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Showing 61 to 80 of 268 Records
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1989 (8) TMI 318
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... ... ..... rd. Discretion to admit fresh evidence is not relevant to rectification proceedings. But in the circumstances, it cannot be held that the Tribunal exercised its jurisdiction wrongly. 5.. Coming to the alternative submission of Shri Shah, namely, that there was absolute lack of jurisdiction as the assessee was not liable to sales tax at all, we are of the view that this submission of Shri Shah is fallacious. There will be merit in the assessee s submission about lack of jurisdiction, only if there is a finding that the assessee was not liable to sales tax as it was only serving and not selling eatables in the restaurant. As stated by us earlier, there is no such finding given by the Sales Tax Officer, Appellate Assistant Commissioner or the Tribunal. In any view of the matter we are in agreement with the learned Single Judge that no interference with the Tribunal s order was called for in this case. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. No order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1989 (8) TMI 317
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... ... ..... ot levied on the assessee for contravention of any rule but for failure to record the statement required by section 7(1) and prescribed by rule 7 in the bills issued in respect of sale of local goods. It has not been found in the instant case that the assessee had failed to record the statement, as prescribed by rule 7, in any bill issued by him in respect of sale of local goods. In the absence of such finding, penalty under section 7(5) of the Entry Tax Act could not have been imposed on the assessee. 7.. Our answer to the question referred by the Board to this Court is that the Board was not justified in holding that the assessee had committed violation of the provisions of section 7(1) of the Entry Tax Act and was liable to pay penalty under section 7(5) of the Entry Tax Act. Reference is answered in favour of the assessee and against the Department. In the circumstances of the case, parties shall bear their own costs of this reference. Reference answered in the negative.
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1989 (8) TMI 316
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... ... ..... of the State Government. It was only to remind them that they should take timely action and approach the higher authorities to file appeals against the orders which were detrimental to the interests of the Revenue. Mr. Brar also referred to rule 55 of the Punjab General Sales Tax Rules to contend that the Assistant Excise and Taxation Officer assists the Excise and Taxation Commissioner in the discharge of his duties and as such he is competent to file the appeal. This argument is also untenable. No express authority by the Excise and Taxation Commissioner authorising the Assistant Excise and Taxation Officer to file revision petition has been brought to our notice. Power of superintendence invested by rule 55, ibid., does not percolate to every Assistant Excise and Taxation Officer in the State of Punjab without any express authority. For the reasons mentioned above, we answer the question in the affirmative and against the Department. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1989 (8) TMI 315
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... ... ..... see is a public limited company incorporated in India and is carrying on the business of planting and growing rubber in its estate in Kerala. The company formed for the said purpose or with the said intention can only produce rubber and market it in a profitable manner. The company is engaged in a regular systematic activity and it cannot at all be stated that such an activity or occupation is pursued for pleasure. The said activity also requires attention. In the light of the inclusive definitions of the words business and dealer in the Central Sales Tax Act, we have no doubt that the revision petitionerassessee company is carrying on the business when it sold inter-State the rubber produced in its. estate. The Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal was justified in holding that the estate owners who sell inter-State the rubber produced in their own estate will be dealers for the purpose of the Central Sales Tax Act. The revision is without merit. It is dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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1989 (8) TMI 314
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... ... ..... he arrears in instalments and the assessee having cleared all the arrears within the time stipulated in the Government order he could not be held to be a defaulter in payment of tax. In the present case, there is neither any statutory provision nor is there any order from which it is possible to infer that the date fixed by the Sales Tax Officer for payment of tax had been postponed. As such the principles laid down in the decided case are of no assistance for deciding the present case. 7.. From the analysis and the discussions made in the preceding paragraphs, it is manifest that in the facts and circumstances of the case the petitioner was rightly held to be in default of arrears of tax dues and the order of imposition of penalty was legal and justified. There is, therefore, no scope to interfere in the impugned orders. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed, but in the circumstances of the case, without any order for costs. J. DAS, J.-I agree. Writ petition dismissed.
