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1993 (2) TMI 326
... ... ... ... ..... rms of the trust deed, they may use the property of the company only in a particular way and must not make us of the assets of the company for the purpose of a profit-making concern. I find that they are strictly bound by the trusts of the trust deed, and that those trusts are charitable trusts. It seems to me, therefore, that, while nominally the property of the company is held under the provisions of the memorandum and articles of association, in actual fact the property of the company is regulated by the terms of the memorandum and articles of association plus the provisions of the trust deed, and, therefore, the company is restricted in fact in application of its property and assets and may apply them only for the charitable purposes which are mentioned in the trust deed." This may be so, for the purpose of defining charity, but' in a country like ours it is impossible to hold that such theories could be advanced or implemented. Petitions and Appeals disposed of
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1993 (2) TMI 325
... ... ... ... ..... g that the assessment order dated 28 - 12 - 1979 was within limitation under the amended Section 21 (5)." 11. We have considered the circumstances and the conclusions of the above decisions. We see no reason to differ from the above decisions. We also affirm that vested rights can not be divested by an amendment made subsequently. Accordingly, we are of the view that the impugned order of Commissioner dated 2C - 12 - 1991 passed under the Proviso of sub - section (2) of Section 21 added by U. P. Act 28 of 1991 which came in force on 19 - 2 - 1991 is apparently without jurisdiction. Thus the writ petition is liable to succeed and the impugned order is liable to be quashed. 12. We accordingly allow the writ petition and quash the order of the Commissioner dated 20 - 6 - 1991 contained in Annexure No. 1 to the writ petition as also consequential proceedings. Let a certiorari be issued accordingly. Under the circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to the costs.
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1993 (2) TMI 324
... ... ... ... ..... e 5 to FR 56 (m) in 1979. The Tribunal, therefore, fell in error in issuing the direction to correct his date of birth and the impugned order of the Tribunal cannot be sustained. Ordinarily, keeping in view of judgment of this Court in Amulya Chandra Kalita's case (supra), we should have remanded the case to the Tribunal for a fresh disposal because of the fact that the order of the Tribunal was rendered by only one member or to have awaited the decision of some cases pending in this Court in which the validity of the order passed by single member of the tribunal is under consideration but since we have ourselves looked into all the facts and circumstances of the case and given an interpretation to Note 5 to FR 56 (m), we do not consider it. expedient to adopt either of these course. In view of the interpretation placed by us, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order of the Tribunal is set aside. There shall however, be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.
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1993 (2) TMI 323
... ... ... ... ..... nts, which did not pass through the accounts, as mentioned in exhibit P3 order, from the two societies were only for the sale of goods, is seen affirmed by the revisional authorities in exhibits P4 and P6 and this is based on the basis of materials available in the case and after getting the confirmation letter from the two societies. 5.. In the light of the above difference in the nature of the transactions for the two years (1984-85 and 1985-86), the plea made by the appellant that in similar circumstances the levy of penalty for the year 1985-86 was set aside and remitted by exhibit P4 order is without substance. There is all the difference between the facts and circumstances for the years 1984-85 and 1985-86. The levy of penalty for the year 1984-85 by exhibit P3 and affirmed in exhibits P4 and P6 orders, is justified. 6.. We see no reason to interfere with the judgment of the learned single Judge. The writ appeal is without merit. It is dismissed. Writ appeal dismissed.
