|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 361 to 380 of 403 Records
-
1997 (4) TMI 43 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Immovable Property By Central Government, Law Applicable, Leasehold Interest, Movable Property, Retrospective Effect
-
1997 (4) TMI 42 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Revised Return ... ... ... ... ..... he question referred to in the earlier part of the judgment has been sent to us for our opinion. The question regarding the limitation now stands concluded by the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Kumar Jagdish Chandra Sinha v. CIT 1996 220 ITR 67, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. Their Lordships have accepted the view taken by the Delhi High Court and the Allahabad High Court by overruling the view taken by the Calcutta High Court in Mst. Zulekha Begum s case 1981 129 ITR 560. The question regarding recording of finding by the Income-tax Officer beyond the expiry of ordinary period of limitation after completion of assessment, for extension of limitation under section 153(1)(b) is a finding of fact. As the matter now stands concluded by the Supreme Court of India in Kumar Jagdish Chandra Sinha s case 1996 220 ITR 67, the question referred to us is answered in the negative, i.e., against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee. No costs.
-
1997 (4) TMI 41 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Transfer Of Immovable Property ... ... ... ... ..... ovisions of the IT Act. The Court will be also obliged to find out as to on whose failure the permission could not be obtained. Even prior to the decree, it is open to any of the parties to obtain the necessary permission from the authority, since the transfer is yet to be made. 12. Therefore, from the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case and on a careful consideration of the submissions made by learned counsel appearing for the parties, I feel that the learned trial Court did not commit any jurisdictional or factual error in rejecting the application under O. 7, r. 11 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. Accordingly, I do not find any merit in the revisional application and the same is dismissed but in the circumstances without costs. 13. Heard the learned advocate for the petitioner for prayer of stay of operation of the order. I do not find any merit in such submission. Accordingly, the petitioner s prayer of stay of operation of the order is hereby rejected.
-
1997 (4) TMI 40 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Estate Duty, CBDT Circulars, Valuation Report ... ... ... ... ..... nterpreting the instruction and by unnecessarily importing the valuation report, has gone contrary to the spirit of the instruction and thus the impugned order clearly stands vitiated. For the foregoing reasons, therefore, this petition is allowed. The impugned order is set aside to the extent it has levied estate duty on the basis of the valuation returned in the valuation report by the valuation cell. The respondents are directed by issuance of a writ of mandamus to levy estate duty upon the estate left by the deceased on the basis of the valuation as returned by the person accountable and not on any other basis. If the person accountable or any other person on their behalf has already paid the estate duty on the aforesaid basis, needless to say there will not be any further liability on her part to pay any other amount towards the estate duty. There shall be no order as to costs. All parties to act on a xeroxed signed copy of this dictated order on the usual undertakings.
-
1997 (4) TMI 39 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Reference, Revision, Prejudicial, Question Of Law ... ... ... ... ..... efore, the assessment as framed by the Income-tax Officer on the point does not appear to be erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue.... To sum-up, I am of the opinion that the assessment as framed by the Income-tax Officer in this case had been made by him after conducting proper enquiries and the learned Commissioner of Income-tax was not justified in setting aside the said assessment on the ground of the same being erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue. All these findings arrived at by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, are purely findings of facts and no question of law arises. The Tribunal was, therefore, justified in rejecting the application moved by the Revenue under section 256(1) of the Act. Since no question of law arises out of the judgment passed by the Tribunal we, therefore, do not find any merit in this application. The application under section 256(2) of the Income-tax Act, filed by the Revenue, is, therefore, dismissed.
-
1997 (4) TMI 38 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Depreciation, Building, Roads, Actual Cost, Derived From, New Industrial Undertaking ... ... ... ... ..... o grant deduction to any profit from the industrial undertaking, it would have very well used the expression, attributable to in section 80HH of the Act. We, therefore, do not find any justification to give the expression derived from a wider meaning to cover every receipt connected with the industrial undertaking. Therefore, we hold that the Appellate Tribunal has committed an error of law in holding that the interest earned on the deposit with the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board by the assessee should be treated as income derived from industrial undertaking for the purpose of the relief under section 80HH of the Act. In the result, we answer the questions of law referred to us as under (i) The first question of law in the affirmative and against the Revenue. (ii) The second question of law in the affirmative and against the Revenue. (iii) The third question of law in the negative and in favour of the Revenue. In view of the divided success, there will be no order as to costs.
