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Showing 41 to 60 of 432 Records
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1996 (3) TMI 536
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... ... ..... is noted that in her reply of 4-2-1995 the appellant submitted that she is a widow and her only source of income is by way of rental and other investment. While determining the quantum of penalty this fact as also the fact that the contravening transaction was the only one, ought to have been taken into consideration. It is also necessary to take into consideration the fact that by the contravention in the manner as in the present case the appellant has not acted in derogation of the objects and purposes of the Act. On the other hand, it has resulted in augmentation of foreign exchange reserves. In view thereof, in my opinion a penalty of ₹ 10,000 would be adequate to meet the ends of justice. The respondent shall treat the amount of ₹ 10,000 out of the amount of ₹ 30,000 deposited by the appellant by way of pre-deposit as payment of the said penalty and refund the balance amount of ₹ 20,000 to the appellant within 45 days of the receipt of this order
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1996 (3) TMI 535
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... ... ..... nt is a pittance. We must hold that the investment is explained from the undisclosed income brought to tax. We accordingly delete the addition of ₹ 3,00,000 also. 12. The assessing officer has made a separate addition of ₹ 3,00,000 towards unexplained investment in the renovation of house by the appellant. Compared to the addition of ₹ 2,44,22,090 which we have sustained, the unexplained investment is a pittance. We must hold that the investment is explained from the undisclosed income brought to tax. We accordingly delete the addition of ₹ 3,00,000 also. 13. In view of the above, the addition of ₹ 2,44,22,090 is sustained. The rest of the additions made by the assessing officer are deleted. 13. In view of the above, the addition of ₹ 2,44,22,090 is sustained. The rest of the additions made by the assessing officer are deleted. 14. In terms of the above, the appeal is partly allowed. 14. In terms of the above, the appeal is partly allowed.
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1996 (3) TMI 534
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... ... ..... i pleads that duty involved on exempt material, when imported, would be of this order. Hence it is justified. We find that Collector has not allowed logging of these S/Bs for export obligation under DEEC scheme which order, we have upheld. Hence no duty benefit would accrue to them and that could not be an acceptable reason for this quantum of penalty. (ii) From the evidence discussed, we find that the material could be polyester fibre left over mixed with waste. Hence in such case, we cannot rule out use of some percentage of fibre in the export product, for which duty benefit would be available. (iii) The buyer is satisfied with the quality of the beds supplied indicating that beds are conforming to their requirements. Having regard to all these considerations, we feel that ends of justice would be met, if penalty is reduced to 6 lakhs (Rs. 2 lakhs for each S/B). Accordingly we reduce the penalty from ₹ 16 lakhs to ₹ 6 lakhs with consequential relief.
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1996 (3) TMI 533
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... ... ..... , JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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1996 (3) TMI 532
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... ... ..... JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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1996 (3) TMI 531
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... ... ..... deduction of developmental charges varies between 33-1/3 to 65 depending on facts and circumstances in each case. view of the fact that we have in evidence tentative developmental charges of ₹ 29 per incurred in 1975-76, taking a pragmatic view we that after deducting developmental charges respondent is entitled to compensation ₹ 8/- sq.yd. with a statutory rate of solatium on enhanced compensation 30 and 9 interest for one year from the date of taking possession, i.e., June 2, 1984 and after expiry of one year, 15 till the date of deposit. The respondent is not entitled to additional amount under Section 23 1-A for the reason that the respondent had filed W.P No.2510 of 1982 and kept the matter pending till the Amendment Act became operative. The award could not be made on account of the pending proceedings in the High Court and the same was made as per the directions of the High Court. The appeal is accordingly allowed but, in the circumstances, without costs.
