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Case Laws
Showing 261 to 280 of 339 Records
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1996 (11) TMI 79 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Writ jurisdiction - Alternative remedy ... ... ... ... ..... authorities of the Tribunal as the case may be. As and when decisions of the Apex Court are cited, it is needless to state, the appellate authorities or Tribunals, as the case may be, are bound to follow them. 16.Since I have taken the view, following the Division Bench Judgment of this Court aforementioned that the petitioners have to avail alternative remedy of appeals, I do not think it necessary to consider on merits, all the other contentions raised by the parties in these writ petitions. 17.In the result, for the reasons stated, I pass the following order - 18.The writ petitions are dismissed. I further direct that if the petitioners file appeals before the appellate authorities against the impugned orders within a period of 30 days from today, the appellate authorities shall decide such appeals on merits and in accordance with law, without going to the question of limitation. All the contentions of the parties are left open to be urged before the appellate authorities.
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1996 (11) TMI 78 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Writ jurisdiction ... ... ... ... ..... rely because the challan has been obtained from the office or issued from the office. Mr. K. Jayachandran, Additional Central Government Standing Counsel arguing for the respondents contended that a perusal of the challan does not indicate that it is a demand, and the proceedings have yet to be commenced. In the circumstances, I feel that the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the challan tantamounts to a demand and the apprehension of the petitioner that he will be met with penal consequences, if he does not pay the amount is unwarranted. As and when proceedings are initiated, it is open to the petitioner to move the Court for appropriate relief, if the provisions of the Act are not complied with or if there is any violation of the principles of natural justice. Under these circumstances these writ petitions are dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs. Consequently, W.M.P. Nos. 21224, 21225 and 21227 to 21230 of 1996 are also dismissed.
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1996 (11) TMI 77 - SUPREME COURT
Demand - Limitation ... ... ... ... ..... t relying on Rule 10 but relying on 10A instead, it should have produced before us material to show that the assessments were such as would not be covered by Rule 10 but would be covered by Rule 10A. No such material has been produced. Learned Counsel for the Revenue submits that the matter should be remanded to the Tribunal to enable the Tribunal to look into this aspect. 5.We do not think that such a remand would be justified on the facts of the present case. The action that was taken was under Rule 10, that is to say, upon the basis that the assessments were final assessments. The orders of the authorities below, while not clear about this, would also suggest that the assessments were final assessments. The Tribunal has only proceeded upon the basis that the assessments could only be on a provisional basis. 6.Having regard to the facts aforestated, we think that the appeal must now succeed. 7.The appeal is allowed. The order under appeal is set aside. No order as to costs.
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1996 (11) TMI 76 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... o such exemption, and it is the order of the High Court which is under challenge by the Revenue. 4. The very Notification has been analysed by this Court in Prestige Engineering (India) Ltd. and Ors. v. Collector of Central Excise, Meerut and Ors., 1994 (73) E.L.T. 497 (S.C.) 1994 (6) SCC 465, and this Court has held that the insistence of the Revenue upon the same article being returned to the customer after undergoing the manufacturing process at the hands of the job worker would rob the Notification of substance. It had to be remembered that the Notification was intended to help factories doing job work, which were charging their customers only for the work done by them. In their hands the value of the article was the value of the job work done by them and not the total value of the article, which would have been the case but for the Notification. 5. The judgment aforesaid clearly covers the case before us. Following it, the appeal is dismissed, with no order as to costs.
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1996 (11) TMI 75 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the imported goods fall within the description `lining material' or "fabrics, made from man-made fibres/yarns" falling at Item 25 of the List of Non-permissible Items for import under Appendix 4?
Held that:- It is not clear that the majority view of the Tribunal in this behalf is not based on basic authorities even if the expert opinion of consumers of such material is ignored. It is rightly pointed out that if the opinion evidence adduced on either side is ignored and if the opinion of the Textile Commissioner is also brushed aside as the Collector had done, what is left to be considered is the relevant Policy and the Collector's subjective satisfaction; that is, his own expertise. The majority after examining the basic authorities and after pointing out how the Collector's expertise based on Shri Sharma's opinion ran contrary to the basic materials, has rejected his conclusion. The approach adopted by the majority could not be said to be erroneous in any manner whatsoever. Besides, as stated earlier, this being a question of fact we see no reason why we should take a different view than the one taken by the majority. We, therefore, come to the conclusion that the material in question is lining material. Appeal dismissed.
