|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 281 to 300 of 354 Records
-
1991 (2) TMI 75 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Approved Gratuity Fund, Business Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... licane Permanent Fund Ltd. v. CIT 1989 179 ITR 492, the Madras High Court held that any contribution to the approved fund is deductible and in case the statutory requirements are contravened, it is for the authority concerned to take action and it would not affect the contribution towards the approved fund as such. In the instant case, there is no necessity to go into this question because it is not the case of the Revenue that this contribution was outside the purview of the statutory Rules. The sole contention of the Revenue is based on the fact that a claim to deduction of a similar sum was negatived during the earlier year. This is entirely irrelevant. So long as the contribution satisfies the statutory requirments as a contribution to the approved fund, the assessee is entitled to the deduction and the Tribunal was justified in upholding the claim of the assessee in this regard. Therefore, our answer to the question referred is in the affirmative and against the Revenue.
-
1991 (2) TMI 73 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Estate Duty, Interest, Provisional Assessment ... ... ... ... ..... ner a provisional assessment of the estate duty payable by the person delivering the account on the basis of the account delivered, at any time after the receipt of the account by him under sub-section (2) of section 57 of the Act Upon making of the provisional assessment, the assessee has to pay to the Controller, or furnish security to his satisfaction for the payment of the estate duty, in accordance with the provisional assessment and the Controller thereupon is to grant him a certificate that such duty has been or will be paid or that none is due, as the case may be, in respect of the property mentioned in the certificate. Therefore, in so far as it was held that only an error apparent on the face of the record could be rectified under section 61 of the Act after the regular assessment was made, there was no possibility of payment of interest under section 70(2) of the Act. Hence, this case is entirely distinguishable. In the result, we dismiss the writ appeal. No costs.
-
1991 (2) TMI 72 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... int of a willing purchaser . In other words, estimating the value which one has to do is on the basis which a willing purchaser would pay in buying the said asset in the open market. It has nothing to do with how the vendor would apply the consideration after he receives it. The concept of the net realisable worth of an asset has no relevance at all in valuing the shares in the present case. There is no liability which would go to make up the valuation. We may also add that in Bharat Hari Singhania 1979 119 ITR 258, the Allahabad High Court relied on the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Pandit Lakshmi Kant Jha 1973 90 ITR 97 and held that the notional capital gain would not come within the meaning of debt owed and cannot be deducted from the value of the shares which it would fetch in the open market. For the reasons aforesaid, we answer the question in the affirmative and in favour of the Revenue. There will be no order as to costs. SHYAMAL KUMAR SEN J. -I agree.
-
1991 (2) TMI 71 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... 1962-63 onwards. There is no dispute about the facts of the case. It is not possible to accept the submission made on behalf of the Revenue that the said amount should be treated as income of the assessee during the assessment year 1968-69 when it was received by the assessee in lump sum as part payment. In CIT v. T. N. K. Govindarayalu Chetty 1987 165 ITR 231, the Supreme Court held that interest on the compensation upon acquisition payable by the State accrued yearly and was taxable proportionately in each of the years between the date of acquisition and the date of payment. Following the ratio and the principles laid down in this case, we hold that the Tribunal was justified in holding that the amount of compensation for requisition of the land of the assessee was assessable year to year on accrual basis and not in a lump sum in the year of receipt. We answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. There shall be no order as to costs.
-
1991 (2) TMI 70 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Accounting, Business Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... er the question referred to this court either properly or effectively. We, therefore, decline to answer the question referred to this court, but, at the same time, direct the Incometax Appellate Tribunal to restore the appeal to Me and decide the matter afresh in accordance with law. It is for the Appellate Tribunal to consider the method of accounting adopted by the assessee, i.e., whether the assessee had accepted the liability in sales tax proceedings and how and in what manner the provision is made in the accounts, etc. All aspects should be considered by the Tribunal afresh and then only a decision shall be rendered. We decline to answer the question referred to this court, but direct the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal to restore the appeal to Me and decide the question afresh. The reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this judgment under the seal of this court and the signature of the Registrar will be forwarded to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench.