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1996 (3) TMI 530
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... ... ..... 1) SCC 130, Shri Suryakant Venkatrao Mahadik vs. Smt. Saroj Sandesh Baik (Bhosale), 1996 (1) SCC 384, and Mohan vs. Bhairon Singh Shekhawat, 1996 (1) Scale SP3, is another pointer to indicate that there is nothing in the judgment in Manohar Joshi to give rise to any such apprehension that it can enable misuse of religion for making appeal for votes in an election. We may add that the deficiency, if any, in the statutory prohibition enacting the corrupt practice in Section 123 of the Representation of the People Act, has to be cured by legislation and that deficiency cannot be cured by reading into a penal provision something which is not enacted therein. The proposal was made at one time to perform the legislative exercise of enacting a provision to prevent any possible misuse of religion during elections, but it was, unfortunately, abandoned. We do hope that at least now there would remain no misapprehension in the mind of anyone. The writ Petition is, therefore, dismissed.
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1996 (3) TMI 529
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... ... ..... e case of The Collector of Customs, Madras v. Nathella Sampathu Chetty, AIR 1962 SCC 316 (1962 (1) Cri LJ 364). Considering the language of Section 19 of the Sea Customs Act, 1878 and Section 23A of Foreign Exchange Regulation Act of 1947 the Supreme Court observed in that case that there was no scope for any argument that there has been any incorporation of the provisions of the earlier statute in the later. Similarly in the present case, there is no provision for incorporation of the Customs Act, which was under Section 4 of the Antiquities Act of 1947 getting attracted in the Antiquities Act of 1972. 23. After analysing the provisions of both the Act and relying on the observations of the Supreme Court and the facts stated above, I find that the complaint filed in this case under the Customs Act is not sustainable. Accordingly, the complaint in question is quashed and the proceedings initiated on the basis of that complaint are ordered to be dropped. 24. Petition allowed.
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1996 (3) TMI 528
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... ... ..... should not be made liable under the letters of guarantee, the terms whereof clearly stipulate that on the failure of the principal debtor to abide by the contract, they will be liable to pay the amount due from the principal debtor by the appellants. Clause 15 of the letter of guarantee, in terms states that any action settled or stated between the bank and the principal debtor or admitted by the principal debtor shall be accepted by the guarantors as conclusive evidence. In view of this stipulation in the letter of guarantee, once the decree on admission is passed against the principal debtor, the guarantors would become liable to satisfy the decree jointly and severally. In the result, these appeals by special leave against the guarantors must be allowed. The order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court is set aside and the order passed by the learned Single Judge is restored. The respondent-guarantors will pay the cost of the appeals quantified at ₹ 10,000.
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1996 (3) TMI 527
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... ... ..... ould have been difficult since the assistance is scanty. This unhappy situation would have resulted in injustice to several persons. It is our sad experience that in some cases even after reserving the cases for judgment and directing them to give their written arguments no one would take responsibility to assist the Court. We hope that the Union of India and the Railway Administration would take steps to see that necessary and needed assistance would forthcome to the Court or the Tribunal to avoid undue burden on this Court for proper adjudication of disputes. We hope that this unsavory situation would not be repeated hereafter. We indicate that they should make a particular officer responsible to assist the counsel appearing for them by placing all the necessary rules or instructions so as to enable this Court or the Tribunal to adjudicate the disputes and reach proper decision expeditiously. The appeals are disposed of accordingly but, in the circumstances, without costs.
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1996 (3) TMI 526
Whether the delinquent officer/employee had or did not have a fair hearing?
Held that:- No prejudice has resulted to the respondent on account of not furnishing him the copies of the statements of witnesses. We are satisfied that on account of the said violations it cannot he said that the respondent did not have a fair hearing or that the disciplinary enquiry against him was not a fair enquiry. Though the copies of the statements of two witnesses [Kaur Singh, Patwari and Balwant Singh] were not furnished, the respondent was permitted to peruse them and take notes therefrom more than three days prior to their examination. Of the two witnesses, Balwant Singh was not examined and only Kaur Singh was examined. The respondent did not raise any objection during the enquiry that the non-furnishing of the copies of the statements is disabling him or has disabled him, as the case may be, from effectively cross- examining the witnesses or to defend himself. The Trial Court has not found that any prejudice has resulted from the said violation. The Appellate Court has no doubt said that it has prejudiced the respondent's case but except merely mentioning the same, it has not specified in what manner and in what sense was the respondent prejudiced in his defence. The High Court, of course, has not refereed to aspect of prejudice at all.
