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Showing 261 to 280 of 359 Records
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1991 (3) TMI 99 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... nation about such excess amount or the explanation offered by him is not, in the opinion of the Assessing Officer, satisfactory, the excess amount may be deemed to be the income of the assessee for such financial year. In this state of affairs, we do not think it advisable or appropriate to interfere at this stage. All the questions of fact and law can be gone into in the reassessment proceedings if the petitioner chooses to raise the same. We may not, however, be understood as saying that initiation of reassessment proceedings has been validly done. We do not express any opinion on that question and relegate the petitioner to the assessing authority. If he has not already filed his objection/revised return in pursuance of the impugned show-cause notice, he may do so now within a period of one month from today. The assessing authority shall consider the same and dispose of the matter in accordance with law. The writ petition is dismissed with the above observations. No costs.
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1991 (3) TMI 98 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Company, Surtax ... ... ... ... ..... ons made therein are naturally in connection therewith. Since, however, in our view, mere transfer of an amount from a reserve under one head to another does not and should not make any difference, in our opinion, the Supreme Court judgment is squarely applicable. Accordingly, we hold that even though during the year in question there is no retiring gratuity reserve as such, out of the amount standing to the credit of that reserve was transferred to the general reserve (sic). Only that part of the reserve will constitute a reserve as is found to be in excess of the assessee s liability in that regard on the basis of actuarial valuation as on the relevant date. The answer to the first question will, therefore, also be in the negative and in favour of the Revenue. However, while giving effect to our judgment, the Tribunal will have to find out the excess, if any, in the said amount of reserve over the assessee s liability and treat that part as a reserve. No order as to costs.
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1991 (3) TMI 97 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ion of a capital gain is prescribed by section 48. The Supreme Court has held that where the cost of acquisition of an asset is nil, the capital gain is not chargeable to tax (vide CIT v. B. C. Srinivasa Setty 1981 128 ITR 294 (SC)). On this reasoning, even if the said receipt is a capital gain, it is not a capital gain chargeable under the provisions of section 45 for the simple reason that there was no cost of acquisition for the tenancy right (vide CIT v. Markapakula Agamma 1987 165 IT 386 (AP). Accordingly, it must be held to be a receipt of a casual and non-recurring nature within the meaning of clause (3) of section 10. The Appellate Tribunal was in error in holding that the said receipt was a capital gain and in further directing the Income-tax Officer to compute the tax treating it as a capital gain. For the above reasons, the question referred is answered in the negative, that is, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1991 (3) TMI 96 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Deduction, Other Sources ... ... ... ... ..... finding has become final. Once the assessee is found to be the owner of the seized goods under the Income-tax Act, it is for him to plead and prove that the goods were lost to him. So far as the income-tax proceedings are concerned, there is no material to show that the said goods seized were lost to the assessee during the accounting period. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was justified in holding that the assessee cannot treat the value of the goods confiscated as a loss. The alternative plea put forward before the Appellate Tribunal was rightly rejected. Therefore, we are of the view that the Appellate Tribunal was justified in disallowing a sum of Rs. 1,25,000 as loss for the assessment year 1972-73. We answer the question referred to this court in the affirmative against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue. A copy of this judgment under the seal of this court and the signature of the Registrar shall be forwarded to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench.
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1991 (3) TMI 95 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Estate Duty, Gift, Property Passing ... ... ... ... ..... pal estate of the deceased, the Assistant Controller included a sum of Rs. 24,208 which represented the premia paid by the deceased in respect of the policies within two years before the death of the deceased. The Tribunal has taken the view that no estate duty liability arises in regard to the aforesaid premia under section 9 of the Estate Duty Act. This court has, in CGT v. Seth Arvind N. Mafatlal 1990 184 ITR 580, taken the view that the premia paid by the assessee in respect of the policies of insurance of his life taken out under the provisions of the Married Women s Property Act for the benefit of his children would be in discharge of his obligation and would not amount to gifts made by the assessee to the beneficiaries of the policies. In this view of the matter, if the premia do not amount to gifts, it is obvious that sections 9 and 27 would not apply. We, therefore, answer the question in the affirmative and in favour of the accountable person. No order as to costs.
