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1996 (11) TMI 471
Issues involved: Clarification and modification of judgment regarding pendency of criminal cases, interpretation of phrases 'pendency of trials' and 'non-commencement of trial,' addition of offenses exempted from previous directions.
I. Clarification of time limit for pendency of criminal cases: The Supreme Court clarified that the time limit for pendency of criminal cases does not apply if the delay is due to dilatory tactics of the accused or actions prolonging the trial by the accused. Accused cannot seek discharge or acquittal if the delay is caused by their own actions or seeking stay from higher courts.
II. Interpretation of phrases 'pendency of trials' and 'non-commencement of trial': - Trials before Sessions Court commence when charges are framed under Section 228 of the CrPC, 1973. - In warrant cases by magistrates instituted upon police reports, trials commence when charges are framed under Section 240 of the CrPC, 1973. For cases instituted otherwise, trials commence when charges are framed under Section 246. - In summons cases by magistrates, trials commence when accused are asked under Section 251 to plead guilty or present a defense.
III. Addition of offenses exempted from previous directions: The Court added offenses including matrimonial offenses, offenses under the Negotiable Instruments Act, criminal misappropriation, criminal breach of trust, rash and negligent acts, and offenses affecting public health, safety, convenience, decency, and morals to the list of offenses exempted from previous directions. Accused discharged or acquitted for these offenses must be proceeded against as per the new order.
IV. Dissemination of clarificatory order: The Court directed the communication of the clarificatory order to all High Courts, Chief Secretaries of States, and administrative Heads of Union Territories. High Courts were instructed to send Compliance Reports within three months to ensure implementation of the clarificatory order.
Separate Judgment: Legal Applications (LAs) 3-6 of 1996 were disposed of in light of the clarificatory order issued by the Supreme Court.
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1996 (11) TMI 470
Issues Involved: 1. Competence of the complainant to file the complaint. 2. Authorization of the Manager to file the complaint. 3. Validity of subsequent ratification of the complaint.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Competence of the Complainant to File the Complaint: The primary issue was whether the complaint filed by M/s. Satish and Company, represented by its Manager, was competent as per the date of filing. The Court noted that the complaint was filed without any letter or resolution authorizing the Manager to act on behalf of the company. Section 142(a) of the Negotiable Instruments Act stipulates that a complaint must be made by the payee or holder in due course. Since M/s. Satish and Company was the payee, the complaint should have been filed by an authorized representative of the company. The Court concluded that the complaint was not validly instituted as on the date of filing since no authorization was presented.
2. Authorization of the Manager to File the Complaint: The Court examined whether the Manager, Mr. Naresh Kumar, was duly authorized to file the complaint. The complaint was filed without any accompanying authorization letter, and Ex. P-1, a letter authorizing the Manager, was filed one year later. The Court emphasized that the Manager must be explicitly authorized to file such complaints, as the designation alone does not confer the authority to bind the company in legal proceedings. The Court referred to relevant sections of the Negotiable Instruments Act and the Civil Procedure Code, concluding that the Manager was not authorized to file the complaint at the time it was filed.
3. Validity of Subsequent Ratification of the Complaint: The Court considered whether the subsequent filing of Ex. P-1 could ratify the complaint retroactively. The Court held that the complaint must be valid at the time of filing for the Court to take cognizance of the offence. Subsequent ratification cannot cure the defect of an initially incompetent complaint. The Court cited the principle that legal proceedings must be initiated by duly authorized persons to bind the company and prevent repudiation of legal consequences. The Court referenced the case "K. N. Sankaranarayanan v. Shree Consultations," which held that an invalid initiation cannot be validated by later ratification. The Court concluded that Ex. P-1, filed after one year, could not retroactively authorize the complaint, and filing a new complaint within the statutory period was necessary.
Conclusion: The Court found no illegality or infirmity in the lower court's order and dismissed the appeal, affirming the acquittal of the accused. The Criminal Appeal was dismissed.
