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Showing 321 to 332 of 332 Records
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1994 (3) TMI 12
Income Tax Act, Question Of Law ... ... ... ... ..... vities, therefore, would amount to business. The Tribunal has proceeded only on the basis that some manual/professional skill is required for earning income from brokerage which could not be the only criteria. There should be some special qualification of a person apart from skill and ability, which is required in carrying on any activity which could be considered as profession. This could be by having education in a particular system either in a college or university or it may be even by experience. No such finding has been given by the Tribunal with regard to personal qualification and, therefore, we are of the view that the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was not justified in coming to the conclusion that the income from brokerage should be assessed as professional income and not brokerage income. In view of the decision of this court referred to above, the present reference is also answered in favour of the Department and against the assessee. There is no order as to costs.
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1994 (3) TMI 11
Assessment Order, Assessment Proceedings, Reassessment Proceedings ... ... ... ... ..... t once proceedings under section 147 of the Act are initiated by issuing a notice under section 148 read with section 139(2) of the Act, the assessment proceedings start afresh, and that the proceedings for assessment of that year will be pending and will continue until a final order of assessment is rendered. We respectfully agree with the Kerala High Court view. We, therefore, conclude that, without reference to section 143(3), reassessment cannot be made under section 147 and, therefore, by virtue of the specific language employed in section 148, there is no embargo for the assessing authority to invoke the provisions of section 144B introduced for the protection of the assessee by providing for a reassessment notice. We, therefore, hold that the assessment in question was within time. The view taken by the Tribunal is unsustainable in law. The question referred for our decision is answered in the negative, i.e., in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. No costs.
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1994 (3) TMI 10
... ... ... ... ..... was material, for the Tribunal to hold that the amount had not become irrecoverable in the year of accounting ? On the facts, the Tribunal has found that the assessee filed a revised return for the year 1967-68 on March 26, 1972, whereas the assessment order for that year was passed on March 25, 1972. That being the position on which there is no dispute, the claim for write off having not been in accordance with the requirement of section 36(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, we do not think there is any case for interference with the conclusion reached by the Tribunal as it is clear that the assessee has not written off at least before the assessment order was made for the relevant year. In view of the fact as found by the Tribunal and as accepted by us, we answer the first question in the affirmative and against the assessee. In view of our answer to question No. 1, it is not necessary for us to answer question No. 2. Hence, we return that question without answering the same.
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1994 (3) TMI 9
Criminal Proceedings, Failure To Deduct Tax At Source ... ... ... ... ..... ed without their knowledge. It is significant to note that the obligation of the accused to prove under the proviso that the offence took place without his knowledge or that he exercised all due diligence to prevent such offence arises only when the prosecution establishes that the requisite condition mentioned in sub-section (1) is established. The requisite condition is that the partner was responsible for carrying on the business and was, during the relevant time, in charge of the business. In the absence of any such proof, no partner could be convicted. I agree as submitted that the complaints marked as annexure A and the proceedings in C. C. Nos. 50, 51, 52, 54, 53 and 55 of the Additional Chief judicial Magistrate (Economic Offences), Ernakulam, as against the petitioners are unsustainable and are quashed, as prayed for. The proceedings against the first accused-firm, however, shall continue in accordance with law. The criminal miscellaneous cases are allowed as above.
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1994 (3) TMI 8
Alternate Remedy, Assessment Notice, Assessment Proceedings, Failure To Disclose Material Facts, Reassessment Proceedings
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1994 (3) TMI 7
Claim For Depreciation, Revised Return ... ... ... ... ..... urrent depreciation is a first charge on the profit as held by the Supreme Court in Mother India Refrigeration Industries P. Ltd. s case 1985 155 ITR 711 and that charge cannot be ignored by withholding the particulars so as to avail of the setting off the earlier year s loss which lapses by the prescribed period of limitation. In our considered opinion, therefore, the assessee cannot withdraw the claim for depreciat ion allowance when particulars are available in accordance with section 34 only for the purpose of setting off of the loss of the earlier years. Since the particulars were available as furnished along with the original return, the Income-tax Officer is bound to allow the deduction of depreciation in computing the income from business. The assessment made by the Income-tax Officer, in this case, is, therefore, correct and in accordance with law. The question referred to us is, therefore, answered in the negative, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee.
