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Showing 21 to 40 of 226 Records
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1992 (10) TMI 256
... ... ... ... ..... he official registers. There is absolutely no material whatsoever to show that the counterfeit stamps were in fact purchased by him from the treasury. A bare allegation by way of an explanation by the accused-appellant that he purchased all the stamps including the counterfeit ones from the treasury appears on the face of it to be false, as he has neither produced registers maintained by him nor did he make even an effort to summon the treasury records. There is no material whatsoever even to probablise such a plea. In these circumstances the only inference that can be drawn is that he had "knowledge" and "reason to believe" that the stamps which he had in his possession and which he was selling or offering to sell, were counterfeit ones. These ingredients of the two provisions of law are fully established. Therefore the convictions are correct. The offence also is a serious one and the sentence awarded is not excessive. The appeal is therefore dismissed.
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1992 (10) TMI 255
... ... ... ... ..... the impunity with which the legal ethics are side-lined by some members of the profession. 4. It is not disputed in the present case that on March 15, 1974 when Mr. Adhia, advocate withdrew from the case, the petitioners were not present in court. There is nothing on the record to show as to whether the petitioners had the notice of the hearing of the case on that day. We are of the view, when Mr. Adia withdrew from the case, the interests of justice required, that a fresh notice for actual date hearing should have been sent to the parties. In any case in the facts and circumstances of this case we feel that the party in person was not at fault and as such should not be made to suffer. 5. We, therefore, allow the appeal, set aside the order of the learned single Judge dated March 15, 1974. We also set aside the order of the Division Bench dated August 5, 1974. The High Court shall now hear and decide Arbitration Petition No. 57 of 1972 pending before it on merits. No costs.
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1992 (10) TMI 254
... ... ... ... ..... s discretion under Article 136 of the Constitution in cases where the petitioner had given an undertaking in the High Court and had obtained time to vacate the premises on the basis of such undertaking. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the petitioner, having given an undertaking in pursuance to the directions given by the High Court in the Judgment dated March 6, 1992, and having availed the protection from eviction on the basis of the said undertaking, cannot be permitted to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution and assail the said judgment of the High Court. In that view of the matter, we do not consider it necessary to deal with the submissions urged by Dr. Singhvi that the respondent, being an employee of the University at the time of his retirement, was not a 'specified landlord' under section 2(hh) of the Act. The special leave petition is, accordingly, dismissed but without any orders as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1992 (10) TMI 252
... ... ... ... ..... d on the burden to the consumer. Thus, having collected the octroi duty, there is no equity in favour of the IOC to claim a refund of the same. Learned counsel for the appellant also conceded that the question of refund, in the facts and circumstances of the case, does not arise and we, therefore, hold that the appellant shall not be entitled to any refund of the octroi duty, already deposited by the appellant with the Municipal Corporation. We also clarify that the IOC shall not be liable to pay the octroi duty, in respect of the transaction covered by the 4th category, hereafter, only on the condition that the IOC does not collect any octroi duty from its dealers or agents in respect of the re-exported goods at the time of their appropriation outside the municipal limits. Should the IOC collect any such octroi duty from its dealers or agents, it shall remain liable to deposit the same with the Municipal Corporation and shall not retain such octroi duty for its own benefit.
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1992 (10) TMI 251
... ... ... ... ..... e consumer. Thus, having collected the octroi duty, there is no equity in favour of the IOC to claim a refund of the same. Learned counsel for the appellant also conceded that the question of refund, in the facts and circumstances of the case, does not arise and we, therefore, hold that the appellant shall not be entitled to any refund of the octroi duty, already deposited by the appellant with the Municipal Corporation. We also clarify that the IOC shall not be liable to pay the octroi duty, in respect of the transaction covered by the 4th category, hereafter, only on the condition that the IOC does not collect any octroi duty from its dealers or agents in respect of the re-exported goods at the time of their appropriation outside the municipal limits. Should the IOC collect any such octroi duty from its dealers or agents, it shall remain liable to deposit the same with the Municipal Corporation and shall not retain such octroi duty for its own benefit. R.P. Appeal allowed.
