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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 305 Records
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1995 (12) TMI 405
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... ... ..... ealised from the customer cannot be treated as a part of the turnover. The learned Tribunal has reproduced in its order the definition of turnover and seems to be under the impression that the seller's turnover is equivalent to the buyer's cost. This is not so. Whatever a buyer spends on acquiring the goods is not necessarily the price which the seller receives. The insurance charges have not been received by the present dealer as a part of the price of the goods and have been received only as return of the amount spent by it on behalf of the customer. Therefore the amount of the insurance charges was also not liable to inclusion in the'turnover 5.For the above reasons, this revision petition is allows and the aforesaid additions to the turnover are hereby deleted The revisionist get his costs of this revision petition which I assess at ₹ 1500/-. 6. A certified copy of this order be sent to the Tribunal in terms of Section 11 (8) of the U. P. Sales Tax Act.
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1995 (12) TMI 404
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... ... ..... ch that "bona fide need of the landlord will stand very much on the same footing in regard to either class of premises, residential or commercial" fully support the view, we have taken, that the classification created by the amendment has no reasonable nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the Act. We, therefore, hold that the provisions of the amendment, quoted in earlier part of the judgment, are violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and are liable to be struck- down. We allow the appeal, set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court, declare the above said provisions of the amendment as constitutionally invalid and as a consequence restore the original provisions of the Act which were operating before coming into force of the amendment. The net result is that a landlord - under the Act - can seek eviction of a tenant from a non-residential building on the ground that he requires it for his own use. The parties to bear their own costs.
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1995 (12) TMI 403
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... ... ..... ases that even though the proceedings are summary in nature, yet a discretion is vested with the Company Law Board to proceed with the matter by itself. We have also proceeded with cases wherever we felt that, on the basis of affidavits, we would be in a position to take a final decision . But in the present case, we find, that from the affidavits filed and the documents annexed thereto and also the various documents that we ourselves had called for during the course of the proceedings we will not be in a position to take a final decision. Even though under Section 10E of the Act we could summon witnesses, etc., since the proceedings under Section 111(4) are of summary in nature, we do not propose to do so. Therefore, we are of the view that it is not a fit case to proceed with under Section 111(4) and, accordingly, we dismiss these applications. The applicants may file a civil suit if so advised. Interim orders passed earlier are vacated. There will be no order as to costs.
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1995 (12) TMI 402
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... ... ..... evision under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Only if this Court finds that the Tribunal has exceeds its jurisdiction, this Court is entitled to invoke the judicial supervisory jurisdiction under that article. When the Tribunal has passed an Order only after taking into consideration the interests of justice, I do not find any ground to interfere with the same. The revision petition which is devoid of any merits is liable to be dismissed. 18. The eviction petition which was filed in the year 1981 has not yet been taken up even for trial, though more than fourteen years have elapsed. I am of the view that this revision is filed only to protect the proceedings so that the landlord may not get possession of the building atleast during his lifetime. 19. For the reasons stated above, the revision petition is dismissed with costs. Rent Controller shall dispose of R.C.O.P. No. 4 of 1981 on or before the court closes for summer vacation and report compliance to this Court.
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1995 (12) TMI 401
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... ... ..... in the event of failure in arriving at the agreement. Rule 8(2) provides that on receipt of the reference, the Development Commissioner may order stay of recovery of taxes of the Panchayat pending its decision in the matter. Therefore, in cases where agreement is not arrived at and the matter is required to be referred to the Development Commissioner there cannot be any automatic stay of recovery of taxes contemplated by Rule 4 only in context of making of the application to the Panchayat under Section 201(1) of the Act. In this view of the matter, the petitioners will have to await the decision of the State Government/ Development Commissioner under Section 201(3) of the Act of 1993 if they have approached the State Government in accordance with the Rules. 4. Under the above circumstances, no case is made out for invoking the jurisdiction of this Court at this stage and the petition is rejected. Notice is discharged with no order as to costs. Interim relief stands vacated.
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1995 (12) TMI 400
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... ... ..... nner prohibited from awarding interest pendent lite. Looked at from another point, if there was a dispute as to whether under this term of the contract the Arbitrator was prohibited from awarding interest pendent lite, that was a matter which fell within the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator, as the Arbitrator would have to interpret subclause (g) of Clause 13 of the contract and decide whether that clause prohibits him from awarding interest pendent lite. In that case it cannot be said that the Arbitrator had wandered outside the contract to deny to him jurisdiction to decide the question regarding payment of interest pendent lite. Even if we were to accept the contention urged by the learned counsel for the appellant placing reliance on paragraphs 26 and 29 of the Associated Engineering Company case (supra) we think, that the Arbitrator was well within his jurisdiction in awarding interest pendent lite. In view of the above we see no merit in this appeal and dismiss the same.
