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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 268 Records
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1994 (2) TMI 309 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... by the Speaker was, therefore, in violation of the constitutional mandate contained in paragraph 3 of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution and is liable to be quashed on the basis of the law laid down by this Court in Kihoto Hollohan case2. 45.In that view of the matter we do not consider it necessary to deal with the submission of Shri Sorabjee that the action of the Speaker in excluding Dharma Chodankar from the group of Naik was in violation of the principles of natural justice. 46.In the result, while CA No. 3309 of 1993 filed by Bandekar and Chopdekar is dismissed, CA No. 2904 of 1993 filed by Naik is allowed. The order dated May 14, 1993 passed by the High Court in Writ Petition No. 48 of 1991 is set aside and the said writ petition is allowed and the order dated February 15, 1991 passed by the Speaker, Goa Legislative Assembly declaring Naik as disqualified for being a member of the Goa Legislative Assembly is quashed. There is no order to costs in both the appeals.
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1994 (2) TMI 308 - COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS (APPEALS)
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... ... ..... priate rate on a Bill of Entry. So, all these documents such as the Shipping Bills, the Bills of Entry, the relevant invoices and also a declaration from M/s. Savio the suppliers to the effect that the 240 replacement winding drums have been supplied vide their invoice were identical 240 drums which were sent back to M/s. Savio, Italy, would indicate the identity of the goods, beyond doubt. Thus, I find that the appellant has fully established the identity of the goods that the drums re-exported are only those which have been imported. When the drums have been subjected to payment of duty when they were imported along with the machine, and again when replacement have been received duty has been paid second time in respect of those drums. Thus, the duty has been paid twice. Therefore, the duty which was paid earlier has to be repaid as drawback to the appellant. In the light of the above, I set aside the order of the Lower Authority and the appeal of the appellant is allowed.
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1994 (2) TMI 307 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... us allegations of misconduct have been alleged against the respondent, the Tribunal was quite unjustified in interfering with the orders of suspension of the respondent pending inquiry. The Tribunal appears to have proceeded in haste in passing the impugned orders even before the ink is dried on the orders passed by the appointing authority. The contention of the respondent, therefore, that the discretion exercised by the Tribunal should not be interferred with and this Court would be loath to interfere with the exercise of such discretionary power cannot be given acceptance. 15. In the light of the above, we are of the considered view that it is a fit case for interference. However, it is made clear that we have not expressed any opinion on merits. The entire matter has yet to be investigated into and proceeded on the legal evidence and according to law. The appeals are accordingly allowed and the orders of the Tribunal are set aside, but in the circumstances without costs.
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1994 (2) TMI 306 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ved because the bracketed portion only clarifies what is meant "the income by way of such dividends as computed in accordance with the provisions of this Act". The said phrase is not used for governing the entire section 80M or for making sub-section (2) nugatory. In this view of the matter, we hold, that, for working out the deduction under section 80M(1) of the Act, the net dividend income after reducing the quantum of dividend income further on account of relief admissible under section 80K of the Act is to be taken into consideration. 16. In the result, the questions in all the references are answered in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee by holding that, in computing deductions allowable under sub-section (1) of section 80M, the net dividend income should be reduced by the deductions allowable to the assessee under section 80K, as provided in sub-section (2) of section 80M. 17. The references stand disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs.
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1994 (2) TMI 305 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ct in which case, it is not an instrument chargeable to duty and the question of impounding does not arise. Much less, there could be a demand for stamp duty. 30.It is the benefit of this agreement which is sought to be assigned in favour of Basant Cooperative Housing Society. In the narration of facts, we have pointed out as to how from the beginning i.e. from December 15, 1970 onwards, when the offer was made by the respondent in answer to a questionnaire, it was made clear that the offer was made as a promoter. This position was again affirmed on February 23, 1971 which was accepted by Collector on March 16, 1971. The letter from the Collector dated December 13, 1977 puts the matter beyond doubt because the respondent’s request to transfer the rights, title and interest in Plot No. 101, in favour of Basant Cooperative Housing Society was sanctioned. In law, the benefit of such a contract can be assigned. That is precisely what the respondent did in the instant case.
