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Showing 141 to 160 of 359 Records
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1991 (3) TMI 231 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Classification ... ... ... ... ..... gment of Gujarat High Court. We are required to follow the judgments of High Courts in preference to the earlier decision of this Tribunal as the High Court judgments were not considered by the Tribunal. The contention of the appellants before the Collector (Appeals) was that their soya bean meal and de-oiled rice-bran were ingredients for animal feed, but were not animal feed per se. This contention does not hold good in view of the judgments of Bombay and Gujarat High Courts and also this Tribunal rsquo s decision in the case of Punjab Bone Meals (Supra). 5. Therefore, following the judgments of Bombay High Court and Gujarat High Court and the earlier decision of this Tribunal in Punjab Bone Meals rsquo case, we hold that the appellants soya bean meal and de-oiled rice-bran were covered by the term ldquo Animal Feed rdquo and were liable to export duty under Item 21 of the Second Schedule to the Customs Tariff Act, 1975. We uphold the impugned order and dismiss the appeals.
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1991 (3) TMI 230 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Demand - Clandestine Removal ... ... ... ... ..... o demand of duty as well as penal provisions had been invoked, in the normal course it could be expected that both these aspects will be covered by the same order. However, there was no bar in law to treat the duty aspect and the penalty aspect separately. 37. The principle of functus officio urged by the learned Counsel does not help the appellant as the order on the penalty aspect had been reserved. 38. In the Tribunal also, the Benches many times initially confine themselves only to the point of jurisdiction and pass orders and only subsequently decide the matters on merits if needs be. Keeping this analogy in mind and also noticing that no prejudice has been caused in any case to the appellant by passing a separate order and his submissions have been duly taken into account I do not consider the second order bad in law. 39. In the result, I agree with my learned colleague that there was no reason to interfere with the impugned order. Accordingly the appeals are dismissed.
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1991 (3) TMI 229 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Valuation - Misdeclaration of value ... ... ... ... ..... . Therefore, we accept the finding of the Collector that the invoice price should be accepted in respect of the imports from Hungary. 38A. emsp We agree with Mr. Kantawala that there is no material to prove that in fact there is increase in the cost of raw material, and therefore, the cost of bearings should also be increased. We also agree with him that it depends on various factors in the absence of which we cannot accept the contention of the appellants. 39. emsp We are also of the opinion that the suppliers are various government organisations of the countries from where the goods are imported. It will be improper to assume that the price confirmed by the official suppliers did not disclose the true price. M/s. Jayaram Doss Khusiram v. CC, Bombay CEGAT rsquo s Order No. 302/84-A dated 14th May, 1984 . 40. In other respects we agree with the Collector and confirm his order. 41. In the light of the foregoing we feel no merits in the appeals and accordingly, we dismiss them.
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1991 (3) TMI 228 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Appeal - Jurisdiction ... ... ... ... ..... limit which would have operated against them, if they had filed a claim for refund. In fact, they could have pressed their point about refund during the hearing in the High Court which apparently, they do not seem to have done, thinking that in the event of getting the opportunity to file an appeal before Collector (Appeals), they would be able to call into question all the classification lists from 1972 onwards and become entitled to a larger sum of money as refund. 18. emsp We do not, therefore, think that the appellant is entitled to interpret the orders of the High Court in such a way as to disregard the various provisions of the law and seek any direction from us to authorities to grant him refund of duty paid from 1972 onwards. Thus, having examined all the arguments and the case laws cited before us at considerable length, we are of the view that the order passed by the Collector (Appeals) was correct and the present appeal merits rejection. We accordingly dismiss it.
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1991 (3) TMI 227 - ITAT MADRAS-C
... ... ... ... ..... s. 209A(1)(a) or 209A(2) would not apply. The income returned for the asst. yr. 1984-85 was only Rs. 2,191. In view of the meagre amount of returned income and in view of the fact that for earlier assessments losses were determined the assessee is under a bona fide impression that it need not file any advance tax return. Hence we feel that interest under s.217(1)(a) cannot be levied. 24. Ground No. II for the asst. yr. 1984-85 The assessee incurred advertisement expenditure of Rs. 1,98,738. On the excess of Rs. 1 lakh expenditure in this regard, 20 per cent was disallowed under s. 37(3A), which worked out to Rs. 19,748. This is being contested now before us in this second appeal. Since no arguments are addressed on this ground, we feel that the disallowance is correctly made and no interference is called for. 25. In the result the appeals for the asst. yrs. 1982-83, 1985-86 and 1986-87 are allowed, whereas the appeals for the asst. yrs. 1983-84 and 1984-85 are partly allowed.
