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Case Laws
Showing 261 to 280 of 290 Records
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1990 (3) TMI 30 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Business, Income ... ... ... ... ..... bunal was correct in law in holding that there was no cessation of sales tax liability of Rs. 11,40,967 in the case of the firm, Messrs. Kwality Restaurant and Ice-cream Company, and thereby deleting the addition of Rs. 1,36,900 by following their earlier order in Wealth-tax Appeal No. 1458/D/84 in the case of the other partner which has not been accepted by the Department ? The petition stands disposed of.
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1990 (3) TMI 29 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Reassessment, Writ ... ... ... ... ..... n, if necessary. It will, thus, be very difficult, if not impossible, for the Department to complete the assessments in accordance with the principles of natural justice assuming the references are answered in its favour. On the other hand, if the assessments are allowed to be completed, it is likely that they will result in multiplicity of proceedings. But taking into account all these circumstances, this court is of the view that the balance of convenience lies in favour of the Revenue. The Tribunal was, therefore, justified in not granting stay of the reassessment proceedings. Moreover, in writ jurisdiction, this court does not sit in appeal. It interferes only if the order challenged is without jurisdiction or patently wrong. In the result, the impugned order of the Tribunal calls for no interference. The petition is dismissed. Rule stands discharged. No order as to costs. The oral application of the assessee s counsel for the stay of this order for some time is rejected.
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1990 (3) TMI 28 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Benami Transaction, Financing Company
... ... ... ... ..... sue, arguments be heard on that issue. The defendants, in the meantime, also filed the present IAs. In view oil these facts, evidence could not be recorded even during those days. This case was originally filed in the year 1976 and, taking into consideration all these circumstances, I am of the view that, being a very old case, it requires to be expeditiously dealt with. The matter may, therefore, be listed before the Deputy Registrar for fixing fresh dates of trial in this case in October, 1990. Since already sufficient opportunities were granted to the parties to file the list of their witnesses, no indulgence can be shown to them now for the same purpose. If parties still desire to seek the assistance of the court for summoning their witnesses, they will file process fee, diet money, etc., within a week after the dates of trial are fixed. They shall also be responsible to get service effected upon their witnesses. To be listed before the Deputy Registrar on March 30, 1990.
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1990 (3) TMI 27 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Failure To Disclose Material Facts, Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... ngth of which it had obtained loans from creditors as also entries in the books of account showing payment of interest, it was for the Income-tax Officer to investigate and determine whether these documents were genuine or not. The assessee could not be said to have failed to make a true and full disclosure of the material facts by not confessing before the Income-tax Officer that the hundis and the entries in the books of account produced by it were bogus. As stated earlier, the petitioner in this case had disclosed necessary particulars about loan accounts. Such a finding is duly recorded in the assessment orders. In the circumstances, the petitioner cannot be blamed for not further informing the Income-tax Officer that the evidence placed on its behalf may not be genuine. In the above view of the matter, the validity of the notices issued under section 147(a) cannot be upheld. They are accordingly quashed. Rule is made absolute in terms of prayer (b). No order as to costs.
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1990 (3) TMI 26 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Due Time, Offence, Prosecution, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... SC 709, that the legal position is well-settled that when a prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by the court is as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made prima facie establish the offence. It is also for the court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. In the present case, as a prima facie case appears to have been made out against the petitioners, the question of quashing the trial does not arise. The order of the Magistrate charging the petitioners to face the trial for the offence under section 35B of the Act does not appear to suffer from any illegality or impropriety. I find no merit in these criminal revision petitions which 1, hereby, dismiss. The files of the trial court be immediately returned to the court concerned for proceeding in the matter in accordance with law.
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1990 (3) TMI 25 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... this property is higher than Rs. 61,00,000 as stated in the sale deed. Investigation could certainly have been made by the Income-tax Officer when he was completing the original assessment. This was not done even though the assessment was made under section 143(3) read with section 144B meaning thereby that the assessment passed through the scrutiny of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner also. On these facts, in my view, the ratio of the Supreme Court decision in ITO v. Madnani Engineering Works Ltd. 1979 118 ITR 1 and the Calcutta High Court decision in Tarawati Debi Agarwal v. ITO 1986 162 ITR 606 is clearly applicable. The petitioner cannot be held guilty for non-disclosure of full and relevant information necessary for assessment. In the result, the condition precedent for assumption of jurisdiction under section 148/147(a) is not satisfied. Hence, the petition succeeds. The impugned notice is quashed. Rule is made absolute in terms of prayer (a) No order as to costs.
