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Case Laws
Showing 221 to 240 of 304 Records
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1993 (3) TMI 84 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Depreciation, Limitation ... ... ... ... ..... CIT v. Gangaram Chapolia and Co. 1991 187 ITR 594. The court held that there is no help where the rectification is not made within the time. In the present case, it is the admitted position that four years long passed before the assessee sought for rectification in question. It is precisely for that reason that the assessee took the position that the limitation should commence not from the date of the original order of assessment but from the date of the rectification order that was passed on July 12, 1982. The view is urged because if computed from that date, the application is well within the time and there is no impediment to the rectification being carried out. But as we have observed, the contention is not correct. The Tribunal also fell into error in upholding the assessee s contention. In the aforesaid premises, we answer the question in the negative, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. There will be no order as to costs. SHYAMAL KUMAR SEN J. - I agree.
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1993 (3) TMI 83 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... under section 263 of the Act. In that forum, all factual disputes can be effectively adjudicated. Our non-interference should not be construed to be expression of any opinion about the merits of the case. An alternative submission of Mr. Mahanti is to the effect that the offer of Rs. 111.37 lakhs as additional income to be subjected to tax was made with a view to buy peace, though there was no necessity for doing so. The intention was to avoid adverse publicity and the Revenue with eyes open accepted the offer and is now trying to gain undue advantage out of that situation, in resorting to legally mala fide actions. It is submitted that the offer should be permitted to be withdrawn. Prayer is made for a direction to that effect. We express no opinion in the matter. If the petitioner is so entitled in law, it may move the appropriate authority in this regard. The writ applications are, accordingly, dismissed with the aforesaid observations. No costs. D. M. PATNAIK J.-I agree.
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1993 (3) TMI 82 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
Advance Tax, Burden Of Proof, Reference ... ... ... ... ..... crores whereas it was about Rs. 1.82 crores for the year under consideration. This seems to have weighed with the Tribunal. The variation in the turnover of previous year and the year under consideration has been considered to be relevant by the Tribunal. Before the Tribunal, the turnovers with details relating to total tonnage of output were placed. Though the Tribunal has not very elaborately dealt with these aspects, yet it has specifically referred to the turnover aspect and the comparative incomes of previous years. We are, therefore, of the considered opinion that the conclusion of the Tribunal cannot be characterised to be perverse so as to give rise to a question of law. Since the Tribunal has arrived at its finding regarding bona fide plea of the assessee by consideration of germane materials, and has arrived at a factual conclusion, no question of law arises out of the order of the Tribunal. The reference application is rejected. No costs. D. M. PATNAIK J.-I agree.
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1993 (3) TMI 81 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Addition To Income ... ... ... ... ..... was there a partial partition either as regards the three members of the family. This is the basic primary fact on the basis whereof the Tribunal proceeded to hold that the aggregate sum of Rs. 90,000 remained the property of the family. The contention that the said sum was advanced as loan by the family to the three members has not been proved before the Tribunal. The Tribunal also found that there was no agreement in support of the contention that any advance was made by the family to the three members. In our view, on the facts and circumstances of the case, the Tribunal came to a correct conclusion and as the findings of the Tribunal have not been challenged as being perverse, we cannot go into the question whether, in fact, there was any agreement between the family and the three members. For the reasons aforesaid the question in this reference is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the Revenue. There will be no order as to costs. NURE ALAM CHOWDHURY J.-I agree.
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1993 (3) TMI 80 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Depreciation, Initial Depreciation, Small Scale Undertaking, Whether Small Scale Undertaking ... ... ... ... ..... s cannot be treated as plant and machinery for the purposes of this section and, therefore, their value cannot be taken into consideration for determining the ceiling of Rs. 7.5 lakhs for the purpose of determining whether an industrial company is a small scale industrial undertaking or not. In our opinion, the language of section 32(1)(vi) as well as the Explanation is clear. There is no ambiguity therein nor is there any scope for any other interpretation than the one we have given above. In that view of the matter, we do not find any error in the decision of the Tribunal. We, therefore, hold that the Tribunal was justified in holding that the assessee-company was entitled to initial depreciation under section 32(1)(vi) of the Act on the plant and machinery as claimed by the assessee. Accordingly, in the light of the foregoing discussion, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. No order as to costs.
