|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 161 to 180 of 276 Records
-
1992 (7) TMI 124
High Court, Question Of Law, Supreme Court ... ... ... ... ..... n on the Madras High Court by the consent does not arise now. The parties, particularly the assessee, waived the benefit given under section 256(1) and, therefore, the same cannot be agitated now. It has been held by the Supreme Court in the case of Director of Inspection of Income-tax (Investigation) v. Pooran Mall and Sons 1974 96 ITR 390, that if a benefit is conferred by law, the same can be waived by agreement and the question of consent or waiver does not arise. 8. After hearing the arguments of the learned counsel for a considerable length of time, we are of the opinion that the decisions relied upon by him do not support his case. We, therefore, pass order under section 260(1) in conformity with the judgment of the Madras High Court referred to above. 9. On the issue before us, the Honourable High Court has answered the question in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee and, therefore, we reverse our decision on this count. The appeal of the Revenue is allowed
-
1992 (7) TMI 123
Tribunal's Order ... ... ... ... ..... r dated 21-6-1991 passed in the case of the deceased assessee for the Wealth-tax assessment year 1980-81 in WTA No. 319/Hyd/1984, holding that the order passed under section 171(3) is valid and binding until upset and reversed by competent authorities under law. It will be highly preposterous and the results perhaps may be disasterous to hold that an order passed under section 171(3) is valid and binding in relation to the proceedings under the Income-tax Act but the same order is not to be acted upon or rather not binding and invalid for the purposes of any proceeding under the Wealth-tax Act or for that matter under the Estate Duty Act. Unhesitatingly we therefore hold that the Appellate Controller of Estate Duty committed a grave error in confirming the re-opening action of the Asstt. Controller of Estate Duty under section 59(b) and framing another assessment. We therefore vacate and quash the orders of the lower authorities and allow this appeal of the accountable person
-
1992 (7) TMI 122
Adequate Consideration, Fair Market Value, Stamp Duty ... ... ... ... ..... ch a categorical finding it cannot be held that the assessee had transferred the property in question without adequate consideration. It is also noticed by us that the assessee and the transferee are not related to each other. No material has been placed before us nor we find the same being available with the Assessing Officer to satisfy him that the transfer was not bonafide and that it was tainted with oblique motives, particularly to evade tax. We have also taken note of the decision of the Hon ble Supreme Court in the case of K.P. Varghese wherein their Lordships at page 615 have observed It is a well settled rule of law that the onus of establishing that the conditions of taxability are fulfilled is always on the revenue and. . . . In our view, therefore, the Assessing Officer was not justified in assessing the appellant invoking the provisions of section 4(1)(a) of the G.T. Act. We therefore vacate the orders of the authorities below and allow the appeal of the assessee
-
1992 (7) TMI 121
... ...
... ... ..... have a common mess and the right of common worship. Therefore, in our considered view every partial partition with regard to some of the properties held by the joint family does not necessarily bring about a division in status. Even after a partial partition of the properties among its members, a joint family can still exist having commonality of residence, mess and worship. According to us, the lower authorities are perfectly justified in holding that the impugned narration did not bring about a division in status. On the other hand they are perfectly justified in holding that the integrity of the family is still maintained even after 31st March, 1963. It follows that even by the date of death of the deceased, the joint family in which the deceased is a member, existed. Therefore, the lineal descendant s share is liable to be added under s. 34(1)(c) of the ED Act for aggregation. 9. In the result, we fail to see any merit in the assessee s appeal and, hence, it is dismissed.
-
1992 (7) TMI 120
A Firm, Agricultural Land ... ... ... ... ..... ave a common mess and the right of common worship. Therefore, in our considered view every partial partition with regard to some of the properties held by the joint family does not necessarily bring about a division in status. Even after a partial partition of the properties among its members, a joint family can still exist having commonality of residence, mess and worship. According to us the lower authorities are perfectly justified in holding that the impugned narration did not bring about a division in status. On the other hand they are perfectly justified in holding that the integrity of the family is still maintained even after 31-3-63. It follows that even by the date of death of the deceased, the joint family in which the deceased is a member, existed. Therefore, the lineal descendant s share is liable to be added under section 34(1)(c) of the Estate Duty Act for aggregation. 9. In the result, we fail to see any merit in the assessee s appeal and hence it is dismissed
-
1992 (7) TMI 119
... ...
... ... ..... t is no doubt relevant but it cannot be formed as the basis for drawing inference of contumacious conduct of the assessee for the instant assessment year. In order to arrive at such finding one has to advert to the facts obtaining in the instant case and in case finding is reached against the assessee, it can be sought to be supported or re-enforced by the past history. The CIT(A) rightly observed that defaults committed by the assessee in the past can be taken into account for determining the quantum of penalty. However, as stated above, the past history cannot be taken as basis to punish the assessee for the acts relating to this year. We have since reached the finding that the estimate of advance tax could not be proved to be untrue to the knowledge or belief of the assessee. We do not attached weight to the past history. 7. In view of our discussion the orders of the tax authorities below are set aside and the penalty is cancelled. 8. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
-
1992 (7) TMI 118
... ...
