In the result appeal is partly allowed.
-
1989 (7) TMI 171
Income From Property, Religious Trust, Sale Proceeds ... ... ... ... ..... meet the expenditure. It so happens because of large number of pilgrims, their share has gone up and they are forced to part with the surplus. They give a good part from prasadams to others freely. But the surplus has to be disposed of. They cannot be preserved because they are perishable. They cannot be thrown out, it would be sacrilege. At the same time, if disposed of to the public, it would fetch them funds which would be useful for carrying on the activities of the Mutt. As Sri Thiruvengadam had pointed out that the remuneration or the reimbursement has already been given to them in terms of the share in the prasadams. The mere Act of converting that share into cash does not involve any business activity. 10. Under these circumstances, we are satisfied that there is no business activity undertaken by these two Mutts. Therefore, provisions of section 11(4A) are not attracted. The assessees continue to have the right for exemption under s.11. 11. The appeals stand allowed.
-
1989 (7) TMI 170
Penalty, Concealment Of Income ... ... ... ... ..... and Sons 1977 106 ITR 307 (All.) 4. S.R. Jadav Desai v. Sixth WTO 1980 121 ITR 531 (Kar.) 5. R.P. Ramaswamy Chettiar v. CWT 1983 144 ITR 87 (Mad.) 6. Madhukar Manilal Modi v. CWT 1978 113 ITR 318 (Guj.) 7. CIT v. Hill Goods Truck Owners Union 1980 124 ITR 224 (Punj. and Har.). I felt no need to refer to an y of these decisions as I found that the principles laid down in those cases, though unexceptional and should be respectfully applied by me, but on the facts of this case, I come to the conclusion that the filing of the returns could not be said to be voluntary as there was a lurking fear in the minds of the assessee for detection of the concealment of income, and there was an admission in unmistakable terms that there was concealment of income and so was the unanimous finding of both the Members and more emphatically by the learned Accountant Member. 14. The matter will now go before the regular Bench for disposal of the appeals, in accordance with the opinion of majority.
-
1989 (7) TMI 169
... ... ... ... ..... nstant case, the assessee having paid the first two instalments of advance tax based on the statement of income which is as per the initial option allowed to the assessee, he has only complied, with the law. Secondly, this statement being not the same as an estimate of income for it does not involve any estimation but only adoption of either the last assessed income or the last returned income. Thirdly, if as a consequence the first two instalments fell short of the last instalment it does not lead to the inference that the advance tax payable was reduce in either of the first two instalments. Lastly, since the Act intends only to cover cases where an estimate of lower income was filed even prior to the payment of either of the first two instalments and not those where statement of income are filed, the very initiation of proceedings under s.216 is bad in law and on facts of the case. We accordingly quash the order of charging of interest. In the result the appeal is allowed.
-
1989 (7) TMI 168
Advance Tax, Assessed Income, Assessment Year, Interest Payable By Assessee ... ... ... ... ..... case, the assessee having paid the first two instalments of advance tax based on the statement of income which is as per the initial option allowed to the assessee, it has only complied with the law. Secondly, this statement being not the same as an estimate of income for it does not involve any estimation but only adoption of either the last assessed income or the last returned income. Thirdly, if as a consequence the first two instalments fell short of the last instalment it does not lead to the inference that the advance tax payable was reduced in either of the first two instalments. Lastly, since the Act intends to cover only cases where an estimate of lower income was filed even prior to the payment of either of the first two instalments and not those where statements of income are filed, the very initiation of proceedings under section 216 is bad in law and on facts of the case. We accordingly quash the order of charging of interest. In the result the appeal is allowed.
-
1989 (7) TMI 167
... ... ... ... ..... side. 7. As regards the calculation of income from exports the assessee rsquo s contention was that the aforesaid amount of Rs. 27,91,979 was not the net income and whether these receipts resulted in any income could be determined only after finding out the corresponding expenditure. The contention appears to be correct and although the order under appeal does not specifically say so, we are of the view that the learned Commissioner had set aside the assessment only with the intention that the IAC(A) will determine the export profit and then allow the deduction under s. 80HHC and that such deduction would not exceed the export profit. Such an exercise is necessary to give effect to the Commissioner rsquo s order. Since we are setting aside the order as passed by the Commissioner we need not ourselves express further on this aspect of the matter. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the order under appeal is set aside and the assessment, as made by the IAC(A), is restored.
-
1989 (7) TMI 166
Assessment Year, Motor Vehicles ... ... ... ... ..... iscellaneous expenses were debited on15-5-1981whereas taxes amounting to Rs. 375 had been paid on28-4-1981. Another factor which also needs to be noticed is that the salary of the driver amounting to Rs. 750 was debited only on6-5-1981and without the driver, the question of giving the truck on hire to Shri Mauji would not have arisen. As we have already mentioned above, it does not stand to reason that the new truck would have been put on the road or given on hire when two other trucks belonging to the assessee were available. There is no evidence of any extraordinary circumstances necessitating this unusual course of action. On the basis of the evidence on the record, we are therefore of the view that this was merely an attempt on the part of the assessee for claiming depreciation. The claim was clearly disallowable on facts and the orders of the income-tax authorities do not warrant any interference. 7. In the result, the appeal filed by the assessee fails and is dismissed.
........
|