|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 241 to 260 of 332 Records
-
1994 (3) TMI 92 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Writ jurisdiction - Stay/dispensation of pre-deposit ... ... ... ... ..... pecially when the petitioner had accepted the order and sought for extension of time for payment of the amount. In this view of the matter, I am not inclined to interfere with the order, dated 2-11-1992 made by the second respondent Tribunal. 4. The only further question to be decided is whether the petitioner should be given further time to make the deposit. On this aspect of the case. I have no doubt, in my mind that some indulgence should be shown in favour of the petitioner on the facts of this case. Consequently, the order, dated 31-12-1992 made by the second respondent is set aside. The petitioner is given time to comply with the order, dated 2-11-1992 on or before 30-4-1994. If the amounts are deposited by 30-4-1994, the second respondent is directed to take up the appeal and dispose of the same on merits. If the amounts are not deposited by 30-4-1994, the appeal of the petitioner shall stand dismissed. These two writ petitions are ordered in the above terms. No costs.
-
1994 (3) TMI 91 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Revision, suo motu ... ... ... ... ..... s time-barred. In my view, the third respondent which has been conferred with powers of suo motu revision, which as noticed earlier, may and ought to be exercised even at the instance of the aggrieved person in a deserving case, has committed an error in not doing so. In my view, it is a case of total non-application of mind to the obligation cast upon the third respondent to do real and substantial justice. For all the reasons stated above, the impugned order is hereby quashed. The third respondent is directed to dispose of the revision filed by the petitioner as one to be dealt with under Section 36(2) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 and decide the issues raised on merits. Having regard to the long lapse of time, the third respondent is directed to dispose of the revision within three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order of course after giving an opportunity to the petitioner. The writ petition is allowed to the extent indicated above. No costs.
-
1994 (3) TMI 90 - SUPREME COURT
Whether on basis of the recovery, the appellant can be held to be guilty for an offence under Section 135(1)(a)of the Customs Act ?
Held that:- The prosecution has established that the appellant was concerned in an attempt at evasion of duty under the provisions of the Act, as such committed the offence under first part of Section 135(1)(a) of the Act. He was also concerned in evasion of the prohibition imposed by sub-section (2) of Section 11J of the Act, by not having delivered to the proper officer, an intimation containing the particulars of the place, where the silver ingots, in such a huge quantity were to be kept and stored, as such he committed the offence even under the second part of Section 135(1)(a) of the Act. The very fact that 3,274.98 kgs. of silver ingots worth more than rupees 18 lakhs had been kept buried near the well in the garden, leads to irresistible conclusion that the said silver ingots had not been kept or stored in normal course of business. Appeal dismissed.
-
1994 (3) TMI 89 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... exhibit P-7, and direct the first respondent to recompute the interest due from the petitioner under section 220(2) of the Income-tax Act after adjusting the amount of Rs. 58,663 as prayed for by the petitioner and calculating the interest accordingly. In view of this the proceedings under section 226(3) of the Income-tax Act evidenced by exhibit P-1 also becomes unsustainable. 1, therefore, set aside the said notice as well. In the result I quash the orders, exhibits, P-1 and P-7, and also the adjustment of Rs. 58,663 due as refund to the petitioner firm towards the amounts due from Kanagasabai for the assessment year 1989-90. 1 direct the recomputation of the interest under section 220(2) of the Act as stated above. I make it clear that it is open to the first respondent to invoke the provisions of section 182(4) of the Act or section 187(1) of the Act after fulfilling the condition precedent set out by the said provisions. In the circumstances, I make no order as to costs.
-
1994 (3) TMI 88 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Fines And Penalties, Income Tax Act, Legal Expenses, Penalty Proceedings, Supreme Court
-
1994 (3) TMI 87 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Mistake Apparent From Record, Rectification, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... oubt, open to the assessing authority while acting under section 35 to look into the whole evidence already in existence by the date of the assessment. But if the mistake discovered is the result of an enquiry made subsequent to the assessment it could not be said to form part Of the record for the purpose of section 35. The same view was taken by the Karnataka High Court in E. M. Viswanathan Chettiar v. Agrl. ITO 1983 142 ITR 244, wherein it was held (at page 247) An apparent error must be from the records of the case and not an error discovered from other sources. Any error discovered as a result of investigation of other records or other sources will not constitute an apparent error on the face of the records which alone confers jurisdiction on the officer concerned to rectify any order. We respectfully agree with the view of the Karnataka High Court. In the result, we answer the two questions in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. No costs.
-
1994 (3) TMI 86 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Capital Employed, New Industrial Undertaking ... ... ... ... ..... he undertaking would refer only to the opening balance on the first day or would also include other transactions and should refer to the closing balance on the first day. Learned counsel for the Revenue points out that the rejection of the argument that the other capital employed during the entire computation period should also be taken into account, includes also the transactions of the first day because immediately after the opening balance, even the transactions of the first day must be taken to be the capital employed during the computation period and not on the first day of the computation period. This stands to reason because the expression capital employed as on the first day of the computation period must necessarily refer only to the opening balance on the first day of the computation period, which is the capital actually employed in the inception. The question referred has, therefore, to be answered in the negative, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee.
