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Case Laws
Showing 141 to 160 of 290 Records
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1990 (3) TMI 165 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Rate of Duty ... ... ... ... ..... ision or order relating, among other things, to the determination of any question having a relation to the rate of duty of customs or to the value of goods for purposes of assessment, shall be heard by a Special Bench constituted by the President for hearing such appeals and such Bench shall consist of not less than three members and shall include at least one judicial member and one technical member. 13. In the instant case the applicants at no stage challenged the jurisdiction of the Special Bench. On the other hand they submitted to the jurisdiction of the Special Bench and obtained the judgment, and having done so it does not lie in their mouth to say that the questions of law proposed by them lies do not relate to the determination of any question having a relation to the rate of duty or value of goods. 14. In the light of the above discussion, we hold that the above reference application is not in accordance with law and is therefore, rejected as being not maintainable.
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1990 (3) TMI 164 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Classification ... ... ... ... ..... . The appellants seem to have also been under a mistaken notion that the items described in Sr. No. 2 are also included for the benefit of notification. The Collector (Appeals) has rightly held that ldquo it has become an established practice, not to allow the benefit of this notification to any wireless transmitter-cum-receiver apparatus, even though the duty concession certificate is produced from the specified authority rdquo . 17. In simple terms the benefit of the notification applies only to wireless apparatus and not to apparatus for wireless reception incorporated in a single unit with transmitting apparatus and component parts thereof. 18. I agree with the finding of learned Sister Ms. Maruthi that DME is not a wireless reception apparatus incorporated in a single unit with transmitting apparatus. The appeal has no merits and it is dismissed. In accordance with the majority opinion the matter is remanded to the Collector in terms of paragraph 7 of the majority Order.
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1990 (3) TMI 163 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Classification ... ... ... ... ..... eeds that prior Show Cause Notice must be issued to the person against whom any demand on ground of short-levy or non-levy of payment of excise duty is proposed to be made. In 1989 (20) ECR 30 (SC) in the case of The Collector of Central Excise, Baroda v. M/s. Kosan Metal Products Ltd. (supra), the Hon rsquo ble Supreme Court has observed in paragraph 4 of the judgment that Section 11A provides that when any duty of excise had not been levied or paid or had been short-levied or short-paid or erroneously refunded, a notice is to be served on the concerned person within a period of six months. (iii) The judgment of Kerala High Court in the case of Good Shepherd Rubber Company, Palghat v. Inspector of Central Excise, Palghat and Others, reported in 1978 E.L.T. (J 66) was upheld by the Division Bench of the same High Court in the judgment reported in 1978 E.L.T. (J 471) in the case of Inspector of Central Excise, M.O.R. Palghat and Another v. Good Shepherd Rubber Co., Olavakkode.
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1990 (3) TMI 162 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
... ...
... ... ..... amining the Tariff and not the Notification. Here we are examining a Notification. Therefore, the High Court rsquo s observations are not directly applicable. We keep in mind the general validity of the observation which in our opinion goes beyond the confines of the Tariff Heading. Even in the light of this judgment it appears to us that slugs having been held to be different from circles they must be held to be different from sheets and plates mentioned in Sl. No. 115 of the Notification No. 341/76-Cus. We repeat our view that if it was the intention of the Government to extend the benefit of the Notification to slugs, the notification should have included slugs which it does not. 18. In this view the Revenue rsquo s appeal has to succeed and we order accordingly. As we have interpreted the Notification on its own and not with reference to Chapter Notes and Headings of the Tariff, the arguments of both sides extended in this regard become redundant. 19. We allow the appeal.
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1990 (3) TMI 161 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the High Court is justified in setting aside the Detention order?
Held that:- The object and purpose of the observation, seem to be that the family members of the detenu should not be kept in darkness by withholding the information about the passing of the order of detention and the place of detention thereby preventing them from having any access and from rendering any help or assistance to the detenu and similarly the detenu should not be deprived of the privilege of meeting their relations and getting any help or assistance.
Coming to the present case, we are satisfied that the family members had sufficient knowledge about the detention of the detenu by virtue of the mittimus issued as well the place of detention. Therefore, no legitimate grievance can be made that there is a contravention to the observation in A.K. Roy’s case [1981 (12) TMI 159 - SUPREME COURT.
