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Case Laws
Showing 241 to 260 of 276 Records
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1992 (7) TMI 36 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Investment Allowance ... ... ... ... ..... n to an industrial undertaking for the purpose of business of construction, manufacture or production of an article or thing specified in the list in the Eleventh Schedule. It is not in dispute that marble is one of the items which are mentioned in the Eleventh Schedule while counsel for the petitioner may be right in contending that mining of marble may not amount to manufacture but the said provision, namely, section 32A(2)(b)(iii)of the Income-tax Act, applies to an industrial undertaking which, interalia, carries on the business of production of an article. The mining of marble would amount to carrying on the business of production and reference may usefully be made to the case of Chrestien Mica Industries Ltd. v. State of Bihar 1961 12 STC 150 (SC), where the Supreme Court held that the process of mining mica is a process of production. Following the said decision, we feel that the answer to the question proposed is self-evident and therefore, this petition is dismissed.
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1992 (7) TMI 35 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Business Income, Deduction ... ... ... ... ..... obligation in the accounting year, it cannot be the subject-matter of deduction even under the mercantile system of accounting. The Tribunal has not referred to the terms of the contract between the Director-General of Supplies and Disposals and the assessee-company. It is not known whether the liability could be law fully fastened upon the assessee-company in terms of the contract. Since the dispute in regard to the claim of Rs. 3,16,061 made by the Director General of Supplies and Disposals had been referred to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the contract, it appears to us that, until the award is delivered by the arbitrator, the liability of the assessee-company was nothing but contingent. In that view of the matter and following the decision of this court in CIT v. Roberts McLean and Co. Ltd. 1978 111 ITR 489, we answer the question referred in this case in the negative and in favour of the Revenue.There will be no order as to costs. K. M. YUSUF J. - I agree.
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1992 (7) TMI 34 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Income From Undisclosed Sources ... ... ... ... ..... be reviewed if there is no evidence to support them or if they are perverse. The third question, namely, whether the Tribunal was legally correct in deleting the addition of Rs. 2,06,284 is only consequential to the first two questions proposed in the application. The Tribunal having believed the evidence and material filed by the assessee that was the end of the matter and we cannot say that the conclusion of the Tribunal is perverse or arbitrary in the sense that no person duly instructed in law could have reached such a conclusion. Moreover, no such question has been raised in this application, nor was any such question raised in the application under section 256(1) before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. Consequently, the order of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal is concluded by the findings of fact and its order does not give rise to any question of law. The application is without any merit and is accordingly rejected with costs which we assess at rupees two hundred.
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1992 (7) TMI 33 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Agricultural Income Tax, Deduction, Disallowance, Rubber Subsidy ... ... ... ... ..... ot envisage a sale of the produce as a condition precedent for charging the income received or derived in the shape of produce to agricultural income-tax. The question whether subsequently the produce has really been sold or whether the sale consideration has been actually realised from such a sale becomes wholly irrelevant for attracting liability to tax under the Act. Consequently, we are of the view that the disallowance made by the authorities below on this item of doubtful debts claimed for the petitioner appears to be quite in accordance with the law and no exception could be taken to the conclusions of the authorities below on this aspect. The tax cases shall stand allowed only in respect of the claim for the assessee made in respect of rubber subsidy to the tune of Rs. 13,566, which shall stand deducted from the computation of agricultural income of the assessee for the assessment in question and, in all other respects, the tax revision will stand dismissed. No costs.
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1992 (7) TMI 32 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Export Market Development Allowance, Weighted Deduction ... ... ... ... ..... ed and directed the Tribunal to adjudicate the question in the light of the decision of the Special Bench in J. Hemchand and Co. s case (I. T. A. Nos. 3255 and 3330/(Bom).of 1976-77) to the extent it has been adopted or incorporated by the circular of the Central Board of Direct Taxes dated December 28, 1981. Having regard to this decision, we decline to answer the question referred in so far as it relates to sales expenditure on export sales incurred in India and direct the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal to restore the appeal to file and adjudicate (in the question in the light of the decision of the Special Bench in J. Hemchand and Co. s case to the extent it has been adopted or incorporated by the circular of the Central Board of Direct Taxes, dated December 28, 1981. We dispose of the reference accordingly. Communicate a copy of this judgment under the seal of this court and the signature of the Registrar to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench for information.
