Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 443 Records
-
1996 (2) TMI 580
... ... ... ... ..... this sense the importance of the use of the conjunction "and" necessarily gets co-related to see the sales promotion activity flowing from advertisement and publicity in regard thereto. Even otherwise commission as it is understood is also payment as remuneration to the person earning and in that sense also could not be understood in its effect in the nature of sales promotion. 8. Learned senior counsel has placed for our consideration a more or less similar view of this court in CIT v. Popular Automobiles Ltd. 1995 212 ITR 611. 9. In addition we find that in regard to the same assessee in Original Petition No. 13828 of 1994--CIT v. Veneers and Laminations (India) Ltd. by the judgment dated November 3, 1994, although without reasons, depending on the order in Original Petition No. 2867 of 1993--CIT v. Popular Automobiles Ltd. 1995 212 ITR 611, this court has already declined reference sought for by the Revenue. For the above reasons, the petition stands dismissed.
-
1996 (2) TMI 579
... ... ... ... ..... luded from consideration, there remains the specific information received,Exhbt. 33 and his own statement recorded by the Authority under Section 313, Exhbt. 83 and 84 and all of them go to show that the appellant was the owner of the said flat. Ns pointed out earlier that nobody has identified the flat in question as belonging to the appellant and in the absence of corroborating evidence, one cannot come to a confirmed conclusion regarding ownership and possession on the basis of the retracted statements of the appellant alone. For all these reasons, we hold that the persecution failed to establish the ownership of the flat in question as belonging to the appellant and consequently the conviction and sentence challenged in this Appeal cannot be sustained. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed and the conviction and sentence passed against the appellant are set aside. The appellant will be set at liberty at once unless required in any other case. Fine, if paid will be refunded.
-
1996 (2) TMI 578
... ... ... ... ..... Recovery Officer is authorised to recover the amount specified therein by any of the modes mentioned in Section 25 of the Act there is a specific provision as to how recovery is to be made by the Recovery Officer and one of the mode of recovery is by attachment and sale of immovable property, in my opinion, there is no reason as to why the Tribunal cannot sell the property which has been mortgaged by the defendant to the bank by way of collateral security. (15) For the aforesaid reasons, I am of the considered opinion that suit for recovery of debt by sale of the mortgaged property can be filed before the Debt Recovery Tribunal constituted under the Act and no case has been made out as to why this suit should not be transferred to the Tribunal. (16) I, Therefore, transfer this suit to the Debt Recovery Tribunal constituted under The Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act 1993, and parties are directed to appear before the Tribunal on 20th March, 1996.
-
1996 (2) TMI 577
... ... ... ... ..... ls within the mischief of the provisions contained in Section 13 (2) (iii) of the Act which make the tenants-respondents liable for eviction form the demised premises. Consequently, the appeal succeed and is hereby allowed with costs throughout. The order of the High Court and the Judgment and orders of the Courts below are set aside. The application of the appellant-landlords for eviction of the tenants-respondents is allowed. It is directed that the appellants shall be place in actual physical possession of the demised premises after evicting the tenants-respondents therefrom. We are, however, aware of the fact that the respondents-tenants are running an industry in the demised premises and it may not be possible for them to immediately vacate the premises. We therefore, in the interest of justice direct that the tenant-respondents shall not be evicted from the demised premises till 30th June, 1996 on furnishing usual undertaking in this Court within four weeks from today.
-
1996 (2) TMI 576
... ... ... ... ..... ; Counsel for the appellant Mr. Salve submitted that propositions No. 3 and 4 contained in paragraph 27 of the judgment are very wide and require reconsideration and appropriate modification, whereas Mr. Tarkunde, Counsel for respondents submitted that propositions No. 3 and 4 May down the law correctly. It is unnecessary, on the facts of this case, to consider to what extent propositions No. 3 and 4 require to be clarified or modified, since in this case the Tribunal has proceeded only on the basis that the instant case clearly falls within the ratio laid down by this Court in M.M.R. Khan's case (supra), which we have held is a totally wrong perspective. In these circumstances, we are not called upon to consider the rival pleas regarding the scope and ambit of propositions No. 3 and 4 contained in para 27 of the Judgment in Parimal Chandra Raha's case (Supra). We set aside the award passed by the Tribunal. This appeal is allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.
-
1996 (2) TMI 575
... ... ... ... ..... act now sought to be relied upon is only to relieve distress warrant pending disposal of the dispute in the High Court. Therefore, it cannot be construed that there is any contract between the Union of India and the Municipality. In view of the fact that the Municipality has no right to demand service charges from the Union of India, the demand made by the Municipality is clearly ultra vires its power. It is true that earlier W.P. No.2844/92 was filed and was dismissed by the High Court and the special leave was refused by this Court on the ground of gross delay. 5. It is now settled law that the summary dismissal does not constitute res judicata for deciding the controversy. Moreover, this being recurring liability which is ultra vires the power, earlier summary dismissal of the case does not operate as a res judicata. 6. The appeal is accordingly allowed. Writ is issued as prayed for. Whatever amount has been paid by now cannot be recovered from the Municipality. No costs.