-
1997 (4) TMI 37 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Charitable Purpose, Education ... ... ... ... ..... the benefit of exemption, under section 11 of the Act. Accordingly, we answer the first question of law in the negative and in favour of the Revenue. (II) Second question Since we have held that there was no valid transfer the question whether it would be open to the Assessing Officer to consider the question whether the trusts are charitable in nature or not in spite of grant of certificate under section 12A of the Act does not arise, accordingly, we return the second question unanswered. (III) Third question It relates to the applicability of section 13(1)(d), proviso (iia) of the Act. Since we have held that there was no valid transfer by T. N. K. and V. Educational Trust, it is also not necessary to consider in the hands of the family trusts whether the trusts have complied with the provisions of section 11(5) of the Act in making the investment in the approved forms, the third question of law does not arise and it is also returned without providing an answer. No costs.
-
1997 (4) TMI 36 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
House Property, Annual Value ... ... ... ... ..... eipts should be treated as annual value spoken to in section 23(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 , and answer the said question as reframed, in the negative and in favour of the Revenue and remit the matter back to the Tribunal for it to call for a necessary finding from the assessing authority regarding the fair rent for the building in question pursuant to the above section 4 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, and see whether such fair rent is in excess or less than the amount of rent actually received or receivable by the assessee from the tenant and accordingly compute the abovesaid annual value under section 23(1) of the Act in the light of the abovesaid observations and consequently, compute the Income from house property under the Act. We gratefully record our appreciation for the very valuable assistance given by Mrs. Chitra Venkataraman, who has taken very great pains to bring to our notice the relevant observations in several decisions.
-
1997 (4) TMI 35 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Revision, Jurisdiction, Notice, Opportunity ... ... ... ... ..... r before he assumes jurisdiction to proceed to revise an order passed by the Income-tax Officer. The jurisdiction of the Commissioner to proceed under section 33B is not dependent on the fulfilment of any condition precedent. He is not required to give any notice before commencing the inquiry. All that he is required to do, before reaching his decision and not before commencing the inquiry, is to give the assessee an opportunity of being heard and make or cause to make such inquiry as he deems necessary. These requirements have nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the Commissioner. They pertain to the region of natural justice. The Supreme Court observed with clarity that breach of the principles of natural justice may affect the legality of the order made, but that does not affect the jurisdiction of the Commissioner. Following the aforesaid authority, we answer all the abovementioned questions in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee.
-
1997 (4) TMI 34 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Prosecution, Wilful, Evade Tax, Set Aside ... ... ... ... ..... erit in the contention raised by learned counsel for the petitioners. A perusal of annexure-5 goes to show that against the assessment order on the basis of which the criminal complaint has been filed against the petitioners, the petitioners preferred an appeal which was allowed by the Commissioner of Income-tax and the assessment order was set aside and the matter has been remanded for fresh assessment according to law. As the assessment order which formed the very basis of the prosecution is no longer in existence, the petitioners cannot be prosecuted on the strength thereof. In the result, the petition is allowed and the impugned order taking cognizance as also the criminal prosecution of the petitioners resting thereon are hereby set aside. It would be open to the Department to file a fresh complaint against the petitioners in case after fresh assessment the petitioners are found to have committed any offence while filing their return for the assessment year in question.
-
1997 (4) TMI 33 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Circulars, Assessment ... ... ... ... ..... he ambiguity of the previous circular. He contended that it has already been held by the apex court in the case of Kerala Financial Corporation v. CIT 1994 210 ITR 129 that a circular which detracts from the provisions of the Act, is not binding on the Income-tax Department. That apart similar writ petitions filed on behalf of other persons, bearing C. W. J. C. No. 10338 of 1996 and analogous cases were dismissed as withdrawn before this court on October 18, 1996. In my view, having regard to the facts noticed above, as also since at the time of final assessment, Circular No. 737, dated February 23, 1996, had already come into force, no grievance can be made that such a circular has been applied retrospectively. Therefore, for the reasons stated above, I answer the question against the petitioner. But certainly with liberty to file an appeal before the competent authority with regard to any other grievance. Subject to the aforesaid liberty, this writ application is dismissed.