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1993 (2) TMI 322
... ... ... ... ..... atory amendment was deleted and the original position was restored. If under the original position prawns are excluded so far as the item fish is concerned, that position continued throughout even despite the clarificatory amendment by G.O. Ms. No. 999, Revenue, dated September 3, 1976 or by subsequent deletion of that clarification by G.O. Ms. No. 1253, Revenue, dated October 1, 1977. Consequently the effort made by the learned counsel for the petitioner-assessee on the basis of the later amendments to the exemption G.Os also remains abortive so far as the petitioner s case is concerned. For all these reasons, therefore, we hold that the exemption notification did not cover at the relevant time the commodities in which the petitioner-assessee was dealing, mainly prawns as prawns are different from fish and hence the assessment was rightly levied on these items. 7.. In the result, the tax revision case is dismissed. We, however, make no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1993 (2) TMI 321
... ... ... ... ..... le, or for their benefit, Government has transgressed the limits set by article 14 against classification in as much as there is a very sound rationale behind the classification, and the benefits given to the smaller country bricks manufacturing units. This is sufficient to dispel the arguments of counsel for the petitioners, wire-cut brick manufacturers whose units and investments are larger, products costlier and whose markets are expansive and among the more affluent in society. Therefore, there is no reason to brand exhibits P2 and P3 as discriminatory or as violating article 14 of the Constitution. 8.. In this view of the matter, there is no scope for considering the petitioners prayer for directing the respondents to remove the discrimination by extending the benefits of exhibits P2 and P3 to manufacturers of wire-cut bricks also even assuming that it is possible for this Court to entertain such a request. Original petition is accordingly dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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1993 (2) TMI 320
Constitutional validity of Chapter 111-C read with section 58B (5A) of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934, introduced by the Banking Laws (Amendment) Act, 1983 challenged
Held that:- No doubt, the impugned legislation places restrictions on the right of the appellants to carry on business, but what is essential is to safeguard the rights of various depositors and to see that they are not preyed upon. From the earlier narration, it would be clear that the Reserve Bank of India, right from 1966, has been monitoring and following the functioning of non-banking financial institutions which invite deposits and then utilise those deposits either for trade or for other various industries. A ceiling for acceptance of deposits and to require maintenance of certain liquidity of funds as well as not to exceed borrowings beyond a particular percentage of the netowned funds have been provided in the corporate sector. But for these requirements, the depositors would be left high and dry without any remedy. Even the corporate sector was not free from blame. It had done damage to the economy and brought ruination to small depositors. This was why Section 58A in the Companies Act of 1956 came to be introduced.
It cannot be contended that suddenly the companies like the appellant and the petitioners arc called upon to reduce deposits. Even otherwise, the interests of the depositors is the prime concern. Unquestionably, Rule 3A is to deposit 10% of the deposits maturing during the year in the manner prescribed in Rule 3. Some deposits would be maturing between April 1, 1978 and March 31, 1979. To provide for such marginal situation, a proviso is inserted. Does it to make the rule retroactive? Of course, not. Appeal dismissed
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1993 (2) TMI 319
... ... ... ... ..... tled to take advantage of the Fifth Schedule. Primarily balloons are used as toys by the children, sometimes they are also used for other purposes like decoration. Decorative purpose of balloons is only incidental because of the colours given to the balloons by the manufacturer. If all the balloons are manufactured under a particular colour, the decorative utility of the balloons will be lost. In the circumstances, we are of the view that the dominant purpose of the balloons shall have to be taken into consideration and if so, the balloons are entitled to come under the purview of entry 47 of the Fifth Schedule. The clarification issued by the Commissioner dated January 27, 1986, is not happily worded. 6.. For the reasons stated above, we allow these revision petitions. 7.. Learned Government Pleader is directed to file his memo of appearance within six weeks. 8.. The assessing authorities are directed to re-do the assessment in the light of this decision. Petitions allowed.
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1993 (2) TMI 318
... ... ... ... ..... condition was complied with. The applicant is, therefore, not entitled to the grant of eligibility certificate prior to March 2, 1984. Accordingly, the application is dismissed. Interim order, if any, stands vacated. The amount of security, if any, deposited by the applicant in terms of interim order made by the High Court on January 14, 1986, read with order dated February 28, 1992, passed by this Tribunal in RN-62(T) of 1992 shall be adjusted against assessments for the periods prior to December 21, 1985. No order is made as to costs. It appears that the same case was earlier numbered as RN-62(T) of 1992 when the applicant moved an application for interim order before this Tribunal. After record was received from the High Court, the same case was numbered as RN-259(T) of 1992. Accordingly, this judgment disposes of both RN-62(T) of 1992 and RN-259(T) of 1992. Let a suitable order be made in RN-62(T) of 1992. P.C. BANERJI (Technical Member).-I agree. Application dismissed.
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1993 (2) TMI 317
... ... ... ... ..... , 1986 filed by the applicant No. 1 company on April 8, 1986, under rule 3(66a) of the Bengal Sales Tax Rules, 1941 and issue the necessary eligibility certificate for a period of 12 months from the date of first sale of goods manufactured in the industrial unit of the applicant No. 1 company. He is directed to issue such certificate within a period of three weeks from this date. He is further directed to dispose of in accordance with law any application for renewal of eligibility certificate already filed or to be filed in future by applicant No. 1 company. Since an interim order was made on March 6, 1992, the respondents are directed to modify any assessment, if made, in respect of applicant No. 1 company for the period from October 28, 1985 to October 27, 1988 to the extent necessary in view of this judgment and order. The interim order dated March 6, 1992, will stand vacated. There will be no order for costs. P.C. BANERJI (Technical Member).-I agree. Application allowed.