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1991 (3) TMI 94 - HIMACHAL PRADESH HIGH COURT
Estate Duty, Relief ... ... ... ... ..... ied in section 61 has no application in such cases. 2. The Board have accepted the Madras High Court decision. (Sd.) P. Ranganathan Under Secretary, Central Board of Direct Taxes . . . A circular of this kind issued by the Central Board of Direct Taxes would be binding on the officers and persons employed in the execution of the Act by virtue of the provisions of section 5(8) of the Act. The binding nature of such circulars issued by the Board was considered by the Supreme Court in the case of K. P. Varghese v. ITO 1981 131 ITR 597. In view of what we have stated above, the impugned decision of the respondent, Annexure G , cannot be sustained in law and has to be quashed. The writ petition as such is allowed. The order, Annexure G , passed by the respondent on August 29, 1980, is quashed and set aside with a further direction to the respondent to refund the sum of Rs. 13,106 paid by the petitioners on account of estate duty towards the estate of late Smt. Lila Wati. No costs.
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1991 (3) TMI 93 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Deduction, Estate Duty ... ... ... ... ..... on 5 of the Estate Duty Act. Hence, we answer question No, 1 in the affirmative and against the assessee. In our view, the surrender value of the insurance policy was bound to be aggregated with the other property passing on the death of the deceased as it was not such property as would fall within the exception created under sub-section (3) of section 34 of the Act, inasmuch as the deceased had an interest in the surrender value of the policy at the time of her death and such interest or property did not come into existence as a consequence of or upon her death. In the result, we agree with the Tribunal and answer question No. 2 in the affirmative and against the assessee. Counsel on both sides are agreed that question No. 3 referred for the opinion of this court is already concluded by a judgment of this court in CED v. Bipinchandra N. Patel 1990 186 ITR 29. In view of this judgment, we answer question No. 3 in the affirmative and against the assessee. No order as to costs.
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1991 (3) TMI 92 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rned counsel for the Department, contended that when the liabilities were cancelled, it was not only open but the Wealth-tax Officer was obliged to ignore these liabilities for the purpose of valuing the shares under rule 1D. Shri Dilip Dwarkadas, learned counsel for the assessee, has reiterated that the liabilities under section 23A continued to exist during the pendency of the reference proceedings. However, we are unable to agree with Shri Dilip Dwarkadas. What we have to see is the situation as obtaining on the relevant valuation dates. If on the valuation dates, the liabilities did not exist in that the Tribunal had cancelled those liabilities, it is not possible to hold that merely because the Department had filed a reference application, the liabilities continued to exist so as to be taken into account for the purpose of valuation under rule ID. Accordingly, we answer the second question in the negative and in favour of the Revenue. There will be no order as to costs.
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1991 (3) TMI 91 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Article 14 Of The Constitution, Legislative Competence ... ... ... ... ..... on June 30, 1969, whereas, according to the Department, the death having taken place on September 30, 1969, it was likely that certain things had happened during the course of those three months which ought to be taken into account. In our judgment, this question is only of academic interest in view of our conclusion that the valuation of unquoted shares for the purpose of estate duty also can be and should be made in accordance with rule 1 D of the Wealth- tax Rules, 1957. We say so as Explanation 1 to rule 1D itself makes it clear that the valuation in accordance with rule 1D is to be made on the basis ofthe balance-sheet drawn up on a date immediately preceding the valuation date (in the present case, it will be the date of death). Incidentally, this is also the view taken by the Karnataka High Court in the case of CED v. J. Krishna Murthy 1974 96 ITR 87. Accordingly, we answer the question in the affirmative and in favour of the accountable person. No order as to costs.
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1991 (3) TMI 90 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Capital Reserve, Company, Surtax ... ... ... ... ..... se of Vazir Sultan Tobacco Co. Ltd. v. CIT 1981 132 ITR 559, approved the Madras High Court decision in the case of CIT v. Indian Steel Rolling Mills Ltd. 1973 92 ITR 78. In that judgment, it was observed that though there is a distinction between a reserve and provision in the Companies Act, 1956, that distinction cannot be imported into the meaning of the word reserve in rule 1 of the Second Schedule to the Super Profits Tax Act (in the present case, the Surtax Act). The term reserve , it was stated, meant a sum specifically set apart for future use or for a specific occasion and it must be a specific sum for specific use. In our judgment, the nature of the provision herein falls within the meaning of the word reserve ascribed to it in this judgment. Accordingly, we are in agreement with the Tribunal that these amounts correctly represented reserve . The first question is, therefore, answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. There will be no order as to costs.