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1990 (3) TMI 160 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Project Import ... ... ... ... ..... Control Licence and to the list of articles referred to in clause (4) of regulation 3, duly attested by the authority issuing the Import Trade Control Licence Provided that in the case of imports made by the Government Agency, the application shall in addition to the said original deed of contract (alongwith a copy) be accompanied by documents, if any, permitting consequential amendments to the list of items cleared by the Directorate General of Technical Development and the certificate issued by the Project authority concerned. 12) A reading of the relevant tariff heading and the Project Import Regulations, makes it clear that the existence of a written contract is absolutely essential for the purpose of registering a contract as a Project Import under Heading 84.66 of the Customs Tariff Act. A contract in writing is contemplated. The lower appellate authority rightly rejected the appeal. 13) We see no reason for interference with the impugned order. The appeal is dismissed.
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1990 (3) TMI 159 - CEGAT, BOMBAY
Stay - Pre-deposit of duty and penalty ... ... ... ... ..... removing metal containers in unassembled condition since long under Chapter X procedure and hence the position of manufacture of parts can be well within the knowledge of the Department. In this view of the matter, we are not prima facie satisfied about the allegatin of suppression for invoking the extended period, particularly when our attention was drawn to the show cause notice issued as early as on 30-7-1987 without alleging suppression. Only the subsequent show cause notice dated 23-8-1988 specifically alleges suppression. Prima facie this appears to seek to recover the duty in respect of the past period having missed the earliest opportunity to issue the demand in time. In view of this prima facie satisfaction, we grant unconditional stay and waiver of recovery of the duty and penalty amounts. We also direct the department not to dispose of the plant and machinery of the factory and not to interfere with the normal process of production, till the disposal of the appeal.
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1990 (3) TMI 158 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Exemption to captive consumption ... ... ... ... ..... es on all fours to the case before us. 7. At this stage Mrs. Zutshi with her usual fairness, invites our attention to Order Number 501/89-D dated 1-9-1989 (M/s. L.M.L. Ltd. v. CCE, Kanpur) wherein the same issue of eligibility for Notification 118/75 was under consideration and wherein the appeal was allowed. 8. In this case the only reason for which the appellant was disentitled to the benefit of Notification 118/75 was because, the appellant had not followed the Chapter X procedure as required by the notification. There is no dispute that the appellant captively consumed the steam generated in one unit. The failure on the part of the assessee to follow the Chapter X procedure cannot take away the substantive benefit available under the notification as has been held in the case reported in 1989 (39) E.L.T. 658. 9. Following the ratio of the above-mentioned decision we set aside the impugned order and allow the appeal. The cross-objection filed by the department is dismissed.
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1990 (3) TMI 157 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Appeal by Department - Authorisation to file appeal ... ... ... ... ..... as Regional Benches were entertaining appeals in such matters. Therefore there was sufficient reason for the Collector to believe that the present appeal fell within the jurisdiction of the Regional Bench, namely West Regional Bench. 8. It is also well settled law that the substantive right of filing an appeal granted under a statute cannot be affected by procedural aspect of filing an appeal before Special Bench or Regional Bench. In any event assuming that the appeal before the Special Bench is barred by limitation all that would be required for the department would be to file an application for condonation of delay which would be favourably considered as has been done earlier in similar facts and circumstances. 9. For the above reasons we hold that the 2nd objection of the respondent is also not sustainable and is over-ruled. 10. Having held that the appeal is maintainable and has been filed within time, we direct registry to fix a date for hearing of the appeal on merits.
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1990 (3) TMI 156 - CEGAT, DELHI
Origin of Goods - Confiscation ... ... ... ... ..... , no finding has been recorded with reference to Section 111(d) (although reference has been made to Sections 111(p) and 119). This shows that the findings and the operative portion themselves are not in harmony. 32. That apart as we have seen the department rsquo s case is based more on assumption and presumption rather than on evidence and the appellants are in any case entitled to the benefit of doubt particularly in the context referred to above. 33. Even otherwise if it is considered that Chapter 4 Procedure should have been followed at least in the case of watch movements, the order of confiscation having not been passed with reference to the sub-section, it is no longer open to the department to take this plea at this stage. 34. Looking to the totality of facts and circumstances, I consider that charges with reference to Sections 111(d) and 119 fail even on the basis of preponderance of probability. 35. In the circumstances, I set aside the order and accept the appeal.