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1996 (11) TMI 469
Issues: 1. Bail application of the appellants based on the apprehension of influencing witnesses and tampering with evidence. 2. Interpretation and applicability of Section 437(6) of the Cr.P.C. 3. Consideration of the totality of facts and circumstances for granting bail. 4. Allegations of tampering with evidence and influencing witnesses. 5. Legal provisions for granting bail in non-bailable offences. 6. Examination of the complainant and cross-examination in the trial. 7. Addition of a new accused in the criminal conspiracy. 8. Dismissal of bail applications by lower courts and challenges in the High Court. 9. Conditions for granting bail and imposition of necessary restrictions.
The Supreme Court reviewed a case where the appellants were accused of inducing payment for securing contracts. The High Court had rejected their bail application based on apprehensions of tampering with evidence and influencing witnesses. The Court examined the totality of circumstances, emphasizing the complainant's commitment and lack of evidence tampering. It noted that the case dated back 16 years with slow progress. The Court analyzed Section 437(1) of the Cr.P.C., highlighting the entitlement to bail unless jeopardizing the prosecution. The Court found no basis for current tampering apprehensions and criticized the High Court's reliance on past unrelated activities. Consequently, the Supreme Court granted bail, subject to stringent conditions like not leaving the country, cooperating with authorities, and attending trial hearings promptly.
The Court addressed the interpretation and applicability of Section 437(6) of the Cr.P.C., choosing to focus on the overall circumstances rather than strict compliance. It delved into the nature of the offence, the existing facts, and the lack of evidence supporting tampering fears. The Court dismissed concerns of witness influence, especially given the complainant's steadfast pursuit of justice. The judgment overturned the High Court's decision, emphasizing the need for bail without expressing any opinion on the case's merits. The Court directed the appellants' release on bail, subject to strict conditions to ensure compliance and cooperation with the ongoing legal processes.
Furthermore, the Court discussed the dismissal of previous bail applications by lower courts and subsequent challenges in the High Court. It highlighted the reasons for rejection, including new evidence and fears of tampering. The Court scrutinized the grounds for denying bail, emphasizing the lack of current evidence supporting tampering allegations. The judgment set aside the High Court's decision, granting bail to the appellants with stringent conditions to prevent any interference with the legal proceedings.
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1996 (11) TMI 468
Issues involved: Challenge to acquisition of land under Land Acquisition Act, 1894 u/s 4(1) for manufacturing purposes; Claim for restitution of land possession due to cessation of public purpose.
Judgment Details:
Issue 1: Challenge to Land Acquisition: The appeal arose from the Madras High Court's judgment on the acquisition of 6 acres 41 cents of land for manufacturing Synthetic Rasina. The land was acquired under Chapter VII of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Possession was taken in 1964, and subsequent transfers and lease agreements were made with subsidiary companies. The appellants challenged the acquisition on the grounds of ceased public purpose. The courts held that once compensation was received and land vested in the state, the appellants had no right to challenge the acquisition.
Issue 2: Cessation of Public Purpose: The appellants argued that the acquisition became invalid when the public purpose ceased to exist. However, the court found no merit in this argument. The acquisition process had been finalized, compensation paid, and possession surrendered to the government as per the agreement's conditions. The land was then allotted for a different public purpose to a subsidiary company. The court concluded that the original public purpose was substituted with another, and the matter had been settled 32 years ago. Therefore, the writ petition could not be entertained after such a long period.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision to dismiss the appeal, stating that the writ petition could not be entertained after such a long period. The appeal was accordingly dismissed with no costs.
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1996 (11) TMI 467
Issues Involved: The issues involved in this case include insurable interest in a vessel, liability of an insurance company, rights of a mortgagee in an insurance claim, jurisdiction of the National Consumer Dispute Redressal Commission, and interpretation of relevant legal provisions.
Insurable Interest and Liability of Insurance Company: The case involved a dispute where the insurance company refused to pay the insurance amount to the purchaser of a vessel, claiming he had no insurable interest. The National Consumer Commission found that the purchaser had insurable interest as he was in possession of the vessel and had insured it, directing the insurance company to pay the amount due under the policy with interest.
