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Showing 241 to 252 of 252 Records
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1995 (4) TMI 12
Financial Year, High Court, Supreme Court ... ... ... ... ..... substance is brought into existence or if a new or different article having distinctive name, character or use results from particular process or processes, such process or processes would amount to manufacture. The court has, however, pointed out that processing and manufacture are distinguishable. Nothing has been shown in this judgment of the Supreme Court, upon which we can persuade ourselves to take a different view from what is stated in Chillies Export House s case 1978 115 ITR 73 (Mad), the earlier judgment of this court. The court has taken the view that processing is a continuous and regular action or succession of actions leading to the accomplishment of some results. The court, on the activities of the assessee, has posed the question in the case on hand. What is the result achieved ? --- and answered, in our view, none at all. We do not have any reason to take a contrary view. The Tribunal has taken the correct view of law. The reference is answered accordingly.
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1995 (4) TMI 11
Capital Gains, Computation Of Capital, Cost Of Acquisition Of Tenancy Rights ... ... ... ... ..... xpenditure in connection with the said tenancy agreement such expenditure cannot take the place of cost of acquisition of the tenancy rights. It may be stated in this connection that having regard to the facts of the case, there was no essential difference between the tenancy rights and rights arising from the so-called sub-lease agreement. There had been unbroken continuity, right from 1952 till the tenancy was surrendered by the respondent in favour of the Syndicate Bank in so far as the respondent s occupation as a statutory tenant was concerned. Although in the question referred to the High Court, the term sub-lease right has been used, the said right cannot be construed as a new right separate from the right as of a statutory tenant which the respondent continued to have since the beginning. For the reasons given above, we answer the question in favour of the assessee and against the Department. The reference is dismissed without cost. MUKUL GOPAL MUKHERJI J.---I agree.
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1995 (4) TMI 10
Financial Year, High Court, Supreme Court ... ... ... ... ..... earlier has, therefore, no application in the present case. We have considered the rival submissions and find no merit in the argument of the Department. In our view, the case reported in State Bank of Travancore v. CIT 1986 158 ITR 102 (SC) is not applicable to the present case. The Tribunal was justified in deciding the controversy against the Commissioner of Income-tax, we are in agreement with the same. For the reasons stated above, the first question referred for decision is answered in the affirmative by holding that interest credited to the suspense account cannot be added to the income of the assessee and the controversy involved in this reference which is question No. 2 is not covered by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State Bank of Travancore v. CIT 1986 158 ITR 102. Both the questions, therefore, are answered in favour of the assessee and against the Department. The reference is, therefore, dismissed with costs. MUKUL GOPAL MUKHERJI J.---I agree.
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1995 (4) TMI 9
Finding Of Fact, Question Of Law ... ... ... ... ..... ed by the Tribunal on appeal, namely, I. T. A. No. 1977/(Del) of 1987. On a perusal of the said order passed by the Tribunal, we find that on appreciation of the records the Tribunal has come to the conclusion that no new source of income was being explored by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) when he gave a direction to make an enquiry in respect of investment made in the purchases. The Tribunal further came to a finding that the directions of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) did not amount to enhancement of income much less investigations into a new source of income which was not processed by the Income-tax Officer at all. In our opinion, the said findings of the Tribunal are based on appreciation of evidence and are findings of facts. Therefore, they do not give rise to any question of law. In the aforesaid view of the matter, we decline to call for any reference on the aforesaid question as proposed by the assessee and we accordingly dismiss this petition.
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1995 (4) TMI 8
Central Excise, Search And Seizure, Tribunal's Order ... ... ... ... ..... We do not find that there is any impediment now in our directing the two Departments of Income-tax and Central Excise to return such seized valuable items and hundis to the assessees which they cannot retain pursuant to the order of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. Learned counsel for the assessee rightly points out that cancellation of the prohibitory order under section 226(3) and return of all his valuables and hundis is his legal right under sections 132(5), 132(6) and 132B of the Act. Consequently, we allow both these petitions and direct the respondents to return to the assessees the seized valuables, cash and hundis to which they are entitled pursuant to the order passed in their income-tax cases by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. We direct that the prohibitory order issued under section 226(3) of the Act, for that purpose, shall not remain in operation. However, we make no order as to costs. The amount of security deposit, if any, be returned to the petitioners.
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1995 (4) TMI 7
Application For Directing Reference, High Court, Question Of Law, Search And Seizure, Seized Assets
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1995 (4) TMI 6
Literal Interpretation, Sale Proceeds, Special Deduction, Taxing Statutes ... ... ... ... ..... come-tax, while passing the impugned order contained in annexure I to the writ petition, has failed to exercise his jurisdiction though he was so invested with such power wholly on an erroneous misconception of the provisions contained in sub-section (2)(a) aforesaid. In view aforesaid, the order of the Commissioner dated February 13, 1995, relating to the assessment year 1992-93 refusing to exercise his jurisdiction to allow further time is hereby set aside. The Commissioner is hereby directed to decide the matter afresh in the light of the observations made hereinbefore, as expeditiously as possible. The interim order of stay of assessment granted on March 9, 1995, and extended subsequently shall continue till the disposal of the application of the petitioner contained in annexure 2 to the writ petition and its communication to the petitioner by the assessing authority, whichever is later. The writ petition is thus disposed of. There will, however, be no order as to costs.
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1995 (4) TMI 5
Actual Cost, Borrowed Capital, Capital For Purposes, Computation Of Capital, Industrial Undertaking, Special Deduction
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1995 (4) TMI 4
Power of tribunal - Tribunal remanded the matter to the Income-tax Officer for making a fresh assessment - application by assessee u/s 256(1) asking the Tribunal to refer the questions - Supreme Court is not inclined to go into this question of competency of Tribunal at this stage
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1995 (4) TMI 3
Whether Tribunal is justified in law in holding that the reassessment u/s 147(a) cannot include items already barred u/s 147(b) & accordingly in deleting the six additions made in the reassessment for the assessment year 1959-60 - Whether Tribunal is justified in drawing a distinction between items falling under sections 147(a) and 147(b) and in deleting the items of additions that could be brought u/s 147(b) - both the questions must be answered in favour of the assessee
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1995 (4) TMI 2
Discretionary Trust - Whether, in law and on facts and having regard to the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 164 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the assessee is entitled to the concessional rate of tax - Whether, in law and on facts and in view of the provisions of the trust deed, the trust cannot be subjected to maximum marginal rate of tax
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1995 (4) TMI 1
Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that the statutory allowance mentioned in section 23(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, should be allowed every time separately in computing the income from house property falling to the share of each of the co-owners including the assessee
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