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1991 (3) TMI 89 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Annuity, Exemptions, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... as touched and the full amount of corpus would not be available for being handed over to the residuary beneficiary. Unless part of the corpus of the trust fund was utilised, there could be no commutation of the annuity into a lump sum grant. This was forbidden by the trust deed. Thus, the second requirement of the relevant provision of the Act regarding there being a provision in the trust deed preventing commutation of the annuity into a lump sum grant is also satisfied. In this view of the matter, we have no hesitation in holding that the right of the assessee to receive Periodical amount of Rs. 1,000 per month under the trust deed was in the nature of an annuity which was clearly exempt from levy of wealth-tax under the provisions already quoted above. In view of the above discussion, we answer question No. 3 in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. We answer question No. 4 also in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1991 (3) TMI 88 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rships. In the other category of cases, the facts were that there was a renunciation by one partner of a part of his share in favour of other partners by execution of document. These cases, therefore, have no bearing on the question before us. The facts in the case before us, as we have already pointed out, are that the incoming partner is a major he shares both profits and losses he was a graduate his father was 65 and suffering from asthma, and eventually died. In the circumstances, we consider it quite reasonable to infer that he was taken as a partner for consideration particularly in the light of the observations of our Court in the two cases referred to above. Accordingly, we answer the first question in the negative and in favour of the assessee. The second question is consequential and is also answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. In view of our answers to questions Nos. 1 and 2, it is not necessary to answer question No. 3. No order as to costs.
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1991 (3) TMI 87 - HIMACHAL PRADESH HIGH COURT
Limitation, Penalty ... ... ... ... ..... of section 275 have been correctly analysed by holding that it is the fresh assessment made by the Income-tax Officer after remand which should be taken as the relevant assessment and not the first assessment prior to remand. The subsequent judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Ganapathi Rao s case 1978 115 ITR 277 has not taken note of the decision in Seetharama Lakshmi s case 1978 111 ITR 212 (AP). We are, therefore, in full agreement with the law laid down by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Seetharama Lakshmi s case 1978 111 ITR 212, and hold that, where the original assessment order is set aside in appeal, there is no subsisting assessment order till completion of a fresh assessment and it is the date of the fresh order of assessment which is relevant for computing the period of limitation for initiating proceedings for imposing penalty. In view of the above, the reference is answered in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee.
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1991 (3) TMI 86 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Deduction, Gratuity, New Industrial Undertaking, Special Deduction ... ... ... ... ..... ood reasons have been set out in the various judgments of other High Courts in support of the view that the assessee must be held entitled to avail of the benefit of carry forward and set-off of section 80J deficiency in the year of profit even in the absence of computation thereof in the year of loss. We concur with the reasoning and conclusion in each of the judgments cited before us, except the above-referred judgment of the Karnataka High Court in the case of CIT v. Sree Valliappa Textiles 1987 166 ITR 548. We respectfully differ from the Karnataka view. In view of the above discussion, we answer question No. 1 also in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. In the result, to repeat, the questions are answered as follows Question No. 1 In the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. Question No. 2 In the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. Question No. 3 In the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. There shall be no order as to costs of the reference.
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1991 (3) TMI 85 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Gratuity ... ... ... ... ..... uding the aforesaid amount of Rs. 5,34,000 accrued during the previous year. Accordingly, we answer the reframed question in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. Needless to mention, in view of our answer to the reframed question in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee, the Tribunal has to pass such orders as are necessary to dispose of the case conformably to such judgment as provided in section 260(1) of the Act. In other words, it does not necessarily follow that the liability must be allowed as a deduction. If, in the meantime, as had happened in this case, certain provisions have come on the statute book which are applicable in the year under reference, the Tribunal will have to consider the assessee s claim in the light of such provisions while giving effect to our order under section 260(1). The Tribunal s passing such an order under section 260(1), in our opinion, will be in conformity with the view taken by the Supreme Court. No order as to costs.