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1990 (3) TMI 155 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Refund - Additional duty of Customs ... ... ... ... ..... of Act No. 45 of 1986 has no application to claims for refund of additional duties of customs. 12. The counsel for the appellants has submitted that the second set of claims which came to be dismissed by the Assistant Collector should be considered as in continuation of the first set of claims. This contention is not acceptable for the reason that the Assistant Collector rsquo s orders of rejection of the first set of claims were not appealed against. What the appellants did was to file a second set of claims on the enactment of Act No. 45 of 1986. We have seen the memorandum of appeal filed before the Collector (Appeals). From this it appears that what was appealed against was the decision of the Assistant Collector which was communicated to them on 27-11-1986, that is, on the second set of claims. In our view, therefore, the dismissal of the claims by the lower authorities on the ground of bar of limitation was correct. 13. In the result, the present appeals are dismissed.
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1990 (3) TMI 154 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Classification ... ... ... ... ..... sure cooker was complete. Shri Chakraborty has cited one decision in support of his contention that without weight and the vent pipe the pressure cooker was complete. In the said case of Motor Industries Co. Limited (supra), this Tribunal held that a nozzle whether fitted with nozzle holder or not was classifiable under Item 34A of the erstwhile Central Excise Tariff as injector. On the analogy of the said decision, we hold that in the present case the product manufactured by the appellants was a pressure cooker classifiable under Item 54 of the erstwhile Central Excise Tariff. 4. We have observed that the value of the seized goods was Rs. 22, 539.30 only. Considering the value of the goods, the penalty imposed by the Additional Collector is considered to be excessive. We, therefore, reduce the penalty from Rs. 8.000/- to Rs. 2, 000/- only. The amount of fine (Rs. 4, 600.00) is upheld. Subject to the above modification the impugned order is upheld and the appeal is dismissed.
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1990 (3) TMI 153 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Classification ... ... ... ... ..... e (Appeals) Bombay who has passed the impugned order in this case brushing aside the decision of this Tribunal in the case of Amit Polymers and Composites Ltd., Hyderabad v. CCE, Hyderabad 1989 (20) ECR 435 by saying that the case has been decided without having been apprised of the correct process of manufacture. It was open to the Department to have taken up the matter in appeal, if it was aggrieved by the decision in the Amit Polymers case. Till the Tribunal rsquo s order is reversed, the Collector was bound by that decision and could not have ignored it. The Collector has also based his decision on classification, not on the basis of the process of manufacture in the appellants rsquo factory but on the basis of a visit to an unknown factory, not disclosed to the appellants. He has relied upon materials and evidence obtained behind the back of the appellants which they had no opportunity to rebut or controvert. We are constrained to express our unhappiness at such conduct.
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1990 (3) TMI 152 - SUPREME COURT
Whether there were grounds for the High Court to interfere with the findings of the trial court acquitting the accused?
Held that:- he counsel for the State, however, pointed out that the High Court has observed at one place in the judgment that the counsel for the accused has not raised any contention that the room in the third floor also formed part of the licensed premises. Except making this bare observation, the High Court has not considered the plea taken by the accused and the finding of the trial court in this regard. In the same paragraph, the learned Judge has, however, mentioned that the accused raised a contention in the trial court that the room in the third floor also formed part of the licensed premises and this plea found favour with the trial court. That apart the case of the accused has throughout been that room in the third floor formed part of the licensed premises. Therefore this observation of the appellate court that the counsel did not contend that the third floor formed part of the licensed premises does not appear to be correct. At any rate, there is no such admission by the accused and nor can it be said that there was such a concession by the counsel for the accused. For all the aforesaid reasons, the conviction and sentence awarded by the High Court are set aside. Accordingly the appeal is allowed.
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1990 (3) TMI 151 - ITAT PUNE
A Firm, Agricultural Income, Assessing Officer, Levy Of Penalty, Revised Returns, Total Income
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1990 (3) TMI 150 - ITAT PUNE
... ...
