|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 382 Records
-
1996 (1) TMI 465 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... encashment, notice is issued to him not to present the same for encashment and yet the payee or holder in due course presents the cheque to the Bank for payment and when it is returned on instructions, Section 138 does not get attracted. Under these circumstances, since the accused has not made the payment within 15 days from the date of the receipt of the notice issued by the payee or the holder in due course, the dishonest intention is inferable from those facts. Accordingly, the ingredients as contained in Section 138 have been prima facie made out in the complaint. The High Court, therefore, was wholly incorrect in its conclusion that the ingredients have not been made out in the complaint. The orders of the High Court quashing the complaints are illegal. They are accordingly set aside and the trial Court is directed to disposed of the matters as expeditiously as possible. It is made clear that we do not intend to express any opinion on merits. 8. The appeal are allowed.
-
1996 (1) TMI 464 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ; (6) A reading of sub-clause (2) of Section 20 shows that the Appellate Tribunal shall exercise its powers in relation to "any order" made or deemed to have been made by the Tribunal. The words "any order" would include interlocutory orders, which substantially affect the rights of the parties, and those words are not confined to the final disposal of the application filed under Section 19. Similarly, sub-clause (1) of Section 20 reads the words "an order" and that would also mean that an appeal lies against interim orders which substantially affect the rights of the parties, and those words are not confined to an order which finally disposes of the application before the Tribunal. (7) Inasmuch as the appellant has a wider remedy by way of an appeal, this court will not exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The learned Judge was; Therefore, right is not entertaining the writ petition. (8) The appeal is dismissed.
-
1996 (1) TMI 463 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ot be allowed to be circumvented in this fashion. The Court should have declined to entertain the application moved by the Arbitrator nearly six years after making of the Award. Without the application of the Arbitrator, the application made by Jayantikumar Ishwarbhai Patel Under Section 14(2) could not survive. The court should not come to the aid of a party where there has been unwarrantable delay in seeking the statutory remedy. Any remedy must be sought with reasonable promptitude having regard to the circumstances. 11. In our view, the respondents Nos. 3 to 5 cannot be allowed to circumvent the law with the help of the Arbitrator and obtain indirectly an order Under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act, which they could not do directly. 12. The appeal is allowed. The order passed by the High Court on 30th September, 1994 and also the decree in terms of the Award passed by the Civil Judge (S.D.), Anand, on 5th October, 1994 are set aside. There will be no order as to costs.
-
1996 (1) TMI 462 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... erest. We also see no justification by the courts below of not having awarded interest, whatever be its rate, from the date of the application. The way inflation has galloped in the past two decades and the value of the rupee eroded, we see no justification why interest at the rate of 12 per annum was not awardable in the instant matter. We, therefore, order that the interest on the sums modifying awarded by us, shall be payable from the date of the application itself and at the rate of 12 per annum. Payments which might have been made by the respondents, be adjusted. The Tribunal is required to work this out so that the correct figure is available to the parties for determining their rights and liabilities. The parties may approach the Tribunal for fixing the figure payable and the sum so ascertained after making adjustments, shall be paid over to the claimants within three months of the determination. 4. The appeals stand partially allowed to the above extent. 5. No costs.
-
1996 (1) TMI 461 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... hat statute, it has been held by this Court in the case of Hari Shanker (Supra) that such provision of finality will not take away revisional powers of the High Court Under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. There is also no such express provision in the Arbitration Act attaching finality to the appellate order Under Section 39 of the said Act. As already indicated, only bar under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 is of a second appeal from an appellate order Under Section 39. The impugned order of the High Court upholding maintainability of revisional application under Rule 36A of the Rules, therefore, is justified and no interference against such decision is warranted. This appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed without any order as to costs. As the revision application is pending for a long time, the High Court is directed to dispose of revisional application on merits as early as possible but not exceeding four months from the date of communication of this order.
-
1996 (1) TMI 460 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... evance of the petitioner in this petition for special leave to appeal against the judgment dated June 16, 1992 passed in Appeal No. 623 of 1979 is that the petitioner is claiming title on the basis of adverse possession and enjoyment in respect of certain immovable properties lying in district Anantpur and that the said properties have been included in the schedule to the plaint of the Suit No. O.S. No. 26 of 1970 and by the impugned judgment the said properties have been held to be of respondent No. 1, the plaintiff in the said suit. It is submitted that the petitioner was not impleaded as a party in the said suit and that in respect of the properties over which the petitioner is claiming title by adverse possession another suit (O.S. No. 31/80) filed by respondent No. 1 is pending. Having regard to the fact that O.S. 26 of 1970 has been dismissed by this Judgment the petitioner can have no subsisting cause for grievance. The special leave petition is, therefore, dismissed.
-
1996 (1) TMI 459 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... e written statement to treat it as a plaint originally instituted. The amendment which was sought to be made was treated to be clarificatory and, therefore, this Court had upheld the amendment of the written statement and treated it to be a cross suit. The ratio therein squarely applies to a fact situation where the party acquires right by bar of limitation and if the same is sought to be taken away by amendment of the pleading, amendment in such circumstances would be refused. In the present case, the gift deed was executed and registered as early as July 28, 1978 which is a notice to everyone. Even after filing of the written statement, for 3 years no steps were taken to file the application for amendment of the plaint. Thereby the occurred right in favour of the respondents would be defeated by permitting amendment of the plaint. The High Court, therefore, was right in refusing to grant permission to amend the plaint. The appeal is accordingly dismissed but without costs.
