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Case Laws
Showing 321 to 340 of 403 Records
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1997 (4) TMI 83 - SUPREME COURT
Exemption for specified end use - Customs - Goods "used in the leather industry" ... ... ... ... ..... the goods were not only capable of being utilised as embellishment for shoes but also the goods were imported for the purpose. It has to be shown that the goods were actually used as embellishment. The Tribunal will examine the facts and dispose of the case accordingly. 5. There is a further point taken by the Revenue. This case arises out of an application for refund. Even if the importer succeeds on merit in this case, the refund cannot be granted to the importer automatically. If the assessee can prove that the burden of the duty has not been shifted to the consumer, the refund must be granted to the assessee straightaway. In that view of the matter the refund application will have to be considered by the Assistant Collector of Customs in the light of the judgment delivered by this Court in Mafatlal Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, 1997 (89) E.L.T. 247 (S.C.). 6. The appeal is finally disposed of with the directions given herein above. There will be no order as to costs.
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1997 (4) TMI 82 - SUPREME COURT
Plastics - Scraps ... ... ... ... ..... e to the decision in law and the test is whether the Scraps were mouldable. Having regard to the nature of this Scrap, it cannot be said that the Explanation has made any difference at all to the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid judgment in Bina Corporation s case. 3. It appears that this Explanation was not noticed by the Tribunal, although in the order under appeal the Appellate Collector specifically referred to and relied upon this Explanation. Under these circumstances, we are of the view the case has to be considered by the Tribunal afresh in the light of the Explanation-III to Entry 15A(1) of the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1982. 4. We set aside the order of the Tribunal and remand the case back to the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal to pass a fresh order in accordance with the law after taking into consideration the said Explanation-III to Tariff Item 15A(2). 5. The appeals are disposed of as above. There will be no order as to costs.
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1997 (4) TMI 81 - SUPREME COURT
Refund claim - Held that:- The question of refund will now be governed by the decision of this Court in Mafatlal Industries v. Union of India [1996 (12) TMI 50 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA]
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1997 (4) TMI 80 - SUPREME COURT
Printed cartons ... ... ... ... ..... ts of printing industry. In that case, the judgment in Rollatainers case was distinguished in the following words This court in Rollatainers case held that what is exempt under the notification is the product of the printing industry. The product in this case is the carton. The printing industry by itself cannot bring the carton into existence. Let us apply this above formula to the facts of his case. 3. The distinction was that in the Rollatainers case, the product under consideration was carton, whereas the product under consideration in the case of Metagraphs Pvt. Ltd. was aluminium label. The case before us is of cartons. Neither the Appellate Collector before whom the facts were stated at great length nor the Tribunal has found that the cartons were manufactured by the respondent. This is squarely governed by the judgment in Rollatainers case (supra). Following that judgment, we allow this appeal and reverse the judgment under appeal. There will be no order as to costs.
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1997 (4) TMI 79 - SUPREME COURT
SSI exemption - `Industrial Unit' ... ... ... ... ..... td. - 1989 (43) E.L.T. 739 (Tribunal) - Affirmed by this Court in 1997 (83) E.L.T. A-46. 2. Texspin Engg. and Mfg. Works v. CCE, Final Order No. 204/86-D, dated 11-4-1986 - Affirmed by this Court in 1990 (50) E.L.T. A57. Our attention was also drawn to a judgment of the Bombay High Court in Devidayal Electronics and Wires Ltd and Anr. v. Union of India and Anr. - 1984 (16) E.L.T 30 (Bom.) , where a similar view has been taken. The learned Addl. Solicitor General has contended that these cases were decided under different Notifications. The contention of the assessee is that this view of the Bombay High Court has been consistently followed by the Tribunal in many other notifications also. 6.We need not express any view on any other notification. 7.We are of the view that the Tribunal has correctly interpreted the Notification No. 89/79-C.E., dated 1-3-1979 with which we are concerned in this case. 8.This appeal must fail and is dismissed. 9.There will be no order as to costs.
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1997 (4) TMI 78 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the goods are usually wrapped for making them marketable?
Held that:- The value of the goods as defined in Section 4(4)(d)(i) is the "normal price" which means the price at which such goods will be ordinarily sold by the assessee to a buyer in course of wholesale trade. The duty will have to be levied on the packed goods at the time of removal from the factory. The goods together with packaging will have to be valued at that point of time on the basis of the wholesale price at which such packed goods are to be sold. It is only the duty payable on the packed goods which will have to be deducted from the wholesale price of the [packed] goods. Without any special rule or notification to that effect, the duty already paid on the packing material cannot be deducted at the time of clearance of the goods.
Thus value of the wrapping paper along with the duty paid on the wrapping paper will have to be included in the value of the wrapped goods which are to be cleared. Appeal allowed.
