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Showing 221 to 240 of 290 Records
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1990 (3) TMI 70 - SUPREME COURT
Whether provisions of Rule 9(2) of the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1982 had not been complied with?
Held that:- Having regard to the purpose of these rules as we conceive it, namely, to ensure that there was an application of mind to the points in respect of which the question for filing an appeal arose and that the appeal was duly authorised by the Collector, and was filed by the person authorised by the Collector, and was filed by the person authorised by the Collector in order to ensure that frivolous and unnecessary appeals are not filed, we are of the opinion that in the present context and in view of the terms of the rules and the purpose intended to be served, the appeal was competent and was duly filed in compliance with the procedure as enjoined by the rules. It has to be borne in mind that the rules framed therein were to carry out the purposes of the Act. By reading the rules in the manner canvassed by Dr Pal, counsel for the respondent, before us which had prevailed over the tribunal, in our opinion, would defeat the purposes of the rules. The language of the relevant Section and the rules as we have noticed, do not warrant such a strained construction.
In the aforesaid view of the matter we are of the opinion that the tribunal was in error in dismissing the appeal on the ground that it did. In the premises, the judgment and order of the tribunal cannot be sustained.
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1990 (3) TMI 69 - SUPREME COURT
Whether Runners and Risers being solidified moulten metal in process of manufacture in the channel and the better one being subjected to same use as ingot, namely for rolling, their clearance as ingots was in accordance with law and the notices issued for short levy were liable to be discharged?
Held that:- What is apparent is that leviability of duty on Runners and Risers as covered by Tariff Item No. 26 was not free from difficulty. The Board, the Government and even the department by and large was clearing these items as scrap entitled to benefit of notifications exempting or levying duty on concessional rate on item covered by Tariff Item No. 26. Even in the State of Punjab it was cleared for some time till dispute arose. Although it would not operate as estoppel but rule of fairness is yet another principle which is well-settled and precludes public bodies, specially the government departments from re-opening such matters which were taken to be settled due to its actions. Further from perusal of notices issued to different petitioners some appear to be wholly beyond six months and others partly. For instance, notice was issued to M/s D.B.A. Steel Pvt. Ltd., Punjab on 24-12-1981 for period 20-1-1979 to 4-8-1981. Similarly, notice to Pratap Steels Mandi Gobindgarh, Punjab was issued on 17-9-1979 for period 15-7-1977 to 8-4-1979. The period within six months was from 10th March, 78 only. Therefore, one of the questions that shall arise and which has been kept open by Tribunal is if notices beyond six months were barred by time.
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1990 (3) TMI 68 - SUPREME COURT
Challenge regarding inhibition of the State to legislate on sugar
Held that:- Sugar is one of the items which was included in the Schedule to the Act, statutorily, right from its inception. Such inclusion is found in Maharashtra, Gujarat, West Bengal, Bihar, etc. Whether it was subsequently deleted or re-included or re-grouped or it was added later was immaterial as section 40 of the Act empowered the State Government to amend or include any item in the Schedule of agricultural produce. Existence of such delegated power is a usual feature of the statutes. No illegality or infirmity could be pointed out in ft. Any challenge, therefore, founded on excessive delegation of legislative power, was misconceived. Appeal dismissed.
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1990 (3) TMI 67 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the power to levy the tax or fee is conferred on that authority and if it falls beyond to declare it ultra vires?
Held that:- The courts cannot review the wisdom or advisability or expediency of a tax as the court has no concern with the policy of legislation, so long as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution. It is only where there is abuse of its powers and transgression of the legislative function in levying a tax, it may be corrected by the judiciary and not otherwise. Taxes may be and often are oppressive, unjust, and even unnecessary, but this can constitute no reason for judicial interference. When taxes are levied on certain articles or services and not on others, it cannot be said to be discriminatory. Cooley observes : "Every tax must discriminate ; and only the authority that imposes it can determine how and in what directions." The TAC having decided to impose weighing dues on the goods mentioned in the bye-laws, it is not for the court to question it on the ground that some similar commodities or commodities arriving by rail or road were not subjected to the tax.