Rights of Mortgagee in Insurance Claim: The Gujarat Maritime Board, as the mortgagee of the vessel, objected to the direction of the Commission to pay the entire insurance amount to the purchaser. The Board argued that it had an interest in the vessel and should be considered in the insurance claim. The Commission initially stayed its order but later directed the full payment to the purchaser, prompting the Board to appeal.
Jurisdiction of the National Consumer Commission: The question arose whether the Commission had the jurisdiction to decide the conflicting claims of the mortgagee and the purchaser under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. The Supreme Court held that the Commission had the power to adjudicate such disputes as incidental to its substantive jurisdiction under the Act.
Interpretation of Legal Provisions: The Supreme Court interpreted the relevant legal provisions to determine the powers of the National Commission in deciding disputes under the Consumer Protection Act. It emphasized that the Commission had the authority to adjudicate rival claims and decide disputes where multiple parties sought the same relief.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the Commission's orders and remitting the matter for fresh disposal according to law, without expressing any opinion on the merits of the case. The Court clarified that its observations served as reasons for the order and not as findings on the claims of the parties involved.
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1996 (11) TMI 466
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's order, and remanded the writ petition for fresh disposal on merits. The Court emphasized the necessity of providing reasons for decisions. The High Court was requested to expedite the disposal of the writ petition. The stay order on the termination of services was extended for three months.
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1996 (11) TMI 465
The Supreme Court dismissed the special leave petition challenging the order of the High Court confirming the dismissal of an appeal. The petitioner's counsel had withdrawn the appeal without authorization, but the Court held that it was within the counsel's power to do so under Order III, Rule 4 of the CPC. The Court did not find any illegality in the order passed by the lower court.
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1996 (11) TMI 464
Issues Involved: 1. Challenge to the acquisition proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. 2. Delay in completing the acquisition proceedings. 3. Validity of multiple declarations under Section 6 of the Act. 4. Application of Section 55 of the Delhi Development Act, 1957. 5. Withdrawal of acquisition under Section 48 of the Act. 6. Acquisition of land with existing structures and green areas.
Summary:
1. Challenge to the acquisition proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894: Various notifications u/s 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 were issued between 1959 and 1965 for the planned development of Delhi. The appellants challenged these notifications and subsequent declarations u/s 6 on various grounds, including the validity of multiple declarations and the delay in finalizing the acquisition proceedings. The Supreme Court dismissed these challenges, referencing previous decisions, including Aflatoon & Ors. vs. Lt. Governor of Delhi (1974), which upheld the validity of such notifications and declarations.
2. Delay in completing the acquisition proceedings: The appellants argued that the delay in completing the acquisition proceedings deprived them of fair compensation, as the market value of the land increased significantly over time. The Court acknowledged the delay but noted that it was partly due to the landowners' own actions, such as filing numerous objections and writ petitions. The Court upheld the view from Ram Chand vs. Union of India (1994) that quashing the acquisition proceedings due to delay would not be appropriate, but directed the payment of additional compensation at 12% per annum from two years after the Aflatoon decision until the award date.
3. Validity of multiple declarations under Section 6 of the Act: The appellants contended that issuing more than one declaration u/s 6 from a single notification u/s 4 was not permissible. The Court referred to the Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Act, 1967, which allows multiple declarations from a single notification. This amendment was upheld in Uday Ram Sharma vs. Union of India (1968) and reaffirmed in Aflatoon's case, thus dismissing the appellants' contention.
4. Application of Section 55 of the Delhi Development Act, 1957: The appellants argued that the land designated for compulsory acquisition under the master plan should be acquired within six months of notice u/s 55 of the Delhi Development Act, failing which the acquisition should be deemed abandoned. The Court found no merit in this argument, noting that the land acquisition process under the Land Acquisition Act overrides the six-month period specified in the Delhi Act. The Court agreed with the High Court's view that Section 55 does not inhibit the acquisition of land for public purposes under the Land Acquisition Act.
5. Withdrawal of acquisition under Section 48 of the Act: The appellants claimed that the government had withdrawn certain lands from acquisition, and thus the entire acquisition process should be quashed. The Court examined the original records and found no valid order for withdrawal. It held that withdrawal u/s 48 requires a notification in the official gazette, which was not done. The Court upheld the High Court's view that mere communication of a misconstrued order does not constitute a valid withdrawal.
