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Showing 261 to 280 of 332 Records
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1994 (3) TMI 72 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Recovery Proceedings ... ... ... ... ..... ppellate jurisdiction. The petitioner may, therefore, make a stay application before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals), before whom the appeals are pending for both the assessment years. In the result, the petition fails and is dismissed in limine with the observations that if the petitioner makes a stay application within ten days from today, then the same will be decided by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals), respondent No. 4, within two weeks from the date a certified copy of this order is produced before him by the petitioner, who undertakes to produce the same within ten days from today. If such application is made, as aforesaid, then until the decision of such application, no coercive measures will be taken for recovery of tax against the petitioner. If the petitioner fails to take steps, as aforesaid, then the stay order will stand vacated automatically. A copy of this order be given to counsel for the parties, on payment of usual charges, within 24 hours.
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1994 (3) TMI 71 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Agreement For Avoidance, Capital Gains, Income Tax Act, Rubber Estate, Taxing Statutes ... ... ... ... ..... ffirmative holding that the decision of the Appellate Tribunal that the capital gains arising in Malaysia cannot be subjected to tax in India is in accordance with the terms of the agreement for avoidance of double taxation entered into between the Governments of India and Malaysia notified in the Notification No. G. S. R. 167(E), dated April 1, 1977. Tax Case No. 72 of 1987 The question of law referred for our consideration is answered in the affirmative holding that the direction of the Appellate Tribunal ordering the exclusion of the income from capital gains arising on the sale of a property in Malaysia is quite in accordance with law and well justified in view of the provisions contained in article VI of the agreement for avoidance of double taxation entered into between the Governments of India and Malaysia, notified in Notification No. G. S. R. 167(E), dated April 1, 1977. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of these cases, there shall be no order as to costs.
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1994 (3) TMI 70 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Income From Other Sources, Interest On Deposit ... ... ... ... ..... ndertaking or utilising it for any other purpose. It is the money of the company. This cannot be so in the case of loan which is raised for a specific purpose. Clause B-19 of the subsidiary objects of the company is not applicable as it merely provided for investing of monies not immediately required for the purposes of its business when it had not started its business and the process of construction of the factory was still on. The activity of the deposit of surplus funds out of the share capital could not be said to be incidental to the construction of the factory. Interest income from bank deposits thus accrued or arose out of an independent source of income during the period when the business had neither been set up nor had commenced and was assessable as income from other sources. In view of our discussion, the answer to the question referred becomes quite self-evident. We, therefore, answer the question in the negative, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee.
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1994 (3) TMI 69 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Backward Area, Industrial Undertaking, Literal Interpretation, Taxing Statutes, Words And Phrases
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1994 (3) TMI 68 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Assessed Income, Income Returned, Returned Income Less Than 80 Per Cent ... ... ... ... ..... income is less than eighty per cent. of the assessed income, there is a rebuttable presumption that the assessee has concealed income and the onus is on the assessee to rebut the presumption by cogent and reliable evidence. In the case reported, the Tribunal held that the assessee s explanation was false, but the Tribunal had cancelled the order of penalty. The Supreme Court held that the Tribunal was not justified in cancelling the order of penalty. The same is the position in the present case before us. This decision has been followed by our High Court in the case of CIT v. Lunidaram Tulsidas Punjabi 1993 204 ITR 674, to which decision one of us (Dr. Saraf J.) was a party. In the premises, the Tribunal was not justified in cancelling the order imposing penalty. The questions referred to us are, therefore, answered as follows Question No. 1 In the negative and in favour of the Revenue. Question No. 2 In the negative and in favour of the Revenue. We make no order as to costs.
