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Showing 21 to 40 of 354 Records
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1991 (2) TMI 409
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... ... ..... il Court and for a period of 10 days thereafter, status quo in respect of the premises concerned shall be maintained. 65. We certify that substantial questions of law relating to the interpretation of the Constitution arise in these petitions and appeal. 65. Each party to these petitions and appeal shall bear and pay its own costs. 67. We make it clear that each of the writ petitioners will be entitled, in proceedings before the Estate Officer and in appeal therefrom, to contend that the notices served upon them under Section 4 and the orders passed thereon are not valid having regard to the interpretation placed by us upon those provisions. 68. Upon the application of the petitioners, we stay our order in the writ petitions and appeal for a period of eight weeks from today. During that period of eight weeks no action shall be taken either by the respondents or by their Estate Officers in regard to any eviction proceedings under the Eviction Act, 1971. 69. Order accordingly.
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1991 (2) TMI 408
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... ... ..... what is good in respect of one case may not be good in respect of another case. One or two factors by themselves may not be sufficient to lead to any definite conclusion but on the overall considerations, if the Court finds that the unit for all purposes is a distinct one, the only factor that it is run by a common employer, may be a company or a partnership, would hardly be of any consequence. Considered in the light of all these cases except for the fact of petitioner Company owning the two units and the consolidation of their accounts, there is nothing which can be said to be indicative of the two units being a department or branch, of each other. Consequently the view taken by the Commissioner in Ex. B is erroneous and has to be quashed. Petitioner is entitled to the benefit claimed in Ex. A and the Commissioner shall give that benefit with effect from the date claimed. Rule is these terms made absolute with parties being left to bear their own costs. Rule made absolute.
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1991 (2) TMI 407
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... ... ..... of a society' within the meaning of section 91 and hence the Registrar's jurisdiction to entertain the claim was held not to have been barred under section 28 of the Rent Act. Applying the law laid down in the above decisions we are of the view that the instant dispute is one envisaged in section 91 of the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act and the Cooperative Courts rightly exercised jurisdiction. The next question, namely, section 91 is ultra vires the Article 14 of the Constitution of India to the extent it tries to reach persons who are not members is not tenable, inasmuch as the appellant is involved in a dispute touching the business of the Society and he was a nominal member of the Society by dint of his agreement of leave and licence and he was made so on his application. Result is that this appeal fails and it is dismissed, but under the facts and circumstances of the case without any order as to costs. Interim orders stand vacated. R.P. Appeal dismissed.
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1991 (2) TMI 406
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... ... ..... who had completed houseman ship in the speciality and he pleaded that the refusal of admission to him and admission granted to several respondents was contrary to the regulations. He maintained that he was at Sl.No. 7 of the list and ought to have been granted admission in DCH which he preferred. 2. There is some force in his submission but we find it difficult at this point of time to entertain the application as the 1990-91 session is almost complete and it would not be proper to allow him admission belatedly and disturb others who have already been admitted and have been undergoing the course. We accordingly dismiss the writ petition. Petitioner may look for admission in a future year. There will be no order for costs.
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1991 (2) TMI 405
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... ... ..... r Section 14-B when he is residing in a rented premises. Before parting with the case, we have to deal with one other contention which has been specifically raised by Mr. Sanghi. The counsel argued that the concerned landlord has taken voluntary retirement long earlier and he has become a part of the society just like any other landlord and Section 14-B was not intended to confer such landlord, the special right to recover immediate possession of the premises. Obvious answer to this contention is found in Section 14- B(1) which states that the persons who have already retired may within one year from the date of their release or retirement from such Armed Forces or, within a period of one year from the date of introduction of Section 14-B, whichever is later apply to the Controller for recovering the immediate possession of their premises. That is the legislative wisdom. In this view of the matter, the appeals stand disposed without an order as to costs. Appeals disposed of.
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1991 (2) TMI 404
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... ... ..... otification to 17 other employees in other departments while denying the said benefits to the said respondents in the Agriculture Department. It has been brought to the notice of the Court that the Operators-cum-Mechanics would be absorbed in the existing vacancies in the category of Sub-Assistant Engineers since injustice had been done to the respondents by keeping them in the panel since 1974 without taking any steps for their appointments as Sub-Assistant Engineers along with others when such appointments were made and the assurance made before the Court. The fact that in implementation of the judgment of the learned single Judge, the respondents have already been admitted to the benefits of the amended Rule, is an additional reason for this Court not to interfere with the impugned judgment. We are, therefore, of the view that both the civil appeals have only to be dismissed. We do so accordingly. The parties are directed to bear their respective costs. Appeals dismissed.
