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Case Laws
Showing 81 to 100 of 364 Records
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1995 (2) TMI 399
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... ... ..... ant which is used to destroy bacteria growing in perspiration and prevent body odour. Such products would, therefore, fall within the expression cosmetic . 7.. In common parlance or ordinary parlance also, deodorant cologne is regarded as cosmetic by those who deal with or use it. 8.. Having regard to the above discussion, it is obvious that the Tribunal was not justified in holding that the product Bain D or Deodorant Lavender Cologne sold by the assessee was not a cosmetic. We are of the clear opinion that it is a cosmetic which falls under entry 19 of Schedule E to the Bombay Sales Tax Act (as it stood at the material time). 9.. Accordingly, the first question is answered in the negative and in favour of the Revenue. In view of our answer to the first question, the second question does not arise, and hence needs no answer. This reference is disposed of accordingly. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs. Reference disposed of accordingly.
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1995 (2) TMI 398
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... ... ..... in the course of export out of the territory of India The rule makes it clear that the manufactured goods must belong to registered dealer who claims set-off. The condition is that he should sell the same in the State of M.P. or in the course of inter-State trade or commerce or in the course of export out of territory of India. 9.. On the finding of fact that the raw materials were not purchased by the assessee and the manufactured goods did not belong to him and he did only a job-work on the raw materials belonging to another registered dealer it necessarily follows that he is not entitled to the set-off claimed by him. The second question referred should also be answered against the assessee. 10.. Both the questions are answered in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. A copy of this order under the signature of the Additional Registrar and seal of the High Court shall be forwarded to the Tribunal. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1995 (2) TMI 397
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... ... ..... e are, therefore, of the opinion that the Tribunal was justified in holding that no purchase tax was leviable under section 13 of the Act on the purchase of the car in question though on grounds different from those given by the Tribunal. 8. We have carefully perused the questions referred to us by the Tribunal. We are, however, of the opinion that it is necessary to reframe the question to bring out the real controversy arising in this case. We, therefore, reframe the question as follows Whether the Tribunal was justified in holding that no purchase tax was leviable under section 13 of the Act in respect of the purchases made by the assessee from a person who was not a dealer within the meaning of section 2(11) of the Act? 9.. For the reasons set out above, we answer the above reframed question in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. 10.. Under the facts and circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs. Question reframed and answered in the affirmative.
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1995 (2) TMI 396
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... ... ..... lar No. 13/91 dated November 16, 1991, giving further instructions to the check-post officials in the light of the decision of the learned single Judge which is under appeal in these appeals. In partial modification of the impugned circular, the Board has issued in that circular various instructions to the check-post officials including the following one (3) Dealers who own estates and factories in this State, Government owned companies including CAMPCO and tyre manufacturing companies are permitted to transport goods without payment of advance tax provided the monthly tax is regularly paid in accordance with rule 21. Some of the appellants are dealers who may fall within the scope of the above instruction and as such they may not hereafter be affected by the provisions in sub-section (2B) and the impugned circular. Subject to the observations made above, all the writ appeals would stand dismissed. We direct the parties to bear their respective costs. Writ appeals dismissed.
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1995 (2) TMI 395
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... ... ..... bility of the dealer to make the payment. Obviously, he cannot give relief in cases where he is not satisfied about inability to make the payment. The satisfaction of the Commissioner under sub-section (4-A) of section 22 has certainly a bearing on the decision to be arrived at in regard to the existence of sufficient cause as contemplated under section 17(3). The statutory authority and the Appellate Tribunal have committed a grievous error of law in taking the view that the order passed under section 22(4-A) has little bearing on the question of liability for penalty under section 17(3). In the facts and circumstances of the case, penalty could not have been imposed. 6.. In the result, we answer the question in the negative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. No costs. 7.. A copy of this judgment under the signature of the Additional Registrar and seal of the High Court will be transmitted to the Appellate Tribunal. Reference answered in the negative.
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1995 (2) TMI 394
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... ... ..... authority to take care of situations, where in the light of orders proposed to be passed in exercise of revisional power, modifying the order of assessment, etc., concealment of turnover is detected which might justify imposition of penalty under section 36(2) of the Act. In such a case, while passing the order in revision under section 57 of the Act, the revisional authority may itself impose penalty under section 36(2) of the Act, though no such penalty had been imposed by the assessing authority while assessing or reassessing the amount of tax. 7.. From the above discussion, it is obvious that under the facts and circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was not justified in upholding the levy of penalty under section 36(2) of the Act by the revisional authority. We, therefore, answer the question referred to us in the negative and in favour of the assessee. 8.. Under the facts and circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs. Reference answered in the negative.