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1992 (7) TMI 31 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Advance Tax, Penalty ... ... ... ... ..... case is tainted with illegality going to the root of the assumption of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the Income-tax Officer has no right at the stage of provisional assessment to recompute the returned income for the purpose of raising the demand under section 210 on the basis of pre-assessment computation. In the present case, we do not find any such illegality in the action of the Income-tax Officer as might reduce the demand under section 210 to a nullity and render the provisions of section 212(3A) read with section 209(1)(c) ineffectual. For the reasons aforesaid, we hold that the demand raised by the Income-tax Officer under section 210 in the case could not be said to be a nullity precluding the initiation of penal proceedings. The assessee had taken shelter solely behind hyper-technicality which we do not approve. In the premises, we answer the question in the affirmative and against the assessee. There will be no order as to costs. J. N. HORE J.-I agree.
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1992 (7) TMI 30 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... . Aggarwal that this contention was not raised. The mere fact that the grounds of appeal have been set out by the Tribunal in, its order where this contention is specifically raised and the observation of the Tribunal that it had heard the Departmental representative without the Tribunal elaborating as to what other contentions the Departmental representative contended leaves us to believe that whatever was set out in the grounds of appeal must have been considered. The only basis for the amount to be added in the income of the assessee was that it was the undisclosed income of the assessee and it was not a case of exemption being claimed and the same being disallowed by the Tribunal. In our opinion, the question was raised and if the Tribunal chose not to deal with it or discuss it, it would not mean that the question does not arise at all. We, therefore, direct the Tribunal to state the case and refer the aforesaid question to this court. There will be no order as to costs.
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1992 (7) TMI 29 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Banking Company, Company, Provisions, Reserves, Secret Reserves, Surtax ... ... ... ... ..... ars, the fund for bad and doubtful debts as a reserve and it was only when it wanted to change its stand in the subsequent year that the Tribunal held that the same should continue to be treated as a reserve . In the case before us, the Department never treated the fund as a reserve in the previous years. Moreover, the Punjab State Small Industries Corporation was not a banking company and the question of its having reasonably and legitimately anticipated bad and doubtful debts did not arise. For the reasons recorded above, we are of the view that on the facts and circumstances of the present case, the sums of money set apart by the assessee herein for meeting its anticipated liability were a provision and the Tribunal erred in law in holding them to be a reserve . In the result, both the questions referred to us are answered in the negative, i.e., against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue. The reference is answered accordingly. The parties shall bear their own costs.
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1992 (7) TMI 28 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Assessment, Deduction, Firm, Goodwill ... ... ... ... ..... and the Hindu undivided families of Jagjit Singh and Gurcharan Singh in the first instance and later on to the two Hindu undivided families of Jagjit Singh and Gurcharan Singh by virtue of the will left by Gopal Singh deceased. In view of the above discussion, we would answer the questions referred by the Tribunal as follows (1) The Tribunal was not justified in holding that the goodwill did not belong to the two retiring Hindu undivided families of Jagjit Singh and Gurcharan Singh. (2) In view of our answer to question No. (1), it follows that the Tribunal was not legally correct in disallowing the claim of the appellant firm for payment of rent for the goodwill to the two Hindu undivided families of Jagjit Singh and Gurcharan Singh, especially because the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) had held that the amount claimed on account of rent in this behalf was reasonable and the said finding, had not been disturbed by the Tribunal. We dispose of the reference accordingly.