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1991 (3) TMI 84 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Depreciation, Plant ... ... ... ... ..... see. However, we direct that while giving effect to our judgment the Tribunal shall allow the assessee depreciation on the amount of Rs. 47,207, treating it as a part of the cost of the plant within the meaning of sections 43(3) and 32 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. With the consent of the parties and for the sake of uniformity and convenience (sic) there is another reference relating to the assessee s assessment for assessment year 1970-71, being Income-tax Reference No. 466 of 1977, in which, like the earlier reference in CIT v. Toshniwal Electrodes Mfg. Co. 1990 185 ITR 29, two questions of law have been referred to this court. We have taken it on board. Following our judgment in the assessee s own case in CIT v. Toshniwal Electrodes Mfg. Co. 1990 185 ITR 29, we answer the second question in this reference in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. In view thereof, the first question is again not pressed by counsel for the assessee. There will be no order as to costs.
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1991 (3) TMI 83 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Depreciation ... ... ... ... ..... other words, the admitted position is that the buildings in the housing colonies represent the assessee s business assets entitled to depreciation. The question, therefore, is whether the approach roads inside that housing colony or colonies can or cannot be treated as building . Having regard to what has been held by our court in CIT v. Colour Chem Ltd. 1977 106 ITR 323 and by the Calcutta High Court in Oil India Ltd. v. CIT 1978 114 ITR 323, the test to be applied in such cases is whether the roads or roadways have to be regarded as adjuncts to the factory building, in this case housing colonies or something appurtenant to such buildings. In the facts as they are stated in the statement of the case, we are inclined to hold that the roads in question are adjuncts to the buildings in the housing colonies and are appurtenant thereto. Accordingly, the second question also requires to be and is hereby answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. No order as to costs.
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1991 (3) TMI 82 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Industrial Undertaking ... ... ... ... ..... bution of electricity or any other form of power (emphasis supplied.) If the production of a cinematograph film amounts to manufacture of an article or goods within the meaning of section 104(4)(a) as it then stood, it follows that the said activity must be treated as an industrial undertaking within the purview of section 80J of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Apart from the circular, we are satisfied that, even on a common sense view, film production will have to be considered as a manufacturing activity and the undertaking will have to be considered as an industrial undertaking. It is so considered under excise law and other allied laws also. Whether the assessee satisfies all other conditions of the said section or not will have to be examined by the authorities below to whom the directions have already been issued by the Income-tax Tribunal. Accordingly, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1991 (3) TMI 81 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Depreciation, Entries In I.T. Rules ... ... ... ... ..... . was intended to include accidental or inadvertent omissions in the construction work of the kind mentioned earlier, viz., dams, tunnels canals, and not to extend to earth-moving machinery. We are, therefore, unable to accept the reasoning of the Tribunal for holding that the drilling machinery owned and used by the assessee would fall within entry 4 of item III -D of Part I to Appendix I to the Rules enabling the assessee to claim depreciation at 30 and not at 10 , as allowed. Though learned counsel for the assessee placed strong reliance on the decision in CIT v. Super Drillers 1988 174 ITR 640 (AP), we find that that decision does not, in any manner, advance the case of the assessee, for the question had been approached by the court as one of fact. We, therefore, answer the common question referred in T. C. Nos. 1188 to 1190 of 1980 and the second question in T. C. No. 1391 of 1980 in the negative and in favour of the Revenue. There will be, however, no order as to costs.
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1991 (3) TMI 80 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Compensation, Trusts, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... f law. There is no need to direct the Tribunal to draw up a supplementary statement of the case and refer those questions to us for opinion as the answer to the questions is obvious. Section 21(2) clearly envisages direct assessment on the beneficiaries notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1) of section 21. As regards the second set of questions, however, i.e., questions Nos. 7 to 11, we are inclined to hold that the matter requires a closer examination. Accordingly, we make the rule absolute with regard to questions Nos. 7 to 11. However, we will reframe the question of law as under Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in taking the value of the assessee s interest in the impugned immovable property at Rs. 1,95,278 for all the years under reference ? The Tribunal is directed to draw up a statement of the case and refer the question of law to this court within six months from the receipt of writ. No order as to costs.
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