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1992 (10) TMI 250
... ... ... ... ..... Act, which reads thus "Provided further that nothing contained in this clause shall apply in the case of an employee whose income in the previous year chargeable under the head 'Salaries' exceeds twenty thousand rupees;" The assessee has been in profit not only in the relevant assessment year but also in the previous assessment year. Such payments have been made to the employees even before and was not unique feature of that year only. Such payments of bonus made under identical circumstances have been allowed even in the past. No material was placed to hold that bonus was excessive or unreasonable. The Tribunal sustained this view of the Commissioner (Appeals). 4. The ITO had overlooked the second proviso. The finding that second proviso was attracted is based on facts. There is no legal error in the approach to the question. 5. Under the circumstances, both the questions are answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. No order as to costs.
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1992 (10) TMI 249
... ... ... ... ..... y Commissioner of Sales Tax was justified? (2) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in law in coming to the conclusion that in the eye of law after the empty tins are used in the packing of oil, their resale either express or implied cannot be possible and that, therefore, purchase tax under section 15 of the Gujarat Sales Tax Act, 1969, on the purchases of such empty tins from unregistered dealers was required to be levied? Question No. (1) is not pressed and, therefore, it is not necessary to answer it. We answer question No. (2) in the negative. It cannot be stated that merely because empty tins were consumable stores used in the manufacture of oil for sale, they cannot be resold. The Tribunal has to decide it on merits keeping in view the aforesaid discussion with regard to the words manufacture and resale . In the result, all these references are decided accordingly with no order as to costs. References answered accordingly.
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1992 (10) TMI 248
... ... ... ... ..... as not considered the circumstances under which the petitioner could not produce the forms earlier. Question of sufficiency of the cause was not at all considered. In the circumstances, the question whether the assessee-petitioner had sufficient cause for the belated production of C forms will have to be considered and only thereafter the question of accepting them would arise. In this view of the matter, we set aside the orders of the assessing authority, the first appellate authority and of the Appellate Tribunal. Accordingly we allow this revision petition and remand the matter to the assessing authority who shall consider the sufficiency of the cause under rule 12(7) of the Central Rules and make an appropriate order either to accept or not to accept the declarations in C forms filed by the assessee before the Appellate Tribunal on December 14, 1989. The assessee-petitioner shall take back the C forms and produce the same before the assessing authority. Petition allowed.
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1992 (10) TMI 247
Valuation - Related persons - Trade discount ... ... ... ... ..... the basis of evidence on record that the appellants and the distributors are not lsquo related persons rsquo . Price at which goods are sold by the appellants to the distributors after giving a discount of 42 frac12 would form the basis of assessable value under Section 4 of the Act. (iii) emsp Whether the discount given by the distributors to their dealers can also be denied, assuming that the appellants and the distributors are lsquo related persons rsquo . Finding on this issue is not necessary in view of our finding on the second issue. Suffice it to say and to put it very mildly, the authorities below are duty bound, even on their own finding that the lsquo appellants rsquo and lsquo distributors rsquo are related persons, to allow the discount which the distributors were giving to their dealers and stockist. Not to do that is to go against the provisions of proviso (iii) to Section 4(1)(a). 3. emsp In short, appeal is allowed with consequential relief to the appellants.
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1992 (10) TMI 240
Whether the learned Judge was not right in holding that the taxable event under the section is not the purchase of goods used in the manufacture of end-products but the despatch of manufactured goods to out-State destinations?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The levy is waived where the manufactured goods are sold within the State, or sold in the course of inter-State trade or commerce or sold in the course of export. It is retained and collected where the goods are taken out of Maharashtra State by way of consignment, in which event the State sees no reason not to retain and collect the levy on purchase of raw material. The provision is substantially similar to section 9 of the Haryana Act. Whatever we have said with respect to the Haryana provision applies equally to this provision of the Bombay Sales Tax Act.
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1992 (10) TMI 237
Whether the levy of additional tax under the Additional Sales Tax Act as amended by the Additional Sales Tax (Amendment) Act, 1979, is a single point levy or a multi-point levy?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. There being no legal or constitutional bar for a combination of single point levy and a multi-point levy and levying of additional tax, there is no infirmity or constitutional inhibition which would invalidate the impugned Validation Act.
