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Showing 181 to 200 of 226 Records
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1992 (10) TMI 46 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... conclusion of ours, questions Nos. 1 and 2 shall have to be decided in the negative, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue by saying that the Tribunal was not right in law in holding that the imposition of penalty of Rs. 25,968 was justified, and by further saying that the finding of the Tribunal that the imposition of penalty was justified as sustainable in law, is not correct. Question No. 3 shall have to be answered in the affirmative, but again in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue, by saying that the finding of the Tribunal that the penalty is justified in law is not based on appreciation of relevant material. Question No. 4 shall have to be answered in the negative, but once again in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue by saying that the Tribunal was not justified in law in the imposition of penalty on the basis of the correct principles of law. We, therefore, answer the referred questions as indicated above, with no order as to costs.
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1992 (10) TMI 45 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Bonus, Business Expenditure, Company ... ... ... ... ..... previous year and that, when the board meeting sanctions the payment of bonus at a higher rate, after the close of that particular year, by no stretch of imagination can it be said that there was an existing liability or a crystallised liability to pay the bonus during the relevant year. Such liability to pay bonus is at a higher rate. In view of this, it appears clear that the view which is being sought to be canvassed by learned counsel, Mr. Mehta, for the assessee, before us cannot be accepted. If once this decision is reached, it would follow that the Tribunal was justified in law in confirming the disallowance of bonus amount of Rs. 15,178 and further holding that the liability of the bonus was not referable to the year under reference. The conclusion, therefore, would be that the questions referred to us require to be answered in the affirmative, against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue. We hereby accordingly answer the said questions with no order as to costs.
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1992 (10) TMI 44 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
New Industrial Undertaking ... ... ... ... ..... the computation period should be excluded while computing the capital for the purpose of section 80J. If the debts, however, consist of or include borrowed moneys which fall within the description of rule 19A(3)(b), the same are to be included while computing the capital for the purpose of section 801. On the second question, Mr. Ponda, learned counsel appearing for the assessee, drew our attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT v. V. Damodaran 1980 121 ITR 572, and submitted that the second question ought not to have been referred to us by the Tribunal at the instance of the assessee in the same reference application. We are not examining this submission because, in any view of the matter, our answer to question No. 1 covers the second question which is raised at the instance of the assessee. Therefore, there is no need to answer question No. 2. The questions are answered accordingly. Looking to the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.
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1992 (10) TMI 43 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Actual Cost, Business, Depreciation ... ... ... ... ..... hold that the Tribunal was not right in holding that the assessee was not entitled to claim the benefit on the basis of this additional liability resulting from the exchange rate fluctuation. In the result, we answer question No. 1 in the affirmative, that is, against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue. We decline to answer question No. 2 as it does not call for any reply. Question No. 3 is not answered as it is not pressed and question No. 4 is answered in the negative, that is in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. No order as to costs. The reference application is dismissed. Rule is discharged with no order as to costs. As this reference arises out of three reference applications made before the Tribunal, the office is directed to give three separate numbers to the three matters arising out of those three reference applications treating Income-tax Reference No. 74 of 1980 as arising out of the order passed in Reference Application No. 119/(Ahd) of 1979.
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1992 (10) TMI 42 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Assessment, Estate Duty ... ... ... ... ..... ears that the justifiable view would be that the computation was not possible under section 40 of the Estate Duty Act, 1953. It, therefore, becomes clear that the Tribunal was right in holding that no property passed on the death of the deceased Dhanbharati which could be included in the dutiable estate of the deceased under the relevant provisions of the Estate Duty Act, 1953. In the same way, in our view, the Tribunal was also further justified in coming to the conclusion that the deceased was only a Mahant of the Math in question and, on his death, no property would be said to have passed under section 5, 6 or 7 of the Estate Duty Act, 1953, and, therefore, consequently nothing was liable to be included in the dutiable estate of the deceased. Therefore the question referred to us requires to be answered and replied in the affirmative, against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee. We, therefore, do hereby answer the said questions accordingly with no order as to costs.