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1991 (3) TMI 225 - ITAT MADRAS-C
... ... ... ... ..... only directory. Administrative law recognizes that discretionary powers are coupled with duties and the repository of a discretion is under a legal duty to observe certain requirements that condition the manner in which its discretion may be exercised (de Smith s Judicial Review of Administrative Action - Fourth Edition, page 283). Section 285A(2) states that the Commissioner may impose such fine not exceeding fifty rupees as he thinks fit for every day during which the contravention continues. This indicates that this section has been devised for compelling the filing of a form and not for penalizing a default after the form is actually filed. The picture that emerges is that even if the failure to file the form originally were to be taken as a technical default, it was entirely venial and did not attract the provisions of the section. Hence we are convinced that these are not fit cases for imposition of penalty. The penalties imposed are cancelled. The appeals are allowed.
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1991 (3) TMI 223 - ITAT MADRAS-C
A Firm, Carrying On Business ... ... ... ... ..... g in a benefit to a Director to be rested according to a different standard. In this situation, the provisions of section 40(c)(i) which apply specially to expenditure resulting in remuneration to the Director have to be applied in preference to the general provisions of section 40A(2). We must also remember that the Supreme Court has held in the case of Union of India v. India Fisheries (P.) Ltd. 1965 57 ITR 331 that if there is an apparent conflict between two independent provisions of law, the special provision must prevaill. The proviso to Section 40A(2)(a) also makes this clear. It is not in dispute that this expenditure resulted in a benefit to the Directors. Therefore, this expenditure has to be added to the remuneration already paid to the directors to consider whether the ceiling prescribed under section 40(c) is exceeded. We direct the Income-tax Officer to conduct this exercise and make the necessary disallowance. 11. In the result, the appeal is treated as allowed
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1991 (3) TMI 222 - ITAT MADRAS-C
Deemed Concealment, Reduction Or Waiver ... ... ... ... ..... hat which might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of the commission of the offence. In the present case, since the deemed concealment pertains to a return filed at a time when sections 273A was in force along with the Explanation, the legal position at that time was that the penalty imposable for a deemed concealment as a whole shall be waived if the disclosure is made within 15 days from the issue of notice under section 139. Since the conditions prescribed for such waiver have been fulfilled by the assessee, it is not possible to inflict the penalty since such an infliction would expose the assessee to a punishment greater than that which was in force at the relevant time. Hence we are satisfied that on the facts of this case and in view of the legal position at the relevant time, the penalties imposed under section 271(1)(c) cannot be maintained. They are, therefore, cancelled. 11 to 13. These paras are not reproduced here as they involve minor issues.
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1991 (3) TMI 219 - ITAT MADRAS-B
... ... ... ... ..... the points considered and decided by the first appellate authority. Therefore, as far as the Tribunal s functioning under the jurisdiction of the said Courts, 1987 and 1998 Amendments merely clarified pre-existing position. 20. As regards Shri krishnan s points that in case of the investment trust of India, the Tribunal had not considered the decision of the ITAT, Madras Bench in the case of Carborandum Universal Ltd., we may at once point out that in the former case the Tribunal had examined the various decisions of the Madras High Court having a direct bearing on the doctrine of merger starting from C. Gnanasundara Nayagar vs. CIT (1961) 41 ITR 375 (Mad) and came t a conclusion that on the doctrine of merger simplicity the Madras High Court never subscribed to the full merger view. In the circumstances, therefore, we see no force in this contention of Shri Krishnan. 21. We, therefore, decline to interfere in the matter. 22. In the result, the assessee s appeal is dismissed.