Accordingly, we allow the appeal and set aside the judgment of the High Court affirming the judgments of the Trial Court and Appellate Court the suit filed by the respondent shall stand dismissed.
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1996 (3) TMI 525
Constitutional validity of act questioned - Held that:- The attack upon the constitutionality of the Andhra Pradesh (Amendment) Act 35 of 1995 both on the grounds of legislative incompetence and violation of fundamental rights fails . The Amending Act, which has been given retrospective effect from the date of commencement of the Principal Act, i.e., Andhra Pradesh Prohibition Act, 1995, is constitutionally valid. The writ petitions challenging its validity are accordingly dismissed.
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1996 (3) TMI 524
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... ... ..... pledged in the name of the registering authority, etc. 4.. In the instant case before threatening the cancellation of registration with direction to pay a sum of Rs. 1,50,000 in cash by depositing in a nationalised bank, the Commercial Tax Officer (FAC), Sankarankoil, has not applied his mind to the above provisions of the Here italicised. Act and Rules. He has arbitrarily demanded a huge sum on the ground to prove the genuineness of your business which is not statutorily recognized ground for demanding security deposit. The security should be deposited only for securing proper realisation of the tax payable on the turnover of a dealer. The arbitrary demand made in the impugned notice dated January 29, 1996 is therefore set aside. And this Tribunal doth further order that this order on being produced be punctually observed and carried into execution by all concerned. Issued under my hand and the seal of this Tribunal on this day the 12th day of March, 1996. Petition allowed.
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1996 (3) TMI 523
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... ... ..... ated 27th June, 1990 and No. 71 of Notification dated 4th March, 1992 dealt with almost all articles, mentioned in entry No. 57 of the Notification dated 8th March, 1969, except toilet articles . After the supersession of the notification dated 8th March, 1969, toilet articles were thus taxable at the residuary rate. It was thus taxable at the rate of 10 per cent during the assessment year 1987-88 (entry No. 57 dated 8th March, 1969) and at residuary rate during the assessment year 1992-93. 13.. Accordingly, the revision No. 8 is dismissed. The revision No. 9 is allowed. It is held that sanitary napkins were exigible to tax as toilet articles. The orders of the assessing authority, of the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) and of the Rajasthan Tax Board, Ajmer are accordingly modified in respect of the assessment year 1992-93. Amounts collected in excess will be refunded within three months. No order as to costs. Revision Petition No. 8 dismissed. Revision Petition No. 9 allowed.
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1996 (3) TMI 522
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... ... ..... th is at least 100 times the thickness and the edges can be milled, trimmed, sheared or flame cut. A sheet can also be obtained by cutting of strips . (portion underlined by us). From the meaning of the term sheet as given above it will be seen that sheet is supplied in straight lengths and therefore, sheet in coil form is a contradiction in term. Hence, the material imported by the applicant cannot be considered to be sheet of any kind. In this view of the matter what was imported by the applicant from Bokaro Steel Plant and Durgapur Steel Plant was strip and is therefore exigible to entry tax under item No. 53(d)(iii) of the Schedule to the Entry Tax Act. 18.. The application is therefore dismissed without any order as to cost. The operation of this judgment and order is stayed for eight weeks on the oral prayer of the learned advocate for the applicant. 19.. L.N. Ray (Chairman)-I agree. 20.. S.N. Mukherjee (Judicial Member)-I agree. Application dismissed. Here italicised.