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1993 (3) TMI 79 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Diversion By Overriding Title ... ... ... ... ..... c) of clauses 18 and 15 of the partnership deed what was diverted was a share of the income accrued which was a part of the income accrued during the particular period of one year. Thus, the diversion, if at all, was to take place from the income of that particular year and the payment thereof also was to be made within a period of two years and one year respectively which again clearly goes to show that this payment had nothing to do with the system of accounting followed by the assessee or the actual date of payment. In the light of the foregoing discussion, we are of the clear opinion that the Tribunal was not justified in holding that the sums of Rs. 60,000 and Rs. 99,333 paid to the widows of the deceased partners did not constitute the assessee s income. In that view of the matter, we answer the question referred to us in the negative, that is, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. Under the facts and circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs.
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1993 (3) TMI 78 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Cross Transfer ... ... ... ... ..... t to refer to a subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in CIT v. Keshavji Morarji 1967 66 ITR 142, wherein also the Supreme Court applied its earlier decision in C. M. Kothari s case 1963 49 ITR 107 (SC). It was reiterated by the Supreme Court that if the two transfers are inter-connected and are parts of the same transaction that it can be said that the circuitous method was adopted as a device to evade the implications of section 16(3)(a)(iii) or (iv) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, the case will fall within the section. In the light of the above decisions of the Supreme Court, we are of the clear opinion that under the facts and circumstances of the case the interest arising to the assessee s wife and minor child is assessable in the hands of the assessee under section 64(iii) and 64(iv) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Accordingly, the question referred to us is answered in the affirmative, that is in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. No order as to costs.
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1993 (3) TMI 77 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
New Industrial Undertaking ... ... ... ... ..... 80K of the Act, if he fulfils the requirements in respect of dividend income of Rs. 6,72,220. Having arrived at this conclusion, it may be expedient to observe that the question referred to us by the Tribunal is not happily worded and does not project the real controversy in the proper perspective. We, therefore, reframe the question as follows Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, and having regard to the definition of gross total income under section 80B(5) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the Tribunal was justified in upholding the deduction under section 80K from the dividend income of the assessee without deducting therefrom the pro rata expenditure incurred by the assessee on brokerage, share transfer fees and interest ? In the light of the above discussion, we answer the question as reframed by us in the affirmative, that is in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. Under the facts and circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs.
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1993 (3) TMI 76 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Notice, Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... on for Obtaining a copy of the reasons recorded by the assessing authority to proceed under section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, then the assessing authority shall communicate the reasons recorded by him under section 148 to the petitioner within one week from the date a certified copy of this order is produced before him by the petitioner along with a copy of the application said to have been made in this behalf to the respondent, subject, of course, to the necessity of protecting his source/informant, if he thinks that protection is necessary in this case and when the reasons are communicated by the assessing authority, the petitioner may file reply before him within one week from the date of communication of the reasons. Till then, the proceedings pursuant to the impugned notices dated November 19, 1991 (annexure 6 to the petition), relating to the assessment years 1988-89 and 1989-90, will not be completed. A copy of this order may be given within 24 hours on payment.
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1993 (3) TMI 75 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Interest, Interest On Bank Deposits ... ... ... ... ..... s deductible from that item under the provisions of the Act as explained above. That is not the case here. Therefore, section 80AB has no application to the facts of these cases. The interest paid on the loan transactions has to be deducted from the business income, and not from the interest received from the bank on the fixed deposits. The assessees were therefore right in the submissions which they made before the Commissioner of Income-tax in the revision petitions which they filed. This aspect of the matter has been overlooked by the Commissioner in passing the order, exhibit P-5. Accordingly, I allow the original petitions, and quash exhibits P-2 and P-5. The first respondent is directed to complete the assessments afresh after deducting the interest paid by each of the petitioners to the bank on the loans on their fixed deposits from out of the business income of the petitioners, and also to grant them the deduction under section 80L. There will be no order as to costs.