-
1991 (2) TMI 69 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Advance Tax ... ... ... ... ..... cial year is to be taken into account for the purpose of considering whether or not the assessee had discharged its obligation. The Gujarat High Court in the case of Chandrakant Damodardas v. ITO 1980 123 ITR 748, and our High Court in the case of Pfizer Limited v. K. N. Anantharama Aiyar, CIT 1987 163 ITR 461, have held that such payment is required to be considered as a payment towards advance tax within the meaning of section 210. As a natural corollary, to say the least, it has to be held that the question whether an assessee is entitled to interest under section 214 on the excess of advance tax payment over the liability is a debatable question. That being so, it has to be further held that withdrawal of such interest by taking recourse to the proceedings under section 154 is not justified. Accordingly, we answer questions Nos. 1 and 3 in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee and question No. 2 in the negative and in favour of the assessee. No order as to costs.
-
1991 (2) TMI 68 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Building, Depreciation ... ... ... ... ..... entitled to depreciation and development rebate under the Income-tax Act ? Counsel are agreed that the issue involved herein is covered by number of decisions of our court, the last one being CIT v. Tata Oil Mills Co. Ltd. 1990 182 ITR 130. Following the aforesaid judgment, we answer the question referred to us in the negative, but direct the Tribunal that the assessee is entitled to depreciation on the roadways connecting the plants with one another within the factory premises as building and not as plant . No order as to costs.
-
1991 (2) TMI 67 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Assets, Net Wealth, Wealth Tax, Wealth Tax Act ... ... ... ... ..... ealth-tax assessments. It was, in such circumstances that the court held that there is no presumption that intangible addition made in the income-tax assessment of an earlier year continued to be available or was available with the assessee for the later year. The said argument cannot hold good when, for the same assessment year, intangible additions are made in the income-tax assessments, and the said amount is treated as an asset, as on the valuation date. We are of the view that the Appellate Tribunal was in error in holding that the additions made in the income-tax assessment for the very same year cannot be considered to be assets for the purpose of wealth-tax on the relevant valuation date. We, therefore, answer the question referred to this court in the negative, against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue. A copy of this judgment under the seal of this court and the signature of the Registrar shall be forwarded to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench.
-
1991 (2) TMI 66 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Company, Surtax ... ... ... ... ..... its books following the straight line method. During the accounting year 1964-65, it changed its method of claiming depreciation to the written down value method in place of the straight line method. Having done so, it passed the entry of Rs. 20,34,872 under the head Depreciation reserve . It is out of this depreciation reserve that the amount of Rs. 19,97,065 was transferred to General Reserve No. 1 account in the year 1969 which is in dispute before us. On these facts, we find that the judgment of our court in the case of CIT v. Zenith Steel Pipes Ltd. 1978 112 ITR 215, is fully applicable. In fact, it was fairly stated by Shri Dwarkadas for the assessee that the Tribunal had relied upon its order in that case for the purpose of taking the view it took. Since that decision has been reversed by our court in the case , we have no difficulty in answering the question in the negative and in favour of the Revenue. The question is so answered. There will be no order as to costs.
-
1991 (2) TMI 65 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... espect of an apprehended liability as in the case before us. In the present case, the claim is not with regard to interest. It is with regard to the principal amount of liabilities. In our judgment, the Supreme Court decision in CIT v. Sitaldas Tirathdas 1961 41 ITR 367, if applied properly, goes against the claim. At this stage, Shri Dalvi stated that the claim for interest at least to the extent of interest on the principal amount of liabilities, if any, should be directed to be allowed. We are afraid, that in the absence of any material on record, it is not possible to accept Shri Dalvi s submission, particularly as there is no discussion about this claim in the order of the Tribunal and the questions of law referred to us do not cover this aspect. Accordingly, the first question of law is answered in the negative and in favour of the Revenue. In view of our answer to question No. 1, questions Nos. 2 and 3 do not survive. Hence, they are not answered. No order as to costs.