The tax having not been found to be discriminatory or otherwise illegal, we do not find any force in the submission that it imposed any unreasonable restriction on the appellants' rights guaranteed under article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. Appeal dismissed.
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1990 (3) TMI 66 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Actual Cost, Depreciation, Developement Rebate, Investment Allowance, New Industrial Undertaking, Special Deduction
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1990 (3) TMI 65 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Appeals, Writ ... ... ... ... ..... , we think that the matter should now be sent back to the officer concerned for reconsideration and if he elects to use his discretion, as he has done, in favour of the said company, he should give his due and proper reasons. With the observations as above, we dispose of this application and since we feel that no useful purpose would be served by keeping the appeal pending and that too for the views as expressed, we treat the appeal on the day s list and have the same disposed of also. We further direct that respondent No. 1 should now deal with and dispose of the proceedings involved and pending before him by passing a reasoned order within four weeks from today. While making this order, we also keep it on record that we have neither decided anything on merits nor the Departmental appeals which are pending. All parties including the respondent officer concerned should act on the basis of the order portion of this order on the usual undertaking. Stay as prayed for is refused.
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1990 (3) TMI 64 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Appeals, Writ ... ... ... ... ..... owever, found that the subsequent instructions make it clear that while exercising the discretion under section 220(6) of the Income-tax Act, the officer concerned has to, consider the various factors. This court has further found that respondent No. 1 has considered the relevant factors and disposed of the applications for stay by giving some reliefs and this writ court cannot substitute the same by its own discretion. This court is not sitting in appeal upon every decision of the statutory authority. This court has to examine the decision-making process as observed in a recent Supreme Court decision in AIR 1989 SC 997 (State Of U. P. v. Maharaja Dharmander Prasad Singh). This court has examined the impugned orders and it does not find that the same are mala fide, capricious or even made arbitrarily. Accordingly, this court does not find any merit in the writ petition to interfere in the matter. Consequently the writ petition is rejected. There will be no order as to costs.
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1990 (3) TMI 63 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Carry Forward And Set Off, Casus Omissus, Depreciation, Registered Firm, Unabsorbed Depreciation
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1990 (3) TMI 62 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Certificate Proceedings, Writ ... ... ... ... ..... ide his orders dated April 27, 1971, and August 16, 1971. It is true that the petition does not indicate as to what happened as regards the assessment for the assessment year 1958-59. It is also true that the assessment for the assessment year 1966-67 was not fully set aside but was set aside only on two grounds. However, it is not known from the notice issued by the Tax Recovery Officer dated January 27, 1984, for settling a sale proclamation as to which assessment years the certificates pertained, nor is there any material made available to this court which would indicate as to whether any of the certificates pertained to the assessment year 1958-59 or 1966-67 and, if so, to what extent. That apart, it is not without significance that the assessment orders for none of these years have yet been completed. In the above view of the matter, the court finds merit in this writ petition. The rule is made absolute in terms of prayer, clauses (b), (c) and (d). No order as to costs.
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1990 (3) TMI 61 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Company Director ... ... ... ... ..... he show cause notice, any hearing was given to the petitioner or Any order under section 179 of the Act was passed, the affidavit-in-reply (though not filed) was silent. It merely stated that the Department takes liberty to refer to the records as regards these averments in the petition. Under the circumstances, it will have to be assumed that no hearing was given to the petitioner after the reply to the show-cause memo was filed nor was there any order passed under section 179 of the Act. As a natural corollary, in the absence of an order under section 179 of the Act passed legally, it was not open to the Income-tax Officer (in this case, the Tax Recovery Officer) to issue a demand notice to the petitioner and/or to take further proceedings in pursuance thereto. The issue of demand notice was clearly illegal and without jurisdiction. It requires to be quashed and is hereby quashed. In the result, the rule is made absolute in terms of prayer, clause (a). No order as to costs.