-
1996 (1) TMI 458 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... dicial notice of the law prevailing as on the date of the order or judgment and apply relevant provisions of law prevailing on that day and mould the relief on the basis of that law. In view of the facts that Haryana Amendment Act, 10 of 1995 came into force w.e.f. July 7, 1995, the only person entitled under the amended law, to avail the right of pre-emption, is the tenant whose vendor’s had sold the whole or a part thereof to the third parties. It would, therefore, be clear that as on date, Bhagwan Singh has no right to claim pre-emption under the Act, as amended under the Amendment Act, 1995. The appeals are accordingly allowed. The judgment and order of the High Court and the decree and judgment of the appellate Court are set aside and that of the trial Court, i.e., Sub-Judge, Second Class, Bhiwani made on October 31, 1985 in suit No.201/83 is restored. In conclusion, the suit stands dismissed but, in the circumstances, parties are directed to bear their own costs.
-
1996 (1) TMI 457 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ever asserts a custom at variance with the Hindu Law, shall have to prove it...... " o p /o p In view of the above position, the view of the learned judge that the appellant is not entitled to raise the executability of the decree in execution is not correct since the Amendment Act was applicable at the time of passing the decree by the appellate Court and the above decree, therefore, is nullity. When the matter goes to the root of the jurisdiction, it is settled law that it can be raised even in execution also. Under those circumstances, the High Court was not right in rejecting the revision of the appellants stating that they are not entitled to raise the plea of nullity. In this view of settled legal position, it does not serve any purpose to remand the matter to the executing court for fresh orders. o p /o p Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The orders of the courts below are set aside. Consequently, the execution petition also stands dismissed. No costs. o p /o p
-
1996 (1) TMI 456 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... rbitrator was applied to the dispute and how he arrived at the decision. The High Court, though does not act in exercising judicial re-view as a court of appeal but within narrow limits of judicial review it would consider the correctness and legality of the award. No doubt, as rightly pointed out by Mr. V.R. Reddy. Additional Solicitor General that the questions are technical matters. But nonetheless, the reasons in support of his conclusion should be given. In this case, arbitrator has not given reasons. The award of the arbitrator is set aside and the matter is remitted to the arbitrator to make an award and give reasons in support thereof. Since we have decided this question for the first time, it must be treated that any decision made prior to this day by any arbitrator under Section 7B of the Act is not liable to be reopened. In other words, the order is prospective in its operation. The appeal is accordingly allowed but in the circumstances, with no order as to costs.
-
1996 (1) TMI 455 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... nces, had the appellant remained in India, he could have gone to the Escorts like many others did, to save his life. But instead he has done that in London incurring considerable expense. The doctors causing his operation there are presumed to have done so as one essential and timely. On that hypothesis, it is fair and just that the respondents pay to the appellantt the rates admissible as per Escorts. The claim of the appellant having been found valid, the question posed at the outset 15 answered in the affirmative. Of course the sum of ₹ 40,000/- already paid to the appellant would have to be adjusted in computation. Since the appellant did not have his claim dealt with in the High Court in the manner it has been projected now in this Court, we do not grant him any interest for the intervening period, even though prayed for. Let the difference be paid to the appellant within two months positively. The appeal is accordingly allowed. There need be no order as to costs.
-
1996 (1) TMI 454 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... he Court should not read the words to be imposing a limitation, nor should they be confined to only purposes under the 1973 Act as that would amount to adding words, such as "under the Act" after the expression "all purposes". 6. We have given our considered view to this submission made by the learned counsel for the respondent-Samiti, but we are afraid we cannot accept it. We think that the interpretation placed by the learned counsel for the appellants is more appropriate, having regard to the structure of Section 7(3) and the context in which the words "for all purposes" have been used. We therefore, uphold the contention urged on behalf of the appellants. 7. In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and order of the High Court impugned herein are set aside and the decision of the Property Tax Officer, Guna, to levy tax and enforce its recovery cannot be assailed. 8. The appeal will stand allowed accordingly with no order as to costs.
-
1996 (1) TMI 453 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... t in the contention that the levy of a fee for a bottling licence is beyond the scope of the U.P. Excise Act of 1910. 4. It is next submitted that in the plant of the appellants/petitioners, bottling is done as a part of the manufacturing activity. Since they already possessed a manufacturing licence, and since a duty of excise is levied on the liquor manufactured, an additional fee for a bottling licence should not be imposed. This argument also has no merit. Bottling is a distinct activity for which a licence is required under the provisions of the U.P. Bottling of Foreign Liquor Rules, 1969. There is an express power under the U.P. Excise Act, 1910 to levy such a fee as set out above. In the premises and in view of the ratio of the judgment of this Court in Khoday Distilleries v. State of Karnataka, Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, which applies to these cases also, there is no merit in these appeals/petitions. The same are accordingly dismissed with costs.