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1992 (7) TMI 27 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... amount to creating two classes among the heirs mentioned in Class 1, the male heirs in whose hands it will be joint Hindu family property, vis-a-vis, sons and female heirs with respect to whom no such concept could be applied or contemplated. It may be mentioned that heirs in Class I of the Schedule under section 8 of the Act included widow, mother, daughter of a predeceased son, etc. It can, therefore, be said that the view taken by the Tribunal is not correct. We, therefore, answer the question referred to us as under On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was not justified in holding that the separate property of the deceased Shri L. K. Goyal would constitute Hindu undivided family property in the hands of his sons and grandsons. We hereby direct that a copy of this judgment be sent under the seal of the court and under the signature of the Registrar to the Tribunal who shall pass necessary orders in conformity with this judgment. Costs made easy.
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1992 (7) TMI 26 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Failure To Disclose Fully And Truly, Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... ment in this case can only be justified under section 147(a). In other words, the assessee must be found to have failed to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment for the relevant year. The assessee can disclose only such facts or materials as are in existence at the relevant time, and which are known to him. The finding of another Income-tax Officer in the case of the assessee s son recorded long after the making of the original assessment of the assessee could not have been disclosed by the assessee since such finding was not in existence at the relevant time. We, therefore, find no justification to interfere with the finding recorded by the Tribunal in this case. The Tribunal, in our opinion, was right in quashing the reassessment proceedings initiated in this case. The question referred to us by the Tribunal is, accordingly, answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. There will be no order as to costs. K. M. YUSUF J.-I agree.
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1992 (7) TMI 25 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Capital Employed, Depreciation, Developement Rebate, New Industrial Undertaking, Special Deduction From Profits And Gains
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1992 (7) TMI 24 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Appeals, Assessment ... ... ... ... ..... on. The suspension was expected to be of temporary duration, because the property was merely requisitioned for military use, it was not acquired. As soon as the property was derequisitioned, the assessee took measures to resume production of coal. It was necessary to remove the impediments which had come in the way by reason of the temporary suspension of work. The buildings were renovated, the machinery reconditioned and the accumulated debris removed from the land. The colliery was, in word, reinstated to the condition necessary for ensuring production. No new asset was brought into existence no advantage for the enduring benefit of the business was acquired. The case before us has fundamental parity with the facts of that case. In both the cases, the expenditure is for reinstatement of the source of income in continued usability. We, therefore, answer the question in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. There will be no order as to costs. K. M. YUSUF J.-I agree.
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1992 (7) TMI 23 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Company, Reference, Surtax ... ... ... ... ..... amalgamation, the transferor-company amalgamated with the transferee-company and that any dividend which was declared thereafter by the transferor-company and which had been paid to the transferee-company in respect of shares which the transferee company originally held in the transferor-company could not be treated as income of the transferee-company because, after coming into operation of the scheme of amalgamation, the transferee-company could not receive dividend On its own shares. In the premises, in our view, looking to the appointed date, the value of the shares issued by the assessee-company in favour of the U. K. company must, therefore, form a part of the capital base of the assessee-company from the appointed date. The answer, therefore, to the question, in our view, is obvious and no useful purpose will be served, looking to the relevant facts, by directing the Tribunal to frame the question and refer it to us. Rule is, therefore, discharged. No order as to costs.
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1992 (7) TMI 22 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Appeals, Assessment ... ... ... ... ..... ion, it is the duty of the appellate authority to remove the particular defect or irregularity occurring in the course of the proceeding. In this case, the Assessing Officer violated the principles of natural justice. It is mandatory for him to pass a reasoned order and communicate it because, in its absence, the assessee s statutory right to appeal becomes nugatory. Therefore, the order suffers from a supervening irregularity within the jurisdiction which need be eliminated. So long as there is no error of jurisdiction, the proceeding cannot be annulled. The Tribunal was right in holding that the order of the officer is invalid but it is not a nullity. It is quite fair, in the circumstances, to ask the Assessing Officer to pass a fresh order in accordance with law after giving the assessee an opportunity of being heard. In the premises, both the questions are answered in the affirmative and in favour of the Revenue. There will be no order as to costs. K. M. YUSUF J.-I agree.