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1989 (8) TMI 313
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... ... ..... e basis of the said Scheme. 9.. So far as the last submission is concerned, which in effect is a claim of estoppel on the basis of the note given by the Inspector of Taxes, we find that the said note was given on April 25, 1987, whereas the impugned assessments relate to periods up to March 31, 1987, i.e., prior to that date and, as such, any claim based on the said note cannot affect the impugned assessments. 10.. In view of the aforesaid factual position, we do not deem it necessary to decide the important question whether the note in the form of opinion given by the Inspector of Taxes would act as estoppel and the Superintendent of Taxes would be prevented from assessing the turnover of a dealer and levying tax thereon under the provisions of the Act. We leave it open to be decided in an appropriate case. 11.. In view of what is stated above, we do not find any merit in the writ petition and the same is, therefore, dismissed. No order as to costs. Writ petition dismissed.
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1989 (8) TMI 312
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... ... ..... t 4 Q.E. 31.3.1980 Rs. 25,000 at 7 percent Rs. 1,75,000 at 8 percent 4 Q.E. 31.3.1981 Rs. 1,50,000 at 8 percent . 15.. It is evident that he did not refer to any materials at all in the orders of assessment. In the affidavit filed by the respondents there is no reference to any evidence or material on which the aforesaid estimate was based. No material is also available from the records of the case. It is, therefore, manifest that the Superintendent of Taxes having rejected the books of account made the assessment on mere guess and surmises without reference to any evidence or materials at all which he was required to do under the law. The impugned assessment orders, on this score also, are vitiated and cannot be sustained. 16.. In view of what is stated above, the orders of assessment for the assessment years ending March 31, 1980 and March 31, 1981, impugned in the present writ petitions are set aside. Both the petitions are allowed. No order as to cost. Petitions allowed.
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1989 (8) TMI 311
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... ... ..... ion 2(p) of the Rajasthan Act and section 2(h) of the Central Act and was includible in the turnover of the assessee. In the present cases, there is no statutory regulation controlling the sale and purchase of bicycles. So, the principles formulated above will not be applicable to the present cases. In the result, we hold that in the facts and circumstances of the present cases, the amount of freight charged on the goods and later on deducted from the bill does not form part of the turnover and answer the first question in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. We also hold that the ratio of Hyderabad Asbestos Cement Products Ltd. case 1969 24 STC 487 (SC), is fully applicable to the facts of the present cases and the decisions of the Madhya Pradesh and Madras High Courts are not attracted. Thus, the second question is also answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1989 (8) TMI 310
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... ... ..... axes Officer 1986 RTC 165 followed. Similar view was taken by the Tribunal in 1988 3 RTJS 229 and 1986 RTC 165. It has been held in Commercial Taxes Officer v. Hemraj Udhyog 1987 64 STC 324 (Raj) 1987 23 STL 29 (Raj) as follows In these circumstances, we are of the view that a particular interpretation was accepted and acted upon by the taxing authorities for a long period of time and the provision no longer exists, but has been replaced by a different provision, it would not be proper for this Court to depart from the interpretation which has held the field for a very long time. We may refer in this connection to a decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal III v. Balkrishna Malhotra 1971 81 ITR 759 (SC). 8.. Having regard to these facts, circumstances and authoritative observations, there exists no good ground for interference. 9.. Consequently, the revision petitions are dismissed. No order as to costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1989 (8) TMI 309
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... ... ..... 3 STC 510. It has been held therein that the liability to pay interest is automatic and arises by operation of law and the assessing authority is not under an obligation to issue a show cause notice before levying interest on the tax thereto. Mr. Sood has not brought to our notice any decision wherein after the period for filing the return and payment of tax has been extended by a competent authority by invoking a statutory provision, the dealer was still required to pay interest. In the result, we hold that in view of the provisions contained in section 25(5), rules 2(q), 17 and 62 of the Rules, when the appropriate authority grants extension for filing the return and payment of tax, the prescribed date for that stands shifted to the date determined by the appropriate authority. If the return is filed and tax is paid by that date the dealer is not liable to pay interest. We thus answer the question in the negative and against the Revenue. Reference answered in the negative.