-
1994 (3) TMI 85 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Accounting Year, Business Expenditure, Closing Stock, Raw Material ... ... ... ... ..... rely a contract with the M.M.T.C. to purchase the raw material at a future date. No payment was made by the assessee during the accounting year and no property therein passed to the assessee. In such a situation, the materials contracted to be purchased cannot be regarded as the assessee s stock-in-trade and, therefore, cannot be valued in the accounts as such. We are, therefore, of the clear opinion that the assessee is not entitled to claim any anticipatory loss in such a case where he has merely entered into a contract for purchase of some raw materials and opened a letter of credit for that purpose but neither have the materials been received by him within the accounting year and nor had the property therein passed to him. In that view of the matter, we answer the question referred to us at the instance of the Department in the negative, i.e., in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. This reference is disposed of accordingly. There shall be no order as to costs.
-
1994 (3) TMI 84 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Partnership Deed, Passing Of Property ... ... ... ... ..... e legal heirs together with other assets and that it should be valued in the manner contemplated under rule 7(c) of the Estate Duty Rules. In that decision, their Lordships specifically disapproved the view expressed by this court in P. T. Abdul Sattar v. CED 1984 150 ITR 207. Since the value of the share in the goodwill held by the deceased was the asset of the deceased which passed on to the legal heirs, the same is also to be included in computing the estate duty payable by the accountable person. In view of this finding, we answer question No. 2 in the affirmative, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. Since we have already answered question No. 2 in the affirmative against the assessee, the answer to question No. 3 should necessarily be in the affirmative, against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue. A copy of this judgment under the seal of this court and signature of the Registrar shall be forwarded to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. Cochin Bench.
-
1994 (3) TMI 83 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Cash System, Expenditure Incurred, High Court ... ... ... ... ..... ness income. Hence, the interest paid to the bank during the accounting year in which the interest on delayed payment was received must be taken to have been incurred for getting the said interest. That portion of the interest, which was paid during the accounting year, must be deducted from the amount received. This is more so since the assessee was following the cash system of accounting after the termination of the business. Therefore, the assessee is not entitled to claim deduction of the interest paid to the bank during the previous assessment years. In this view of the matter, we answer question No. 3 in the affirmative, against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue. We also answer question No. 4 referred at the instance of the Department in the affirmative, against the Department and in favour of the assessee. A copy of this judgment under the seal of this court and the signature of the Registrar will be forwarded to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench.
-
1994 (3) TMI 82 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Plant And Machinery, Revenue Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... isions have laid down when and under what circumstances even in the absence of specific provisions in the Act, revenue expenditure can be allowed as a deduction in the computation of the income of the assessee. They do not say that expenditure of capital nature or capital loss can be allowed as a deduction in computing the taxable income by taking resort to any commercial or accounting principles. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the clear opinion that the Tribunal was not justified in holding that the assessee was entitled to claim deduction of a sum of Rs. 2,42,624 arising from revaluation of the items of machinery purchased by it but not installed or put to use in arriving at its commercial or accounting profit for the relevant assessment year. The question referred to us is, therefore, answered in the affirmative (sic), i.e., in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. Under the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
-
1994 (3) TMI 81 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Capital Asset, Capital Gains, Computation Of Capital, Market Value, Total Income ... ... ... ... ..... urces of disclosed income and would help the assessing authorities to effectively prevent generally the evasion of tax due to the State. When that seems to be the main object and purport of the introduction of section 55A of the Act, assigning a restrictive meaning or limiting the operation of the section to assessment only of a particular category of income alone would amount to rewriting the provision and defeat the very object of enacting such a provision. Consequently, I am not satisfied that the grievance of the petitioner in this case can be sustained by this court as having any basis in law. The writ petition, therefore, fails and shall stand dismissed. No costs. The dismissal of this writ petition, or the observations made, if any, in this order for the limited purpose of this writ petition, shall not stand in the way of the petitioner independently challenging at the appropriate stage any orders that may be passed against the petitioner, if the petitioner so desires.
-
1994 (3) TMI 80 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Burden Of Proof, Income From Undisclosed Sources ... ... ... ... ..... held that there was no evidence on the basis of which the Tribunal could come to a finding that the sum remitted by its employee was remitted by the assessee and it represented the undisclosed income of the assessee. The facts of this case are very much identical to the facts of the present case. In this case also, the only fact that the amount was remitted by the Calcutta company to the assessee is not sufficient to hold that the amount belonged to the assessee or that it constituted the income of the assessee, more so, in the face of the categorical statement of the Calcutta company that the said amount belonged to it. We are, therefore, of the clear opinion that the finding of the Tribunal in this case is perverse and unreasonable and not sustainable in law. In the premises aforesaid, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. Under the facts and circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs.