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1994 (2) TMI 304 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ed loss carried forward for set off. 15. The second question relating to the allowability of the depreciation on building on the basis that the building for a hotel is a plant stands concluded by the judgment of this Court delivered in the case of S.P. Jaiswal Estates (P.) Ltd. IT Reference No. 122 of 1991, dated 10-2-1994 . Following the said decision we hold that the building is a distinct category of asset, independent and a class by itself and the statutory provision requires it to be treated as such and not as an item of general plant and machinery, no matter whether functionally the building of the hotel is more than a building. Following our earlier decision in the aforesaid case, we hold that the hotel building is to be depreciated at the rate appropriate for a building and not at the rate applicable to a general plant. 16. Thus, we answer both the questions in the negative and in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. 17. There will be no order as to costs.
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1994 (2) TMI 303 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ught one know, there may be other cases waiting already for appointment on compassionate grounds, they may be even harder than that of the second respondent. 17. Thus, apart from the direction as to appointment on compassionate grounds being against statutory provisions, such direction does not take note of this fact. Whatever it may be, the Court should not have directed the appointment on compassionate grounds. The jurisdiction under mandamus cannot be exercised in that fashion. It should have merely directed consideration of the claim of the second respondent. To straightaway direct the appointment would only put the appellant Corporation in piquant situation. The disobedience of this direction will entail contempt notwithstanding the fact that the appointment may not be warranted. This is yet another ground which renders the impugned judgment dated October 19, 1993 unsupportable. For these reasons, the civil appeal will stand allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1994 (2) TMI 302 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ting its application in the manner aforesaid will defeat the purpose for which Rule 39 has been incorporated. We, therefore set aside the decision of the Madras High Court since impugned in these proceedings and declare that Rule 39 of the Mineral Concession Rules is legal and valid. In view of such declaration, the order of the High Court in cancelling leases which were granted in exercise of power under Rule 39, simply on the score that no such power could have been exercised under Rule 39 which had been declared ultra vires and invalid, is also set aside. It is, however, made clear that although a lease granted in exercise of power under Rule 39 cannot per se be held invalid, whether the exercise of power under Rule 39 in a given case has been properly made or not can always be questioned. If such question is raised in a case, it will be open to the High Court to decide the question on merits. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
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1994 (2) TMI 301 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... mendment and that he was competent to pass interlocutory orders in the suit. The Division Bench of the High Court has, however, found that in view of the said order passed by the Court on 19-4-1993, the trial court no longer had any jurisdiction to proceed in respect of the suit in any way whatsoever and could not proceed with the hearing of the amendment application and to allow the amendment of the plaint. The Division Bench has further observed that "no specific order staying the hearing of the amendment application was passed by the Court for the reason that the Court was granting stay of the suit itself and it is not necessary to pass any specific order in respect of any interlocutory proceeding in the suit". We do not find any infirmity in the said approach of the Division Bench of the High Court. SLP (Civil) Nos. 121-22 of 1994 are also liable to be dismissed. 23.In the result all the three special leave petitions filed by the petitioner (RMI) are dismissed.
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1994 (2) TMI 300 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... that an order made in violation of natural justice is void. 29. According to us, therefore, the legal and proper order to be passed in the present case also, despite a mandatory provision having been violated, is to require the employer to furnish a copy of the proceeding and to call upon the High Court to decide thereafter as to whether non-fur-nishing of the copy prejudiced the appellant/petitioner and the same has made difference to the ultimate finding and punishment given. If this question would be answered in affirmative, the High Court would set aside the dismissal order by granting such consequential reliefs as deemed just and proper. 30. The appeal and Writ Petition are allowed accordingly. As the dismissal order relates back to 1978, we would request the Division Bench of the High Court to dispose of the matter within a period of three months from the date of the receipt of this order. In so far as the present proceeding is concerned, we make no order as to costs.
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1994 (2) TMI 299 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ers who came in and purchased under their own decree, which was afterwards reversed on appeal, and the bona fide purchasers who come in and brought at the sale in execution of the decree to which they were no parties, and at a time when that decree was a valid decree, and when the order for the sale was a valid order." 4. In our view the above principle will apply in the case in hand as it is the decree-holder who has put the respondent No. 2 in possession and, therefore, when the decree has been set aside he is bound to restore to the judgment-debtor what he gained under the decree and subsequently transferred to the respondent No. 2. 5. We, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the order of the High Court and direct restoration of possession to the appellant in terms of the order passed by the Rent Controller. Needless to say such restoration will abide by the result of the eviction petition filed by the respondent No. 1. However, there will be no order as to costs.