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1997 (4) TMI 77 - SC ORDER
Excise Duty - Levy and collection ... ... ... ... ..... Tobacco Co. Ltd. - 1996 (83) E.L.T. 3. 2. In view of the aforesaid decision, it must be held that the duty is chargeable at the point of manufacture and not from the removal from the factory, although for the sake of convenience, the Statute has provided that the levy of duty and collection of duty shall be at the factory gate at the time of removal. In view of the principles of law laid down in the above-mentioned decision, the appeal is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
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1997 (4) TMI 76 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Strictures against President ... ... ... ... ..... the President dated 22nd December, 1996. The point in issue referred to in that paragraph was specifically raised in the writ petition which led to the order of D.B. I, dated 23rd September, 1991 and with regard to which the Court had directed the President to give his findings. And yet, he gave no finding on it. 4. I have taken all this exercise to highlight as to how the order of D.B. I has been flouted. If the President finds if difficult to understand the order. I feel it would be most appropriate for D.B. I itself to make him understand it. It would under the circumstances be most appropriate if the matter is taken up by D.B. I itself and dealt with at its end. Let the matter be placed before D.B. I on 8th April, 1997 after obtaining appropriate orders from Hon ble the Acting Chief Justice. Till then, the proceedings before the Tribunal shall remain stayed. Dasti also. However, nothing said by me shall be taken as an expression of opinion of the merits of the petition.
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1997 (4) TMI 75 - SUPREME COURT
Whether claimants entitled to relief to customs duty payable at the time of clearance of the imported commodities?
Held that:- No legal foundation for both the appellants to secure the reliefs prescribed in Entry No. 84.66 of the Customs Tariff. Appeal dismissed.
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1997 (4) TMI 74 - SUPREME COURT
Whether Sections 11A and 11B are similarly worded and the scheme of the two sections is the same?
Held that:- In the instant case, the High Court after quashing the provisional assessment, directed the assessments to be made afresh in accordance with the guidelines given by it. No question of giving any notice under Section 11A arises at this stage. The provisional assessment was quashed by the High Court and direction was given to recompute the value of the excisable goods. This could only be done in accordance with the substantive provisions of Section 4 and in accordance with the procedure laid down in Rule 173-I which at the material time stood.
The scope of Section 11A and Rule 173-I are quite different. In this case, the provisional assessment earlier made by the proper officer has been quashed and pursuant to the direction of the High Court, the proper officer has made the final assessment. No question of failure of issuance of show cause notice under Section 11A arises in this case. Even otherwise, we do not find any infirmity in the order of the Tribunal. Appeal dismissed.
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1997 (4) TMI 73 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the Tribunal was right in law in holding that there was succession by inheritance in this case as contemplated by section 78(2) of the Act and, therefore, the assessee is entitled to carry forward and set off the deceased Shri Madhukant M. Mehta's loss in business against the income for these years?
Whether the Tribunal was right in law in holding that section 75(2) of the Act does not prevent the assessee from claiming the set off of losses in question?
Held that:- Having regard to the finding recorded by the Tribunal after taking into consideration the facts and circumstances that the partners, as heirs, had succeeded to the business of the deceased which finding has been accepted by the High Court in the present case, thus in the facts of these cases no ground is made out for interference with the impugned judgment of the High Court. Appeal dismissed.
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1997 (4) TMI 72 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the estate left by Manjunatha Gowda was obtained by survivorship applying section 8(1)(d) of the Hindu Law Women's Rights Act, 1933 ?
Held that:- The object of section 8(1)(d) is to give a right to claim a share in the joint family property to all females referred to in clauses (a) to (c) thereof. Merely because partition by one of the coparceners under clauses (a) to (c) is a condition for a class of family members entitled to a share in the property, it does not apply to a case where a class of family members are entitled under section 8(1)(d) since it stands on altogether a different footing and, therefore, partition is not a condition precedent for claiming a share by a class of family members enumerated in section 8(1)(a) of the Act. But that principle has no bearing on the facts in this case for the reason that the property held was not received by survivorship.
Under these circumstances, the family members enumerated under section 8(1)(d) are not entitled to a share in the estate left by the deceased. Thus we do not find any illegality in the view taken by the High Court warranting interference.
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1997 (4) TMI 71 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Agricultural Income Tax, Revenue Receipt, Rubber Trees ... ... ... ... ..... rubber would not make the amount received a revenue receipt. The maintenance of the rubber plantation is incidental, necessary and auxiliary to the main object of replantation of rubber trees. Hence, we are of the view, the Tribunal was not correct holding that the subsidy was given for maintaining the rubber plantation. The order of the Tribunal in both the tax cases holding that the subsidy received is a revenue receipt, is not in conformity with the judgment of this court in Velimalai Rubber Co. Ltd. s case 1991 188 ITR 262, and the decision of the Supreme Court in Kalpetta Estates Ltd. s case 1996 221 ITR 601. Accordingly, we hold that the Tribunal was not justified in treating the subsidy amount received as a revenue receipt, and we hold that the amount of subsidy should be treated as a capital receipt and not liable to be included in the computation of income of the assessee. In this view of the matter, the tax cases are allowed, and there will be no order as to costs.