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1995 (2) TMI 393
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... ... ..... by the customer and the invoice issued by the assessee. 14.. In that view of the matter, in our opinion, the Tribunal was right in holding that there was contravention of the condition of declaration in form 14 and hence the assessee was liable to pay purchase tax under section 14 of the Act. 15.. Accordingly, we answer the first question in the affirmative and in favour of the Revenue. 16.. So far as the second question is concerned, there appears to be some mistake in the said question. The question as framed is vague and does not bring out the real controversy. However, in view of our finding that the assessee did not resell the bus bodies purchased by it and the discussion made above, it is not necessary to answer the same. We, therefore, decline to answer question No. 2. 17. In the result this reference is answered in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1995 (2) TMI 392
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... ... ..... e points in issue after affording reasonable opportunity of being heard to the petitioners and taking into consideration the aforesaid relevant rules and Government orders issued from time to time and further in view of the argument advanced by the learned Standing Counsel that the registration of the petitioner-unit is cancelled and also considering whether grant of the relief sought for by the petitioners will create any legal impediment. As a result thereof, the impugned order dated September 7, 1993 (annexure 6 to the writ petition) is quashed and the petition stands allowed to the extent indicated above. It is further directed that the authority concerned shall decide the petitioner s case afresh within three months from the date of producing a certified copy of this order before it in the light of the observations made above. A certified copy of this order be issued to the learned counsel for the petitioners within three days on payment of usual charges. Case remanded.
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1995 (2) TMI 391
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... ... ..... g so, the ancillary activity of publishing and selling the literature containing the message of Saibaba, photographs, stickers, etc., undertaken by the assessee-trust to achieve the above object, which does not amount to trade, commerce, etc., also cannot be held to be business within the meaning of section 2(5A) of the Act. That being so, the assessee-trust cannot be held to be a dealer within the meaning of section 2(11) of the Act in respect of the sales of books, booklets, stickers, photographs, etc., containing the message of Saibaba or image of Saibaba, at a nominal price with the object of spreading the message of Saibaba by it and hence no tax can be levied on the amounts received from the sales thereof. 13.. In view of the above opinion of ours, the question referred by the Tribunal is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. 14.. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1995 (2) TMI 390
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... ... ..... In view of the above, we hold that the Tribunal was not justified in law in holding that a memorandum of appeal not containing the grounds of appeal is not an appeal in the eye of law and hence question of giving reasonable opportunity for amendment of the memorandum of appeal by furnishing the grounds of appeal did not arise. We are of the clear opinion that the appeal did not cease to be an appeal in the eye of law because of the omission to set out the grounds of appeal in the memorandum of appeal. It was at the most an irregularity which could have been cured by the appellant. Such omission clearly falls under rule 60. It was, therefore, incumbent on the appellate authority to allow the appellant to amend the memorandum of appeal and supply the omission. 10.. In the result, the question referred to us is answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. 11. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs. Reference answered in the negative.
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1995 (2) TMI 389
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... ... ..... ning the taxable turnover under the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act. There, no doubt this Court held that the contract of sale provided for inspection and rejection of unapproved goods, which would mean that the property in goods did not pass unless they were delivered at the mills site for inspection or approval and in such circumstances, the expression freight charges paid on our account occurring in the documents could not have any significance and that therefore the Tribunal was not justified in directing exclusion of the transport charges in the determination of the taxable turnover. It is clear that the said decision has no application to the present cases since, as already stated, passing of property has no criterion in deciding the situs of sale under section 5(1) of the Act. 14.. The net result is all the appeals are allowed and the common impugned order dated July 1, 1994 of the Joint Commissioner in all these three matters is set aside. No costs. Appeals allowed.
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1995 (2) TMI 388
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... ... ..... ction (6) of section 55 of the Act (as substituted by Maharashtra Act 42 of 1971), in particular clause (b) thereof, it is clear as held by this Court in Balaji Cotton Company 1995 97 STC 613 that the appellate authority has no power to set aside the penalty to enable the assessing authority to make a fresh order or to initiate the proceedings afresh. In the context of clause (b) of section 55(6) of the Act, setting aside of an order of penalty can only mean cancellation of the penalty. That being the legal position, the authority which imposed the penalty cannot reimpose the same by passing a fresh order. 7.. In view of the above, we answer the question No. 1 in the negative and in favour of the assessee. In view of the above answer to question No. 1, question No. 2 has become academic. We, therefore, do not answer the same. This reference is disposed of accordingly. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs. Reference disposed of accordingly.
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1995 (2) TMI 387
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... ... ..... tion of law, to construe the expression each month as each complete month would amount to rendering the amendment made by the Legislature with the specific object of changing the existing position, nugatory which is not permissible mode of interpretation. 6.. We are, therefore, of the clear opinion that for each month does not mean for each complete month . So far as the use of the expression for each month or part thereof in sub-section (3), as substituted from April 21, 1987, is concerned, we find that the substituted sub-section (3) no more deals with penalty, it provides for levy of interest. It is in that context that the Legislature, with a view to remove all disputes in regard to interpretation, used a different expression, which is explicit. 7.. In view of the above, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and in favour of the Revenue. 8.. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1995 (2) TMI 386
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... ... ..... ed such transactions within the definition of business. On the face of this definition, it is not open to the assessee to contend that the transaction in question did not amount to business. In the definition of business contained in section 2(bb) of the M.P. General Sales Tax Act, there was no such provision at the material time. 9.. For the reasons set out above, we are of the clear opinion that the amended definition of business contained in clause (5A) of section 2 of the Act would apply to all sales effected after the coming into force of the said definition. Neither the date of closure of the business nor the fact that the closure of the business had taken place before the amended definition came into force are relevant for that purpose. 10.. In view of our above opinion, we answer the question referred to us in the negative and in favour of the Revenue. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. Reference answered in the negative.