-
1996 (2) TMI 574
... ... ... ... ..... cts of the case, we decline to interfere. The appeal is dismissed accordingly.
-
1996 (2) TMI 573
... ... ... ... ..... e, allowed, the impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside and the Central Government is directed to consider the application submitted by the Trust for grant of permission to establish a new medical college in accordance with the provisions of Section 10A of the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 without insisting upon the Trust to comply with condition regarding obtaining essentiality certificate from the State Government The Central Government shall consider and pass an order in this regard within a period of one month. In the event of permission being granted by the Central Government for the establishment of the medical college by the Trust the Medical University shall consider the application of the Trust for affiliation of the said medical college to the Medical University without insisting upon the requirement of obtaining prior permission of the State Government for establishing the medical college. The appeals are disposed of accordingly. No orders as to costs.
-
1996 (2) TMI 572
... ... ... ... ..... s a doubt about the correctness of the statement of Respondent 1 but be that as it may, we think that the most appropriate order to pass was to leave it to the management to grant admission if the averments made by the respondent candidate were correct. 9. We, therefore, set aside the order of 13-3-1995 on merits and substitute it by an order to the effect that the management would be at liberty to admit the candidate notwithstanding the interim orders of the Division Bench of the High Court in the earlier proceedings if the management has found the candidate fit for admission in the relevant year. If, however, the management has not selected and found him fit for admission, the management should convey the same to the candidate so that the candidate knows his position. Since we are setting aside the order of 13-3-1995, the subsequent order of 28-6-1995 cannot be allowed to stand. We set it aside also. The appeals will stand disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs.
-
1996 (2) TMI 571
... ... ... ... ..... lt out in these regulations it can be easily inferred that the threshold limit for a challenge to the management is a holding of at least 30 per cent, because any acquisition of shares beyond 10 per cent, leads to compulsory acquisition up to 30 per cent. Of course, for reckoning the percentage, acquisition by all persons acting in concert has to be taken into account. In the present case, even "acting in concert" has not been 'established. Further, the holding is much below even 10 per cent. Thus, clearly there is no good reason for our ordering an investigation. If further acquisitions do take place an alternative remedy is also available to the petitioner and the company. 39. In view of the above, we consider that the circumstances contemplated to declare investigation under Section 247(1A) are completely absent in this petition. Therefore, the petition is dismissed and consequently our order dated January 25, 1995, also stands vacated. No order as to costs.
-
1996 (2) TMI 570
... ... ... ... ..... l as the test of use of the word 'private' in contradistinction to 'public', which in our opinion have no relevance for interpreting the expression "exclusively used as a private residential premises". The context in which the aforesaid expression has been used for determining tariff under the Act, it can only apply when any premises is used as a private residential premises. The word 'exclusively' also must be given a rational meaning and viewed from that angle, we are of the considered opinion that the guest house maintained by a company or commercial undertaking in the cities can't be held a premise which is exclusively used as private residential premise. Therefore, Category 'R' of the tariff cannot be held to be applicable. The appeals are accordingly allowed. The judgement of the Division Bench of Bombay High Court is set aside, the writ petitions filed by the respondents stand dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
-
1996 (2) TMI 569
... ... ... ... ..... /o p ORDER o p /o p Appeal dismissed. o p /o p
-
1996 (2) TMI 568
... ... ... ... ..... was clear from the provisions of Section 18(2) of the Act, that mens rea was not at all required and that if it was proved that any act or omission had taken place, there was violation of the concerned section justifying the penalty. 9. In the other decision also penalty was levied on failure to realise sale proceeds in the export sale by the appellant therein. In the said case, the appellant got full amount from the Export Credit Guarantee Corporation but that does not absolve the appellant therein of his liability under the Act. There also it was observed that the intention of the party committing contravention need not be proved by the authorities. These two decisions also support the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant. 10. Therefore, the reasoning of the Appellate Board is totally unacceptable and erroneous in law. Accordingly, we set aside the order of the appellate Board and confirm the order of the first authority and we allow these appeals. No costs.
-
1996 (2) TMI 567
... ... ... ... ..... r activity. By these the view that the applicant does not exist for "purposes of profit" is strengthened. As the applicant, EI, fulfils the conditions for exemption under section 10(22) of the Income-tax Act, the applicability of section 11 of the Income-tax Act becomes academic and is not being examined. Interestingly, the applicant has raised a query regarding income from only four aspects of its activities which are enumerated in question (i). Hence, the ruling of the authority is limited to these four aspects only. In conclusion, the answers to the questions framed are as under Question (i) The applicant fulfils the conditions for granting exemption under section 10(22) of the Income-tax Act and thus its income arising or accruing from the sources mentioned in the question would not be taxable. Question (ii) Since the answer to the first question is in the affirmative and in favour of the applicant, the second question becomes academic and need not be answered.