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1997 (4) TMI 70 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Contribution To Recognised Provident Fund, Income Tax Rules ... ... ... ... ..... Tribunal on the question of the applicability of the provisions of section 37 of the Act to the contribution made by the assessee to the recognised provident fund in excess of the limit prescribed under rule 75(1) of the Income-tax rules. There is no finding by the Appellate Tribunal on the question whether the payment was made out of commercial considerations or the expenses were incurred wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the business. Therefore, we are not inclined to go into the point raised by learned counsel for the assessee. Hence, we are of the view that the Tribunal has come to the correct conclusion in holding that the contribution made by the assessee in excess of Rs. 3,000 per annum can be disallowed under rule 75(1) of the Income-tax Rules and the disallowance should be restricted only to the amount Rs. 600 out of Rs. 6,600 made by the Income-tax Officer. Accordingly, we answer the question of law referred to us in the affirmative and against the Revenue.
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1997 (4) TMI 69 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Powers Of Tribunal, Recovery Proceedings ... ... ... ... ..... for the reason that the appellate authority has not independently decided the application and has rejected the stay petition merely on the ground of an order having been made by the Commissioner of Income-tax. In our view, the appellate authority is required to independently decide the application on its own merits. Thus it would be open for Mr. Aggarwal to cite the aforesaid decisions or any other decision on the subject before the Tribunal at the time of making submissions on the stay application. For the aforesaid reasons we make the rule absolute and set aside the impugned order dated April 3, 1997, and direct the Tribunal to decide the stay application of the petitioner afresh in the light of observations made hereinbefore. As far as possible the stay application shall be decided within one month from the date of this order and till the decision of the stay application by the Tribunal, no coercive steps shall be taken to recover the impugned demand from the petitioner.
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1997 (4) TMI 68 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Fines And Penalties, Provident Fund ... ... ... ... ..... section 14B is to penalise the employer so that he may be deterred from making any further default. The court has also opined that damages as imposed by section 14B include a punitive sum quantified according to the circumstances of the case and the levy under section 14B is penal in nature. The Allahabad, Karnataka and Calcutta High Courts have also expressed the view that damages paid under section 14B are penal in nature (see Saraya Sugar Mills (P.) Ltd. v. CIT 1979 116 ITR 387 (All) FB , CIT v. A. Albuquerque and Sons 1992 198 ITR 609 (Kar) and Hasimara Industries Ltd. v. CIT 1993 200 ITR 659 (Cal)). In view of the aforesaid it has to be held that damages paid under section 14B of the Employees Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952, are penal in nature and the same cannot be allowed as deduction under section 37 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Accordingly, the question is answered in the negative, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. No costs.
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1997 (4) TMI 67 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Law Applicable, Retrospective Effect ... ... ... ... ..... der Section 43B(a), the first proviso to section 43B and Explanation 2 have to be read together as giving effect to the true intention of section 43B. Explanation 2, being retrospective, the first proviso has also to be so construed. Without the first proviso, Explanation 2 would not obviate the hardship or the unintended consequences of section 43B. The proviso supplies an obvious omission. But for this proviso the ambit of section 43B becomes unduly wide bringing within its scope those payments which were not intended to be prohibited from the category of permissible deductions. The first proviso to section 43B, therefore, has to be treated as retrospective. Since their Lordships of the Supreme Court have already taken the view that the first proviso to section 43B is retrospective in effect, all the seven references are answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. These cases may be treated to have been disposed of and need not be sent to the Division Bench.
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1997 (4) TMI 66 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Company In Which Public Are Substantially Interested, Development Allowance, Foreign Technician, Harmonious Construction, Taxing Statutes, Weighted Deduction
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1997 (4) TMI 65 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Dispose Of, Writ Petition ... ... ... ... ..... rst instance under section 158BD, the provisions of section 127 are to be complied with to give notice. In this view of the exposition of the relevant scope of section 127 and sections 158BD and 158BG and the admitted position that the petitioner was not granted any opportunity before the transfer was effected, we would accept the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner and direct the first respondent-Commissioner of Income-tax-to hear the petitioner in the matter of transfer of her file from respondent No. 3 to respondent No. 2 and pass appropriate orders. To facilitate the process, we direct, the petitioner shall make a representation to the first respondent within two weeks from today and that on such representation being made, the first respondent shall, after giving opportunity to the petitioner to be heard, dispose of the matter within four weeks thereafter by reasoned order communicated to the petitioner. The writ petition is disposed of accordingly. No costs.
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1997 (4) TMI 64 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Assessment Proceedings, Assessment Year, Reassessment Proceedings ... ... ... ... ..... eration the fluctuations of the exchange rate for the purpose of valuing the exchange rate in that case, it was erroneous, cannot assist the petitioner. The decision of the Supreme Court in ITO v. Lakhmani Mewal Das 1976 103 ITR 437, laid down that reasons for formation of the belief contemplated by section 147(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, for the reopening of an assessment must have a rational connection or relevant bearing on the formation of the belief. The impugned notices, since they recorded cogent and valid reasons, satisfy the tests which have been laid down by the Supreme Court in the said decision. In the above view of the matter, the grounds on which the impugned notices are challenged, fail. The impugned notices have been issued in lawful exercise of the jurisdiction by the Assessing Officer and there is absolutely no warrant for interference by this court with them. The petition is, therefore, rejected with no order as to costs. Interim relief stands vacated.
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