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1993 (3) TMI 74 - JAMMU AND KASHMIR HIGH COURT
Appeal To AAC, Firm ... ... ... ... ..... with the application for initial registration. There is no need to stretch the provisions of section 185(1)(b) to cover a situation which is adequately taken care of by section 185(3). The foregoing discussion leads to the inescapable conclusion that where the Income-tax Officer is seized of a declaration in Form No. 12 under the proviso to section 184(7) and he refuses to extend time, he shall be deemed to have passed the order under section 185(3) which is appeal able under section 246(j) and not under section 185(1)(b) as already noticed. To that extent, we uphold the contention of Mr, Thakur while finding ourselves in respectful disagreement with the view taken by various High Courts on the point. This, however, does not make any difference to the result of this reference. We, therefore, are of the opinion that the Tribunal was justified in holding that the Income-tax Officer s order was appealable though under section 246(j) and answer this reference in the affirmative.
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1993 (3) TMI 73 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Clubbing Of Income Of Minor Child, HUF, Inclusions In Total Income, Total Income ... ... ... ... ..... section 64(1)(iii) cannot be applied to club the income of the minor in computing the total income of the assessee-Hindu undivided family. The said decision was followed in CIT v. Bal Mukund 1990 182 ITR 42 (Raj). It is no doubt true that a few High Courts have taken the view in favour of the Revenue but the golden rule of interpretation is that the interpretation which is beneficial to the assessee has to be adopted and more particularly when most of the High Courts have taken the view which has been taken by this court and since no case has been made out to refer the said matter to a larger Bench, we are of the view that the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was justified in upholding the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner deleting the share income of the minor sons assessed in the hands of the assessee under section 64(1)(iii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Accordingly, the reference is answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue, No orders as to costs.
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1993 (3) TMI 72 - KERALA HIGH COURT
False Statement In Verification, Offences And Prosecution, Wilful Attempt To Evade Tax ... ... ... ... ..... criminal court cannot reach a contrary conclusion. In view of the agreed nature of the assessment and the non-establishment of the falsity of the explanation offered by the petitioner, the very basis of the prosecution goes. It has accordingly to be quashed. However, and since the time for filing an application under section 256(2) is not over, the interests of the Revenue have to be safeguarded by directing, as Manoharan J. did, that the quashing of the complaint will be without prejudice to the rights of the respondents to file a fresh complaint if the order of the Tribunal is set aside in the further proceedings arising consequent on the application under section 256(2) of the Act. Accordingly, I allow the original petition and quash the complaint, exhibit P-7. This will not, however, preclude the respondents from filing a fresh complaint, if the order of the Tribunal is set aside consequent upon the proceedings initiated under section 256(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
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1993 (3) TMI 71 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Charitable Purpose, Charitable Trust, Exemptions ... ... ... ... ..... ection 13(1)(c) for the purpose of forfeiting the exemption. The pertinent question would still remain when one of the two provisos to clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 13 (in this case, the second proviso) is admittedly applicable, the effect of which is that the exemption cannot be forfeited, could one accept the Department s case that the date mentioned in proviso (ii) has lost relevance so much so that the proviso has become otiose. We will certainly avoid such a construction unless compelled by the plain language of the provisions. Under the circumstances, having regard to the undisputed finding of the Tribunal that the case falls within proviso (ii) to clause (c) to sub-section (1) of section 13, it will, in our view, have to be held that the income is entitled to exemption and that the Tribunal was right in its conclusion. We, therefore, answer all the questions in the affirmative, that is, against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee. No order as to costs.
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1993 (3) TMI 70 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Any Remuneration, Other Sources, Remuneration Received By Managing Director ... ... ... ... ..... Tribunal is competent to decide any other objection left undecided on the earlier occasion and, for that purpose, it is not necessary that there should be any direction or order to that effect from the High Court. In the light of the above decisions, since the question or aspect as to whether the rubber replantation subsidy received by the assessee is agricultural income or not was left undecided at the earlier stage when the Tribunal decided the matter, it was open to the Appellate Tribunal to examine the matter in passing final orders from a different and new perspective. To this extent, we answer question No. 2 in the affirmative, against the Revenue. We should also state that, on this aspect, at the earlier stage, the High Court had no occasion to render a decision. The reference is answered as above. A copy of this judgment, under the seal of this court and the sign nature of the Registrar, shall be forwarded to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench, forthwith.