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1991 (2) TMI 403
Whether Section 4 of the West Bengal Entertainments and Luxuries (Hotels and Restaurants) Tax Act, 1972 can be held to be ultra vires the Article 14 of the Constitution of India for failure to make required classification and for imposition of luxury tax on flat or fixed rate only on the basis of air-conditioned floor space?
Held that:- The Act requires the luxury tax to be in proportion of or proportional the air-conditioned space and it requires the tax to be uniform upon the same class of owners of airconditioned hotels and restaurants which means that all similarly situated owners shall be treated alike. It does not suffer from lack of classificaion but instead impliedly authorises it by leaving out non-air-conditioned hotels and restaurants. Equality and uniform policy means uniform and equal rates of assessment and taxation which has been followed in this tax. The concept of equality and uniformity has to adjust from time to time to new and advancing social and economic conditions and needs of public finance and fiscal policy, of course within constitutional limitations.
Thus the measure or unit and the rate of taxation are uniform for all within the group subjected to tax. Further classification within the group was not considered necessary by the legislature which had wide latitude in the matter of classification keeping in view the nature of the taxable event. We accordingly hold that the luxury tax charged under s. 4 of the Act could not be said to be discriminatory, and consequently, the impugned notices also could not be said to be illegal or void. Appeal dismissed.
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1991 (2) TMI 402
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... ... ..... situated in Belgaum, conducted the inspection and searched in the premises. Though the seizure order annexure A is signed by only one of them and the recording of reasons was done by the other two CTOs, it can be gathered from the records that all the three intelligence officers of the department were involved in the investigation of this case, inspection of the accounts and other documents in the premises, the physical stock verification, etc. That the work involved required the active participation of more than one officer is indicated in the volume of large scale evasion detected as reflected in the proposition notice in which the approximate liability is estimated at Rs. 1,35,00,000. 15.. Therefore, on the facts of the present case, there is no reason to hold that there is any contravention of mandatory requirements of any provisions of section 165, Cr. P.C. Hence, the challenge made to the seizure order fails and the writ petition is dismissed. Writ petition dismissed.
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1991 (2) TMI 401
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... ... ..... Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Kalidas Mulji 1985 58 STC 166. The Bombay High Court took the view that it was not necessary to hear the dealer before a case is transferred from one assessing authority to another officer. It was further observed, on the facts that the transfer in that case did not cause any hardship to the assessee. 7.. In this case the petitioner s assessment for the two years have been transferred by the Commissioner in exercise of his power under rule 59 of the Karnataka Sales Tax Rules to the Assistant Commissioner (Intelligence) Bangalore, for the reasons stated in his order annexure A. The department has agreed, at the request of the petitioner s advocate, to hold the proceedings of assessment at Belgaum. Therefore no prejudice or hardship is caused to the petitioner by the order of transfer and it is not open to a dealer under the Act to question the Commissioner s power to transfer. The writ petitions are accordingly dismissed. Writ petitions dismissed.
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1991 (2) TMI 400
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... ... ..... er is vitiated and is accordingly fit to be quashed. The same is accordingly quashed. The case however has to be remitted back to the Joint Commissioner to afford to the assessee an opportunity of being heard on the question whether the intention in the first sale was to transfer the property right in the components of the building or irrespective of the components in the building itself. If it is found that the first sale was of the components only, the rule of law as stated in the judgment of this Court 1974 33 STC 1 (State of Madras v. Raman and Co.) shall apply. Otherwise it will be a case covered by the law stated by this Court in the case reported in 1986 62 STC 432 (Basha v. State of Tamil Nadu). 12.. In the result, this appeal is allowed. The order of the Joint Commissioner in Ref. No. M2/355/80 dated February 19, 1981, is quashed. The case is remitted to the Joint Commissioner for a fresh hearing in the light of the observations made above. No costs. Appeal allowed.
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1991 (2) TMI 399
Whether the plaintiff is entitled to an amount of ₹ 75,000 which according to him he had actually advanced and the respondents had received for the purpose of prosecuting their litigation?