-
1997 (4) TMI 32 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Reassessment, Estate Duty ... ... ... ... ..... and Lal had not been disclosed in the ED return filed by the petitioner is quite relevant and germane to the proceedings under the Act of 1953 and, therefore, there existed good ground for issuance of notice under s. 59. Before concluding, I may dispose of an ancillary argument urged by Shri Mahajan that the notice had, in fact, been sent by the respondent No. 1 on 8th Aug., 1982, but the date was subsequently changed to 8th July, 1982. After perusing the original record, I am convinced that the figure 8 has not been changed to 7 with mala fide design. Rather, it is a case of correction of typographical error. The carbon copy of the notice served upon the petitioner shows that it had in fact been issued on 8th July, 1982. Thus, no capital can be made out of the typographical error in the date of notice. For the reasons mentioned above, the writ petition is held to be without merit and the same is dismissed. The interim order passed by this Court stands automatically vacated.
-
1997 (4) TMI 31 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Depreciation, Developement Rebate, Initial Depreciation ... ... ... ... ..... to claim initial depreciation and higher development rebate on the ground that the assessee was not either manufacturing or producing textiles. Since the factual situation appearing in the present tax case is the same as found in T. C. No. 697 of 1984 (CIT v. Rajalakshmi Textiles Processors Ltd. (No. 1) 19991 235 ITR 718), we have to hold that the assessee is not entitled to claim development rebate at the enhanced rate of 25 per cent. on the machinery installed in factory. Therefore, the view of the Appellate Tribunal that the assessee is entitled to higher development rebate at the enhanced rate of 25 per cent. in respect of certain machineries installed in its factory is not sustainable in law after the decision of this court in T. C. No. 697 of 1984 dated June 17, 1996, (CIT v. Rajalakshmi Textiles Processors Ltd. (No. 1) 1999 235 ITR 718) Following the earlier judgment, we answer the question of law referred to us in the negative and in favour of the Revenue. No costs.
-
1997 (4) TMI 30 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Cash Credits, Peak Credit Theory ... ... ... ... ..... ory as a method of computation, if at all, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal might have made a wrong assessment on the facts as regards the total extent of undisclosed income which was liable to be added to the total income of the petitioner firm in respect of the assessment year which is the subject-matter of the present dispute. We do not think that there is a wide range of conflicting views on the subject as to whether or at all a reference is to be made when peak credit theory is not accepted by the Appellate Tribunal or the assessing authority as the only alternative. The question whether an inference is to be drawn by the Tribunal on the given facts is not always dependent on a question of law or fact. If the inference is of fact, no question with regard to it can be referred to the High Court. We think that this is not a fit case for making a reference at all within the meaning of section 256(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and that being so we reject the application.
-
1997 (4) TMI 29 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Acquisition Of Immovable Property ... ... ... ... ..... icer, the total fair market value of the property would come to Rs. 1,04,700 against the stated consideration of Rs. 30,000. Vide Circular No. 455, dated May 16, 1996, the Central Board of Direct Taxes decided that where the proceedings had been initiated by issue of notice under section 269D, the same should be dropped if the apparent consideration of the immovable property was below Rs. five lakhs. In CIT v. Export India Corporation (Pvt.) Ltd. 1996 219 ITR 461 and CIT v. Gobind Ram 1996 221 ITR 892, this court held that the circular dated May 16, 1996, would be applicable to the proceedings pending at the appellate stage as well, if the apparent consideration of the immovable property is below Rs. five lakhs. In our opinion, these appeals deserve to be dismissed in the light of the two decisions referred to hereinabove. Ordered accordingly. We, however, make it clear that this order shall not be treated as expression of opinion on the points raised in the memo of appeals.