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1993 (3) TMI 69 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, High Court, New Industrial Undertaking, Precedents ... ... ... ... ..... capital employed or an asset and, therefore, in computing the total value of assets under rule 19A(2), capital expenditure on scientific research which has already been allowed, should be included. Though learned counsel for the Revenue is right in submitting that the Andhra Pradesh High Court has not given reasons for taking this view, we see no reason to differ from that view because the Income-tax Act is an all-India statute and as pointed out by the Bombay High Court in Maneklal Chunilal and Sons Ltd. v. CIT 1953 24 ITR 375 and this court in CIT v. Sarabhai Sons Ltd. 1983 143 ITR 473, it is desirable to follow uniformity in income-tax matters. For the reasons stated above, questions Nos. 1 and 2 are answered in the affirmative, that is, against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee. Questions Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are also answered in the affirmative, that is, against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee. Reference is disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs.
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1993 (3) TMI 68 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Best Judgment Assessment, Failure To File Return, Reference ... ... ... ... ..... does not show as to why it held that the assessment is arbitrary. The relevant facts have been stated in the appellate order. What are the details that are lacking therein and what further aspects are to be adverted to by the Income-tax Officer before making the best judgment assessment under section 144, are not adverted to nor stated by the Appellate Tribunal. On the whole, the order of the Appellate Tribunal does not, prima facie, appear to be in accordance with law. We are satisfied that the questions of law, formulated in para graph 7 of the petition, do arise out of the appellate order of the Tribunal. We, therefore, direct the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench, to refer the said questions for the decision of this court within three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. A copy of this judgment, under the seal of this court and the signature of the Registrar, shall be forwarded to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench, forthwith.
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1993 (3) TMI 67 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Estate Duty ... ... ... ... ..... almost the same advantages and disadvantages as the land in question situation wise, the fact remains that so far as the land in question is concerned, it had its own disadvantages, in the sense, it was owned jointly by five persons and there were certain tenants and licensees on the land. The accountable persons had raised these points before the authorities to claim deduction of 22 to 25 per cent. on this count. In our opinion, the Tribunal was wrong In not considering these aspects and making a suit able deduction from the rate of Rs. 150 per sq. yard. In our opinion, the property in question would have fetched 20 per cent. less than the price at which the lands occupied by the Bhavani Chambers and National Chambers were sold, The Tribunal would have been right in fixing the price at 20 per cent, less than Rs. 1.50 per sq. yard. For the reasons stated above, we answer all the four questions as indicated by us, Reference is disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs.
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1993 (3) TMI 66 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
Appeal To Tribunal ... ... ... ... ..... t be treated as a factor against the assessee by the Tribunal when hearing the second appeal. The same has to be disposed of on the merits unfettered by completion of fresh assessment by the Assessing Officer. The appeal does not become infructuous by the passing of an order in pursuance of the order of remand (see Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee v. Raja Shiv Rattan Dev Singh, AIR 1955 SC 576). The principle has been recognised by the Privy Council in Shama Purshad Roy Chowdery v. Hurro Purshad Roy Chowdery 1865 10 MIA 203 (PC). It is stated by learned counsel appearing for the assessee that the result of the assessment for the year 1985-86 would affect the assessment relating to 1984-85 and without taking up the assessment for 1985-86, any proceeding in respect of the assessment year 1984-85 would be an exercise in futility. The Assessing Officer shall consider this aspect while dealing with the assessment for 1984-85. The writ application is disposed of accordingly.
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1993 (3) TMI 65 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Procedure For Appeal To Tribunal, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... n doubts as to whether, in a case where a party has got an efficacious statutory remedy and that remedy is invoked, for the same relief, instead of adjudicating the issue under the relevant statute, it is open to this court to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this court under article 227 of the Constitution. It is not necessary for the purpose of this case to pronounce finally on the said question. We refrain from doing so. Since we have very great doubts in the matter, we are not following the course adopted by the Division Bench in the decision in Guna Shenoy s case 1992 197 ITR 325. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench, is directed to refer the questions of law formulated hereinabove for the decision of this court within three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. A copy of this judgment, under the seal of this court and the signature of the Registrar shall be forwarded to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench, forthwith.
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