6. Acquisition of land with existing structures and green areas: The appellants argued that land with existing structures and designated green areas should not be acquired. The Court noted that recreational facilities are part of the planned development and cannot be excluded. It also stated that structures built without necessary approvals after the notification u/s 4 cannot be exempted from acquisition. The Court left the decision on existing structures to the discretion of the government.
Conclusion: The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals and upheld the acquisition proceedings. It directed payment of additional compensation at 12% per annum from two years after the Aflatoon decision until the award date, calculated with reference to the market value on the date of notification u/s 4(1) of the Act. No order as to costs was made.
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1996 (11) TMI 463
The Supreme Court held that the Land Acquisition Amendment Act 68 of 1984 does not apply to acquisitions under the U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad Adhiniyam, 1965. The Court directed the Land Acquisition Officer to pass the award within six weeks, with interest at 18% if delayed, and withdrawal of acquisition if compensation is not deposited within three months. The appeal was allowed with no costs. (Case citation: 1996 (11) TMI 463 - Supreme Court)
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1996 (11) TMI 462
Issues Involved:
1. Computation of deduction u/s 80HHC. 2. Treatment of compensation received as short-term capital gains.
Summary:
Issue 1: Computation of Deduction u/s 80HHC
Ground No. 6 pertains to the computation of deduction claimed u/s 80HHC. The revenue authorities included excise duty (Rs. 5,80,11,331) and sales tax (Rs. 96,79,522) in the 'total turnover' for the purpose of this computation. The assessee contended that these additions were not warranted as per the scheme of section 80HHC, pointing out that 'export turnover' and 'total turnover' are defined differently in the Act. The Tribunal in Chloride India Ltd. v. Dy. CIT [1995] 53 ITD 180 (Cal.) had observed that including excise duty and sales tax in 'total turnover' would result in disharmony as 'export turnover' did not include these items. The revenue, however, argued that the definition of 'total turnover' in the Act is clear and includes these amounts. The Tribunal agreed with the revenue, holding that the amounts of excise duty and sales tax were rightly included in the 'total turnover'.
Issue 2: Treatment of Compensation Received as Short-Term Capital Gains
The last ground relates to the receipt of Rs. 1,70,50,000 treated as short-term capital gains. The assessee had an agreement to purchase property dated 18th April 1981, and another agreement dated 30th March 1991 to relinquish its rights for a consideration of Rs. 1,70,50,000. The Assessing Officer treated this as short-term capital gain, arguing that the agreement dated 30th March 1991 was independent of the earlier agreement and the asset was held for less than 36 months. The CIT(Appeals) upheld this view. The assessee argued that the right to purchase the property was a long-term capital asset held since 1981, and the compensation received should be treated as long-term capital gains. The Tribunal agreed with the assessee, citing decisions such as Tata Services Ltd. [1980] 122 ITR 594 (Bom.) and Vijay Flexible Containers [1990] 186 ITR 693 (Bom.), and held that the compensation received was for relinquishing a long-term capital asset. Consequently, the Tribunal directed the Assessing Officer to examine the assessee's claim for exemption u/s 54E and grant it if the conditions were satisfied.
Conclusion:
The appeal was partly allowed, with the Tribunal upholding the inclusion of excise duty and sales tax in 'total turnover' for deduction u/s 80HHC, and treating the compensation received as long-term capital gains, directing the Assessing Officer to consider the exemption claim u/s 54E.
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1996 (11) TMI 461
Issues Involved: 1. Legality of the exercise of power under Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. 2. Compliance with mandatory conditions under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. 3. Validity of the declaration under Section 6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. 4. Impact of the judgment of the learned single Judge quashing the declaration under Section 6(1). 5. Necessity for fresh publication of the declaration under Section 6(1) after quashing.