-
1994 (3) TMI 79 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Retention Beyond 180 Days ... ... ... ... ..... Department and till they are returned to their lawful owner, the Department continues to have custody thereof notwithstanding the expiry of one hundred and eighty days. On the expiry of one hundred and eighty days, the Department loses the right to retain the books of account and documents. But, nevertheless, the Department is under a duty to ensure the safety of the books of account and documents till the owner gets back their possession. Thus, under law, it cannot be said that custody of the books of account and other documents by the Department is unlawful. Hence, we hold that the retention of the seized documents by the respondents is illegal. In the present case, the search took place and seizure was made on January 23/24, 1992, retention of the documents beyond July 23/24, 1992, is held to be illegal. Accordingly, we direct the respondent authority to return all the documents seized to the petitioner forthwith in accordance with law. The petition is allowed with costs.
-
1994 (3) TMI 78 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Commission Paid To Directors, Gratuity Liability, Income Tax Act ... ... ... ... ..... er of days on which each machine actually worked double or triple shift during the relevant previous year. Evidently, this letter is confined to a concern . It does not apply to all concerns belonging to a particular assessee. In the instant case, evidently, the two sugar factories, though belonging to the same assessee, are two independent concerns. The above letter of the Board, therefore, has no application. In view of the above discussion, we do not see any merit in the submission of counsel for the assessee. The Gujarat High Court in the decision referred to above-Transpek Industries Ltd. s case 1992 194 ITR 581-has nowhere held that all concerns belonging to one assessee can be treated as one concern for the purpose of extra-shift depreciation allowance. That judgment, in our opinion, has no application to the facts of the present case. We, therefore, answer question No. 3 in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. No order as to costs.
-
1994 (3) TMI 77 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Income Tax Act, Jurisdiction Of High Court, Notice Of Reassessment, Rectification Proceedings, Writ Jurisdiction
-
1994 (3) TMI 76 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Business Income, Interest On Deposit ... ... ... ... ..... as dividend had been credited in the books of account of the company to the accounts of the shareholders or paid to them. After a period of some years, it was found that the company could not have in law declared and distributed any such dividend. Accordingly, the company passed an extraordinary resolution declaring that the dividends should be treated as loans. The court said that in the year in which the dividend had been declared and distributed, it was assessable as income in the hands of the shareholders. In the present case, the amalgamation was effected in the same previous year in which the dividend was declared. Hence, it will be covered by the ratio of the judgment of this court in Mafatlal Gagalbhai and Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. CIT 1992 193 ITR 188 and not by the ratio of the judgment in Kishinchand Chellaram v. CIT 1962 46 ITR 640 (SC). Accordingly, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. There will be no order as to costs.
-
1994 (3) TMI 75 - HIMACHAL PRADESH HIGH COURT
Actual Cost ... ... ... ... ..... purposes of depreciation allowance under section 32 of the Act ? In Srinivas Industries v. CIT 1991 188 ITR 22 (Mad), I had occasion to consider an identical question and, on a consideration of the provisions of the scheme and the relevant provisions of the Act, as well as the view taken by the different courts on this question, it was held that the actual cost of assets cannot be reduced by the amount of subsidy received and section 43(1) of the Act would be inapplicable. It is not in dispute that this decision would govern this reference as well. We, therefore, answer this question, referred to us, in the affirmative and against the Revenue. There is no order as to costs.
-
1994 (3) TMI 74 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Dissolution Of Firm ... ... ... ... ..... es whereas section 189 deals only with business carried on by the firms. It may also be observed that section 176(3A) and section 189 deal with two different aspects-the former with chargeability of receipts to tax despite discontinuance of the business in the year of receipt, the latter with assessment of a firm despite its dissolution. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the opinion that the Tribunal was justified in holding that the receipt of the amount by the assessee during the previous year relevant to the assessment year 1976-77 was assessable in its hands in the said assessment year despite dissolution of the firm and discontinuance of the business on March 31, 1975. In that view of the matter, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and in favour of the Revenue. No order as to costs. In view of our answer to the question referred in Income-tax Reference No. 100 of 1982, the notice of motion becomes infructuous. It is, therefore, rejected.
-
1994 (3) TMI 73 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Actual Cost, Mining Business ... ... ... ... ..... nstance of the assessee-firm that he had made a commitment for payment of Rs. 3,00,000 to Vinayak for getting rid of the inconvenient contractual obligations. In these circumstances, the payment of Rs. 3,00,000 by the assessee-firm is expenditure wholly incurred for the purposes of business of the assessee-firm and it is revenue expenditure. The Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) allowed this expenditure for the assessment year 1974-75 in view of the commitment made on behalf of the assessee-firm by Dr. Hede by his letter dated June 24, 1973. The relevant accounting year for the assessment year 1974-75 ended on June 30, 1973. Since the liability of the assessee-firm to pay Rs. 3,00,000 arose prior to the end of the accounting year 1973, this expenditure was rightly allowed by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) for the assessment year 1974-75. Hence, the question which is referred to us is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. No order as to costs.
....
|