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1992 (7) TMI 21 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Firm, Registration ... ... ... ... ..... licit or where no business is carried on, the very foundation of the agreement is lacking. Holding of shares by any means showing on the face as if some monetary transactions had taken place but actually lessening the burden of statutory taxing liability, in real terms or other wise, of some parties closely related to the partners of the firm cannot be accepted and endorsed as a reflection of any business having been carried on. We do not find any infirmity in the order of the Tribunal in rejecting the claim for registration. The Tribunal has not omitted to consider any relevant fact nor has it considered any fact which was not relevant. There was no error in deriving the conclusion as drawn by the Tribunal in the present case. For the reasons aforesaid, question No. 1 is answered in the affirmative and against the assessee and, accordingly, question No. 2 is also answered in the affirmative and against the assessee. There will be no order as to costs. K. M. YUSUF J.-I agree.
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1992 (7) TMI 20 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Capital Employed, Depreciation, Developement Rebate, New Industrial Undertaking, Special Deduction From Profits And Gains
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1992 (7) TMI 19 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Charitable Purpose, Charitable Trust, Exemptions, Investment, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... t or committed in any particular property or business or transaction with the object of earning a profit. Therefore, where the assessee-trust receives shares of a company by way of donation, it cannot be said that the assessee-trust has dealt with or committed or laid out any part of its existing assets to acquire the said shares. There is complete passivity on the part of the assessee. Apart from the acceptance of the shares as donation, there is no volition, decision-making or action on the assessee s part. There is, in such a situation, no investment of funds of the assessee within the meaning of section 13(2)(h). Therefore, the income from such shares received as donation cannot lead to any disqualification. The Gujarat High Court has also taken a similar view in CIT v. Insaniyat Trust 1988 173 ITR 248. For the reasons aforesaid, we answer the question in this reference in the affirmative and against the Revenue. There will be no order as to costs. J. N. HORE J.-I agree.
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1992 (7) TMI 18 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Depreciation ... ... ... ... ..... bunal was directed to prepare a supplemental statement of the case setting out the particulars of the scheme framed by the assessee in relation to the approved leave salary and the manner of its implementation. In the circumstances, the first question is not answered for the time being and is kept open. In regard to the second question, the matter is concluded by the Full Bench decision of this court in Mysore Kirloskar Ltd. v. CIT 1978 114 ITR 443. Following the said decision, the second question is answered in the affirmative and against the Revenue. In so far as the third question is concerned, the matter is covered by the Division Bench decision of this court in CIT v. Bangalore Turf Club Ltd. 1984 150 ITR 23. Following the said decision, the third question is answered in the affirmative and against the Revenue. The Revenue is at liberty to mention for the posting of the matter in so far as the first question is concerned after the disposal of I. T. R. C. No. 111 of 1987.
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1992 (7) TMI 17 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... stock of shares in the balance-sheet as investment was not decisive. The Tribunal also appears to have accepted the assessee s contention that the sharer, were shown under the heading Investment in conformity, with the provisions of Schedule VI of the Companies Act, 1956. We find that the Tribunal has considered all the facts and materials placed on record by both the assessee company and the Department and it ultimately came to the conclusion that the mere fact that Sri Balmukund Bajoria happened to be the managing director of O. V. E. Ltd. for a few years was not a circumstance warranting the Income-tax Officer s finding that the group was acquiring the shares as an investment with a view to acquire a controlling interest in that company. We find no reason to hold that the findings recorded by the Tribunal are perverse. In this view of the matter, we answer all the three questions referred to this court in the negative and in favour of the assessee. K. M. YUSUF J.-I agree.
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