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1993 (2) TMI 316
... ... ... ... ..... . We should also mention that at the time when the second respondent passed the order under section 45A of the Act (exhibit P7), the guidelines to be borne in mind in the matter of levy of penalty were not easily discernible. Subsequently, this Court had occasion to lay down the guidelines in Sudhi v. Intelligence Officer 1992 85 STC 337. As to whether the penalty is exigible has to be viewed from the angle or perspective laid down in the aforesaid decision. In adjudicating the revision, the third respondent shall bear that in mind. Pending the revision, it is open to the revisional authority to pass such order or further interim orders, as it deems fit and necessary, to meet the ends of justice. We make this position also clear. The third respondent shall dispose of the revision itself within three months from the date of curing of the defects or rectifying the defects by the petitioner. 8.. The original petition is disposed of with the above observations. Petition allowed.
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1993 (2) TMI 315
... ... ... ... ..... ontained in loose parcha. However, it may be noticed that according to the learned counsel the discrepancy of 20.89 quintals in the stock of common paddy was liable to be ignored having regard to heavy purchases of paddy made during the year and no adverse inference should have been drawn for that discrepancy. Since, I am of the view that the matter should go back to the Sales Tax Tribunal for reconsideration, the assessee shall be at liberty to raise this plea also before the Tribunal and such other pleas that may be available to it in law. It is needless to observe that the Tribunal shall consider the matter afresh in giving effect to this judgment considering all such pleas as may be raised before it by the contending parties. In the result, the order of the Sales Tax Tribunal is set aside with the direction to the Tribunal to decide the appeal afresh giving rise to this revision. The revision succeeds and is allowed. There shall be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1993 (2) TMI 314
... ... ... ... ..... shall be in a position to show cause against the proposed action. The narration of facts as referred to by the Tribunal go to show that no opportunity was granted to the assessee-petitioner to show cause against the proposed action for enhancement. This is really of no consequence in the case at hand because of our conclusion that the Tribunal has no power to enhance the assessment in the absence of an appeal or cross-objection. Therefore, the Member was not justified in directing restoration of the enhancement made by the assessing officer. That part of the order is nullified. 7.. Normally we would have left the parties to work out their remedies in a reference application in terms of section 24 of the Act. But keeping in view the fact that the Tribunal has acted contrary to law laid down by the apex Court, we have entertained the writ application and have nullified the enhancement made. The writ application succeeds. No costs. B.N. DASH, J.-I agree. Writ petition allowed.
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1993 (2) TMI 313
... ... ... ... ..... her filed an appeal before the Tribunal and vide orders dated January 31, 1991, the petitioner was directed to deposit Rs. 10 lakhs by June 28, 1991 and to appear before the Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner failing which the appeal was ordered to be dismissed in limine. The petitioner did not deposit the amount and instead preferred an application for rectification before the Tribunal which was dismissed vide orders dated October 7, 1991. It is conceded case between the parties that if the Letters Patent Appeals preferred by the State of Punjab are dismissed then the liability to pay tax is not of the petitioner. In view of the foregoing discussion, whereas the Letters Patent Appeals filed by the State are dismissed, the writ petition is allowed to the extent that the matter shall be heard by the authorities without insisting upon pre-deposit of the amount as asked for by various orders referred to above. However, there shall be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1993 (2) TMI 312
... ... ... ... ..... s, we set aside the order passed by the Appellate Tribunal dated February 25, 1991. 8.. With regard to the plea of the assessee that he was not given an opportunity to cross-examine the Inspecting Officer, we are of the view that the matter is concluded against the assessee by the Full Bench decision of this Court in M.K. Thomas v. State of Kerala 1977 40 STC 278. The above plea has no substance. We reject the said plea. 9.. The only basis on which the Appellate Tribunal held that the rejection of accounts is improper, is by discarding the inspection report dated October 5, 1982. We have held that the said inspection report could be relied on, legally and factually, in this case. In this view of the matter, the rejection of accounts was justified and also the quantum made in the assessment, as upheld by the first appellate authority. 10.. The order of the Appellate Tribunal dated February 25, 1991, is set aside. The revision is allowed with costs Rs. 1,000. Petition allowed.