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1995 (12) TMI 399
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... ... ..... he passing of the preliminary decree in 1973 and final decree in 1974 as referred to earlier. Under AH these circumstances, Article 113 is inapplicable to the facts on hand. Since the petitioner claimed derivative title from him but for his wilful abstention from making enquiry or his omission to file the second sale deed dated September 6, 1980, an irresistible inference was rightly drawn by the courts below that the petitioner had full knowledge of the fact right from the beginning; in other words right from the date when title deed was filed in Title Suit No. 220/69 and preliminary decree was passed OH January 2, 1973 and final decree was passed on February 5, 1974. Admittedly, the suit was filed in 1981 beyond three years from the date of knowledge. Thereby, the suit is hopelessly barred by limitation. The decree of the appellate court and the order of the High Court, therefore, are not illegal warranting interference. The special leave petition is accordingly dismissed.
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1995 (12) TMI 398
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... ... ..... an allegation not in the pleading and then in admitting and relying on material which is not legal evidence for the proof of a corrupt practice. The error was aggravated by an incorrect appreciation of the legal principles and overlooking the meaning of certain terms explained in earlier decisions. The significance of the trial of a corrupt practice and the consequence of the finding thereon, appears to have been missed in the High Court. As a result of the aforesaid discussion, the finding recorded by the High Court against the appellant that charge of corrupt practices under sub-section (3) and (3A) of Section 123 of the R.P. Act has been proved to declare his election to be void on the ground contained in Section 100(1)(b) of the R.P. Act, is contrary to law and is, therefore, set aside. The result is that no ground is made out for declaring the appellants election to be void. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed with costs resulting in dismissal of the election petition.
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1995 (12) TMI 397
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... ... ..... wami, JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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1995 (12) TMI 396
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... ... ..... the rent for these apartments in the U. K. on an ongoing basis from Indian businessmen in India itself through our Indian branch office in Indian rupees. We believe this would lead to a considerable saving in foreign exchange on account of travel expenses abroad being paid for in Indian rupees in India. Would these rupee earnings of ours in India be treated then as invisible exports and be classified to be at par as normal hard currency exports made from India. Of course, if these earnings are not treated at par ? Then it would not be attractive for us to this proposition. Further, could we please be informed of what exact benefits we are entitled to on account of these invisible exports ?” For the reasons discussed above, the Authority pronounces the following ruling on the application of the applicant The applicant is not entitled to any exemption in respect of the earnings received in India in terms of rupees for letting out its London properties to Indian parties.
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1995 (12) TMI 395
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... ... ..... house is concerned, it became the absolute property of Satyawati on the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, i.e., by operation of Section 14(1) of the said Act. On her death, the said first floor devolved upon her son (first defendant) and four daughters (plaintiff and Defendant Nos.6 to 8) in equal shares under Section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act. Defendant Nos.3 to 5 will be entitled only to the 1/5th share of the first defendant in the first floor. The remaining 4/5th share in the first floor is allotted to plaintiff and Defendant Nos.6 to 8, each 1/5th. The decree passed by the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court is modified accordingly and is restricted to the first floor of the house property comprised in No.5, Doctors Lane, New Delhi. All other directions given by the Division Bench in respect of the Doctor's Lane house are affirmed but restricted to the first floor thereof. The appeals are allowed in part accordingly. No order as to costs.
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1995 (12) TMI 394
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... ... ..... of section 245R. This argument is not acceptable. The Authority's conclusion that the transaction to which the question relates has been designed, prima facie, for the purposes of avoidance of tax does not depend upon any other or anterior transaction as envisaged by learned counsel. The Authority is only taking note of the fact that the applicant companies are wholly owned subsidiaries of the British bank and has drawn the inference, for the reasons discussed earlier, that the British bank has invested monies in the Indian bank, not directly but in the names of two newly formed companies located in Mauritius. Prima facie, and it is the prima facie view that is relevant under section 245R, the Authority is of the opinion that the purpose of investment in this manner can only be for the purpose of avoidance of income-tax. For the reasons discussed above, the Authority rejects the applications under clause (c) of the proviso to section 245R(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
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1995 (12) TMI 393
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... ... ..... ated 30-11-95. The civil appeals are dismissed for want of prosecution.
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1995 (12) TMI 392
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... ... ..... sts. (220) We have already come to the conclusion that the land acquisition proceedings are not liable to he quashed in respect of the land, subject matter of these petitions. However, in view of the judgment given by the Supreme Court in case of Ram Chand (supra), where the award has been made prior to 30th April 1982, in consonance with the directions given by the Supreme Court, the petitioners in such cases would be entitled to additional interest 12 per annum from the date of expiry of two years from August 23, 1974 till the date of making of the award. Where the awards have been made subsequent to the said date or are yet to be made, the additional interest is not to be paid as in. such cases, the Parliament has already granted the necessary relief in shape of additional solarium and additional interest and their writ petitions would stand dismissed and the other writ petitions would also stand dismissed with the above directions. (221) The interim orders stand vacated.