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1994 (3) TMI 6
Attachment And Sale, Writ Petition ... ... ... ... ..... d down in Schedule II to the Act . We respectfully agree with the above legal position. Re. (3) Under section 119(2)(b), the Central Board of Direct Taxes is empowered to waive the period of limitation in harsh cases. The contention urged before us that the Central Board of Direct Taxes ought to have exercised the said discretion cannot be accepted for the reason that the assessee had not filed any application under the aforesaid rule before the Central Board of Direct Taxes. The representation made by the assessee on January 25, 1990, to the Chairman of the Central Board of Direct Taxes did not refer to any provision of law it only sought the setting aside of the sale on the ground that the auction was conducted illegally. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that the Central Board of Direct Taxes failed to exercise the statutory discretion vested in it under section 119(2)(b). For the aforesaid reasons, the writ Petition fails and accordingly, it is dismissed. No costs.
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1994 (3) TMI 5
Amalgamating Company, Capital Asset, Capital Gains ... ... ... ... ..... lieu of her shareholding in the amalgamating company, it is a transfer as contemplated under section 2(47) of the Act, is not required to be determined mainly because it appears from the abovereferred letter of the Commissioner of Income-tax that the Department in similar cases belonging to the same group (or the same set of assessees) has accepted that where the assessees have received shares and bonds because of amalgamation, there is no transfer of capital assets within the meaning of section 2(47) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Hence, for the purposes of the present references, it can be stated that the Department had accepted (so far as these assessees are concerned) the position that in such type of cases there is no transfer of capital asset within the meaning of section 2(47) of the Income-tax Act. In the result, because of the peculiar facts, the question in all the references is left unanswered. The references stand disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs.
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1994 (3) TMI 4
Article 14 Of The Constitution ... ... ... ... ..... e challenged on the ground that it discriminates and infringes article 14 of the Constitution of India. Wealth-tax of two per cent. has been uniformly charged on all closely-held companies. Therefore, there can be no distinction drawn between the closely-held companies where property has been transferred or where property has not been transferred by other companies or by its directors, because that is not the only reason for levying wealth-tax on every closely-held company. A closely-held company has been treated as a class apart and tax has been levied on them. There is a reasonable basis for charging wealth-tax only from the closely-held companies and the action of the Legislature is well within its competence. We do not find any discrimination or arbitrariness, as complained of by the petitioners and section 40 of the Finance Act, 1983 cannot be attacked on that count. Consequent to the aforesaid discussion, the petitions fail and are dismissed with costs of Rs. 750 each.
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1994 (3) TMI 3
Appropriate Authority, Immovable Property By Central Government, Movable Property ... ... ... ... ..... s to be more than Rs. 2,00,000 or Rs. 10,00,000, as the case may be. It was in this context that the Madras High Court ruled that when an undivided share is sold under a valid sale deed or under a valid agreement of sale for a consideration which is below the limit prescribed under section 230A or Chapter XX-C, then the said provisions will not apply. In the circumstances, the ratio of the Madras High Court in the case of N. C. Rangesh 1991 189 ITR 270 will also not apply to the facts of the present case. As stated hereinabove, the agreement in question concerns flat No. 10 which has been purchased by the petitioners. The petitioners themselves filed Form No. 37-I. The valuation report submitted by them also does not support their contention that each of the petitioners had individual agree to buy an undivided 1/3rd share in the property from the vendor. For the aforestated reasons, there is no merit in this petition. Accordingly, the writ petition fails and stands rejected.
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1994 (3) TMI 2
Foreign Exchange ... ... ... ... ..... f any trading activity or on money held for the purposes of trade but on account of appreciation in the value of the amount which was held for the purpose of investment. Hence, this accretion is capital in nature. It cannot be considered as a revenue receipt. It was also pointed out by Mr. Dastur, learned counsel for the assessee, that all receipts in the hands of the assessee are not taxable as income automatically. If the Revenue wants to bring any receipt to tax as income, the Revenue should establish that it is by way of income. In support of this contention, he relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Parimisetti Seetharamamma v. CIT 1965 57 ITR 532 and a decision of this court in Dilip Kumar Roy v. CIT 1974 94 ITR 1. We need not go into this question in view of our above findings. In the premises, the question which is referred to us is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. In the circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs.
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1994 (3) TMI 1
Interpretation of section 40(a)(v) as well as section 40A(5) - applicability of ceiling u/s 40A(5) to perquisites given for use to employees for his own purpose or benefit
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