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1992 (10) TMI 41 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Estate Duty ... ... ... ... ..... tor passed on the death of the deceased, Aratgauri. We shall, therefore, have to say that the Tribunal was right in holding that the residuary estate of Shri C. M. Jhaveri passed on the death of his widow, Aratgauri, under section 11 of the Estate Duty Act, 1953. It is also clear that, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was perfectly justified in holding that, under the will of the deceased, Shri C. M. Jhaveri, the deceased, Aratgauri had a life interest in the entire estate. In the same way, we shall have to say that, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the deceased, Aratgauri, had interest in possession in the residuary estate under the will of her deceased husband, Shri C. M. Jhaveri. In view of these findings and conclusions of ours, all the abovesaid three questions shall have to be replied in the affirmative, against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue. We accordingly do hereby answer the abovesaid questions with no order as to costs.
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1992 (10) TMI 40 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Reference, Res Judicata, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... ne way or the other and parties have allowed that position to be sustained by not challenging the order, it would not at all be appropriate to allow the position to be changed in a subsequent year . The above proposition of law is very clear and fully applies to the facts of this case. The valuation which was adopted by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal having become final and there being no change in the circumstances, the assessee cannot be allowed now to reagitate the same issue on the same facts and circumstances. There should be finality even under the income-tax law in respect of a finding which has been given in a particular year. The finding, which has been given with regard to valuation of the property is undisturbed and as such we are of the opinion that the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was justified in rejecting the application for reference. The reference application under section 27(3) of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957, is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.
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1992 (10) TMI 39 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Gratuity ... ... ... ... ..... or that year on actuarial basis. A similar question had arisen in the case of CIT v. Gaskets and Radiators Pvt. Ltd. 1991 192 ITR 509 (Guj). In that case, it was held that only after the Payment of Gratuity Act came into force, the liability of the employer to pay gratuity to its employees arose. Thus, it was only on the coming into force of the Payment of Gratuity Act that the assessee became liable to pay Rs. 25,47,829 by way of gratuity to its employees. Therefore, following the said decision, it will have to be held that the Tribunal was right in holding that the assessee became entitled to the deduction of the entire amount of Rs. 25,47,829 even though, on actuarial basis, the assessee s liability towards payment of gratuity during the previous year under consideration was only Rs. 8,47,815. We, therefore, answer the question in the affirmative, i.e., against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee. This reference is disposed of accordingly with no orders as to costs.
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1992 (10) TMI 38 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Partition, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... the share in the coparcenary property cannot come into existence thereafter. This court in CIT v. Ramanlal Nagindas Shah 1992 195 ITR 9, has observed that it is the settled legal position that where the property was originally owned by coparceners and later devolved on a sole surviving coparcener, as also where such property on partition came to be allocated to a single coparcener who had female members in the family, it has to be assessed in the hands of such sole surviving coparcener or the sole coparcener as a Hindu undivided family. Therefore, it will have to be held that the Tribunal was right in holding that, in spite of partition, there was a Hindu undivided family of Gordhanbhai Patel and his unmarried daughter and consequently the gifts made to the Hindu undivided family could not have been included in the wealth of the assessee. In the result, the question is answered in the affirmative, i.e., against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee. No order as to costs.