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1991 (3) TMI 216 - ITAT MADRAS-B
Closing Stock, Interest On Borrowed Capital, Sale Proceeds ... ... ... ... ..... mits. These are the facts and in view of the mixture of funds in the overdraft account, the assessee s contention that to the extent of Rs. 25 lakhs the assessee should be deemed to have drawn from the sale proceeds credited into the overdraft account seems to be reasonable and the fund-flow statement relied upon by the assessee and thoroughly discussed in the order of the CIT(A) clearly demonstrates how in this situation an amount of Rs. 25 lakhs though apparently drawn from the overdraft account is financed through the revenue receipts embedded in the overdraft account. In these circumstances, we hold that the CIT(A) has rightly approached the matter from the businessman s point of view. The disallowance, therefore, in our view, is rightly deleted in the facts and circumstances of the case. In the result, we do not find any reason to interfere with the finding of the CIT(A). We uphold his order on this point. 23. This para is not reproduced here as it involves minor issues.
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1991 (3) TMI 215 - ITAT MADRAS-B
Accounting Year, Additional Depreciation, Advance Tax, Bona Fide, Business Expenditure, Carrying On Business, Investment Allowance, Plant And Machinery, Sales Tax Act, Sales Tax Liability
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1991 (3) TMI 210 - ITAT JAIPUR
... ... ... ... ..... addition made by the Assessing Officer and sustained by the learned CIT(A) as income from undisclosed sources on the basis of estimated expenses incurred in the marriage of daughter are based only on conjectures and surmises and are not supported by any evidence and hence, they are directed to be deleted. 27. The next objection of the assessee is regarding assessing income from SOP at Rs. 16,708 against Rs. 4,200 assessed last year. We find that the main reason for enhancing income from SOP was increase in assessee rsquo s own income an account of additions of Rs. 1 lakh. Those additions have been directed to be deleted by us. In any case, there appears to be no justification for increasing income from SOP from Rs. 4,200 assessed in the asst. yr. 1984-85 and again in 1988-89 to a higher figure in the assessment year under consideration. Hence the income from SOP is directed to be assessed at Rs. 4,200. 28. Accordingly, all the three appeals filed by the assessee are allowed.
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1991 (3) TMI 208 - ITAT HYDERABAD-B
Expenditure On Scientific Research, Deductions, Business Expenditure, Depreciation, Method Of Accounting, Investment Allowance
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1991 (3) TMI 207 - ITAT HYDERABAD-A
Powers Of Tribunal, Principles Of Natural Justice, Interpretation OF STATUTES ... ... ... ... ..... assessee stood discharged etc. 3. From the above facts, the following points of difference arc noticed and arc placed before the Hon ble President with a request to take suitable further action (1) In a case where the assessee is on appeal against the additions by way of cash credits only and the other additions are not under challenge, whether the Tribunal would be justified in setting aside the entire order of assessment instead of the additions? (2) Whether the additions made by the Assessing Officer in violation of the principles of natural justice should be set aside as void ab initio and thus deleted or should the case be restored to the ITO with directions for redoing? (3) Where an assessee has assailed additions on the failure of natural justice and also on the merits of each addition, whether it would be just and proper to deal with only the question of natural justice and to restore the issue to the Assessing Officer without considering the merits of each addition?