All the assessment and collection provisions under the principal Act and the Rules framed thereunder are attracted and would apply for the assessment and collection of the additional tax as well. The notification issued under section 17 of the principal Act delegating the powers of the Commissioner therefore would automatically apply in so far as the officers authorised to assess and collect are concerned. There was no need for a further delegation of power in respect of the Orissa Additional Sales Tax Act are concerned. The point raised by the learned counsel in this connection is, therefore, devoid of any merit.
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1992 (10) TMI 228
Whether, the freight charges incurred by a dealer in the despatch of cement to the place of the customer could be deducted from the total turnover of the dealer under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959, and the Tamil Nadu Additional Sales Tax Act, 1970?
Whether, the packing charges being the cost of the packing materials used by the dealer in packing cement for being delivered to his customers could be properly excluded from his total turnover for the assessment of sales tax?
Whether, the excise duty paid on packing materials used by a dealer for packing cement to be sold to his customers can be excluded in his total turnover?
Held that:- Assessee's appeal dismissed. The freight charges should be included in arriving at the taxable turnover for the purposes of CST and TNST and that packing charges and excise duty thereon should also be included in arriving at the taxable turnover for purposes of both CST and TNST
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1992 (10) TMI 222
Company when deemed unable to pay its debts ... ... ... ... ..... ating that the petition will come up before this court on January 28, 1993. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, the official liquidator attached to this court is appointed as the provisional liquidator of the respondent company with directions to forthwith take over all the assets and records of the company. From May, 1988, up to January 31, 1991, at the rate of Rs. 17,004.40, the amount of rent works out to Rs. 5,61,145.20. According to the company, it is entitled to adjustment of Rs. 4,21,896.80, i.e., the amount paid to the Corporation and the security amount. In case the company pays to the petitioner Rs, 1,39,248.40 on or before October 30, 1992, this order will not operate. On failure of the company to make this payment the order of admission of the petition, publication of citation and appointment of the provisional liquidator would become operative from October 31, 1992. C. A. Nos. 13340 of 1989 and 406 of 1990 are disposed of in the above terms.
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1992 (10) TMI 214
Classification ... ... ... ... ..... uary Item 68. In the case of Khandelwal Metal and Engineering Works cited supra, the Supreme Court has held that when there is a specific entry in the tariff for what is otherwise considered to be waste material, and it fulfils the conditions of excisability in the sense that the goods are marketable, such waste material would be liable to duty. We are not impressed with the argument of Shri Jain that Sulphuric Acid present in the activated carbon is merely reacting with colouring agents and, therefore what comes out as residue is residue of itself and does not qualify to be treated as ldquo residue resulting from the treatment of fatty substances .... rdquo . Whatever be the nature of the reaction and the consequence of it, the fact remains that lsquo Spent Earth rsquo is residue resulting from the treatment of fatty substances and, therefore, qualifies for assessment under sub-heading No. 1507.00 of the tariff, being also excisable. In view of this, the appeals are allowed.
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1992 (10) TMI 213
Classification ... ... ... ... ..... ove, the matter stands settled by the decisions of the Tribunal that such animal feed supplements are to be classified under Heading 23.02 CETA. The appeals are, therefore, disposed of by holding that the correct classification of the goods cannot be under Chapter 31, but has to be under Heading 23.02 and sub-heading 2302.00 following the ratio of the Tribunal rsquo s decision cited supra as also the Department rsquo s own understanding of the scope of the coverage of the Heading 23.02 noted above. The appeals are disposed of in above terms. rdquo In other words, according to the above Order, Di-calcium Phosphate is to be classified under Heading 23.02 and sub-heading 2302.00. In view of the above, the said product is entitled to the benefit of exemption notification. We, accordingly, dismiss the appeals filed by the Department. As regards the appeal filed by the assessee, namely M/s. Punjab Bone Mills, we allow the same following the Order of this Tribunal referred to above.