-
1996 (1) TMI 452 - COMPANY LAW BOARD
... ...
... ... ..... r proceedings before us, the petitioners never reiterated their prayer regarding cross-examination leading to the presumption that they had abandoned their prayer. As a matter of fact one of the interim orders passed by us on an application of the petitioner during this period even went up to the Supreme Court. Therefore, at this late stage when we have fixed the dates for final hearing, we do not consider it necessary to either record oral evidence or allow anyone to be cross examined. 24. However, the Company Law Board has powers under Section 10E(4) of the Act to order discovery of documents and examining witnesses on oath. Thus, should we, at any point of time consider that on the basis of the affidavits no conclusion can be drawn, we shall, on our own, call such of those petitioners or respondents to depose in person before adjudicating on the allegations. 25. In view of the foregoing, we do not propose to entertain the application and as such the same stands dismissed.
-
1996 (1) TMI 451 - SC ORDER
... ...
... ... ..... paragraph of its order we see no ground to interfere in the matter. The Civil Appeal is dismissed.
-
1996 (1) TMI 450 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... the failure of the prosecution to file the charge-sheet within the maximum time allowed by law, he cannot contend that he had an indefeasible right to exercise it at any time notwithstanding the fact that in the meantime the charge-sheet is filed. But on the other hand if he exercises the right within the time allowed by law and is released on bail under such circumstances, he cannot be rearrested on the mere filing of the charge-sheet, as pointed out in Aslam Babalal Desai vs. State of Maharashtra, (1992) 4 SCC 272. The learned counsel, appearing for the appellant, did not press the appeal on merit, saying that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the City Sessions Judge, should have held that there were reasonable grounds for believing that the appellant was not guilty of any offence under that Act, as required by sub-section 1(b) (ii) of Section 37. Accordingly, the appeal fails and it is dismissed. However, we direct that the trial of the appellant be expediated.
-
1996 (1) TMI 449 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... him. But the High Court appears to have examined the matter as if it was a case under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Apart from the above, we do not think that the proceedings should be prolonged any further. Even if the Tribunal is right in its opinion, the only result would be that the disciplinary authority would be now required to pass final order in the disciplinary proceedings. Having regard to the nature of the charge and having regard to the fact that the respondent was only a temporary employee, we think that the following order would be an appropriate one in the circumstances of this case Instead of reinstatement, pursuant to the order of the Tribunal, the respondent shall be entitled to a consolidated sum of ₹ 30, 000. The respondent shall not be entitled to any other claim. The said amount shall be paid by way of government cheque to the respondent within three months from today The special leave petition is disposed of with the above observations.
-
1996 (1) TMI 448 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... tion in the similar manner after hearing the petitioner and shall pass appropriate order. These authorities will have to consider the fact that it is an acquisition in view of the specific provision of the Act, and not transfer simpliciter as referred in Rule 230(2) quoted above. 13. In view of this position, we set aside the recovery order/notice Annexure C in both the petitions and direct the authority concerned, to decide the question after hearing the petitioner. 14. Mr. Mehta, learned Counsel pointed out from the affidavit filed by Mr. H.G. Meena, Superintendent of Central Excise & Customs, that the order in original confirming the demand in question is passed by the Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Baroda, on 4-9-1990, i.e. after the nationalisation of the Priyalaxami Mills, Baroda. Therefore, the authority will have to examine the effect of the taking over. 15. Petition stands allowed accordingly. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent.
-
1996 (1) TMI 447 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... It is seen that the object of the Act is to prevent misuse of the trust for personal benefit. It is founded on the report of the aforesaid Commission. It is a matter of legislative wisdom and policy. It is not the contention that the legislature has no competence to abolish the system of payment. As stated earlier, it is a legislative judgment reflective of the will of the sovereign people. The Court would give respect and primacy to the legislative judgment, rather than to judicial conclusion. So, we are of the considered view that Section 144 is not unconstitutional in relation to its application to charitable and religious institutions and endowments. The scope and ambit of Section 144 would be fully discussed in Archaka cases, i.e., W.P. No. 638/87 & batch. So, we uphold the validity of Sections 15, 16, 17, 29(5) and 144, subject to the rider mentioned earlier qua Sections 17 and 29(5). The writ petitions and the transfer cases are disposed of accordingly. No costs.
-
1996 (1) TMI 446 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... d. Considered from this perspective and in the facts and circumstances, we are of the considered view that no useful purpose would be served by remitting the case to the High Court or by directing the Land Acquisition Officer to determine compensation. We are of the view that the respondents would be entitled to a total compensation of ₹ 25,000/-. The respondent is also entitled to interest 6 from the date of taking possession till the date of deposit of the amount in the Court. The respondent is also entitled to 15 solatium on ₹ 25,000/- determined as compensation. The appellant is directed to deposit the said amount within six months from the date of the receipt of this order. If possession of any land in excess of the land covered by Section 4 1 has been taken, our order would not cover it and appropriate action according to law should be taken. The appeal is accordingly allowed and the writ petition stands disposed of but, in the circumstances, without costs.
........
|