... ... ..... TR 589 (SC). In this view of the matter also there is no justification to bring to tax the impugned amounts either under other sources or under house property. Thus, the amount of Rs. 4,08,000 and Rs. 6,00,000 respectively for the asst. yrs. 1986-87 and 1988-89 are deleted. 13. Another point at dispute is about the taxability of Rs. 1,65,389 under other sources for the asst. yr. 1986-87. The appellant had received interest on the payments from the vendee and it was this that was brought to tax. 14. We have heard rival submissions. We do not accept the contention of the assessee that the interest paid by the vendee would become part and parcel of the sale consideration. The interest was received in the year under an agreement and, therefore, it is in the nature of income. Accordingly, we uphold the addition of Rs. 1,65,389 for the asst. yr. 1986-87. 15. In the result, the appeal for the asst. yr. 1986-87 is partly allowed while the appeal for the asst. yr. 1988-89 is allowed.
-
1992 (7) TMI 117
... ...
... ... ..... assessee had requested for time for filing the return of income till 10th Jan., 1978 and as this request was not refused, this was not a fit case for levy of penalty. This shows that the assessee was granted time upto 10th Jan., 1978 and in this case the assessee filed the return on 9th Jan., 1978. Further, the assessee has also placed reliance on the decision of the Ahmedabad C Bench of the Tribunal in ITO vs. Mangal Metal Industries (1991) 39 TTJ (Ahd) 426 (1991) 36 ITD 161 (Ahd). The Tribunal took the view that the filing of the audit report along with the return is only directory and not mandatory. Though the claim therein was different which is under s. 80HH, we are of the opinion that the principle laid down therein can be pressed into service in this case also. 8. In view of what has been stated above and also the powers of the CIT(A) are co-terminus with the ITO, we see no reason to interfere with the order of the CIT(A). We accordingly dismiss the Revenue s appeal.
-
1992 (7) TMI 116
... ...
... ... ..... e the other sections such as 80HHA, 80HHB, 80I, 80-J, 80JJ, 80JJA, 80M, 80QQA, 80R, 80RR, 80RRA, 80S, 80T and 80TT of the IT Act,. In all these other sections mentioned by Shri Srinivasan, the section is designed to give deduction from the gross total income if the total gorss income of the assessee included any profit or income mentioned in those sections. But in s. 880HHC there is no such stipulation and the deduction is given on the factum of export outside India as a percentage of the export turnover. Therefore, the provisions of s. 80AB will not be attracted in the facts of the case before us to the provisions of s. 80HHC. In this view of the matter, we are supported by the decision of the Ahmedabad Bench of the Tribunal in the case of ITO vs. Aruna mills Ltd. (1986) 26 TTJ (Ahd) 307. Thus, in any view of the matter, the order of the CIT(A) has to be upheld. 7. In the result the departmental appeal is dismissed and the assessee s appeal is also dismissed as infructuous.
-
1992 (7) TMI 115
Manufacture And Sale, Manufacture Or Production, Other Sources, Previous Year, Purchase And Sale, Same Business, Set Off Of Loss, Speculation Business, Speculation Loss
-
1992 (7) TMI 114
1961 Act, A Partner, Actual Cost, Firm Consisting, In Part, Market Value, Partnership Firm, Setting Up, Tax Liability
-
1992 (7) TMI 113
Income From House Property, Income From Other Sources, Income From Property, Transfer Of Property
-
1992 (7) TMI 112
... ...
... ... ..... ITD 284 (Del). There, on almost identical facts, we have decided the issue in favour of the assessee, inter alia, discussing and relying on the decisions reported as M.P. Davis vs. Commr. of Agrl. IT (1959) 35 ITR 803 (SC), K.D. Kamath and Co. vs. CIT (1971) 82 ITR 680 (SC), Krishna Flour Mills vs. CIT (1962) 44 ITR 501 (SC), Umacharan Shaw and Bros. vs. CIT (1959) 37 ITR 217 (SC), CIT vs. R.M. Chidambaram Pillai 1977 CTR (SC) 71 (1977) 106 ITR 292 (SC) and CIT vs. Shah Mohan Das Sadhu Ram (1965) 57 ITR 415 (SC). 7. In the net result, the assessee is held to be entitled to the benefit of registration as a registered firm for treatment as such for charge of tax under the provisions of the IT Act, 1961 in relation to all the four assessment years under appeal with consequences flowing out of the above to follow. The orders of the learned lower authorities as such stand modified/cancelled in the above terms and the assessee succeeds in all its four appeals. 6. Appeals allowed.