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1990 (3) TMI 60 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Information That Income Has Escaped Assessment, Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... his letter dated January 11, 1985, to the assessee, namely, Both the parties from whom purchases are made and also the party to whom sales are made are found to be non genuine parties and are known to have indulged in bogus havala transactions . There is no indication as to whether and in what context these parties were found to be non-genuine parties and how they were known to have indulged in bogus havala transactions. There is also no indication available from the information that those parties had stated that their transactions with the assessee were bogus. The Supreme Court decision, thus, is squarely applicable. It is not possible to say that the formation of belief that income had escaped assessment had any sound basis. Accordingly, it will have to be held that the notice was issued without satisfying the condition precedent for its issue. The notice is, accordingly, quashed. In the result, the rule is made absolute in terms of prayer clause (a). No order as to costs.
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1990 (3) TMI 59 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... stion with regard to the valuation of the house is a pure question of fact but the other questions relate to the existence of an association of persons and in view of the aforesaid decision of the Tribunal in making reference under section 256(1), we direct the Tribunal to state the case and refer the following questions of law to this court (1) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was correct in law in upholding the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner that the superstructure on plot No. 7, Anand Lok, New Delhi, was owned by the association of persons comprising of the assessee, his wife and two minor children represented by the assessee himself and that only one-fourth share thereof belonged to the assessee ? (2) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was correct in law in holding that an association of persons was legally formed ? The petition is disposed of. There will be no order as to costs.
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1990 (3) TMI 58 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Amendment, Revision Appeal To Commissioner(Appeals) ... ... ... ... ..... aken after June 1, 1988, the merger of the assessment order will be treated as confined to the issues actually considered and decided in appeal in terms of Explanation (c). In my judgment, the construction placed herein is based on sound logic, namely, irrespective of the language in which the amending provisions are couched, the amendment cannot be retrospective with effect from a date earlier to the date on which the provision sought to be amended itself was brought on the statute book. In the above view of the matter, it has to be held that the impugned notices issued by the Commissioner are invalid inasmuch as after the merger of the assessment orders in the appellate orders in view of this court s judgments in CIT v. P. Muncherji and Co. 1987 167 ITR 671 and CIT v. A. S. Narendrakumari Basaheba 1989 176 ITR 515, he had no jurisdiction to take up proceedings under section 263. Hence, the petition succeeds. Rule is made absolute in terms of prayer(a). No order as to costs.
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1990 (3) TMI 57 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Exemption For Scholorships, Scholarship ... ... ... ... ..... unt, to pursue study and research in paediatrics. That decision cannot, therefore, be of any assistance in the present case. Likewise, in CIT v. V. K. Balachandran 1984 147 ITR 4 (Mad), the amounts were paid to the assessee, who was, an exchange visitor , in order to enable him to engage himself as a member in the school of mathematics for doing advanced research in the field of mathematics and to defray the expenses of his travel, study, etc., and it was under those circumstances that the grant-in-aid was held to be a scholarship to meet the assessee s education so as to fall under section 10(16) of the Act. Even that decision cannot have any application at all in the facts and circumstances of this case. Thus, on a due consideration of the facts and circumstances, we answer the first question referred to us in the affirmative and the second question in the negative and against the assessee. The Revenue will be entitled to the costs of this reference. Counsel s fee Rs. 500.
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1990 (3) TMI 56 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Best Judgment Assessment ... ... ... ... ..... r section 146 of the Act. It is not the case of the assessee that it did not receive the notice under section 142(1) of the Act or that it had not a reasonable opportunity to comply with or was prevented by sufficient cause from complying with the terms of the notice under section 142(1) of the Act. Equally, the assessee had not made out that it was prevented by sufficient cause from making the return under section 139(2) as per the notice under section 142(1) of the Act. Thus, on a consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case and also the terms of the notice issued to the assessee under section 148 of the Act, we are of the view that the notice issued to the assessee was valid and that no ground had been established by the assessee for the reopening of the assessment made under section 144 of the Act. We answer the question referred to us in the negative and against the assessee. The Revenue will be entitled to the costs of this reference. Counsel s fee Rs. 500.