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1990 (3) TMI 24 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Assessment, Firm ... ... ... ... ..... he name of one partner and paid for by the firm or from the profits of the partnership business are prima facie partnership property and the ordinary rule is that unless a contrary intention appears either expressly or by the nature of the transaction, property bought with money belonging to the firm, is deemed to have been bought on the account of the firm. We have earlier referred to the entries in the balance-sheet and those entries also clearly establish that the moneys of the firm have been invested as fixed deposits and it is not, therefore, open to the assessee-firm now to claim that the investments should be treated as having been made in the individual capacities of the two partners and that the interest thereon was not liable to be subjected to assessment in the hands of the assessee-firm. We, therefore, answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and against the assessee. The Revenue will be entitled to the costs of this reference. Counsel s fee Rs. 500.
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1990 (3) TMI 23 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Assessment Year, New Industrial Undertaking, Special Deduction ... ... ... ... ..... got relief under section 80J(2) of the Act for the assessment year 1968-69 and, therefore, the subsequent four assessment years are naturally 1969-70, 1970-71, 1971-72 and 1972-73. Thus, the last assessment year for which the assessee can get deduction under section 80J(2) of the Act would be only the assessment year 1972-73. In the instant case, the assessee changed its accounting year from December 31, 1969, to May 31, 1970, with the result there was no taxable income for the assessment year 1970-71. But it is not necessary for us to consider in this case whether in any of the four subsequent assessment years the assessee had taxable income or he was assessed to tax or not. Hence, the Tribunal was correct in upholding the order passed by the authorities below on this point. In that view of the matter, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and against the assessee. The assessee is directed to pay the costs to the Revenue. Counsel s fee is fixed at Rs. 500.
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1990 (3) TMI 22 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Advance Tax, Exemptions ... ... ... ... ..... sistant Commissioner held that this question does not arise for the assessment year 1973-74. When the question itself did not arise for consideration for the relevant year, the Tribunal could not have relied upon the earlier order to come to the conclusion that the activity has connection with the main business activity of the assessee of storing foodgrains. Even otherwise, the view taken by the Tribunal is not correct. Therefore, we have got to answer the first question referred to us in the negative and in favour of the Revenue. So far as the second question is concerned, the scope of section 214 has been fully discussed by the decision of the Gujarat High Court with which we respectfully agree. This decision has been followed by this court in CIT v. G. J. Fernandez 1986 160 ITR 602. Hence, the view taken by the Tribunal on this aspect of the matter is correct and we answer the second question referred to us is the affirmative and against the Revenue. Answered accordingly.
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1990 (3) TMI 21 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Bad Debt, Reference ... ... ... ... ..... oubtful debt, in either case, is purely a factual matter depending on actual facts having a bearing on that and not merely the hopes, fears or judgment of the creditor himself and it is for the assessee who claims it to be a bad or doubtful debt to prove that it had become bad in the accounting year, by relevant and proper evidence. In this case, the Tribunal, as noticed earlier, had adverted to all the relevant considerations relating to the availability of assets and liabilities of the insolvents and had found that the assessee had not been left even with a dim or remote ray of hope of recovery of the amounts from the insolvents and, therefore, the write-off, as claimed by the assessee, should be allowed. The conclusion so arrived at by the Tribunal is essentially one of fact and is more than amply supported by the available materials on record. We, therefore, answer the questions referred to us in the affirmative and against the Revenue. There will be no order as to costs.