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1996 (11) TMI 74 - SUPREME COURT
Demand of duty on yarn - Held that:- In view of the fact that an excisable item comes into existence with the manufacture of a single ply yarn it becomes liable to pay excise duty at that stage itself. The respondent cannot be allowed to contend that the levy of excise duty is postponed to a point of time when the yarn is removed after doubling or multifolding. The liability to pay excise duty arises at the first stage itself, namely, at the time of manufacture of single ply yarn. This being so the demand raised by the Assistant Collector was not invalid. Against assessee & would be liable to pay the aforesaid amount of ₹ 35,190.96 plus interest the rate of twelve per cent per annum thereon.
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1996 (11) TMI 73 - SUPREME COURT
Waste generating ... ... ... ... ..... t has said, again, It may thus be seen that though the physical and chemical characteristics of the original input waste and the resultant waste are the same, the latter is not the same thing as the former in the sense it is not part of the original waste which remained unreacted and did not go through the reaction of depolymeristaion and repolymerisation. In our opinion, there is a definite process of manufacture here within the meaning of Section 2(f) of the Act. 4. In our view, learned counsel for the Revenue is right. Having regard to the fact that the Tribunal has itself held that the physical and chemical characteristics of the original input waste and the resultant waste are the same, it is difficult to see how the resultant waste can be said to have been manufactured for no commodity distinct or different from the original input is produced. 5. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment and order under appeal is set aside. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1996 (11) TMI 72 - SC ORDER
Fabrics - Handloom ... ... ... ... ..... that they were producing the woollen fabrics in a factory owned by each of them. 2. It does not appear that at any stage of the proceedings the appellants had been required to show that the factories in which they produced the woollen fabrics were owned by them. The order of the Tribunal refusing them the exemption of this ground must, therefore, be set aside. 3. If it is the case of the Revenue that the appellants are not entitled to the benefit of the exemption under the said Notification by reason of the fact that the appellants do not own the factories in which the woollen fabrics are produced, the Revenue must give to the appellants a notice to show cause in this regard and the matter must be processed from that stage. 4. The appeals are allowed. The judgment and order under appeal is set aside. 5. The tax, if paid or deposited pursuant to the order of the Tribunal or of the authorities below, shall be refunded to the appellants. 6. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1996 (11) TMI 71 - SUPREME COURT
MANUFACTURE — RECORDING OF SOUND ON BLANK MAGNETIC CASSETTE OR SPOOL TAPES SUPPLIED BY CUSTOMER
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1996 (11) TMI 70 - SC ORDER
Demand - Clandestine removal - Limitation - Appeal to Supreme Court ... ... ... ... ..... the view that this was a clear case on facts that even the manufacture of the article or its user - was not brought to the notice of the Excise authorities. 3. No doubt, the learned Single member took a different view, having regard to his reading of the findings of the Appellate Collector and certain pleadings in a writ petition between the parties in the Kerala High Court. 4. We will not go into questions of fact. The majority view of the Tribunal, based upon material, being that there had been clandestine removal of the article in question, the provisions of Rule 9(1) were breached and, therefore, a notice under Rule 9(2) was competent. 5. The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed, with no order as to costs.
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1996 (11) TMI 69 - SC ORDER
Totaliser system ... ... ... ... ..... leviable. 2. Having regard to the judgment that we have just delivered in C.A. No. 2919/86, M/s. Mittal Engineering Works (P) Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, Meerut, Since reported in 1996 (88) E.L.T. 622 (S.C.) and the content of a totaliser or tote machine employed at a race course as found by the Tribunal upon the evidence, the same is not goods for the purposes of levy of excise duty. 3. The appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs.