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1992 (10) TMI 37 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Annual Charge, Deduction, Income From House Property ... ... ... ... ..... But it ultimately decided the question on the language of the section as it then stood. The discussion contained in these and similar decisions relating to voluntary charges may have been the background in which section 24(1)(iv) was amended to add the words not being a charge created by the assessee voluntarily . The language of section 24(1)(iv) incorporates the concept of a charge being voluntarily created by the assessee as against a charge which comes into being by operation of law or by virtue of an order of the court or by the act of parties other than the assessee such as when the assessee gets a property already subject to a charge. Only those annual charges which are not created by the assessee voluntarily in this sense, are capable of being deducted from the income from house property. In the premises, the question which is referred to us is answered in the negative and in favour of the Revenue. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
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1992 (10) TMI 36 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Assessment, Firm, Reference, Registration ... ... ... ... ..... ami of Messrs. Daulatram Vasudeo and Co. and the inclusion of income of Messrs. Jaipur Oil Company in the hands of the assessee was not justified ? The Division Bench of this court consisting of the Chief Justice K. C. Agrawal and Mr. Justice I. S. Israni, on the second question, came to the conclusion that, from the statements of Chetan Dass and Dhula Ram, there is a clear indication of the existence of the firm, Messrs. Jaipur Oil Company, and the theory of the Revenue is disproved that Messrs. Jaipur Oil Company was a benami firm. The assessment year being the same and also the subject-matter, in our opinion, it is a question of fact which stands decided in identical cases referred to above inasmuch as the Tribunal s finding is the same in both the matters and if the application is refused in the matter of CIT v. Daulat Ram Vasudeo and Co., necessarily the application in this case deserves to be dismissed as a coronary to the same. The application is, therefore, dismissed.
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1992 (10) TMI 35 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... penditure on repairs could not be considered to be a payment made once and for all . Consequently, the repairs of the road was rightly allowed by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. It was not capital expenditure, but was revenue. The expenditure needed in keeping the roads worthy of taking minerals is not of permanent character. In L. H. Sugar Factory and Oil Mills (P.) Ltd. v. CIT 1980 125 ITR 293, it was held by the Supreme Court as revenue expenditure. As in the instant case, making repairs to roads could not be considered to be of enduring benefit, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was right in holding it to be a revenue expenditure. Further, we find that the question raised by the Department is not purely one of law or a mixed question of law and fact. It is purely question of fact which has to be decided on the evidence led by the parties. Consequently, the reference application, having not raised any question of law, is liable to be rejected and it is hereby rejected.
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1992 (10) TMI 34 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Advance Tax, Penalty, Reference ... ... ... ... ..... 1991 189 ITR 319 (Bom) and CWT v. Girdhari Lal Saraf 1991 190 ITR 264 (Raj), that in cases where the amount involved is petty, the reference should not be called for merely for the sake of arguments. We are in agreement with what has been held in the above two cases and besides this we are also of the opinion that there is a difference between an approach to be given for a reference to be called under sections 271(1)(c) and 273(2)(a) as section 271 deals with the cases of false returns while section 273 deals with false estimates which is always at the stage of depositing advance tax. In this view of the matter, we are not inclined to accept this application. The application is dismissed.
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1992 (10) TMI 33 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Benami, Firm, Registration ... ... ... ... ..... was she aware even about her capital account in the books of the firm and thus the finding which was given that she was benamidar of her son, was perfectly justified in the facts and circumstances of the case. If the partnership has been entered into between two persons of whom one is a benamidar of the other, then the net result would be that there is no relation of partnership between at least two persons since the benamidar is on account of the other real owner, namely, the son and he being the only person, the firm cannot be registered as a partnership firm. In these circumstances, we are of the view that the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was not justified in granting registration when the genuineness of the firm was not established and one of the partners was held to be the benamidar of the other and there remained only one person who cannot constitute a firm. Accordingly, the reference is answered in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. No order as to costs.