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1992 (10) TMI 212
Modvat Credit ... ... ... ... ..... ion. 10. I find that the Collector has, in his order, disallowed the credit and ordered the reverting back of the same as prescribed in the unamended Rule 57-I. As it is the amended Rule that will be applicable and as the Rule refers to the recovery of an amount equivalent to the credit where the same has already been utilised, within the time limits stipulated therein, the course open to the Collector is only this and not an innocuous sounding reversal of credit. The appeal succeeds on the question of limitation and is allowed accordingly. 11. It will be open to and, in fact, incumbent on the department to take appropriate action for correcting the action of availment of excess credit subsequent to the proceedings initiated in the present case. The departmental authorities should review their benevolence and not allow grass (or Linoleum, rather) to grow under their feet. 12. The operative part of this order announced in the open Court on 26-10-1992 at the end of the hearing.
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1992 (10) TMI 211
Confiscation ... ... ... ... ..... these goods duties were paid or not. The reasons given by the adjudicating authority in discarding the affidavit of Mrs. Rosalie Peterson are factually and legally correct and we do not find any reasons to interfere with the findings of the adjudicating authority in this respect. Similarly, we do not see any merit in the plea of Shri. S.K. Sharma relating to the goods recovered from the suitcase which had been alleged to belong to Karim from Hongkong. We notice that this affidavit is also of 29-1-1981. Apart from the reasons given by the adjudicating authority in discarding the said affidavit we are unable to understand as to why this affidavit could not be produced immediately after it was sworn by the deponent. In short, the plea of the appellant, Shri S.K. Sharma with regard to confiscation of goods recovered from his residential premises is also set aside. 7. Subject to the modification in the quantum of penalties, mentioned above, the impugned order is otherwise upheld.
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1992 (10) TMI 210
Refund Claim - Limitation ... ... ... ... ..... is all. It need not be presented before the Assistant Collector. It is also evident mat consistent with prior practice, the application was received by Range Office without demur. It was not returned as defective. The assessee was not directed to present the claim before the Assistant Collector. This is the normal course that should have been adopted, if the claim was not entertainable by the Range Office, though addressed to the Assistant Collector rdquo . Therefore, in this case the lower authorities will have to examine the claim afresh as to whether it had been addressed to the Assistant Collector and whether the filing thereof was in the Range office within the time limit under Sec. 11B and whether that was done in accordance with the then prevailing practice for filing and processing such claims. If so, the claim cannot be rejected as time-barred. The impugned order is hence set aside and the case is remanded to the jurisdictional Assistant Collector in the above terms.
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1992 (10) TMI 209
Classification ... ... ... ... ..... ation No. 172/77-Cus. by this Tribunal in the appellants rsquo own case. (See Order No. 275/92-C dated 15-9-1992 - M/s. Indian Communication now Network Limited, v. Collector of Customs, New Delhi. In reply, Smt. Ananya Ray, learned SDR, has nothing to add except to say that what has been argued dh behalf of the Revenue in that case be taken as the argument in the present case. 3. We have considered the submissions. In the aforesaid case of the appellants, this Tribunal while passing Order No. 275/92-C, supra, held that ldquo Correcting Tapes rdquo are classifiable under Heading 8473.10 and the benefit of the said Notification No. 172/77-Cus. is also available to such goods. Thus, following the ratio of the said decision, we set aside the impugned Orders and allow both the appeals with consequential relief to the appellants, if any, subject to the amended provisions of Section 27 of the Customs Act, 1962. See Union of India v Jain Spinners Limited, 1992 (61) E.L.T. 321 (SC) .
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1992 (10) TMI 208
Recovery - Penalty ... ... ... ... ..... is against the aforesaid order of the Collector (Appeals) that the revenue has come up in appeal urging that the power to impose penalty and recovery by way of Section 11A is permissible under law even if adjudgment of duty on RT-12 and non-payment thereof by the assessee. 4. We have heard both sides and we have considered the grounds of appeal by the Revenue and have also gone through the impugned order. We are inclined to agree with the lower appellate authority. Once amount of duty by the assessee stands adjudged on RT-12 returns and if the assessee fails to make the payment on the basis of imposition on RT-12 no further proceedings can be taken by the revenue by way of imposition of penalty as has been done in this case. Recovery of dues can be made, as already observed by the lower authority, invoking either Rule 230 or Section 11 of the Act. We therefore do not find any substance in the appeal of revenue and accordingly we dismiss it while upholding the impugned orders.
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