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Case Laws
Showing 381 to 400 of 437 Records
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1997 (3) TMI 57 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
High Court, Settlement Proceedings ... ... ... ... ..... hya Pradesh High Court that while applying the provisions of section 34(1)(c), the notional partition can be taken into consideration only between the deceased and other members of the Hindu undivided family who would have been entitled to a share in the joint family property if partition had taken place during the life time of the deceased. At that stage, the wives of the sons of the deceased cannot be brought into the picture. We respectfully disagree with the decision of the learned single judge of the Calcutta High Court which runs contrary to the plain language of section 39(1) of the Act. In view of the above, we hold that the appellate authority as well as the Tribunal committed an illegality when they held that the share of the lineal descendants should be computed after excluding the shares of the wives of the coparceners for the purpose of aggregation under the Estate Duty Act. Accordingly, we answer the questions referred to this court in favour of the Department.
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1997 (3) TMI 56 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Advance Tax, Application For Rectification, Assessment Year, Failure To File Estimate, Penal Interest
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1997 (3) TMI 55 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Central Government, Interest Payable, Offences And Prosecution, Retrospective Operation, Tax At Source, Tax Deducted At Source, Taxing Statutes
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1997 (3) TMI 54 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
High Court, Settlement Proceedings ... ... ... ... ..... ming. The lower courts must be made aware of the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in R. S. Nayak v. A. R. Antulay, AIR 1986 SC 2045, wherein the Supreme Court has categorically laid down that the power of discharge under section 245 of the Code will be available to the lower court only when some evidence has come on record. If the lower courts have been acting in a manner against the spirit of the Supreme Court judgment cited above, then it must be taken note of with all seriousness. Therefore, the lower courts are directed, while exercising the power of discharge under section 245 of the Criminal Procedure Code, to exercise their power only after evidence comes on record under section 244 of the Code. The Registry is directed to communicate the last paragraph of this order to the respective Chief Judicial Magistrates of each District with a further direction to communicate the same to each of the courts within their jurisdiction for being taken note of and acted upon.
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1997 (3) TMI 53 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 4 of its order that the reasonable cause has been shown for the delay in filing the return on 30th Dec., 1972. It has concluded thus On the facts of the case it is clear that there was no conscious or deliberate disregard of the statutory obligation on the part of the assessee in submitting the return. That the assessee had reasonable cause for not filing the return on the due date being admitted and finding that the assessee had suffered a shock on account of his wife s death, it would be absolutely unjust without further facts to hold that the state of shock could exist or continue to exist for a particular period of time and not thereafter as seems to have been done by the AAC. The assessee must, therefore, be held to have reasonable cause justifying the delayed submission of the return and the penalty is liable to be cancelled on this point. 5. The aforesaid finding being a finding of fact, it cannot be disturbed. 6. We, therefore, answer the reference in the affirmative.
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1997 (3) TMI 52 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Abatement, Recovery Of Tax ... ... ... ... ..... . The appellants could bring action against Amrit Lal Sud alone for the necessary relief who was still before the court. In the event of success of the appeal, the decree against Amrit Lal Sud could be effective decree against him. These aspects were neither considered at the time of deciding the application under Order XXII, rule 4, Code of Civil Procedure, nor at the time of decision of the appeal by the appellate court which led him to reach a wrong conclusion and dismissing the appeal as having been abated. The decision of the appellate court in the circumstances of the case is not in consonance with law. Therefore, it cannot be allowed to sustain. The appeal, therefore, is allowed and the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court is set aside and the appeal is remanded for fresh decision on the merits. The parties through their counsel are directed to appear before the lower appellate court on May 5, 1997. The said court shall decide the appeal within two months.
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1997 (3) TMI 51 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Estate Duty, Gift ... ... ... ... ..... (o) come into play only when the property is chargeable to estate duty and section 33 deals with the exemptions and this argument arises only if estate duty is payable. The gifts made by the deceased do not fall under the provisions of sections 8, 9, 10, which deal with gifts made by the deceased. Learned counsel for the Revenue has not been able to point out any provision under the Act, which made the amount gifted as chargeable to estate duty and, thus, there is no question of complying with the provisions of section 33(1)(o) of the Act because this provision will apply only if the amounts gifted are otherwise liable to estate duty. We, therefore, hold that the provisions of section 33(1)(o) are not attracted in this case. The Tribunal was right in law to hold that the provisions of section 33(1)(o) will come into play only when the property was chargeable to estate duty under section 8 of the Estate Duty Act. Accordingly, the reference is answered in favour of the Revenue.
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1997 (3) TMI 50 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... application under s. 256 of the Act. The contention is that in the guise of an order under s. 254(2), in fact the impugned order reviews the earlier order made by the Tribunal and that the Tribunal has no power of review. If according to the petitioner that was so, it could raise the question of law to that effect. We find no ground to interfere in our writ jurisdiction. Dismissed.