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1994 (2) TMI 298 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Exemption - Interpretation of taxing statute ... ... ... ... ..... I have already indicated that no duty is leviable on the imported seeds subject to the compliance with the Customs Exemption Notification No. 265/88-Cus., dated 28th September, 1988. The show cause notice was issued on the ground that one of the conditions regarding the production of valid permit in terms of the said notification was not complied with. The only dispute is, therefore, that whether such conditions is still applicable to the import of such seeds. In view of the notification of the Ministry of Agriculture, the Customs authorities could not have insisted on production of a permit in Form D 39 and accordingly, their action in proceeding to levy duty by the impugned show cause notice is on the face of it without jurisdiction. 43.In the result, this application succeeds. The impugned show cause notice and the proceedings initiated thereunder are quashed. The Bond furnished by the petitioner will stand cancelled and discharged. 44.There will be no order as to costs.
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1994 (2) TMI 297 - SUPREME COURT
Infringement of the copyright & Violation of the registered trade mark - Held that:- It is a settled principle of law relating to trade mark that there can be only one mark, one source and one proprietor. It cannot have two origins. Where, therefore, the first defendant-respondent has proclaimed himself as a rival of the plaintiffs and as joint owner it is impermissible in law. Even then. the joint proprietors must use the trade mark jointly for the benefit of all. It cannot be used in rivalry and in competition with each other.
The plea of quasi-partnership was never urged in the pleading. As regards copyright there is no plea of assignment. The High Court had failed to note the plea of honest and concurrent user as stated in Section 12(3) of 1958 Act for securing the concurrent registration is not a valid defense for the infringement of copyright. For all these reasons we are unable to support the judgments of the High Court under appeal. We reiterate that on the material on record as is available at present the denial of injunction, once the infringement of trade mark, copyright and design is established, cannot be supported. Pending suit, there will be an injunction in favour of the appellants (the plaintiffs).
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1994 (2) TMI 296 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... orders of the Assessing Authority within a period of three months from today, the appeal filed before the Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner shall stand restored. The same shall be re-entered against its original number and disposed of according to law within a period of six months from the date of restoration. 7.. Mr. Kaushal further made a prayer that in case the court directs the petitioner to deposit the amount of tax in question, it may also be ordered that in the event of the appeals being allowed by the Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, the amount required to be deposited by the petitioner shall be refunded to it within one month of the decision of the appeal. We find the prayer to be quite reasonable and we order accordingly. 8.. In order to enable the petitioner to comply with the above directions, recovery of the amount shall remain stayed for a period of three months. The writ petitions are disposed of in these terms. Petition disposed of accordingly.
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1994 (2) TMI 295 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... , in these two cases is not bound to make deduction of any amounts by way of tax under the Act in cases where the contract is only for supply of labour, or for the carrying out of a work with materials supplied by the Board, without the contractor supplying or transferring any goods to the Board. If however any goods of the contractor are used and they get embedded in the work, necessarily the question of making deduction for payment of the tax due on such materials will arise. But, that question does not arise in these cases where no transfer of property in goods is involved in respect of the contracts mentioned. 5.. The respondents are therefore directed to look into the matter and make payment to the petitioners of any amount which has been withheld from them in respect of works contracts not involving any transfer of property in goods whether as goods or in some other form. The original petitions are disposed of with the above direction. Petition disposed of accordingly.