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1991 (3) TMI 206 - ITAT HYDERABAD-A
Expenditure Incurred, Foreign Company, Revenue Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... required to be seen is the purpose for which the amounts are paid. The fact that in addition to the lump sum payment there is a stipulation for payment of royalty does not alter the nature of the payment of lump sum amount. As pointed out by the Calcutta High Court in B.N. Elias and Co. (P.) Ltd. s case, the fact that the assessee need not return the knowledge at a later date does not alter the issue inasmuch as the knowledge becomes obsolete and is of no use with passage of time. Once knowledge is acquired, by its very nature it cannot be returned. In view of the above discussion and in view of the above authoritative pronouncements of various courts, in our opinion, the first appellate authority is right in holding that the payments made by the assessee for acquisition of the technical know-how in respect of these years is in the nature of revenue expenditure. The orders of the first appellate authority are accordingly confirmed and the appeals of the revenue are dismissed
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1991 (3) TMI 205 - ITAT GAUHATI
Development Allowance, Weighted Deduction ... ... ... ... ..... e benefit for weighted deduction would be admissible to cases where the assessments are still pending as on 1-8-1981. The above rule 6AA did not amend any provision of section. It simply particularised certain specific activities for which weighted deduction can be considered under sub-clause (ix). In the present case the assessment was apparently pending as on 1-8-1981. The Assessing Officer would have to take into consideration the above rule and to implement the same if other conditions are otherwise satisfied. 26. In view of what we have discussed above, we direct the Assessing Officer to allow the assessee s claim for weighted deduction under section 35B(1)(b)(ix) of the Income-tax on the expenditure incurred by it for maintenance of warehouse outside India after verification and examination of various items admissible in accordance with law, and after giving the assessee an opportunity of being heard. 27. In the result, the appeal is allowed in the terms indicated above
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1991 (3) TMI 204 - ITAT DELHI-E
Accounting Year, Benefit Or Perquisite Arising From Business, Business Income ... ... ... ... ..... d that the depreciation was allowable on other stores and godowns. Since CIT(Appeals) has not adjudicated on the issue, he is directed to do so now. To this extent, this matter is remitted back to the CIT(Appeals). 38. In the result, the assessee s appeal is partly allowed. 39. This leaves us with only one more ground in the revenue s appeal regarding the allowance of Rs. 17,900 on account of rent. 40. CIT (Appeals) has allowed the rent on the ground that the same cannot be disallowed merely because the manufacturing activities of the assessee had stopped. The assessee s business has contained though the manufacturing activity has ceased. The rent has been paid in respect of Kanpur Office. We were given to understand that such a claim has been allowed by the assessing officer himself in the subsequent years. We do not see any error or infirmity in the order of CIT (Appeals) on this account. This ground, therefore, fails. 41. In the result, the departmental appeal is dismissed
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1991 (3) TMI 203 - ITAT DELHI-D
Capital Gains ... ... ... ... ..... d in the point of difference of opinion that whether the consideration passed for the transfer was a short term capital gain or not, included in it is the question whether it was exempt from tax altogether on the ground that it was goodwill. But I do not think that the issue was covered in that manner by the question framed by the learned Members. 18. In conclusion, my opinion on the point of difference of opinion referred to me is that the learned Accountant Member was not right in saying that the consideration received by the assessee for the transfer was for a short term capital asset and therefore the amount in question was to be taxed as short term capital gain. There is no need for setting aside the order of the assessing officer for a fresh adjudication of the matter in terms of the directions recorded in the order of the learned Judicial Member. 19. The matter will now go before the regular Bench for deciding the appeals in accordance with the opinion of the majority.
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1991 (3) TMI 202 - ITAT DELHI-D
Carry Forward And Set Off, Income From Other Sources, Unabsorbed Depreciation ... ... ... ... ..... perusal of the various authorities cited on both sides would indicate that the Madras judgments including East Asiatic Co. (India) Ltd. are the only judgments that squarely apply to the present case and the authorities cited on behalf of the learned counsel for the assessee do not support the contention that even in the absence of any business whatsoever in a particular year, unabsorbed depreciation of an earlier year can be set off against income under heads other than business. We are therefore, of the view that the learned CIT(Appeals) was not justified in reversing the finding of the assessing officer and directing adjustment of unabsorbed depreciation of earlier years against the income of the assessee for the year under consideration assessed under the head Income from other sources . We, therefore, set aside the CIT (Appeals) s order on this point and restore the action of the assessing officer. 8 and 9. These paras are not reproduced here as they involve minor issues
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1991 (3) TMI 201 - ITAT DELHI-C
Revised Return ... ... ... ... ..... y before us. But on the other hand supports the view taken by the Delhi High Court. Here the admitted facts are that the return was filed by the assessee under section 139(4) and the revised return filed by the assessee claiming the loss in Mushroom business was under section 139(5) and the question is whether the assessee can be permitted to revise returns by taking recourse to section 139(5). The Delhi High Court is categorical on this point. In fact this was also the argument taken up by the assessee in Calcutta High Court and that view appears to have found favour indirectly not only with the Calcutta High Court but also with the Allahabad High Court. If that is so, the view appears to be unanimous that a revised return cannot be filed under section 139(5) to make amends for a return filed under section 139(4). 10. For these reasons, we are of the view that the decision taken by the revenue in this case is in accordance with law and we confirm it and dismiss those appeals
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