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1997 (3) TMI 49 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Sale Consideration, Deemed Gift ... ... ... ... ..... ot talk of any deemed gift. The provisions of the Gift-tax Act cannot be availed of for the purpose of the Estate Duty Act. That being so, it cannot be said as to under which provision the deemed gift is to be valued. Moreover, Explanation 2 to section 2(15) of the Estate Duty Act, 1953, also does not talk of a mixed transaction of sale and deemed gift. This provision is attracted only in the cases of transactions in which the rights of the deceased were extinguished. The present case relates to a sale transaction and the deemed gift on account of the difference of the value cannot be bifurcated from the transaction of sale. There is no provision in the Estate Duty Act, 1953, in regard to a deemed gift. This being the position, we find that the Tribunal was justified in law in holding that the provisions of section 9 read with Explanation 2 to clause (15) of section 2 of the Estate Duty Act, 1953, were not attracted in the present case. The reference is answered accordingly.
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1997 (3) TMI 48 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Tax Deducted At Source, Processing, Tendu Leaves ... ... ... ... ..... on to the decision of this court given in the case of CST v. Purshottamdas Somabhai 1980 13 VKN 1, wherein a Division Bench of this court has found that this is a processing. But then the Supreme Court in Delhi Cold Storage Pvt. Ltd. 1994 191 ITR 656 has taken the different view. Therefore, the decision in Purshottamdas Somabhai 1980 13 VKN 1 is no more good law. Shri Nema, learned counsel for the petitioners, submitted that in other States, like---Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra and Bihar, this process of collection and pruning of tendu leaves has been treated to be processing . That may be so but so far as this State is concerned, after the decision of this court in W. P. No. 3022 of 1995 (Chhatisgarh Bidi Leaves Merchants Association v. Union of India 1998 230 ITR 163 (MP) and in the case of Abdul Sattar v. Union of India 1998 230 ITR 163 (MP), we are of the opinion that there is no merit in the petition. The same is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1997 (3) TMI 47 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Diversion, Overriding Title, Business Expenditure, Bonus ... ... ... ... ..... sses Control Order was treated to be revenue receipt/trading receipt, and was held assessable to tax. Therefore, on account of the aforesaid decision of this court, the first question is answered, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. Now coming to the second question regarding grant of bonus to the agricultural staff, though this was not claimed before the Assessing Officer and thereafter it was claimed at the appellate stage by raising an additional ground, it was declined by the appellate authority and it was again agitated before the Tribunal which found that the claim of bonus was justified and granted the same. There is no prohibition on the powers of the Tribunal to entertain an additional ground which according to the Tribunal arises in the matter and for just decision of the case. Therefore, the Tribunal has rightly decided question No. 2. Hence question No. 1 is answered in favour of the Revenue and question No. 2 is answered in favour of the assessee.
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1997 (3) TMI 46 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Firm, Business Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... ation 2 to section 40(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, in the context of clause (b) of section 40, is declaratory in nature. Therefore, even for periods anterior to April 1, 1985, with effect from which date Explanation 2 to section 40(b) of the Act was inserted, any interest paid to a partner, who is a partner representing his Hindu undivided family, on the deposit of his personal/individual funds, does not fall within the mischief of clause (b) of section 40. Such interest would be allowable as a deduction in the computation of the profits of the firm. Similar view has been taken by a Bench of this court in I. T. R. Nos. 61 and 62 of the 1993 (CIT v. S. Veeriah Reddiar 1998 229 ITR 186). In the light of the above discussion, we answer the question in the affirmative, against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee. A copy of this judgment under the seal of this court and the signature of the Registrar, shall be forwarded to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench.
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1997 (3) TMI 45 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Amalgamation, Capital Or Revenue ... ... ... ... ..... nsfer date. Going by the provisions contained under clause (8), it is only the profits and losses of the transferor company after making even such payments that would come to the transferee company. Similar is the nature of the other two items, namely, payment of sales tax arrears as well as estate valuation fee. In the light of the above, we find that the assessing authority had correctly allowed deduction of the three items referred above. Such payments cannot be treated as capital expenditure. There was no payment made for the purpose of acquiring the assets as held by the Commissioner. In view of the above, we answer questions Nos. 1, 3 and 4 in the negative, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. Since question No. 2 is another facet of question No. 1, we refuse to answer question No. 2. A copy of this judgment under the seal of this court and the signature of the Registrar shall be forwarded to the Commissioner of Agricultural Income-tax, Thiruvananthapuram.
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1997 (3) TMI 44 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Reassessment, Depreciation, Record, Mistake Apparent From Record ... ... ... ... ..... ere correct. Though the appeals before the Tribunal are independent appeals, the decision on one appeal is interdependent upon the finding in the other appeal. Therefore, we are of the view that the view of the Tribunal that there was no mistake apparent on the face of the records is not sustainable in law. The Tribunal should also go into the question what is the correct and proper rate applicable to the plant and machinery in question and direct the Officer to rectify the mistake under section 154 of the Act. Accordingly, we answer the second question referred to us for the assessment years 1974-75 and 1976-77 in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. In the result, we answer the first question in the negative and against the assessee. In so far as the second question is concerned, it relates to the assessment years 1974-75 and 1976-77, we answer the question in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. The assessee is entitled to the costs of Rs. 500 one set.