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1996 (3) TMI 521
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... ... ..... it will be operative till such time as the Deputy Commissioner may determine. In this case admittedly no order is passed under section 33-C of the Act. Therefore, the first respondent is not justified in law in withholding the refund. The same view is taken in W.P. No. 2891 of 1995 dated April 19, 1995 by a Division Bench of this Court to which one of us (viz., Syed Shah Mohammed Quadri, J.) was party. It was held therein that if no order was passed under section 33-C at the relevant time, mere pendency of the revision could not be a ground for withholding refund of sales tax to the assessee. We, therefore, direct the first respondent to implement the order of the Appellate Deputy Commissioner in Appeal Nos. 21 and 22 of 1994-95 dated June 22, 1994 and refund the tax to the petitioner which became due to him pursuant to the said order, within four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. Writ petitions are accordingly allowed with costs. Writ petitions allowed
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1996 (3) TMI 520
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... ... ..... under section 22A(7) of the old Act could be imposed if goods not covered by the goods vehicle record and other documents prescribed were found or declaration and documents were found false. The Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Flying Squad II, imposed penalty as he found discrepancy in the letter and bill on the point of sales tax. It is clear from his order that he did not conclude that the documents furnished were false or the goods, i.e., 151 bags were not covered by them. He has simply entertained some suspicion in them on account of the said discrepancy. The Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tax Board have concurrently held that the documents were genuine and the dealer (petitioner) had offered satisfactory explanation for the said discrepancy and the goods sent were duly covered by the documents in possession with the driver of the vehicle. No question of law is involved. 3. Accordingly, the revision petition is summarily dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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1996 (3) TMI 519
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... ... ..... 1994, was void and unlawful. Since by the interim order passed by this Tribunal, the applicant was allowed to continue his business on deposit of certain amount, no further relief is required to be granted to him in this respect. 26.. In the result, the applications in RN-205 of 1994, RN-66 of 1993 and RN-229 of 1995 are dismissed without any order for costs. The amounts which might have been deposited by the applicants in RN-205 of 1994 and RN-229 of 1995 under interim orders dated January 9, 1995 and November 8, 1995 respectively shall be adjusted within twelve weeks hence against taxes under subsections (4) and (4a) which may be found due from the respective applicants under 1982 Act. Otherwise, the amounts or the unadjusted parts of those amounts shall be refunded by the respondents to the respective applicants according to law within twelve weeks from this date. S.N. Mukherjee (Judicial Member).-I agree. M.K. Kar Gupta (Technical Member).-I agree. Application dismissed.
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1996 (3) TMI 518
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... ... ..... hey decide to prefer any such appeal, it will be treated by the appropriate appellate authority as filed in time and will be disposed of on merits by him according to law and after giving the applicants an opportunity of being heard, provided the appeal is filed within two weeks from now. No question of bar of limitation will arise in that case. The sum of Rs. 5,000 which was deposited by the applicants as security in terms of interim order dated April 21, 1995 passed by this Tribunal for release of the seized luxuries, will abide the ultimate result of any such appeal, or will be adjusted against the impugned assessment of luxury tax, if no appeal is preferred in terms of this judgment within the period specified. The impugned order of assessment of tax and demand of the assessed tax shall remain unconditionally stayed for two weeks from now. No order is made as to costs. J. GUPTA (Judicial Member).-I agree. M.K. KAR GUPTA (Technical Member).-I agree. Application dismissed.
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1996 (3) TMI 517
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... ... ..... assuming that to be correct, it would not necessarily follow that there has been sale of IMFL by IBDL to the respondent. The mere fact that the respondent need not hold licence for the manufacture of IMFL would not carry the matter far. The respondent themselves need not hold any licence, anybody who acts on their behalf holding such licence would be sufficient for them. Therefore, the argument advanced on behalf of the respondent that they did not hold licence and therefore, did not manufacture IMFL will be of no significance to the respondent. Therefore, these revision petitions are allowed. The order made by the Tribunal is set aside. However, we cannot make any order except what has been done by the first appellate authority in these cases inasmuch as against the order made by the first appellate authority, no appeal had been preferred by the Revenue to the Tribunal. As a consequence, the order made by the first appellate authority will stand restored. Petitions allowed.
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