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1989 (8) TMI 308
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... ... ..... d rejected the claim on the ground itself without properly applying its mind to the facts of the case and fulfilment of the requirements of the said rule. It was submitted that if the petitioner s case falls under sub-rule (2) of rule 5, the cases should be remanded to the Superintendent of Taxes to examine the claim afresh in the light of the decision of this Court. We find the submission of Mr. Majumdar reasonable. Accordingly, we set aside the impugned orders of assessment and direct the Superintendent of Taxes to examine the claim of the petitioner for exemption under sub-rule (2) of rule 5 of the Rules in the light of the observations made above. 11.. In that view of the matter, it is not necessary for us to consider the other contention of the petitioner regarding arbitrary determination of the turnover, etc. 12.. In the result, the two writ petitions are allowed to the extent indicated above. No order as to costs. J.M. SRIVASTAVA, J.-I agree. Petitions partly allowed.
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1989 (8) TMI 307
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... ... ..... g materials to the contractor to be used in the work, and the contractor is made liable to pay the price of those materials, there is sale of goods by the contractor and he shall be liable to pay tax on such sale. The legal position now is when there is a transfer of property in goods by the contractor in execution of works contract, sales tax law is attracted. 13.. In none of the cases assessment has been completed. The assessing authority in all the cases of works contract shall proceed with assessment of the contractors who have executed works contract of the annual gross turnover of Rs. 25,000 or above keeping in view the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Builders Association 1989 73 STC 370, in Goel Co. 1989 72 STC 368 to the extent not in conflict with Builders Association 1989 73 STC 370 as held above and the law laid down in this judgment. 14.. With the aforesaid directions these writ petitions are disposed of. N.S. RAO, J.-I agree. Writ petitions Partly allowed.
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1989 (8) TMI 306
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... ... ..... ether with the interest was to be adjusted against the appellant s liability for refund and the balance amount, if any, would be paid back to the appellant by the Registrar of the Court. The facts were entirely different there. In the instant case before us, the applicant has not made any claim for interest in the writ application. We are unable to entertain the claim for interest at this stage. Section 10B has no application here. 13.. The application, therefore, succeeds. The applicant shall be entitled to an order of refund of all sums paid by him by way of sales tax on gudaku and the respondents shall issue such refund order within one month upon an application being made in that behalf giving full particulars of payments made so far. The case is thus disposed of. The interim order is vacated and the security furnished be released. There shall be no order as to costs. P.C. BANERJI (Technical Member).-I agree. L.N. RAY (Judicial Member).-I agree. Writ application allowed.
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1989 (8) TMI 305
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... ... ..... ch fell for interpretation and on the construction of those documents were based on the two decisions. However, in the present case, there is no document which falls for construction. In the result, we answer the first question in the affirmative and in favour of the department. Regarding the second question, it is apparent from the record that no C forms were produced before the sales tax authorities in Haryana. Only orders of the sales tax authorities of the Union Territory of Delhi were produced. In the absence of C forms, the Haryana sales tax authorities were justified in not levying tax at the concessional rate. In the absence of any evidence in the form of C forms that the sales had been made to registered dealers, we hold that the sales effected by the applicantdealer were liable to be taxed at the rate of 10 per cent and not 3 per cent. Thus, our answer to question No. 2 also goes against the applicant and in favour of the department. Reference answered accordingly.
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1989 (8) TMI 304
Import - OGL ... ... ... ... ..... cation applied to those machinery which exclusively performed only Vickers Hardness Test. 6. emsp We have heard both the sides, perused the records and the citations. It is not in dispute that the imported machine was for performing Vickers Hardness test. The licence granted was also for importing machinery which performed this test. The catalogue had merely stated that this machinery could be utilised for performing Vickers, Knoop and Scratch Hardness Tests. As has been held in Appeal No. 2552/83-B2 in the case of Collector of Customs, Bombay v. M/s. Living Media (I) Ltd., that merely because a machinery could perform other functions, the benefit of the exemption cannot be denied. The appellants had submitted that they had imported this machinery for carrying out Vickers Hardness Test only. The lower authorities have erred in denying the benefit to the appellants. Applying the rulings, the appellants are entitled to succeed in the appeal and therefore, the appeal is allowed.