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1990 (3) TMI 55 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Special Deduction ... ... ... ... ..... rovisions of section 80HHB assuming that section 80HHB was applicable and also if the agreement was covered by section 80HHB, the agreement could not automatically be treated as covered by section 80-0. In this case, both the assumptions are wrong. In the circumstances, though it is open to the Board to say that the agreement contemplates services which are not covered by section 80-0, this conclusion could not have been arrived at on the ground of the agreement falling within the provisions of section 80HHB. In the above view of the matter, it is considered fair and in the interests of justice that the impugned orders/letters of the Board are set aside and the Board is directed to dispose of the petitioner s application dated September 26, 1983, with reference to section 80-O on merits. Since the matter is pending for quite some time, the Board is further directed to dispose of the application within six months hereof. The rule is made partly absolute. No order as to costs.
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1990 (3) TMI 54 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Appeals, Writ ... ... ... ... ..... t the consideration for transfer of an immovable property as agreed to between the parties had not been truly stated in the instrument of transfer with the object of facilitating the reduction or evasion of the liability of the transferor to pay tax or concealing the income or assets of the transferee. Since that was an impossible task and the provisions proved ineffective, Chapter XXC was introduced. Taking, a clue from the Board s understanding of the provisions also, one can easily say that the conditions requisite mentioned in section 269C without the help of the presumptive clauses are required to be satisfied before the Competent Authority can assume valid jurisdiction to initiate proceedings for acquisition under section 269D/269C. Having regard to the above discussion, it has to be held that the conditions were not satisfied. The impugned notice, therefore, requires to be and is hereby quashed. Rule is made absolute in terms of prayer clause (a). No order as to costs.
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1990 (3) TMI 53 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Special Deduction, Writ ... ... ... ... ..... no whisper in the correspondence/ representations that his visit to Baghdad was a lecture tour. On the other hand, there is an indication in the letter/agreement dated January 25, 1993, that the visit was for a Government project at Baghdad in connection with which technical discussions were held by Shri Correa with other architects and engineers and consultants of the foreign Government. In the circumstances, while it is not a case where this court would like to interfere in its writ jurisdiction, it is considered fair and in the interests of justice that the petition is withdrawn with liberty to the petitioner to make a further representation to the Board explaining its stand clearly which is to be considered by the Board afresh according to law. In view of the above observations, Shri Dwarkadas, learned counsel for the petitioner, seeks permission to Withdraw the petition. Permission granted. The petition accordingly stands disposed of as withdrawn. No order as to costs.
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1990 (3) TMI 52 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Company Director ... ... ... ... ..... ossession of the property in dispute (See section 114, Illustration (e) of the Evidence Act). It is apt in this context to note the definite case of the first respondent that there was no resistance from any quarter much less from the petitioner when the third respondent went to the spot to take delivery of the property and, therefore, there was no need for him to put the third respondent in possession by removing the petitioner from the property. From these circumstances, it is clear that the only remedy, if any, that is open to the petitioner is the one envisaged under rule 44 or 47 of the Income-tax (Certificate Proceedings) Rules or rule 11 (6) of the Second Schedule. It is made clear that any such proceedings, if already initiated or yet to be initiated, by the petitioner, will have to be considered and disposed of uninfluenced by any of the observations or findings made in this order. The C. R. P., therefore, is dismissed but, in the circumstances, no order as to costs.
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1990 (3) TMI 51 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Tax Clearence Certificate ... ... ... ... ..... the departure but to the liability for all times to come, i.e., the liability that may even occur 20 years after the departure. In my judgment, the submission made on behalf of the Revenue is without any merit. When there is no dispute that the tax clearance certificate under section 230(1) is required with regard to the taxes outstanding as on the date of the departure or at the most the tax that may be outstanding with reference to the date of the departure, I fail to understand how satisfactory arrangements can go beyond or a guarantee may be required beyond that period. In this view of the matter, whether the guarantee is in wide terms or in narrow terms is not germane to the issue. After all, the guarantee was given for the purpose of obtaining the tax clearance certificate under section 230(1) and its scope cannot go beyond the requirement of the section. In the result, the petition succeeds. Rule is made absolute in terms of prayers (a) and (b). No order as to costs.
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