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1990 (3) TMI 20 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Aggregation, Estate Duty, Property Deemed To Pass, Throwing Of Individual Property Into HUF ... ... ... ... ..... ithout Prejudice to questions Nos. (1) and (2) above, whether the Appellate Tribunal was right in holding that the lineal descendants share in the aforesaid properties cannot be aggregated under section 34 (1) (c) for rate purposes ? In so far as questions Nos. 1 and 2 are concerned, the decision of this court in Tax Case No. 580 of 1977 dated November 12, 1981, is against the Revenue. In view of that, questions Nos. 1 and 2 have to be answered in the affirmative and against the Revenue. In so far as the third question is concerned, section 34(1)(c) of the Estate Duty Act had been struck down as being violative of article 14 of the Constitution of India in the decision reported in V. Devaki Ammal v. Asst. CED 1973 91 ITR 24 (Mad). Under those circumstances, the Tribunal was quite right in holding that there cannot be an aggregation under that section. We, therefore, answer the third question also in the affirmative and against the Revenue., There will be no order as to costs.
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1990 (3) TMI 19 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Capital Gains, Exemptions Under Capital Gains, Mainly ... ... ... ... ..... ortion of the building had been let out for rent. However, on the acceptance of the factual finding in that case that the part let out was not a small portion of the building, it was held that the benefit of section 54 of the Act could not be availed of by the assessee. Earlier, it has been pointed out that in this case the assessee had been found to have occupied the first floor, larger area than the ground floor, which was let out, and it is, therefore, clearly established in this case that the assessee had used the premises mainly for her residence for the requisite period. Under those circumstances, undoubtedly, the assessee was entitled to claim the benefit of section 54 of the Act, as the decision in CIT v. C. Jayalakshmi 1981 132 ITR 82 (Mad) would, on the facts of this case, be inapplicable. We, therefore, answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and against the Revenue. The assessee will be entitled to the costs of this reference. Counsel s fee Rs. 500.
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1990 (3) TMI 18 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Burden Of Proof, Deemed Gift, Exemptions, Firm, Gift Tax ... ... ... ... ..... ble, viz., five years, he adopted the average income for three previous years and, allowing a discount of 4 per annum, computed the capitalised value at Rs. 74,86,652 as a reasonable consideration for the transfer. However, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal reduced the inadequacy of consideration to Rs. 41,92,000 by adopting a different method, viz., Table III given in C. A. Gulanikar s Book on Wealth and Gift-tax. No case is made out to interfere with this valuation carried out by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal and we affirm the same. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal has also taken into consideration the fact that the lease continued for a full period of five years and it was not terminated. The factual position that there was no termination with six months notice by either party cannot be rejected as wholly irrelevant and is corroborating evidence as to the intention of the parties. Accordingly, this question is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee.
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1990 (3) TMI 17 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Appeal To Tribunal, Writ ... ... ... ... ..... and one Judicial Member. For the proposition raised in this petition, learned standing counsel, appearing for the petitioners, has relied upon a decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in CWT v. S. Baliah 1978 114 ITR 858. We were informed at the Bar by learned standing counsel that the petitioners have already sought a reference to this court in respect of the controversy raised in this writ petition under section 27 of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957. As the petitioners have already availed of the alternative remedy, we do not feel inclined to entertain this writ petition. This petition is, accordingly, dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy.
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1990 (3) TMI 16 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Advance Tax, Appeals, Revision ... ... ... ... ..... no appeal was filed by the petitioner against the charging of interest under section 216 which by implication meant that the petitioner had accepted the levy of interest. There was no mention of levy of interest under section 216 in the appellate order of the Commissioner (Appeals) because that question was not raised in the appeal against the order of assessment. Having regard to the above discussion, it is evident that the order of the Commissioner passed on November 21, 1985, under section 264 did not suffer from any mistake far less a mistake apparent from the record. The impugned order passed by the Commissioner under section 154 withdrawing the relief granted by him under section 264 was thus without jurisdiction. The impugned order is, accordingly, quashed. The rule is made absolute in terms of prayer clause (a). The petitioner is entitled to refund of interest, if already paid, in pursuance of the Income-tax Officer s order or the impugned order. No order as to costs.