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1995 (2) TMI 385
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... ... ..... rnover tax on the sales tax collection in respect of the turnover which is exempted from levy of turnover tax by virtue of proviso (1) to section 5(2A)(i) of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963. 5.. From the above mentioned decision of the Tribunal, it is clear that the Tribunal went into all relevant aspects of the matter and came to a finding of fact that the books of accounts produced by the assessee are not acceptable and that best judgment assessment is the only feasible method. Pursuant to this finding, the Tribunal fixed the addition of 10 per cent of the turnover returned by the assessee. On the facts and circumstances of this case, the said addition is quite reasonable and legal. That addition is based on the finding of fact arrived at by the Tribunal. We do not find any question of law to be decided by this Court in this revision case. Accordingly, we dismiss the revision case summarily under section 41(3) of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act. Petition dismissed.
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1995 (2) TMI 384
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... ... ..... k are known as sanitary ware both by the persons who want to purchase them and the merchants dealing them. In fact, one who wants to purchase these items would normally go only to a shop which deals in sanitary wares. The fact that these items might be used for some other purposes also does not militate against their classification as sanitary ware . Thus looked from the common parlance or trade or commercial test also, these items have to be held to be sanitary wares . 6.. Having regard to the above, we are of the clear opinion that stopcock, bibcock, concealed stopcock, sinkcock, anglecock, round shower, wall mixer, inlet connection and pillarcock are sanitary ware and fittings thereof falling under entry No. 49 of Schedule C, Part II to the Act. In that view of the matter, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and in favour of the Revenue. Under the facts and circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1995 (2) TMI 383
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... ... ..... s turnover. 8.. Counsel for the Revenue also referred to the decision of this Court in Sun-N-Sand Hotel Private Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra 1969 23 STC 507. The question for consideration in the above case was whether service charges realised by the hotel from the customers constituted part of the sale price. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court held that such charges constituted part of sale price. We have carefully considered the above decision which in our opinion has no application to the facts of the present case. The facts of the present case are akin to the facts of the decision of the Supreme Court in Food Corporation of India v. State of Kerala 1988 68 STC 1 and the ratio of the said decision squarely applies. 9.. In view of the above, we answer both the questions referred to us in the negative and in favour of the assessee. 10.. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs. Reference answered in the negative.
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1995 (2) TMI 382
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... ... ..... roversy about the fact that the goods purchased by the assessee were used in manufacture. It is also evident that the goods were sold. The return of the goods by the purchaser per se cannot in any way amount to violation of the terms of the declaration because the goods, on return, are still intended for sale and in the usual course of business, in fact, might have been sold by the assessee to some other purchaser. However, we do not want to go into the factual part of that controversy. Suffice it to say that the return of goods by purchaser by itself cannot and would not attract section 14 of the Act in the absence of a finding that the goods so returned had been used by the dealer for any other purpose in contravention of the terms of his declaration. Without such a finding, resort to section 14 of the Act is not possible. 9.. In the result, both the questions referred to us are answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. Reference answered in the negative.
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1995 (2) TMI 381
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... ... ..... rpose of taxation. We, however, do not propose to discuss this aspect of the matter in detail in the present case, because the language of the rule itself being clear and unambiguous, it is not necessary to do so. The learned counsel for the Revenue strenuously urged before us that there is no discrimination as alleged. However, as indicated above, on the face of clear provisions of rule 41A and the definition of the expression purchase price contained in section 2(22) of the Act, and there being nothing in the context to justify any departure from the said definition, in our opinion, it is not open to us to give a different meaning to the said expression with a view to remove the supposed discrimination. 7.. In view of the above discussion, the question referred to us in all the above references is answered in the negative and in favour of the Revenue. 8.. Under the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. Reference answered in the negative.
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1995 (2) TMI 380
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... ... ..... ce-wise. It is common knowledge that the cost of production of small-scale units is higher than that of large scale or medium scale units. The small-scale units would be placed in a disadvantageous position in marketing their high cost products if sales tax is also added to the price of those products. Because of the exemption from sales tax, in a sellers market, i.e., when demand is high, the small-scale units will have the advantage of increasing the price of their products without the burden of sales tax and in a buyers market they can market their products better by reducing the price to the extent possible below the price of the products of medium and large scale units burdened with sales tax. These are not mean advantages. What incentives are to be given and to what extent and to whom are all matters of policy and that is beyond our pale. In the circumstances, we do not find any merit in these writ petitions and accordingly they are dismissed. Writ petitions dismissed.
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