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1996 (11) TMI 68 - SUPREME COURT
Whether `Printed Aluminium Labels'(hereinafter referred to as "labels") manufactured by the appellant are `products of the printing industry' within the meaning of Notification 55/75-C.E., dated 1-3-1975 issued under Rule 8(1) of the Central Excise Rules, 1944?
Held that:- The label announces to the customer that the product is or is not of his choice and his purchase of the commodity would be decided by the printed matter on the label. The printing of the label is not incidental to its use but primary in the sense that it communicates to the customer about the product and this serves a definite purpose. This Court in Rollatainers case held that "what is exempt under the notification is the `product' of the printing industry. The `product' in this case is the carton. The printing industry by itself cannot bring the carton into existence". Let us apply this above formula to the facts of this case. The `product' in this case is the aluminium printed label. The printing industry has brought the label into existence. That being the position and further the test of trade having understood this label as the product of printing industry, there is no difficulty in holding that the labels in question are the products of the printing industry. It is true that all products on which some printing is done, are not the products of printing industry. It depends upon the nature of products and other circumstances. Therefore, the issue has to be decided with reference to facts of each case. A general test is neither advisable nor practicable. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the Tribunal was not right in concluding that the printed aluminium labels in question are not `products of printing industry'. Appeal allowed.
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1996 (11) TMI 67 - SUPREME COURT
Whether, in the event of the contravention of a post-importation condition of an import licence, it was open to the Customs authorities [to] confiscate imported goods under Section 111(o) of the Customs Act?
Held that:- The communication of the Central Board of Excise and Customs, dated 13th May, 1969 refers to the breach of the condition of a license and suggests that it may not be possible to take action under Section 111(o) in respect thereof. It is true that the terms of the said Exemption Notification were made part of the appellants' licences and, in that sense, a breach of the terms of the said Exemption Notification is also a breach of the terms of the license, entitling the licensing authority to investigate. But the breach is not only of the terms of the license; it is also a breach of the condition in the Exemption Notification upon which the appellants obtained exemption from payment of Customs duty and, therefore, the terms of Section 111(o) enable the Customs authorities to investigate. Appeal dismissed.
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1996 (11) TMI 66 - SUPREME COURT
Whether mono vertical crystallisers are `goods' upon which excise duty under the provisions of the Act can be levied?
Held that:- Where the assembly and erection was done by the customer, there was no occasion for it to send to the appellants a debit note. The fact that there was no debit note in respect of one customer could not reasonably have led the Tribunal to conclude that in the case of that customer a complete mono vertical crystalliser had left the appellants' factory and that, therefore, mono vertical crystallisers were marketable. The Tribunal ought to have remembered that the record showed that mono vertical crystallisers had, apart from assembly, to be erected and attached by foundations to the earth and, therefore, were not, in any event marketable as they were.
Having regard to the material on record, we come to the conclusion that mono vertical crystallisers are not `goods' within the meaning of the Act and therefore, not exigible to excise duty. In favour of assessee.
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1996 (11) TMI 65 - SUPREME COURT
Whether silicone oil imported by the appellant is covered for the purpose of deciding the countervailing duty payable thereon by Central Excise Tariff Item 15A(1) or not?
Held that:- Silicone oil manufactured by them would squarely be covered by Tariff Item 15A(1) while so far as silicone emulsion and other silicone preparations are concerned as they are made by using silicone oil or other components of silicone they would not be covered by Tariff Item 15A(1) but would be covered by Tariff Item 15AA. But in no case they would be covered by Tariff Item 68 which is a residuary Item. The judgment and order of the Tribunal as challenged by the said appellants will stand modified accordingly as above.
In this case as detention order dated 31st January, 1986 was based on the order of the Tribunal which is partly set aside by us the respondent is directed to re-issue appropriate detention order, if found necessary, in the light of recomputation of excise duty liability during the relevant period as held hereinabove
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1996 (11) TMI 64 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Assessment Notice, Reassessment Notice ... ... ... ... ..... returns filed by the assessee. If that is so, the original returns cannot be ignored for the purpose of determining the concealment. We are, therefore, of the view that the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal erred in affirming the decision of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner on the basis of the incomes shown in the returns, filed in response to the notices under section 148. There was no concealment to the extent of the incomes already disclosed in the original returns. So far as the assessment year 1973-74 is concerned, penalty was rightly imposed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner on the difference of the income disclosed and the income assessed. The common question referred to this court is, therefore, answered in the negative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue, in so far as it relates to the assessment years 1966-67, 1968-69 and 1969-70 and the same is answered in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee for the assessment year 1973-74.