Summary:
1. Legality of the exercise of power under Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894: The Supreme Court examined whether the exercise of power under Section 17(4) invoking urgency clause under Section 17(1) is conditioned upon the publication of the notification under Section 4(1). It was established that the Government has the power to invoke Section 17(4) after the publication of the notification under Section 4(1). The Court emphasized that the compliance of the three mandatory conditions under Section 4(1) is necessary before exercising the power under Section 17(4).
2. Compliance with mandatory conditions under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894: The Court reiterated that Section 4(1) requires three mandatory conditions: publication in the official Gazette, publication in two daily newspapers, and public notice of the substance of such notification in the locality. The last of the dates of such publication is crucial for the exercise of power under Section 17(4). The Court held that while these steps are mandatory, it is not necessary that all three steps be completed before making the declaration under Section 6(1) and publishing it.
3. Validity of the declaration under Section 6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894: The Court discussed the mandatory nature of the publication of the declaration under Section 6(1) to give conclusiveness to the public purpose. The declaration should be published in the Gazette after the notification under Section 4(1) is published, with at least a one-day gap between them. The Court held that the date of publication in the Gazette is crucial, not the actual date of printing.
4. Impact of the judgment of the learned single Judge quashing the declaration under Section 6(1): The learned single Judge quashed the declaration under Section 6(1) published on December 24, 1986, which was later reversed by the Division Bench. The Supreme Court held that the Division Bench's judgment restored the declaration under Section 6(1) published on December 24, 1986, making any subsequent declaration superfluous.
5. Necessity for fresh publication of the declaration under Section 6(1) after quashing: The Court concluded that there was no necessity for fresh publication of the declaration under Section 6(1) after the learned single Judge quashed it, as the Division Bench's judgment restored the original declaration. The land vested in the State on January 29, 1987, free from all encumbrances, and the award became final.
Conclusion: The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, upholding the Division Bench's judgment, and confirmed that the declaration under Section 6(1) published on December 24, 1986, was valid and restored. The compliance with the three steps under Section 4(1) is mandatory, but the exercise of power under Section 17(4) does not require waiting for the last of the dates of these steps. The appeals were dismissed without costs.
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1996 (11) TMI 460
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal regarding land acquisition compensation, upholding the High Court's decision to deduct 40% towards development charges. The notice to respondents was deemed served as they did not respond. Land was acquired in Shimla with compensation initially set at Rs. 40,000 per bigha, later increased to Rs. 1,00,000 by the district Judge.
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1996 (11) TMI 459
Issues involved: Appeal filed by Authorised Officer under Tamil Nadu Land Reforms Act to set aside High Court judgment regarding surplus land declaration.
Judgment Summary:
Issue 1: Challenge to High Court's remand order
The appeal was filed by the Authorised Officer under the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms Act to challenge the judgment of the High Court of Madras, which declared about 4.81 standard acres of lands belonging to the respondent as surplus. The High Court had set aside the orders passed by the authorities and remanded the case for fresh consideration in light of a previous judgment. However, the Authorised Officer decided the ceiling proceedings based on a subsequent judgment by the Supreme Court, which reversed the earlier High Court judgment. The High Court accepted the contention that the Authorised Officer was bound by the order of remand and should have considered the dispute based on the High Court's judgment. Consequently, the civil revision filed by the landholder was allowed by the High Court.
Issue 2: Finality of High Court's order
The appellant argued that once the Supreme Court reversed the judgment on which the High Court had based its direction, the Authorised Officer was justified in following the Supreme Court's judgment. However, the High Court's order directing the examination of the dispute based on its judgment had attained finality as it was not challenged before the Supreme Court. The High Court's reasoning was found to be in accordance with legal principles, stating that orders, even if not strictly legal, become final and binding if not challenged before superior courts. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed by the Supreme Court, upholding the High Court's decision.
This summary provides a detailed overview of the issues involved in the legal judgment, highlighting the key arguments and decisions made by the courts involved.
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1996 (11) TMI 458
Issues Involved: 1. Legislative Competence 2. Pre-existing Legislation 3. Violation of Freedom of Speech and Expression 4. Colorable Legislation 5. Violation of Article 14 6. Public vs. Private Entertainment 7. Prohibitive Tax Rate
Summary:
1. Legislative Competence: The appellants argued that the State Legislature lacked the competence to enact the Amendment Act as the subject matter falls exclusively within the province of Parliament (List 1 of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution). The court upheld the High Court's decision, agreeing that the State Legislature had the competence to enact the Amendment Act.