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1997 (3) TMI 43 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Interest On Securities, Other Sources, Debentures ... ... ... ... ..... The above view was taken on the ground that the co-operative land mortgage bank was formed under the Co-operative Societies Act, that is an enactment made by the Tamil Nadu Government and it is not a bank established either by a Central, State or Provincial Act. Since this court has already taken the view that the interest on debentures would not come within the purview of interest on securities , the necessary logical consequence is that the interest on the said debentures would be assessable only under the head Income from other sources . In view of the above, the Appellate Tribunal s conclusion that the said interest should be assessed under interest on securities is not legally sustainable. Mr. Janarthana Raja does not dispute the position of law and also concedes that the said decision would govern the facts of the cases. Accordingly, we answer the common question of law referred to us for both the assessment years in the negative and in favour of the Revenue. No costs.
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1997 (3) TMI 42 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Transfer, Assets, Transaction, Genuine ... ... ... ... ..... minors received the loans from which they constructed the house. That apart, the registered sale deed was also very much there on record which was not in the name of the assessee but in the names of his minor sons. At this stage, we must point out that it was never the case of the Department that the whole transaction was a sham and bogus one. The case of the Department was on the premise that both the minor sons of the assessee were benamidars for their father. In fact, one of the minor sons was on the verge of attaining majority and the other younger son was about to attain majority within 2-3 years. We fully agree with the view taken by the Tribunal that if the parents helped in purchasing the property for their minor sons, there was nothing wrong in it. In the above view of the matter, the question referred to us at the instance of the Revenue Department for the assessment years 1973-74 and 1974-75 is answered against the Department. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1997 (3) TMI 41 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Tax Clearence Certificate, HUF, Dispute, Arbitration ... ... ... ... ..... undivided family. The Assessing Officer has no authority to decide a civil dispute between the parties which is a matter for the competent court to decide. In this case, the averment of the petitioner is that there has been an arbitration and award has been passed. If that is so the validity or otherwise of the award has to be adjudged by the court only, for which the parties must take recourse to law. But the provisions of section 230A or rules 44A and 44B cannot be used as a lever to frustrate the award which might have been validly and legally passed. In that view of the matter, we quash the impugned communication dated December 30, 1996, of respondent No. 1---Income-tax Officer, Ward No. 1, Vizianagaram---and remand the matter to him to consider the question in accordance with law as explained, and pass orders within four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order and communicate the same to the petitioner. The writ petition is accordingly allowed. No costs.
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1997 (3) TMI 40 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Advance Tax, Special Deduction, Co-operative Society ... ... ... ... ..... as June 16, 1980, in all the proceedings including the statement of case). Both sides admitted before us that the payment of Rs. 9,00,000 was made on December 15, 1980, and that the date shown in the proceedings is a mistake. When the payment is made on December 15, 1980, by applying the provisions contained under clause (i) of section 211(1), it has to be taken that the payment is that of advance tax. The Tribunal was, therefore, fully justified in taking the view that payment made on December 15, 1980, was that of advance tax and the assessee will be entitled to all consequential reliefs. In the light of the above discussion, we answer question No. 1 in the negative, against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue. We answer the second question in the affirmative, against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee. A copy of this judgment under the seal of this court and the signature of the Registrar shall be forwarded to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench.
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1997 (3) TMI 39 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... March, 1986, was despatched on 2nd Dec., 1986, and received by the assessee on 5th Dec., 1986. By applying the principles laid down by this Court in Government Wood Works vs. State of Kerala (1988) 69 STC 62 and in an earlier decision of a Bench of this Court in Malayil Mills vs. State of Kerala TRC Nos. 15 and 16 of 1981, it has to be taken that for both years the assessment order had not been made within the period prescribed under s. 35(2). This Court had taken the view that to make the order complete and effective it should be issued so as to be beyond the control of the authority concerned, for any possible change or modification. This should be done within the prescribed period, though the actual service of the order may be beyond that period. For both years the assessment orders were despatched after the period of five years prescribed under s. 35 (2). In the light of the above, we answer the question in the negative in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.
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1997 (3) TMI 38 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Passing Of Property, HUF, Property Of Karta ... ... ... ... ..... advocate for the petitioner, and Shri B. S. Gupta, senior advocate for the accountable person, and, in our opinion, the finding recorded by the Tribunal about the nature of the property which fell to the share of Shri Dewan Chand and Smt. Sarswati Devi is a pure finding of fact and as this finding is based on proper appreciation of evidence, there is no justification for taking a different view. We are also of the opinion that the Tribunal is right in relying on the decision of the Gujarat High Court in Bhimraj Saremal v. CED 1981 132 ITR 35, for taking the view that the property left after allotment of shares to Lal Chand and Vijay Kumar belonged both to Shri Dewan Chand and his wife, Smt. Saraswati Devi. In view of the above, we do not find any ground to hold that the order passed by the Tribunal suffers from an error of law apparent on the face of it. Consequently, the question referred to this court is answered against the Revenue and in favour of the accountable person.
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