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1994 (2) TMI 294 - SUPREME COURT
Whether there was a failure on the part of the State in supplying the arrack undertaken by it to supply and whether the licensees are entitled to any rebate/remission in the amounts payable by them under the contracts, on account of such failure, if any/
Held that:- In case of contracts freely entered into with the State, like the present ones, there is no room for invoking the doctrine of fairness and reasonableness against one party to the contract (State), for the purpose of altering or adding to the terms and conditions of the contract, merely because it happens to be the State. In such cases, the mutual rights and liabilities of the parties are governed by the terms of the contracts (which may be statutory in some cases) and the laws relating to contracts. It must be remembered that these contracts are entered into pursuant to public auction, floating of tenders or by negotiation. There is no compulsion on anyone to enter into these contracts. It is voluntary on both sides. There can be no question of the State power being involved in such contracts. It bears repetition to say that the State does not guarantee profit to the licensees in such contracts. There is no warranty against incurring losses. It is a business for the licensees. Whether they make profit or incur loss is no concern of the State. In law, it is entitled to its money under the contract. It is not as if the licensees are going to pay more to the State in case they make substantial profits. We reiterate that what we have said hereinabove is in the context of contracts entered into between the State and its citizens pursuant to public auction, floating of tenders or by negotiation. It is not necessary to say more than this for the purpose of these cases. What would be the position in the case of contracts entered into otherwise than by public auction, floating of tenders or negotiation, we need not express any opinion herein. The appeals preferred by the State are allowed and the appeals preferred by the licensees/contractors are dismissed.
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1994 (2) TMI 293 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ore the Sales Tax Tribunal, Ghaziabad which passed the impugned order, as a result whereof this extraordinary situation had to be created. The Tribunal, Ghaziabad, shall decide the appeal only if the applicant deposits the sum of Rs. 500 as directed above. It is further directed that till the Tribunal takes its decision on the applicant s appeal, which by this order has been revived, the recovery of the penalty as per the order of the Sales Tax Officer shall not be made. On failure of applicant in compliance of the order in any manner whatsoever the order under challenge passed by the Sales Tax Tribunal, Ghaziabad, shall revive and this judgment including stay of the recovery of the penalty proceedings shall become inoperative. The requisite deposit shall be made by the applicant within the said period of three weeks from today. A certified copy of this order may be made available to the counsel for the parties on payment of usual charges within three days. Petition allowed.
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1994 (2) TMI 292 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tion of learned counsel for the petitioners, because the assessing officer is entitled to proceed with the matter, pursuant to the order of remand made by the appellate authority on March 27, 1989, in Appeal No. 57 of 1988 and further, it does not alter the tax liability. Inasmuch as the turnover of Rs. 20,23,290 was not at all the subject-matter of the appeal in T.A. No. 454 of 1989 and consequently, the order of remand dated September 20, 1989, in T.A. No. 454 of 1989 does not cover the said turnover of Rs. 20,23,290, we cannot countenance the contention of learned counsel for the petitioners based on the theory of merger. In these circumstances, it has to be held that the assessment made at the enhanced rate on a turnover of Rs. 20,43,520.90 is correct and the order of the Tribunal is not liable to be interfered with in this tax case revision. There is no merit in this revision and it is liable to be dismissed and accordingly it is dismissed. No costs. Petition dismissed.
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1994 (2) TMI 291 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ged mistake of law suffered by him at the time he made payment of the tax due under the CST Act. When he was fully conscious of his rights and urged his points and lost, it cannot be said that he was labouring under a mistake of law. This is not therefore a case to which section 72 of the Contract Act could be applied. The petitioner cannot therefore claim refund at this distance of time based on the decision in Hindustan Paper Corporation Ltd. 1993 89 STC 473 (SC) 1993 KLJ (Tax Cases) 275. 4.. The writ petition is defective for the reason that the petitioner who has to get the order of the Appellate Tribunal quashed in order to get relief, has not sought any such relief. He has not produced copy of the Tribunal s order nor has he sought any relief regarding it. The Tribunal is not even made a party to this writ petition. For all these reasons I am of the view that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief. The original petition is therefore dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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1994 (2) TMI 290 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... by the applicant which will be decided in the penalty proceedings under section 15-A(i) it appears necessary in the interest of justice that the goods of the applicant may be released by the Sales Tax Officer (Check Post) on his depositing a sum of Rs. 34,000 which may represent the tax liability of the applicant and for the remaining amount of Rs. 70,000 he may furnish security other than cash and bank guarantee in favour of the Sales Tax Officer (Check Post). As soon as these formalities are completed by the applicant, the Sales Tax Officer (Check Post) shall issue form No. 34 to him and shall permit the applicant to cross the entry check-post on his giving a declaration as per law. The orders of the Sales Tax Officer and the Sales Tax Tribunal are, accordingly, modified to that extent. There shall be no order as to costs. Certified copy of this order may be made available to the counsel for the applicant on payment of usual charges within three days. Ordered accordingly.
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