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1994 (3) TMI 67 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Garnishee Proceedings ... ... ... ... ..... rovisions, the Legislature provided that from such a person, the amount specified in the notice can be recovered in the manner provided in sections 222 to 225. It is nowhere provided that such a person shall be deemed to be an assessee in default for all intents and purposes of the Income-tax Act. In our view, such a person would be deemed to be an assessee in default for a limited purpose. From him only the amount specified in the notice and not the entire amount of arrear of tax due can be recovered by following the procedure under sections 222 to 225. There is no provision that the salary of a third party, who is a debtor of the assessee, can be attached and recovered as an arrear of tax . Hence, in our view, the notices issued by the authority are illegal and contrary to the provisions of section 226 of the Act. In the result, the petition is allowed. The notices dated October 23, 1993 (annexure C ), are quashed and set aside. Rule made absolute with no order as to costs.
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1994 (3) TMI 66 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Actual Cost, Development Allowance, Expenditure Incurred, Weighted Deduction ... ... ... ... ..... n section 41 come into operation. In the instant case, since we have found that the assessee had not incurred any expenditure during the assessment year with which we are concerned, the return of the amount levied by the Coir Board cannot be termed as remission or cessation which took place during any subsequent assessment year. Therefore, the amount refunded by the Coir Board in the subsequent year is not to be brought to tax by invoking the provisions contained in section 41 of the Act. On the facts and circumstances of this case, we hold that the amount of Rs. 1,51,651 cannot be considered as an expenditure incurred by the assessee which is entitled to weighted deduction under section 35B of the Act. Consequently, we answer the third question in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. A copy of this judgment under the seal of this court and the signature of the Registrar will be forwarded to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench.
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1994 (3) TMI 65 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Managing Agent ... ... ... ... ..... ? In respect of interest paid on borrowings for the purpose of purchasing shares of Western India Theatres Ltd., the matter has been considered at length in the assessee s own case in Income-tax Reference No. 93 of 1965 by the Division Bench of Vimadalal and S. K. Desai JJ., in their judgment (per Desai J.) dated December 31, 1984. This judgment has been followed by the Tribunal and we do not see why we should take a different view. In respect of the interest paid on borrowings for the purpose of acquiring the shares of Associated Bombay Cinemas Pvt. Ltd. also, we are in agreement with the Tribunal that the assessee is entitled to deduction of the interest payment under the provisions of section 57(iii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, since that expenditure has been laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purpose of making or earning income. In the premises, the question is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. There will be no order as to costs.
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1994 (3) TMI 64 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Valuation Report ... ... ... ... ..... essing authority to reopen the issue and to pass fresh orders of assessment. From the order of the Tribunal it appears that the assessee had a contention that the Commissioner was not justified in invoking the revisional power under section 25(2) of the Act for reopening the assessment of the years 1976-77 and 1977-78. This contention was negatived by the Tribunal. Even though the decision of the Tribunal was in favour of the assessee the said question could have been got referred to this court, if the assessee so wanted. The assessee s right to have such a question referred to this court is well recognised by law as is seen in the decision in CIT v. Damodaran (V.) 1980 121 ITR 572 (SC). In view of what has been stated above, we answer the question in the negative, that is in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. Copy of this judgment under the seal of this court and the signature of the Registrar will be forwarded to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench.
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1994 (3) TMI 63 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Waiver Of Interest, Waiver Of Penalty ... ... ... ... ..... d under all the clauses and would exhaust the entire power vested under the sub-section was not a matter specifically considered in the said decision. It was a case where the Commissioner exercised his power only with reference to one year even though the assessee had claimed even at the first instance relief in respect of the four years. That was obviously against the express words contained in the section and was clearly illegal. It was in this context that the Division Bench has made the above observation. We, therefore, entirely agree with the view expressed by the learned single judge and dismiss this appeal. Learned counsel for the appellant has made an oral application for a certificate to appeal to the Supreme Court under articles 133 and 134A of the Constitution of India. We do not think that any substantial question of law of general importance is involved in this case which, in our opinion, needs to be decided by the Supreme Court. The oral application is rejected.