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1992 (10) TMI 32 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Appeal To Tribunal, Business Expenditure, Remuneration Paid To Directors ... ... ... ... ..... her party which is affected. This matter has been considered by the Supreme Court in the case of CIT v. Mahalakshmi Textiles Mills Ltd. 1967 66 ITR 710, wherein it has been held that the Departmental authorities would be under a duty to consider the claim even on alternative grounds. This court in Deep Chand Kothari v. CIT 1988 171 ITR 381 and in CIT v. Delhi Sanitary Stores 1981 127 ITR 822, have also taken the view that new questions can be raised before the Tribunal. In these circumstances, we are satisfied that the Tribunal was justified in allowing the questions with regard to the applicability of section 40(c). Accordingly, the reference is answered in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee and it is held that the Income-tax Officer was justified in allowing deduction to the extent of Rs. 1,20,000 and that the Tribunal was further justified in allowing the Department to raise the questions regarding the applicability of section 40(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
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1992 (10) TMI 31 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Fines And Penalties ... ... ... ... ..... come-tax Act and the facts of the case as to whether it was a case of replacement of a worn out or unserviceable engine or the diesel engine was fitted only to replace the petrol engine. The finding of fact could have been recorded by the Tribunal on the basis of evidence before it and not on the basis of any judgment as to whether the petrol engine was worn out or unserviceable or not. In these circumstances, we are of the view that the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was not justified in holding that the expenditure incurred by the assessee-company on replacement of the petrol engine with a diesel engine is an allowable deduction and no advantage of enduring nature is obtained and, therefore, the expenditure was not allowable as revenue in nature. The matter is, therefore, sent back to the Tribunal for deciding it afresh in the light of the observations made above. Accordingly, the reference is answered in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. No order as to costs.
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1992 (10) TMI 30 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
Income Deemed To Accrue Or Arise In India, Salary ... ... ... ... ..... ficer in that regard and, consequently, the matter has not been considered from the said angle, it would be meet and proper for us to remit the matter to the Income-tax Officer with a direction that he would give liberty to the petitioner to adduce relevant evidence with regard to the nature of services rendered by the foreign technicians for which the payment in question is sought to be made and to find out whether it would come within the exclusion part of Explanation 2 to section 9(1)(vii) of the Income-tax Act. The Income-tax Officer, after giving opportunity to the petitioner and on consideration of the materials to be produced before him, would hear and decide the same in accordance with law. In view of our aforesaid conclusions, the impugned order is set aside and the matter is remitted to the Income-tax Officer for redisposal in accordance with law bearing in mind the observations made by us in this judgment. We make no order as to costs. K. C. JAGADEB Roy J.-I agree.
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1992 (10) TMI 29 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ccount during the relevant accounting year but not reflected in the closing stock. So far as the amount of Rs. 30,863 representing the value of the goods which remained in transit during the relevant accounting year and which was not reflected in the closing stock is concerned, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was of the view that such omission on the part of the assessee was bona fide. The finding on the question Whether, on the facts and circumstances of the case, the omission on the part of the assessee was bona fide, is purely a finding of fact. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, having come to the conclusion that, on the facts of the case, there was bona fide omission on the part of the assessee, we are of the view that no interference is called for in the view taken by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. For the above reasons, we answer all the abovementioned questions in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. No order as to costs.
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1992 (10) TMI 28 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Co-operative Society, Providing Credit Facilities, Special Deduction ... ... ... ... ..... dit to the members is an activity of business of selling of goods of which the facility is only an incidence and it will not amount to providing credit facilities in the nature of the business of banking so as to amount to carrying on the business of banking or providing credit facilities to its members. As a matter of fact this clause is meant to cover societies which are carrying on the business of banking and in the course of their business are providing credit facilities to its members. From a perusal of the various decisions and on the basis of the interpretation of the provisions of section 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Act, we are of the view that the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was not justified in coming to the conclusion that the interest on the outstanding balances in respect of supplies of goods would qualify for exemption under section 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Act. Accordingly, the reference is answered in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. No order as to costs.
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1992 (10) TMI 27 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Estate Duty, HUF ... ... ... ... ..... as applied in Narendranath s case 1969 74 ITR 190 (SC). On a careful consideration of the various decisions of the Supreme Court and the High Court referred to above, we are of the clear opinion that there can be a Hindu joint family consisting of a sole coparcener and his wife. That being so, in the event of the death of any one of them, for computing the interest of the deceased in the family property, section 39 of the Estate Duty Act would apply and only that portion of the property which would have fallen to the share of the deceased in the event of partition of the family taking place immediately before the death would be deemed to be the interest of the deceased in the joint family property. That being so, in the instant case, the Tribunal was right in holding that only a half share in the property of the deceased passed on his death. The question referred to us, therefore, is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the accountable person and against the Revenue.
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