... ... ..... interpretation. We are unable to accept this submission. It is true that the meaning which a particular expression would take would be in accordance with the context in which said expression occurs. 13. We have considered the context in which the expression motor car occurs. We find that the intention is to include all motor vehicles used for carrying passengers excluding lorries, etc., which could reasonably come within the ambit of generic expression motor cars . The jeep would come under that expression. The said expression has not been used for confining to the motor vehicle other than jeeps. We accordingly hold that the expression motor cars in clause (vii) of sub-section (3) of section 40 of the Finance Act, 1963 would include jeeps and as such the ITO was justified in including the value of jeeps owned by the assessee-company in the net wealth of the assessee-company. The order of the CWT(A) is set aside and the order of the WTO is restored. 14. The appeals are allowed
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1990 (3) TMI 149 - ITAT PUNE
Business Income, Business Premises, Central Excise, Penalty Proceedings, Set Off ... ... ... ... ..... the case of Khanjan Lal Sewak Ram should be strictly confined to the peculiar facts that existed in said case. The said decision should not be regarded as an authority for the broad proposition that whenever it is found during the course of assessment that the income of the assessee was more than what was in the books of accounts the firm would lose the benefit of registration. It is only when it is established that the profits earned by the firm were distributed in proportion other than the proportion mentioned in the deed of partnership that registration could be refused on the basis of the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in said decision. In the present case there was no doubt about the genuineness of the firm and other conditions for grant of registration were satisfied. The only ground on which the ITO had refused registration was not tenable in law. We therefore confirm the order of the CIT(A) directing the ITO to grant registration. 10. The appeal is dismissed
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1990 (3) TMI 143 - ITAT MADRAS-D
... ...
... ... ..... account for purpose of determining the tax due. In any event since we have found that there was a reasonable cause for the delay in filing the return which the assessee believed was a revised return as the provisional return filed earlier was only a defective return in respect of which the defect was curable and had been waived by the Revenue by accepting the payment of tax on the basis of return, even the levy of interest under s. 139(8) was not justified on the facts of this case. The order of rectification does not survive and we are also in agreement with the decision of the CIT(A) that there was no mistake apparent from record which could be rectified in the computation of interest under s. 139(8). We, therefore, cancel the levy of interest under s. 139(8). We also cancel the penalty imposed under s. 271(1)(a) for the same reasons. 7. In the result, the appeal No. 1449/Mds/87 is partly allowed and appeal No. 305/Mad/89 is allowed. The appeal of the Revenue is dismissed.
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1990 (3) TMI 141 - ITAT MADRAS-D
Appeal To Tribunal, S. 10 ... ... ... ... ..... assessee. We have considered the question of balance of convenience and the balance of convenience is that the irreparable injury to the assessee should be prevented. It is urged before us that the issues in the cross-objections are such that prima facie no stay should be granted. We find that the assessing officer has prepared a painstaking note to support the stand. But, in our view, the facts are such which have to be gone into and it cannot be stated that the contentions urged are beyond the pale of debate. In these circumstances, we make absolute our orders of interim stay, namely, that the proclamation of sale made will stand stayed till the disposal of appeal by the Tribunal. This is of course subject to the assessee paying Rs. 10,000 by the 23rd March, 1990. The appeals themselves as well as the C.Os. will be posted for hearing on the 24th April, 1990. The result is the stay petitions are allowed and the Misc. Petition is treated as dismissed for statistical purposes
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1990 (3) TMI 139 - ITAT MADRAS-C
... ...
... ... ..... expressions in the statutes have to be given the ordinary meaning applicable to the particular expression, specially when it occurs in s. 64 which, the Supreme Court has held, must be strictly construed CIT vs. Prem Bhai Parekh and Ors. (1970) 77 ITR 7 (SC) . Even if we look at the matter with a purposive approach, viz., that the provisions of s. 64 were intended to add back income arising to close relations likely to be under the control of the assessee, from assets transferred by the assessee to them, it is significant that under s. 8 of the Hindu Succession Act a step-son is not an heir and could not, therefore, be considered to be person amenable to the control of the assessee. We also notice that in the assessee s own case under the WT Act by order dt. 19th Jan., 1990 in WTA Nos. 1441 and 1442/Mds/88 a similar addition under the analogous provisions of s. 4(1)(A) has been deleted. 4. In the result, the additions made under s. 64(1)(vi) are deleted. The appeal is allowed.
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