-
1991 (2) TMI 64 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Gratuity ... ... ... ... ..... ed was only a reworking of the figures, by excluding the future increments. We see no error either in the reasoning or in the conclusion of the Appellate Tribunal aforesaid. In the light of our above discussion, we answer the question referred to this court by the income-tax Appellate Tribunal, in the affirmative, against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue, and further hold that the assessee is not entitled to deduct the whole amount of gratuity liability as claimed by it. It is only entitled to deduction of a sum of Rs. 2,18,646 which was allowed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner by his order dated September 12, 1974. The said order has become final and conclusive and the assessee cannot, in view of the nature of the appellate order, claim a further sum of Rs. 1,66,364. The reference is answered as above. A copy of this judgment, under the seal of this court and the signature of the Registrar shall be forwarded to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench.
-
1991 (2) TMI 63 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Industrial Company ... ... ... ... ..... while manufacturing pharmaceutical goods for the assessee. It is not absolutely necessary that the assessee must depute the supervisory staff or exercise direct supervision over the manufacturing process of the kind suggested by learned counsel. It is sufficient if, on an overall view of the matter, it is found that it was the assessee-company which was the real manufacturer and the assessee had merely employed the agency of some one else through whom the goods were caused to be manufactured. It is also not necessary that the assessee must pay the wages of the workers employed in the manufacturing process. We have considered the factual data in this case in the light of the judgment of our High Court reported in Neo Pharma s case 1982 137 ITR 879 referred to hereinabove and we are of the view that the Tribunal was right in the view which it took. In the result, we answer both the questions in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. There shall be no order as to costs.
-
1991 (2) TMI 62 - KERALA HIGH COURT
HUF, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... for consideration and declined to answer the question, but, at the same time, directed the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal to restore the appeals to file and pose the question that arose for consideration from correct perspective and dispose of the appeals in accordance with law. The assessee herein is the same assessee who was the respondent in Income-tax References Nos. 147 to 150 of 1988- 1991 188 ITR 665. In view of the earlier Bench decision of this court dated January 25, 1991, we decline to answer the questions referred to this court but, at the same time, direct the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal to dispose of the appeal afresh in accordance with law and in the light of the directions contained in the judgment in Income-tax References Nos. 147 to 150 of 1988- 1991 188 ITR 665. The reference is disposed of as above. A copy of this judgment under the seal of this court and the signature of the Registrar shall be forwarded to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench.
-
1991 (2) TMI 61 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Disallowance, Perquisite ... ... ... ... ..... paid monthly under the terms of service agreements are perquisites ? 2. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the sum of Rs. 28,334 should be disallowed under section 40A(5) of the Income-tax Act ? The assessment year involved is 1972-73. Counsel are agreed that, in view of our court s decision in the case of CIT v. Indokem Private Ltd. 1981 132 ITR 125, both the questions are to be answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. The questions are so answered. No order as to costs.
-
1991 (2) TMI 60 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Article 14 Of The Constitution, Legislative Competence ... ... ... ... ..... and vest all the properties in the trusts. There is no provision in the Societies Registration Act to convert the properties of a society into trust property. Under these circumstances, looking to the very terms of the instruments in question, it is not possible to apply article 52(d) of the Act. In our considered opinion, the documents fall within the meaning of settlement as defined under section 2(1)(q)(iii) of the Act and as such they are liable to duty under article 48 of the Schedule to the Act. In view of the facts stated and discussion made above, we record our opinion and answer the questions as stated below (1) The deeds in question are not declarations of trust chargeable to stamp duty under article 54A of the Schedule to the Act. (2) The instruments are liable to stamp duty under article 48 of the Schedule to the Act read with section 2(1) (q) (iii) of the Act. The other questions does not arise in view of the opinion recorded on questions Nos. 1 and 2. No costs.