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1994 (3) TMI 62 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Agricultural Income Tax, Assessing Officer, Previous Year ... ... ... ... ..... n their age and other factors. The learned judge was only pointing out the necessity to make proper adjustments and allowances while applying the report of an inspection to an anterior year, taking into account the passage of time and the changes that are likely to have occurred. That necessarily is a caution which has to be observed as was noted in Varghese Varghese v. Commissioner of Agrl. I. T. 1976 105 ITR 732 (Ker) at page 734, and Keethadath Abdulkhader v. Agrl. ITO 1983 140 ITR 91 (Ker). I overrule the contention of the petitioner put forward broadly, against the user of an inspection report in the assessment for prior years. The officer has determined the yield for the years in question making necessary allowances for the passage of time. No illegality has been pointed out therein except the broad proposition mentioned earlier, which I have overruled. There is no other challenge to the orders, exhibits P-1 and P-2. The writ petition is, therefore, dismissed. No costs.
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1994 (3) TMI 61 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Default In Payment, Municipal Taxes ... ... ... ... ..... notice to the assessee before determination, this is an implied condition in respect of levy of all penalties. Sub-section (2) requires that the order of the Commissioner determining the amount of penalty shall be served on the assessee. Section 208 gives to the Commissioner discretion to remit the penalty payable under section 207A. Looking to these provisions it would not be correct to say that the penalty levied under section 207A is not a penalty but payment of interest. Section 471 lays down a table in respect of certain offences committed under sections specified therein and sets out the fine which may be imposed, both maximum and minimum. Undoubtedly, sections 207A and 202 are not listed in that table. This, however, cannot be construed as changing the character of penalty levied under section 207A into payment of interest. In the premises, the question which is referred to us is answered in the negative and in favour of the Revenue. There will be no order as to costs.
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1994 (3) TMI 60 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Assessment Year, Business Expenditure, Fines And Penalties, In The Nature, Sales Tax Act ... ... ... ... ..... tuted by a provision for payment of simple interest. There is a conscious change from imposition of penalty to payment of interest. We are not concerned with the subsequent amendments to section 36(3). We have referred to the altered provision merely for the purpose of showing that there has been a deliberate change in the provisions of section 36(3). In the premises, the question which is before us in Income-tax Reference No. 305 of 1982 is answered in the negative and in favour of the Revenue. We may like to point out that the question as posed before us is somewhat misleading because it refers to interest of Rs. 13,800 levied under section 36 as it stood at the relevant time. There was no provision at the material time for levy of any interest. The only provision was for levy of penalty. The questions which are raised in the remaining references are also, accordingly, answered in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.
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1994 (3) TMI 59 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Business Income, Interest On Deposit ... ... ... ... ..... services performed for its members is chargeable to income-tax under the head Profits and gains of business or profession . In the present case, the membership fee is not taken by the assessee-association for any specific services performed by it to its members. The Tribunal has commented that the assessee does not render any specific services to its members. In view of this fact as found by the Tribunal, it cannot be said that the membership fees are relatable to any specific services which are rendered by the assessee to its members. In the premises, the question is answered as follows The membership fees received by the assessee-association were not related to any specific services rendered by it to its members. The assessee was merely a trade association. Hence, the membership fees were not taxable under section 28(iii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The question referred to us is accordingly answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. No order as to costs.
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1994 (3) TMI 58 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Actual Cost, Mining Business ... ... ... ... ..... l position of recognising only the individual as a partner and, consequently, it must also be recognised that the salary paid to the individual not being part of the income of the firm, cannot be taken as part of the share of profit of a partner. In the circumstances, when section 40(b) refers to the salary paid to a partner, it cannot take into account the salary paid to the individual as a representative of the joint family as he is not a partner in his individual capacity. In view of this position, we are not inclined to agree with the submission of learned counsel for the Revenue that the decision of this court in N. T. R. Estate s case 1986 157 ITR 285 requires reconsideration. Moreover, it is stated that in the assessee s own case, a similar view has been taken by this court and there being no difference in the facts or law, we cannot depart from that view. The question referred is, therefore, answered in the negative, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.