-
1997 (4) TMI 28 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Reassessment, Alternate Remedy ... ... ... ... ..... ead with section 147 of the Act, we do not find any reason to deviate from the well established rule that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain the writ petition under article 226 where an effective alternative remedy is available to the petitioner. This principle of law has been very aptly laid down in Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa 1983 142 ITR 663 (SC) and reiterated in a recent decision in State of Goa v. Leukoplast (India) Ltd., AIR 1997 SC 1875 1997 105 STC 318. We also find that the appellate authority is vested with the power to grant interim stay in an appropriate case. The petitioner can also apply for stay of the order passed by respondent No. 1. For the reasons mentioned above, the writ petition is dismissed. We, however, make it clear that the petitioner shall be free to file application for along with appeal which he may file against the impugned order. He shall also be free to make an application for expeditious disposal of the appeal.
-
1997 (4) TMI 27 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Deemed Dividend, Person With Substantial Interest In The Company ... ... ... ... ..... and on behalf of three minor infants, the total shares held by her should be taken into account. Consequently, the view of the Income-tax Officer that the minors have no voting right and 2,196 shares held in the names of minor children should be excluded in considering the question whether the assessee has a substantial interest in the company is not sustainable in law. The Appellate Tribunal has found that Selva Saroja was the shareholder and not the minors and in view of the said finding of the Appellate Tribunal, the shares held by her in her own and on behalf of the minors cannot be ignored while totalling up the total shares issued by the company. Under these circumstances, the Appellate Tribunal, therefore, was right in holding that the shares in the name of Selva Saroja should be taken into consideration in the application of section 2(22)(e) of the Act. Accordingly, we answer the question of law referred to us against the Revenue. There will be no order as to costs.
-
1997 (4) TMI 26 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Offences And Prosecution, Finding Of Appellate Authority ... ... ... ... ..... fts sent by Raheem to P-W. 5 Muthu, and there is no satisfactory evidence available on record to show that the funds of the accused were utilised or made use of for purchasing these two demand drafts by Raheem, who had sent these two drafts to P-W. 5 Muthu. In such circumstances, I am to hold that the complainant has not proved his case beyond all reasonable doubt and the order of acquittal passed by the lower court in C. C. Nos. 53 of 1985 and 54 of 1985 is not erroneous or perverse, and so the order of acquittal passed by the lower court in both the cases is confirmed, and both the Criminal Appeals Nos. 814 of 1987 and 831 of 1987 are dismissed, and consequently I answer this point against the appellant and in favour of the accused. In the result, the Criminal Appeals Nos. 814 of 1987 and 831 of 1987 are dismissed. The orders of acquittal dated March 31, 1987, passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate at Madurai in C. C. Nos. 53 of 1985 and 54 of 1985, are confirmed.
-
1997 (4) TMI 25 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Export Market Development Allowance, Weighted Deduction ... ... ... ... ..... s court in the case of Lucas TVS Ltd. v. CIT 1996 217 ITR 382, has held that the assessee is not entitled to claim weighted deduction under section 35B of the Act in respect of the interest paid on packing credit. Mr. R. Gangadharen, learned counsel appearing for the assessee, has not disputed the above position of law. Following the above decision of this court, we hold that the Tribunal was not correct in holding that the assessee will be entitled to weighted deduction in respect of the interest paid on the packing credit. Accordingly, we answer the question of law referred to us as under The Tribunal was correct in law in holding that the assessee will be entitled to claim weighted deduction under section 35B of the Act in respect of the commission paid to the State Trading Corporation of India, but will not be entitled to claim weighted deduction in respect of the interest on packing credit. The question of law is answered accordingly. There will be no order as to costs.
-
1997 (4) TMI 24 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Penalty, Waiver, Concealment, Discretion, Agreed Addition ... ... ... ... ..... e facts of the particular case whether waiver in entirety or reduction alone is warranted on the facts and circumstances of the case, the conclusion arrived at by the Commissioner in our opinion, is correct. The Commissioner has reduced the penalty since, according to him, the conditions stipulated in the section are not fully satisfied. A reading of the order of the first respondent would clearly indicate that the first respondent has indicated his reasons for resorting to the power of reduction or waiver of the penalty in preference to granting full waiver of the penalty as demanded by the appellant. We cannot say that the reasons indicated in the order of the first respondent are in any manner irrelevant or not justified. We fully endorse the view taken by the learned single judge in dismissing the writ petition. For the foregoing reasons we hold that there are no merits in the writ appeal and, therefore, the same is dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs.
....
|