-
1992 (7) TMI 111
Assessing Officer, Penalty For Concealment, Penalty Proceedings, Rental Income, Res Judicata, Revised Return, Total Income, Two Partners
-
1992 (7) TMI 110
High Court, Quoted Equity Shares ... ... ... ... ..... decision would squarely apply even after the incorporation of Schedule III in the Act. We have compared the two provisions and find no reason not to accept the argument of the learned counsel. There cannot be any manner of doubt that the two provisions are clearly in pari materia. What the Legislature has done is only to bodily lift the provision from Rule 1D and incorporate the same in Rule 11 of Schedule III of the Act. No change in effect was intended by the Legislature in making this statutory rearrangement. We see no reason to take a view that such rearrangement could have possibly involved any change of effect in the ratio of the aforesaid decision of the Bombay High Court. We are thus inclined to accept the contention of the assessee that in making valuation even under Rule 11 of Schedule II of the Wealth-tax Act the ratio of the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Pratap Bhogilal will have to be given effect to. We direct accordingly and allow this appeal
-
1992 (7) TMI 109
... ...
... ... ..... uirement during the time of Second World War. Later, it was found to be useful on rough roads. Having regard to its utility, it is now used in the same manner as of a motor car. It is pertinent to note that in Stroud s Judicial Dictionary 4th Edition at page 1712 the term motor is defined vide entry 3 as under A petrol-driven tractor was a motor car within the meaning of Art. II(3) of the Motor Cars (Use and Construction) Order, 1904 See Dennis v. Leonard, 141 LT 944. Vide entry 10 on page 1713, motor car is defined as a mechanically propelled vehicle, not being a motor cycle or an invalid carriage, which is constructed itself to carry a load or passengers. . . etc. The Hon ble Madras High Court in the case of Crompton Engg. Co. (Madras) Ltd. in a very clear and unequivocal terms, laid down that jeep is a motor car. We, respectfully following the precedent, decide this issue in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. In the result, appeal of the revenue stands allowed
-
1992 (7) TMI 108
Deduction In Respect, Flat Rate, Non-resident Company, Shipping Business ... ... ... ... ..... e concept of taxation in this context postulate payment on gross income. There is no dispute in regard to the amount received. After receiving the consideration it is the duty of the assessee-company to remit cargo to the ultimate destination. He could use his own vessels for the purpose or hire other vessels. It has got no impact on the taxability of the receipt. The language of the section is clear, and unambiguous. We do not know whether the third party, who carry the cargo to intermediate port, paid the tax or not. What is the residential status of the third party is also not known. But this has no bearing over the matter, since liability to make the payment is that of the assessee, which is clearly set out in the section. In our opinion, there is no double taxation. We are therefore inclined to agree with the ld.CIT (Appeals) on this issue. Accordingly we uphold the impugned order on this count. 7. to 9. These paras are not reproduced here, as they involve minor issues .
-
1992 (7) TMI 107
Assessing Officer, Closing Stock, Excise Duty, Raw Material ... ... ... ... ..... not obliterate the effect of double taxation in this year. It is true that the closing stock is valued less by Rs. 57.52 lac, but at the same time, the assessee had claimed no excise duty paid on the purchase of the inputs lying in the closing stock. An equivalent amount has to be allowed as purchase cost of inputs and the net effect in the income of the assessee would be nil. Taking all the aforesaid into consideration, we are of the opinion that there is no case for making any addition. The addition of Rs. 58,79,694 made and sustained by the departmental authorities to the income of the assessee is, accordingly, deleted. The assessee succeeds on this ground. 15. In this view of the matter, we need not consider the alternate submission of the assessee that if the closing stock is increased, the income of the assessee should be computed by increasing the value of the opening stock on the same basis. 16. to 28. These paras are not reproduced here as they involve minor issues .
-
1992 (7) TMI 106
Capital Gains, Profit On Sale ... ... ... ... ..... n is paid, within the specified period, the assessee should be deemed to have complied with the requirement of the section, even if the legal ownership is not acquired. This is so because the assessee did his task and the delay which may result due to paper formalities cannot be attributed to the assessee and for this purpose the benefit of the section cannot be denied to him. In the present case, we find that the agreement for sale of original asset was entered into on 30-1-1980. In respect of new asset, agreement for purchase was entered into on 12-3-1974. Therefore, it is obvious that the act of purchase of the new asset was not within a period of one year before or after of the transfer of the original asset. We find that, the requirement of section 54 of the Act was not fulfilled. We, therefore, hold that the revenue authorities have taken a correct view in the matter and the impugned order calls for no interference. In the result, appeal of the assessee stands dismissed
-
1992 (7) TMI 105
Capital Gains, Construction Company ... ... ... ... ..... om the agreement that the entire property was in the occupation of the tenants. The names of the tenants are reflected in Annexure A . As per this agreement the assessee-company was not bound to give vacant possession. We have also noted that the assessee-company purchased the property from a private trust. There is no material on record to prove that the assessee-company created any encumbrances in respect of the property since then, making it liable, to pay the said amount of Rs. 1,49,000. Neither the alleged unauthorised parties were produced before the Assessing Officer nor any cogent material was placed before us to demonstrate the exigency for making the payment of Rs. 1,49,000. We do not find any mention in the agreement in regard to the unauthorised occupants. We are, therefore, inclined to accept the finding given by the ld. CIT(Appeals) in regard to the same. We, accordingly, uphold his order on this count also. In the result, appeal of the assessee stands dismissed
............
|