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1996 (11) TMI 63 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Beneficiaries Unknown, Question Of Law ... ... ... ... ..... be the beneficiaries, perhaps as in a general charitable trust. But in a case of contingent interest though the number and identity of the beneficiary will be certain, definite and defined, his taking of the benefit under the trust will depend on the happening or not happening of some event which may be uncertain. The clauses, referred to above, indicate that the interest of the beneficiary, Sahebzadi Oolia Kulsum, was contingent on her being alive on the death of Prince Muazzam Jah Bahadur such interest can never be said to be indeterminate because the beneficiary was named. For the above reasons, we are of the view that the Tribunal is right in upholding the order of the Commissioner of Wealth-tax (Appeals) and holding that section 21(1) will apply. We, therefore, find no reason to direct the Tribunal to refer the above-said questions as, in our view, no referable question of law arises from the order of the Tribunal. The wealth-tax case is, therefore, dismissed. No costs.
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1996 (11) TMI 62 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Wilful Attempt To Evade Tax ... ... ... ... ..... leted the aforesaid addition. This position could not be disputed on behalf of the Revenue, rather it is accepted. Since the basis of prosecution has vanished in view of the fact that the additions have been deleted by the Tribunal, the prosecution of the petitioners would amount to an abuse of the process of the court and to prevent the same and, in the ends of justice, it is just and expedient to quash the prosecution of the petitioner. It appears that apart from the three petitioners, two other persons, namely, Devichand Mohanlal and Sri Shyam Sundar Agrawal, have been also summoned in this case as accused. Since their case stands on the same footing as that of the petitioners, their prosecution is also fit to be quashed in spite of the fact that they have not moved this court. In the result, this application is allowed and prosecution of the petitioners and accused, Devichand Mohanlal and Sri Shyam Sundar Agrawal, is hereby quashed. The application is, thus, disposed of.
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1996 (11) TMI 61 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Undisclosed Sources, Undisclosed Stock ... ... ... ... ..... y partly ignoring relevant material and circumstances and partly by irrelevant considerations, hence the same stand vitiated. So far as question No. 2 is concerned, both learned counsel are in agreement, and in our opinion rightly so, that making a reference to the voluntary disclosures by the assessee for the assessment years 1971-72 to 1974-75 was not relevant for the consideration of the question about actual delivery or non-delivery of the 200 metric tonnes of chicory roots on September 18 and 19, 1973, nor about the conclusion regarding supply of undisclosed stock to fill in the deficiency in the actual receipt of stocks under the Raxor transaction for establishing a nexus between the said transaction and having income from undisclosed sources during the relevant assessment year. The same is also therefore answered in the negative, that is to say, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. Accordingly, this reference stands disposed of with no order as to costs.
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1996 (11) TMI 60 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Capital Asset, Capital Gains, Dissolution Of Firm ... ... ... ... ..... Abichandani J.) was party, the amount received by the assessee on his retirement from the firm was not assessable and cannot be exigible to capital gains tax either under section 45 or under section 28(iv) of the Act, 1961, after referring to the decision of this court in Mohanbhai Pamabhai s case 1973 91 ITR 393 as affirmed by the court in Addl. CIT v. Mohanbhai Pamabhai 1987 165 ITR 166 (SC). It must, therefore, be held that receipt of any sum by a partner on his retirement from the firm or on dissolution of the firm as value of his share in the assets of the firm, does not involve any transfer of capital asset resulting in accrual or receipt of income chargeable to tax as capital gain in the hands of the recipient partner, and the Tribunal was justified in not treating the amount of Rs. 1,88,950 taxable as capital gain. Accordingly, we answer the question of law referred to us in the affirmative, that is to say, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. No costs.
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