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1993 (2) TMI 311
... ... ... ... ..... d machinery in section 10F. That being our view, the total investment in fixed capital assets in terms of section 10F will exceed rupees ten lakhs in the case of the applicant-firm and accordingly the impugned orders of the Assistant Commissioner and the Additional Commissioner cannot be sustained. Accordingly, the impugned orders dated April 20, 1991 passed by the Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, respondent No. 1, and the revisional order dated December 20, 1991 passed by the Additional Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, respondent No. 2, are set aside. Respondent No. 1, Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, is directed to make a fresh order on the application of the applicant-firm under section 10F of the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941, following this judgment within a period of four weeks from this date. The main application is thus disposed of without any order for costs. P.C. BANERJI (Technical Member).-I agree. Application disposed of accordingly.
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1993 (2) TMI 310
... ... ... ... ..... so cited a decision of the Bombay High Court reported in 1990 77 STC 465 (Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Maharashtra Hardware Stores). The principles stated in this decision can be placed before the Deputy Commissioner since on merits we have not expressed any opinion. 10.. Lastly, Mr. Gandhi contended that the petitioner had no full opportunity to place its objections on the merits of the matter as the petitioner concentrated only on the question of limitation. 11.. In the circumstances, we set aside the order under revision, remit the matter to the Deputy Commissioner for fresh consideration on the merits of the case subject to the finding already given by us regarding the question of limitation. The Deputy Commissioner shall issue notice to the petitioner fixing a date of hearing. On the receipt of the notice the assessee is entitled to file its objections within a reasonable time from that date. 12.. The sales tax revision petition is allowed accordingly. Petition allowed.
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1993 (2) TMI 309
... ... ... ... ..... tel 1983 53 STC 169 in which in relation to the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act it was held that when no limitation for the levy of penalty was prescribed, the limitation prescribed for the making of assessment would apply to levy of penalty also. No support need be taken from this judgment because as shown above the determination of an amount payable by a dealer under section 3B of the Sales Tax Act, 1948, is an assessment and the Act specifically provides the period of limitation for assessment. Accordingly I hold that the impugned orders dated 24th of December, 1988 were passed by the Sales Tax Officer concerned much after the expiry of the period of limitation and, therefore, could not have been sustained. For the reasons discussed above, these revisions are allowed and the impugned orders dated 24th of December, 1988 passed by the Sales Tax Officer are, hereby quashed. In the circumstances of the case the parties are made to bear their own costs. Petitions allowed.
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1993 (2) TMI 308
... ... ... ... ..... of the case, a security other than cash or a bank guarantee instead of cash would have served the purpose of securing the interest of the Revenue. The revision is accordingly, disposed of with the direction that if the petitioner furnishes a security other than cash to the sum as directed by the Assistant Commissioner, Sales Tax, Check-post, Jhansi, to the satisfaction of the said officer, the goods may be released. Penalty proceedings may, however, be expedited and concluded at an early date. The security so furnished shall be subject to the orders passed in penalty proceedings. To the extent, the order of the Sales Tax Tribunal is contrary to the directions as given above, cannot be sustained and is set aside. In giving effect to this order the Sales Tax Tribunal shall restore the appeal giving rise to this revision in conformity with the order passed by this Court. The revision succeeds and is allowed in part. There shall be no order as to costs. Petition partly allowed.
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1993 (2) TMI 307
... ... ... ... ..... nts. Instead of an advance assessment for the whole year, it is open to the assessee to avail of rule 21 method. Instead of opting for an assessment for the whole year, it is open to the assessee to submit a return before the 10th of every month along with the tax collected for the preceding month thereby making a self-assessment every month. That is the procedure that has been availed of by the assessee in this case. After the year is over the assessee should file an annual return which should be scrutinised and final orders should be passed. That is contemplated in the proviso to sub-rule (13) of rule 21. It is for making that assessment the assessing authority required the petitioner to produce the accounts and other relevant materials. He was authorised to do so. The plea to the contrary by the assessee has no legal foundation. The learned single Judge was justified in negativing the said plea. We find no merit in this writ appeal. It is dismissed. Writ appeal dismissed.
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