2. Pre-existing Legislation: The appellants contended that the Amendment Act was ineffective since the field was already occupied by the Cable Television Network (Regulation) Ordinance 9 of 1994 and the subsequent enactment made by Parliament. The court found no merit in this argument and upheld the High Court's rejection of this contention.
3. Violation of Freedom of Speech and Expression: The appellants claimed that the Amendment Act violated their freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. They argued that the tax imposed was prohibitive and designed to kill the cable television business. The court held that while providing entertainment is a form of exercise of freedom of speech and expression, the business aspect of it can be taxed. The court cited previous judgments to support the view that taxation is permissible as long as it does not stifle the freedom of expression.
4. Colorable Legislation: The appellants argued that the Amendment Act was a colorable piece of legislation aimed at benefiting cinema operators. The court found no evidence to support this claim and upheld the High Court's rejection of this contention.
5. Violation of Article 14: The appellants argued that the Amendment Act violated Article 14 of the Constitution as it did not levy tax on Doordarshan and other establishments providing entertainment through dish antennas. The court held that there is no comparison between Doordarshan, a government organization, and the appellants, who are private entities. The court found no substance in this grievance.
6. Public vs. Private Entertainment: The appellants contended that the tax was on private enjoyment rather than public entertainment. The court upheld the High Court's decision, agreeing that the nature of the entertainment provided by cable television is akin to that provided by cinema theatres and can be taxed similarly.
7. Prohibitive Tax Rate: The appellants argued that the tax rate was prohibitive and designed to kill the cable television business. The court found that the tax rate was reasonable and comparable to the tax levied on cinema theatres. The court noted that the rate of taxation had since been reduced to 20 percent and found no flaw in the State's reasoning for imposing the tax.
Conclusion: The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, rejecting all the contentions raised by the appellants. The appeals and writ petitions were dismissed with no order as to costs.
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1996 (11) TMI 457
Issues Involved: 1. Legality of the Land Acquisition Officer's decision not to pass an award for C.T.S.No. 218. 2. Validity of the settlement between BEST and the interested parties. 3. Allegations of malafides in the acquisition process. 4. Procedural diligence and conduct of the appellant.
Summary:
1. Legality of the Land Acquisition Officer's Decision: The appellant contended that once a notification u/s 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was issued for both C.T.S.No. 218 and C.T.S.No. 211, the Land Acquisition Officer was bound to pass an award for both lands. The officer's failure to pass an award for C.T.S.No. 218, based on a private settlement, was argued to be illegal. The Supreme Court agreed that the officer had no jurisdiction to exclude C.T.S.No. 218 without a notification u/s 48. However, the Court held that this procedural error did not invalidate the acquisition of C.T.S.No. 211, as the public purpose behind its acquisition remained intact.
2. Validity of the Settlement: The appellant argued that the settlement between BEST and the interested parties, which resulted in BEST obtaining only 906 sq.mtrs. of C.T.S.No. 218, indicated that the public purpose was not genuine. The Supreme Court presumed the settlement was made in good faith to advance BEST's interests, noting that BEST obtained the land and a bus station free of cost. The Court found no evidence that the public purpose stated in the notification was not real.
3. Allegations of Malafides: The appellant alleged that the acquisition was driven by malafides, aiming to benefit the promoters of the Gayatri Darshan Cooperative Housing Society. The Supreme Court found no material evidence to support the claim that the acquisition was influenced by the housing society or Vijayanand Singh. The Court also dismissed the relevance of the change of user in the development plan to the plea of malafides.
4. Procedural Diligence and Conduct of the Appellant: The appellant's writ petition, pending since 1986, was dismissed by the High Court due to lack of diligence. The appellant's counsel had reported "no instructions," leading to the dismissal. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, noting that the appellant had not challenged the acquisition from 1979 to 1986 and only did so after the award was passed. The Court emphasized the need for courts to consider public interest in land acquisition cases and suggested alternative relief methods rather than quashing acquisition proceedings.