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1994 (3) TMI 57 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Managing Agent ... ... ... ... ..... tion of the principles of natural justice in not affording an opportunity to the petitioners to be orally heard. It is evident that the applications for rectification and the petitions for condonation of delay are engineered by the disallowance in the firm s assessment of portions of the salary paid to the petitioners as excessive and unreasonable. Perhaps the attempt is to see if anything could be salvaged in the petitioners assessments though those assessments are based strictly and fully only on the returns filed by them without any change whatsoever therein. Those assessments also stand confirmed by the Commissioner of Income-tax in revision for valid reasons. The petitioners urged the very same reasons before the Commissioner and lost. They accepted the order, exhibit P-39. I do not, therefore. find any substance in any of the grievances raised by the petitioners. The original petition is without merit. It is accordingly dismissed without, however, any order as to costs.
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1994 (3) TMI 56 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Business Income, Interest On Deposit ... ... ... ... ..... ld be formed by the Income-tax Officer and further whether that material had any live link with the formation of the requisite belief. In the present case, the material which was available with the Income-tax Officer was directly relevant to the formation of the belief that the purchase transactions in question were not genuine. Whether that material was sufficient or not is not for us to decide. The only narrow question which is before us is whether the condition precedent for exercising jurisdiction under section 147(a) of the Act was fulfilled in the present case. In view of the interpretation put upon section 147(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, by the Supreme Court in the above case, there is no doubt that the condition precedent was fulfilled. We are not concerned with the merits of the reassessments. In the premises, the question which is referred to us is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the Revenue. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.
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1994 (3) TMI 55 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Income Tax Act, Income Tax Rules, Question Of Law ... ... ... ... ..... tion as framed by the Department in the reference application is not correctly worded inasmuch as it gives an impression as if the Tribunal allowed the expenses as revenue expenditure on an erroneous interpretation of the rule. It is the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) who allowed the expenditure under the rule and, according to the Revenue, by overlooking the wording of rule 8(2). We would, therefore, call upon the Tribunal to state a case for our opinion on the following question of law Whether in view of the wording of rule 8(2) of the Income-tax Rules, 1962, the Tribunal was right in coming to the finding that the claim of the assessee was rightly allowed by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) on the facts of the case ? With the aforesaid observations and direction the petition is allowed. The Tribunal shall state a case and refer the question of law as stated in paragraph 8 (see page 1059) above for the opinion of this court. S. N. PHUKAN, ACTG. C. J.-I agree.
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1994 (3) TMI 54 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
Association Of Persons, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... eology employed by the Legislature, and in this view we find considerable support from the two decisions of the Karnataka High Court and one of the Orissa. High Court, to which reference may now be made. We find that the aforesaid decision of the Bombay High Court has been followed by the Appellate Tribunal (Special Bench), Pune, in its decision in the case of N. R. Karia 1985 13 ITD 545. In the present cases, since the claims of the assessees under section 5(1)(iv) of the Act had not been granted by the authorities below in accordance with the law as correctly decided by the Appellate Tribunal (Special Bench), Pune, in the case of N. R. Karia 1985 13 ITD 545, the Tribunal rightly set aside the orders of the authorities below and directed fresh disposal of the said claims of the assessees in the light of the said decision of the Tribunal (Special Bench), Pune. Our answer to the question referred to us is, therefore, in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. No costs.
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1994 (3) TMI 53 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Chargeable Profits, Companies Profits Surtax, Company Surtax ... ... ... ... ..... of the Rules for computing the chargeable profits con tained in the First Schedule to the Act can arise. Hence, question No. 1 referred to us is answered, in the affirmative, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. As regards question No. 2, it would appear that the tax authorities rightly rejected the assessee s claim for deduction of the amount of surtax while computing the chargeable profits. It will be noticed that there is no provision for reducing the amount of surtax in rule 2 of the First Schedule. Rule 2(i) only authorises a deduction of the income-tax payable by the company. The Tribunal was, therefore, right in holding that the surtax payable under the said Act was not deductible while computing the chargeable profits under the First Schedule to the said Act. Question No. 2 referred to us is, therefore, answered in the affirmative, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. The reference stands disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs.
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