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1989 (8) TMI 303
Poster paper ... ... ... ... ..... r (ii) emsp of a substance not exceeding 25 gms. per square metre. (iii) emsp Others rdquo . Serial Number 6 reads - ldquo Paper and Paperboards other than those specified in Serial Numbers 1 to 5 rdquo . The question of classification of printing paper under Sl. No. 6 would not arise unless the paper is ruled out of the scope of Sl. Nos. 1 to 5 of these Sl. Nos. 2 to 5 are not relevant. Since poster paper does not fall within (i) nor is it any one rsquo s case that it falls under (ii) of Sl. No. 1, it evidently falls under Sl. No. (iii). In the above view of the matter, the appeal is allowed with consequential relief to the appellants. 6. emsp The Collector has filed a cross-objection. The impugned order is in favour of the Revenue and the relief claimed in the so called cross-objection is that the appeal should be dismissed. In view of the impugned order being in favour of the Revenue, there was no cause for filing the cross-objection which is dismissed as not maintainable.
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1989 (8) TMI 302
Kerala High Court's order upholding its liability to the levy of surcharge under the Kerala Surcharge on Taxes Act, 1957, as amended in 1976 challenged Held that:- Appeal dismissed. As during the hearing of these appeals, we adjourned the appeals to enable the assessee to move the State in this behalf but we were told that its efforts were unsuccessful. We need hardly say that the assessee will be at liberty to pursue the matter, put forward its difficulties and seek to persuade the State Government to either reduce or dispense with the surcharge in regard to cardamom sales or to sanction an increase in the rate of commission chargeable by the assessee on its cardamom sales and, failing such efforts, to challenge the validity of the levy for the future, if so advised, in appropriate proceedings.
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1989 (8) TMI 294
Powers of court to grant relief in certain cases ... ... ... ... ..... Comp. Cas. 571 (Delhi), felt doubt about the correctness of the decision of the Division Bench. Shri Tulzapurkar also made reference to the decision in Muktsar Electric Supply Co. Ltd., In re 1966 36 Comp. Cas. 144 (Punj. and Har.), where a single judge of the Punjab High Court held that the High Court can grant relief under sub-section (2) as the sub-section is wide enough to cover criminal prosecutions. There cannot be any quarrel with the proposition, but the sub-section is not wide enough to cover criminal prosecutions commenced under Acts other than the Companies Act. In my judgment, the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the respondents that the petitioners cannot be relieved of civil and criminal liabilities arising out of violation of the Provident Funds Act and Employees State Insurance Act by resorting to sub-section (2) of section 633 of the Companies Act is required to be upheld and the petition must fail. Accordingly, the petition is dismissed with costs.
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1989 (8) TMI 293
Loans to directors, etc. ... ... ... ... ..... the purchase price. The seventh petitioner was, thus, given financial accommodation by the company in the matter of payment of the debt. Such financial accommodation was not and did not amount to a loan. When section 295 refers to an indirect loan to a director, what it means is that the company shall not give a loan to a director through the agency of one or more intermediaries The word indirectly in the section cannot be rea3 as converting what is not a loan into a loan. This, therefore, is a case where the court, under article 226, may justifiably issue a writ quashing the prosecution launched against the petitioners. (See State of West Bengal v. Swapan Kumar Guha, AIR 1982 SC 949 1983 53 Comp. Cas. 114). Having regard to the view that I have taken, I do not consider the alternative submission on behalf of the petitioners that, in any event, the prosecution is barred by limitation. In the result, the petition is made absolute in terms of prayer (a ). No order as to costs.
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1989 (8) TMI 277
Powers of court to grant relief in certain cases ... ... ... ... ..... oint Price Waterhouse to investigate into the affairs. Shri Setalvad submits that whatever may be the default committed by the Indian directors of Orson Electronics Limited, the petitioners cannot be held responsible, nor can it be suggested that the petitioners have acted mala fide or dishonestly or unreasonably. In my judgment, the submission urged by Shri Setalvad is correct and deserves acceptance. The petitioners are required to be relieved from any intended prosecution in respect of violation of provisions of sections 210 and 220 of the Companies Act. I wish to make it clear that the fact that the Japanese directors are relieved would have no effect on the application made by the Indian directors seeking relief under sub-section (2) of section 633 of the Companies Act, and their case will have to be examined independently. Accordingly, the petition succeeds and is made absolute in terms of prayer (a). In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
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