Conclusion: The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the validity of the acquisition of C.T.S.No. 211 and rejecting the appellant's contentions. The Court highlighted the importance of balancing public and private interests in land acquisition cases and urged courts to consider larger public interests while exercising their discretionary powers. No order as to costs was made.
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1996 (11) TMI 456
Issues involved: Determination of the effective date of dismissal in a case where a domestic inquiry was found defective by the Labour Court.
Summary: The appellant, a technician, was dismissed from service by M/s Madras Fertilizers Ltd. after a domestic inquiry on November 18, 1981. The Labour Court later found the inquiry defective but justified the dismissal based on evidence presented. The main issue was whether the dismissal would take effect from the date of the Labour Court's order (December 11, 1985) or the date of the employer's dismissal order. The Constitution Bench decision in P.H. Kalyani v. M/s Air France Calcutta established that in cases where the inquiry is defective but the dismissal is justified based on evidence, the dismissal order relates back to the date it was made by the employer.
In the case of Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha, a three-Judge Bench made observations suggesting a different view on the effective date of dismissal. However, the Supreme Court held that these observations were not in line with the Kalyani decision and the juristic principles discussed. Subsequent cases like Desh Raj Gupta v. Industrial Tribunal IV, U.P. Lucknow & Anr. and Rambahu Vyankuji Kheragade v. Maharashtra Road Transport Corporation followed the Kalyani decision, emphasizing that the dismissal takes effect from the date of the employer's original order, not the Labour Court's award date.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court concluded that the appellant's dismissal was effective from November 18, 1981, the date of the employer's order, and not from December 11, 1985, the Labour Court's award date. The appellant was not entitled to any relief, and the appeal was dismissed without costs.
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1996 (11) TMI 455
Issues Involved: 1. Compliance with auction rules and conditions. 2. Issuance of permits and forms. 3. Payment of arrears and financial commitments. 4. Judicial review and exercise of writ jurisdiction.
Summary:
Compliance with Auction Rules and Conditions: The respondent-firm was the highest bidder for liquor licenses in Gwalior Township Group No.2 for the year 1995-96, with a bid of Rs. 8.52 crores. According to the auction rules, the firm had to deposit 1/6th of the total bid amount immediately and furnish a bank guarantee for 1/12th of the bid amount. The respondent deposited Rs. 1.42 crores but failed to provide the required bank guarantee and did not pay the monthly rental for May 1995. Notices were issued for these defaults, proposing cancellation of the licenses.
Issuance of Permits and Forms: The respondent filed Writ Petition No.711 of 1995 in the Madhya Pradesh High Court, alleging non-issuance of permits and forms by the authorities, which led to the closure of their shops. The High Court directed the authorities not to re-auction the shops and to supply the requisite liquor to the petitioner based on an undertaking to meet all financial commitments.
Payment of Arrears and Financial Commitments: Despite multiple orders from the High Court, the respondent-firm continued to default on payments. Interim orders allowed the firm to sell seized liquor and deposit sale proceeds with the State. The firm admitted arrears but attributed them to the authorities' actions. The Supreme Court noted that the High Court's orders resulted in a significant revenue loss to the State, amounting to Rs. 2,88,54,431/-.
Judicial Review and Exercise of Writ Jurisdiction: The Supreme Court emphasized that the High Court's power u/s Article 226 of the Constitution is supervisory, not appellate. The High Court should ensure decisions are made according to law and natural justice, without delving into disputed facts. The High Court's repeated interim orders, allowing liquor supply and partial payments, disregarded the norms of writ jurisdiction and resulted in substantial revenue loss. The Supreme Court criticized the High Court for not safeguarding the State's interests and for failing to record any findings of statutory violations by the authorities or compliance by the respondent.
Conclusion: The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the impugned orders, and dismissed Writ Petition No.711 of 1995. It directed the High Court to enforce the respondent's undertaking to meet financial commitments and initiate appropriate proceedings against the respondent-firm and its partners for contempt of court. The Supreme Court refrained from imposing penal costs due to the respondent's absence.