-
1991 (2) TMI 59 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Income From Undisclosed Sources ... ... ... ... ..... ces and the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case and in relying on surmises, conjectures and suspicions, irrelevant considerations, improper rejection of material and relevant evidence and approving the perverse and misdirected findings of the authorities below ? 7. Whether the Tribunal s order is legally sustainable for consideration of evidence which had been rejected by it ? All these questions pertain to one single issue, namely, whether the cigarettes of a value of Rs. 1,16,500 said to have been distributed free in pursuance of the Sales Promotion Free Scheme , were actually so distributed free or whether they were sold by the assessee-firm. All the authorities have recorded a concurrent finding of fact that they were really and actually sold. No reasons have been shown to us as to why the said findings of fact should not be accepted nor is it shown how a question of law does arise from the order of the Tribunal. The application is, accordingly, dismissed.
-
1991 (2) TMI 58 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Penalty In Wealth Tax, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... satisfied that, while disclosing his net wealth fully, the assessee has acted in good faith. It is held that, if the assessee honestly thought that he has fully disclosed his net wealth, although the disclosure made by him is ultimately found to be inaccurate, it would not be possible to say that he did not act in good faith. The angle from which the matter has to be examined is whether the assessee made a full disclosure of his net wealth or not it is not to be looked at with reference to the net wealth as ultimately evaluated by the Wealth-tax Officer. In our opinion, the principle of the said decision clearly goes to support the petitioner s contention in this case. Following the said decision, we allow the writ petition and quash the impugned order. The Commissioner of Wealth-tax shall dispose of the application made by the petitioner under section 18B afresh in accordance with law including the principles indicated in the aforesaid Bench decision of this court. No costs.
-
1991 (2) TMI 57 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... the contention of learned counsel but we find ourselves unable to accept the said decision. That was a case where the assessee owned certain salt pans. Some of them he was working himself and some he had leased out. So far as the salt pans leased out are concerned, the question was whether they should be exempted under section 5(1)(xxxi) of the Act. The Madras High Court held that for claiming the said deduction, what is relevant is not mere ownership of an asset but the activity of manufacture. We think that, taking the said view, amounts to reading words into the clause which are not there. More particularly, when the Wealth-tax Act deals with tax on assets owned by an assessee, it would not be appropriate to adopt the interpretation placed upon the said clause by the Madras High Court. We, therefore, disagree with the said view respectfully. For the above reasons, the question referred is answered in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.
-
1991 (2) TMI 56 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Depreciation ... ... ... ... ..... nd not contractual. The facts of the present case before us have made us ponder deeply over the question involved. Probably, if this court had not distinguished Kuthiala s case 1971 82 ITR 570 (SC) in the manner it had been done in Ramkumar Mills case 1988 180 ITR 464 (Kar), we would have ventured to extend its principles to the instant case, subject to what we may have thought about the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in Nawab Sir Mir Osman Ali Khan s case 1986 162 ITR 888. The assessee in the instant case is a public sector undertaking capable of agitating the question further in the Supreme Court. The question involved is of considerable importance and is not entirely free from doubt. Having regard to this circumstance read with the need for us to maintain judicial discipline and propriety by accepting the ratio of Ramkumar Mills s case 1989 180 ITR 464 (Kar), we answer the questions referred to us in the negative and against the assessee. Answered accordingly.
-
1991 (2) TMI 55 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Firm, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... on of this court in CWT v. J. K. Jute Mills Co. Ltd. 1979 120 ITR 150, which too lays down the very same proposition, namely, that the concealed income relating to the assessment years 1939 to 1946 cannot be treated as available for inclusion in the net wealth of the assessee in the assessment years 1958-59 and 1959-60. This decision too is of no relevance in the facts of the present case. The result of the above discussion is that while we do not appreciate the reasoning of the Tribunal on which it allowed the assessee s appeals and dismissed the Revenue s appeals, we cannot, at the same time, answer the question stated straightaway. The proper course would be to direct the Tribunal to pass orders afresh in the light of the legal position and observations adumbrated herein. It is but proper that the Tribunal hears both the parties before passing final orders in the matter. Accordingly, we decline to answer the question, subject to the observations made hereinabove. No costs.
....
|