-
1996 (2) TMI 566
... ... ... ... ..... re, we desist from expressing any opinion on merit or recording any of the contentions raised by the counsel on either side. Suffice it to state that the Administrative Tribunal has committed grossest error in its exercise of the judicial review. The member of the Administrative Tribunal appear to have no knowledge of the jurisprudence of the service law and exercised power as if he is an appellate forum de hors the limitation of judicial review. This is one such instance where a member had exceeded his power of judicial review in quashing the suspension order and charges even at the threshold. We are coming across frequently such orders putting heavy pressure on this Court to examine each case in detail. It is high time that it is remedied. The appeal are accordingly allowed and the order of the Tribunal is set aside. The controversy is at large the disciplinary authority would be free to proceed with the enquiry and trial also be proceeded in accordance with law. No costs.
-
1996 (2) TMI 565
... ... ... ... ..... dingly allowed. CA No. 3387 of 1996 ( SLP (C) No. 2593 of 1994) 14. Leave granted. 15. The facts of this case are that the respondent was selected on regular basis as substitute to Extra-Departmental Packer at Calicut. While he was working, recruitment was made by calling the names from the Employment Exchange. Since his name was not sponsored, he was terminated from employment. In view of the reasoning given above, he being temporary working candidate, he cannot get any right; however, his case is directed to be considered along with other candidates and if he is found eligible, he may be considered and appointed according to the Rules. 16. The appeal is allowed. CAs Nos. 3385-86 of 1996 ( SLPs Nos. 587-88 of 1992) 17. Leave granted. Delay condoned. 18. Though the principle of law laid down hereinbefore is settled, since the respondent has been working since 1983, we decline to interfere with the order passed by the Tribunal. 19. Appeals are accordingly dismissed. No costs.
-
1996 (2) TMI 564
... ... ... ... ..... and as such technicality should not be permitted to prevail as speed breaker in the course of dispensation of justice. True it is that the question was not raised before the first appellate authority but it is equally true that the aforesaid question was one of law and had material bearing on the order of assessment. 7. In view of the aforesaid position, we are satisfied that the Tribunal was not justified in not entertaining the ground of appeal regarding the deductibility of the capital subsidy in computing the actual cost of the assets for the purpose of calculating depreciation. The disposal of the case is in direct conflict with the view taken by this Court and by the apex Court. 8. In the aforesaid premises, we answer the question in the negative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. 9. This reference is answered accordingly but without any order as to costs. 10. The counsel fee for the non-applicant is, however, fixed at ₹ 750, if certified.
-
1996 (2) TMI 563
... ... ... ... ..... was not justified. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner has invited our attention to the decisions of this Court in Bhagat Ram v. State of H. P' and Guizar Sitigh V. State of Punjab2 and has submitted that in the facts of this case the High Court was right in taking the view that the penalty of termination of services was disproportionate to the misconduct found established. We are unable to agree. The facts in the cases aforementioned were very different and they can have no application to the present case. Having regard to the misconduct that has been found established against the petitioner, it is not possible to say that the Corporation, in removing the petitioner from service, has imposed a punishment which is disproportionate to the misconduct. We are, therefore, unable to uphold the judgment of the High Court. 6. The appeal is accordingly allowed, the judgment of the High Court is set aside and the award of the Labour Court is restored. No orders as to costs.
-
1996 (2) TMI 562
... ... ... ... ..... Court in the case of Hindustan Steels Ltd. vs. State of Orissa (1972) 83 ITR 26 (SC). 6. With regard to the claim of ignorance of law also, it is seen that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh . (1979) 118 ITR 326 (SC) held that there is no presumption that every person knows the law. It is often said that everyone is presumed to know the law, but that is not a correct statement; there is no such maxim known to the law. This ratio of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court is squarely applicable in the case of the assessee who is a dentist by profession. Even if there is any ignorance of law, which resulted in infraction of law, the default is in the nature of technical or venial infraction of law which does not prejudice the interests of the Revenue, as no tax avoidance or tax evasion is involved in this case. I hold accordingly and cancel the penalty. 7. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
-
1996 (2) TMI 561
... ... ... ... ..... such project to be treated as a PE only if the duration of the project exceeds 183 days in any fiscal year, which is not the case here. It, therefore, follows that the applicant has no PE in India within the meaning of article 5 and since article 7 of the DTA permits the taxation, in the hands of a resident of Singapore, only of the profits attributable to a PE in India, no part of the profits earned by the applicant from its activities under the contract can be charged to Indian income-tax even though such activities took place within Indian territory and the profits therefrom would have been chargeable to tax in India but for DTA. 7. For the reasons discussed above, the authority pronounces the following ruling on the question raised in Application No. P 11 of 1995. Ruling The revenues earned by the applicant from the contracts entered into with ABC, Singapore during the previous year ended on 31st March, 1995 would not be liable to tax in India, as it had no PE in India.
........
|