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1995 (12) TMI 391
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... ... ..... he reason given and the decision taken by the Settlement Commission, or the order complained of is without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or the same is perverse causing manifest injustice, or is arbitrary. The Settlement Commission had the jurisdiction to pass the impugned order under section 245D(1) rejecting the application for settlement summarily. The order passed is within the parameters contemplated in the said provisions. In our opinion, the Settlement Commission in making the impugned order has not committed any error of law which may call for any interference at the instance of this Court in these proceedings. 16. The writ petition is, therefore, rejected summarily. 17. At the end, the learned counsel for the petitioner made an oral request for grant of leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, which is also rejected, as in our opinion the case does not involve a substantial question of law of general importance or it needs to be decided by the Supreme Court
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1995 (12) TMI 390
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... ... ..... a law which it may be competent to enact," o p /o p 5. In our considered opinion, the question as to whether the accounts of the Reserve Bank of India, State Bank of India and other public sector banks and financial institution should be under the compulsory audit jurisditcion of Comptroller and Auditor General or not is a matter which is not to be considered by us but exclusively falls within the domain and jurisdiction of the Legislature. It is not a matter which is within our sphere and reach and that it would not be appropriate for us to exercise our extraordinary jurisdiction to assume to ourselves a supervisory role over matters falling exclusively within the purview of legislative wisdom of the Parliament. o p /o p On consideration of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and taking note of the totality of the circumstances, we do not find any merit in this petition and accordingly dismiss the same but leaving the parties to bear their own cost. o p /o p
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1995 (12) TMI 389
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... ... ..... te of detention as per the orders of the Magistrate and not from the date of arrest by the police. Consequently the first period of fifteen days mentioned in section 167(2) has to be computed from the date of such detention and after the expiry of the period of first fifteen days it should be only judicial custody." These two fatal errors committed by the Designated Court would warrant setting side its order, and cancelling the bail granted to the respondent. He shall be arrested forthwith, but subject to the concession that he may of his own appear before the Designated Court and surrender himself and pray for bail on the merit of the matter if it is due to him. If he approaches the Court for the purpose, the Designated Court may put the Public Prosecutor to notice immediately and thereafter examine whether the respondent is due for bail in the facts and circumstances of the case, subject to the limitations imposed in the statute. The appeal stands allowed accordingly.
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1995 (12) TMI 388
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... ... ..... ral flaw even it be. Procedure is handmade of administration of justice and should not come on the way of the Court in the administration of justice. Non-compliance of procedural part is an irregularity and is not illegality. It will be relevant to state that this object is raised by the respondents in the course of arguments. They have not raised this contention any time before and it is stated again that they have not filed any affidavit-in-reply. If they would have filed an affidavit-in-reply and raised this contention, this would have been regularised. This apart, the facts stated in their application are all based on record. Mr. Shah has relied on a judgment in the case of J.A. Goraswa, . However, in the facts and circumstances of this case, we do not sustain the objection as to non-compliance of Rule 7 and to be precise affidavit. 53. In view of the above discussion, we are of the opinion that the petition should fail and is hereby dismissed. Rule discharged. No costs.
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1995 (12) TMI 387
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... ... ..... ot;37. General.'(1) Any expenditure (not being expenditure of the nature described in ss. 30 to 36 and not being in the nature of capital expenditure or personal expenses of the assessee), laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purposes of the business or profession shall be allowed in computing the income chargeable under the head profits and gains of business or profession.''' 15. We find that the amount expended was wholly and exclusively connectable with the purposes of the business and was not in the nature of capital expenditure or personal expenses of the assessee. That being so the Tribunal committed an error in not allowing the expenditure as deductible in terms of sub-s. (1) of s. 37 of the IT Act, 1961. 16. In the result, we answer the question in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. 17. The reference is answered accordingly. Counsel fee for each side is, however, fixed at ₹ 750, if certified.
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1995 (12) TMI 386
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... ... ..... act scope and ambit of the provisions of the Act, read with the circular. 10. Accordingly, in the facts and circumstances of the case, when section80J has been replaced by the Parliament in place and state of section 84, in that event, we are of the view that the said circular would apply in the same field. The purpose of the two sections being the same and the said two sections are in pari materia. Accordingly, we are the view that the Tribunal was right in holding that the said circular was applicable in case of the industry set up under section 80J even though the original circular was issued under section 84. Accordingly, we are rejecting the contention raised by the revenue. 11. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the first question is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. 12. Question No. 2 is also answered in the affirmation in favour of the assessee. 13. The question No. 3 is also answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee.
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