Whether the advance in question was opposed to public policy
Held that:- The agreement itself stipulated that on the successful establishment of the claim, the Nawab would not only return the said advance but would also pay to the plaintiff consideration for the said advance. That consideration was agreed to be at the rate of one anna in a rupee. It is, therefore, apparent on the face of the record that the advance and the share in the estate, were a part of the same contractone as a consideration for the other. The two stand together and none can stand without the other. Hence, I am not impressed by the contention advanced by Shri Shah for the appellant that the amount of ₹ 75,000 which was advanced by the appellant can be separated from the other agreement or could be treated differently. Thus in agreement with the High Court that the agreement has to be treated as a whole and the two parts, viz., the advance and the consideration for the same cannot be separated from each other.
The parties had entered into the agreement in question with the avowed purpose that the plaintiff would use his then prevailing influence with the worthies in the Government to secure the gains for the Nawab. The Court On this evidence came to the conclusion that the agreement was nothing but one obviously made to lend services as a "go-between" or a "carrier" for commission. This being so, it was against public interest and detrimental to the health of body politic. A bargain whereby one party is to assist another in recovering property and is to share in the proceeds of the action and such assistance is by using the influence with the administration, irrespective of the fact that the persons intended to be influenced are not amenable to such influence is against protection and promotion of public welfare. It is opposed to public policy. In this view, we would hold that the plaintiff cannot enforce the agreement to recover the amount from the respondents. Appeal dismissed.
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1991 (2) TMI 398
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... ... ..... ath Sharma, Shri Prabhunath Sharma, Shri Om Nath Sharma and Shri Sew Sankar Sharma in respect of Sharma Chemical Works as well as xerox copy of an agreement dated January 2, 1985, between M/s. Sharma Chemical Works and M/s. Sahara Ayurvedic Products, the applicant, showing that the applicant will make an annual payment of Rs. 10,000 to M/s. Sharma Chemical Works, being the royalty for using and utilising the trade name Banphool under the authority of M/s. Sharma Chemical Works. In the circumstances, the contention of the applicant that the mark Banphool is not a trade-mark or a brand name cannot be accepted. Mr. Roy Chowdhury has also conceded this, after the aforesaid documents were shown to us by the learned State Representative. All the contentions of the learned advocate for the applicant thus fail. The application is, accordingly, rejected. We make no order as to costs. P.C. BANERJI (Technical Member).-I agree. L.N. RAY (Judicial Member).-I agree. Application dismissed.
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1991 (2) TMI 397
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... ... ..... ceed against the applicants in accordance with law and will be at liberty to pass order for assessment of tax under the Act of 1941 in respect of the applicants for any period, which will not be earlier than April 1, 1981 and there will be no question of any limitation for making the assessment of tax under the Act of 1941 for any such period, once the liability to pay tax under the Act of 1941 is determined. In case the learned Commercial Tax Officer comes to the conclusion that the applicants are liable to pay tax under the Act of 1941, he will take steps for registration of the applicant No. 1, the company, as a dealer under the Act of 1941 in accordance with law. This order is being passed by us, without entering into the merits of the respective cases. The applicants will be at liberty to challenge the order or orders to be passed by the learned Commercial Tax Officer in accordance with law. The main application is, accordingly disposed of. We make no order as to costs.
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1991 (2) TMI 396
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... ... ..... e steel flats. Even the certificate of registration in form B did not permit the assessee to use the C forms for purchase of steel flats. This fact sufficiently justified the recording of the finding that there had been false representation on the part of the assessee. In this connection, it is relevant to point out that the assessee had not requested the assessing authority to include steel flats in the certificate of registration in form B and what they had sought to be included was only machinery and tools and this has been specifically noticed by the first appellate authority. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we have not been persuaded to interfere, in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction, with the findings of fact recorded by the authorities below, which finding, in our opinion, is based both on materials on record and on proper appreciation of the facts and circumstances of the case. The tax revision cases fail and they are dismissed. Petitions dismissed.
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1991 (2) TMI 395
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... ... ..... goods for sale or otherwise and therefore the expression or otherwise is intended to denote a conjunctive introducing a specific alternative to the words for sale immediately preceding, the Supreme Court observed These observations, in our opinion, have no relevance to the present facts of the case. Further this very contention was negatived, though without reference to Ganesh Prasad s case 1969 24 STC 343 (SC) 1969 3 SCR 490 in the passage set out hereinbefore in Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Pio Food Packers 1980 46 STC 63 (SC). The expression consumption otherwise must in the context mean consumption of other goods for purposes other than sale. 3.. The error is so apparent that no elucidation is necessary. In the result, the application is allowed. The impugned orders are set aside. The respondents are directed to treat the charcoal used by the petitioner as fuel not taxable under section 7-A of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959. No costs. Petition allowed.