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1996 (11) TMI 454
Issues Involved: 1. Meaning of "appropriate Government" u/s 2(1)(a) of the Act. 2. Correctness of the view in Heavy Engineering case. 3. Entitlement of contract labour to be absorbed upon abolition and the effective date. 4. High Court's power under Article 226 to direct absorption and the effective date. 5. Necessity of reference u/s 10 of the ID Act for adjudication of disputes regarding absorption. 6. Correctness of the view in Dena Nath and Gujarat State Electricity Board's case. 7. Right of workmen for absorption and the remedy for enforcement.
Summary:
1. Meaning of "appropriate Government" u/s 2(1)(a) of the Act: The term "appropriate Government" as defined u/s 2(1)(a) of the Act was debated. The Supreme Court concluded that the Central Government is the "appropriate Government" from the inception of the Act, making the notification published under Section 10 on December 9, 1976, valid in law.
2. Correctness of the view in Heavy Engineering case: The Court held that the interpretation in Heavy Engineering case, which narrowly construed the phrase "appropriate Government" on common law principles, is inconsistent with the scheme and spirit of the Constitution. The Court overruled the view taken in Heavy Engineering case.
3. Entitlement of contract labour to be absorbed upon abolition and the effective date: The Court held that upon abolition of the contract labour system by notification u/s 10(1), the workmen are entitled to be absorbed as regular employees. The effective date for such absorption should be the date of abolition, i.e., December 9, 1976.
4. High Court's power under Article 226 to direct absorption and the effective date: The High Court has the power under Article 226 to direct the absorption of contract labour upon abolition of the contract labour system. The Court directed that the workmen should be absorbed from the date of abolition, i.e., December 9, 1976.
5. Necessity of reference u/s 10 of the ID Act for adjudication of disputes regarding absorption: The Court held that it is not necessary to make a reference u/s 10 of the ID Act for adjudication of disputes regarding the absorption of contract labour. The High Court can directly enforce the notification under Article 226.
6. Correctness of the view in Dena Nath and Gujarat State Electricity Board's case: The Court found the view in Dena Nath's case, which held that the High Court cannot direct absorption of contract labour, to be incorrect. The Court also found the methodology suggested in Gujarat Electricity Board's case to be unworkable and incongruous.
7. Right of workmen for absorption and the remedy for enforcement: The Court affirmed that workmen have a right to be absorbed upon the abolition of the contract labour system. The appropriate remedy is for the High Court to enforce this right under Article 226 by directing the absorption of such workmen as regular employees.
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1996 (11) TMI 453
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals as per the decision in Union of India v. Metal Box Company of India Limited. No costs were awarded. (1996 (11) TMI 453 - SC)
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1996 (11) TMI 452
Issues involved: The judgment addresses the issue of whether criminal proceedings should be stayed pending a departmental enquiry.
Summary:
The appeal arose from a case where disciplinary proceedings were initiated against an employee for causing a fatal accident while driving a corporation vehicle. The employee faced charges under Section 304, Part II, IPC. The High Court stayed the departmental proceedings, leading to the appeal. The appellants argued that the departmental enquiry was distinct from the criminal case and should not be stayed. They relied on previous judgments to support their stance. On the other hand, the respondent contended that staying the proceedings was justified to prevent prejudice in the criminal trial. They cited relevant case laws to support their argument.
The Supreme Court analyzed the legal principles involved in staying disciplinary proceedings during criminal trials. It emphasized that each case should be considered based on its unique circumstances. The Court highlighted the different objectives of criminal prosecution and departmental enquiries, stating that the standard of proof and rules governing each process are distinct. It was concluded that unless the criminal charge is grave and involves complex legal issues, both proceedings can proceed simultaneously. The Court stressed the need for expeditious completion of departmental enquiries to maintain efficiency in public administration.
In this specific case, the charge against the employee in the departmental enquiry was unrelated to the criminal offence under IPC sections 304A and 338. Therefore, the Court held that staying the proceedings was not warranted. The appeals were allowed, and no costs were imposed.
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