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1990 (3) TMI 15 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Capital Gains, Exemptions, Investment In Specified Securities ... ... ... ... ..... Development Bonds (Second Issue), 1983, has been notified as a specified security in pursuance of sub-clause (iii) of clause (c) of Explanation 1 to sub-section (1) of section 54E of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Therefore, the investment made by the petitioner on August 26, 1983, in the National Rural Development Bonds (Second Issue), 1983, is an investment in a specified security. The second investment is made on July 28, 1984. That is in the special series of units issued under the Capital Gains Unit Scheme, 1983, of the Unit Trust of India. This also has been notified as a specified security by Notification No. G. S. R. 804(E), dated October 27, 1983 (see 1983 144 ITR (St) 63). In the circumstances of the case, the petitioner is entitled to succeed in this original petition. Exhibit P-1 is, therefore, quashed. The second respondent is directed to rework the benefit available to the petitioner in the light of this judgment. The original petition is allowed as above. No costs.
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1990 (3) TMI 14 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Remission By Tribunal ... ... ... ... ..... l, the Tribunal observed that the proper order to be passed is to set aside the orders of the authorities below and restore the matter to the file of the Income-tax Officer for de novo making an assessment in each case in accordance with law after complete investigation bearing in mind the directions given by the Administrative Commissioner regarding specific aspects. We understand this order as stating that the entire matter is at large before the Income-tax Officer and that in the course of the de novo proceedings, it would be open to him to examine all the aspects including the applicability of section 68 of the Income-tax Act to the cash credits in question. We find, on a careful consideration of the matter, that there is absolutely no prejudice caused to the Revenue by the course directed to be adopted by the Tribunal, as all aspects relating to the assessments could be taken care of in the remitted proceedings. We, therefore, dismiss these tax case petitions. No costs.
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1990 (3) TMI 13 - HIMACHAL PRADESH HIGH COURT
Exemption From TDS Provisions, Trading In Alcoholic Liquor, Forest Produce, Etc. ... ... ... ... ..... dered to be the object of the legislation as it originally stood. L-13 licensees appear to be a class which, in view of the existing system of the transaction of sale of country liquor, cannot be considered to be a class evading payment of tax and thus failing under the category of others for whom sections 44AC and 206C were brought into the statute book, history and object and reasons of which we have specifically dealt with quite elaborately in the initial part of this judgment. The net result of our examination of the matter is that the present petitioners (L-13 licensees) come within the purview of this proviso and the provisions of section 206C and the other parts of section 44AC(1) do not apply to buyers covered by the proviso. The demand of tax at the purchase point from the petitioners by the respondents has no authority of law and they are restrained from doing so. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of this case, we leave the parties to bear their own costs.
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1990 (3) TMI 12 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Failure To Disclose Material Facts, Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... llustrate the point, let us assume the case of an assessee who does not file his returns of income. The mere fact that returns of income were not filed cannot, by any stretch of imagination, lead to the belief that income assessable to tax had escaped assessment. For the formation of that belief, you require something more than the mere fact of non-filing of return or non-disclosure of what is considered by the Income-tax Officer to be full particulars. Indirect support for the view is available in the decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of ITO v. Lakhmani Mewal Das 1976 103 ITR 437 and in the case of ITO v. Madnani Engineering Works Ltd. 1979 118 ITR 1. In the above view of the matter, the notice issued is without jurisdiction and is hereby quashed. As a consequence thereof, the assessment made in pursuance thereof will also have to be quashed. In the result, the rule is made absolute in terms of prayer clause (a) and the amended prayer (c) (i). No order as to costs.
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1990 (3) TMI 11 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Advance Tax, Interest Payable By Government ... ... ... ... ..... nt order under sub-section (1) of section 214 and from the date of the assessment order up to the date of actual refund under sub-section (2) thereof. It is, however, seen that the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 214 specifically lays down that no interest is payable for any period after the date of the provisional assessment. That apart, sub-section (2) of section 214 is applicable to refunds under that Chapter, i.e., Chapter XVII. In the present case, the refund was issued not under Chapter XVII, but under Chapter XIV and, sub-section (2) as such is not applicable. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that there is any apparent mistake of law in the order of the Income-tax Officer in granting interest up to the date of the provisional assessment order. Accordingly, the rule is made partly absolute, i.e., the petitioner shall be entitled to the interest on the entire amount of refund, i.e., Rs. 13,57,063, from April 1, 1978, to August 7, 1978. No order as to costs.
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