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1991 (2) TMI 394
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... ... ..... 973 32 STC 649 (Mad.) squarely and fully apply, with all force to the facts of the instant case, we have refrained from discussing the other judgments cited by the learned counsel for the parties, which in any event, are not the judgments, arising out of consideration of the provisions of section 2(r), explanation (2), clause (iii) of the Act and rule 5A(a) of the Rules but revolve round the consideration of the provisions of section 2(h) of the Central Sales Tax Act, which provision is materially different than the provision contained in section 2(r), explanation (2), clause (iii) of the Act. As a matter of fact, this distinction has been clearly spelt out and noticed by this Court in India Pistons Limited v. State of Tamil Nadu 1974 33 STC 472. 6.. As a result of the above discussion the appeal succeeds. The order of the Board of Revenue is set aside and that of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner is restored. There shall, however, be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.
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1991 (2) TMI 393
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... ... ..... nation that the Tribunal estimated the turnover by making an addition of 15 per cent to the taxable turnover as per books of account. The Tribunal has thus accepted the explanation of the assessee why he was unable to produce the account books and the sale bills. This is a finding on a question of fact, entered by the Tribunal. Material was available before the Tribunal in the form of an affidavit, which the Tribunal, accepted in evidence. Here is therefore a case where there is some evidence to support the finding of the Tribunal on a question of fact. This Court cannot go behind that finding. In the circumstances the Tribunal cannot be said to have committed an error of law in determining the turnover of both the years based on the sales turnover of the appellant as per his books of account and in adding 15 per cent of that turnover. No error of law has been committed by the Tribunal. These tax revision cases are without merit and are hereby dismissed. Petitions dismissed.
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1991 (2) TMI 392
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... ... ..... ich a single article is put alone is not conclusive to know the real nature or character of the article that will determine how to identify it for the tax purpose. As noticed by the Tribunal, the Revenue authorities identified these cables as electrical goods for all purposes, except that in the matter of sale of such cables to automobile parts dealers, they wanted to impose a tax rate of 13 per cent treating only such sales as sale of parts and accessories of motor vehicles and trailers in entry 3 of the First Schedule. The revenue authorities evidently committed an error of law in so dividing the PVC cables for tax purposes into electrical goods and parts and accessories of motor vehicles. The Tribunal has taken a correct view in holding that the assessment originally made was in order and the reassessment at 13 per cent on a portion of turnover is not justified. There is no merit in these petitions. These petitions are accordingly dismissed. No costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1991 (2) TMI 391
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... ... ..... y applying the Commissioner s circular. As we are of the view that the circular does not reflect the correct view of the matter, it is liable to be ignored. Assessing authorities are directed to make fresh orders, after considering the question in the light of this decision as to the meaning of accessories in relation to a sprinkler each article has to be examined afresh to consider whether it is an accessory in the light of this order. Consequently, these petitions are allowed and we set aside the circular of the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes dated May 25, 1987, issued as per No. CLR. CR. 26/87-88. We also set aside all the impugned assessments so far as they apply item 20 of the Second Schedule to the Act to the various articles, as accessories to sprinklers and direct the respondentassessing authority to make fresh orders, in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made above. Rule is made absolute. We make no order as to costs. Writ petitions allowed.
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1991 (2) TMI 390
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... ... ..... in three months from this date and the applicant is directed, on the basis of the undertaking, to extend co-operation for the purpose of investigation. The respondents are also directed to return the seized books of account and papers within 15 days of completing the investigation. As prayed for, the respondents are given the liberty to retain xerox copies of the seized books of account and papers at their own cost at the time of returning the originals to the applicant. The respondents are also given the liberty to put their signatures on the seized books of account and papers before photo copying and returning the same to the applicant. The sum of Rs. 10,000, which was paid by the applicant after the seizure and over and above the normal payments according to returns, as per annxure B to the present application, will abide the ultimate result of the investigation. The main application is, thus, disposed of. No order is made as to costs. Application disposed of accordingly.
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