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Case Laws
Showing 301 to 320 of 382 Records
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1998 (1) TMI 82 - SUPREME COURT
Writ jurisdiction ... ... ... ... ..... ions of the High Court. It is also made clear that if adjudication ultimately culminates against the respondent, it will be open to it to file an appeal before CEGAT and till the decision of CEGAT on appeal, there will be no recovery of the amount even if it is adjudicated upon by the adjudicating authority in these proceedings. The learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that if there is any adjudication made by the authority pursuant to the impugned show cause notice, an appeal would certainly be maintainable before CEGAT. In our view on the peculiar facts of this case only and not as a precedent we have directed that the recovery of the adjudicable amount shall remain stayed till CEGAT s decision if at all any occasion arises for the respondent to go in appeal. However, it will be open to the appellate authority, namely, CEGAT to direct the respondent in such an eventuality to give sufficient security as may be directed. 3. The appeal is allowed accordingly. No costs.
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1998 (1) TMI 81 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
Writ jurisdiction - Delay in adjudication ... ... ... ... ..... rs had made a representation on 19-6-1997 in which a similar controversy has been raised as in show cause notice we consider it expedient and to be in the interest of justice to direct the second respondent, the Assistant Commissioner, Central Excise Division, Muzaffarnagar before whom the adjudication is pending in pursuance of the show cause notice to decide the same expeditiously and in accordance with law, preferably, within a period of three months a certified copy of this order is filed by the petitioners before the said respondent. However, if for some reasons it is not found possible to decide the issue up for consideration within the period of three months, stated above, in that case the request of the petitioners will be considered for an interim relief, that is, for the stay of realisation of excise duty which is being demanded under the show cause notice from the petitioners. 4. Subject to the above observations, the writ petition shall stand finally disposed of.
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1998 (1) TMI 80 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
Writ jurisdiction - Stay/dispensation of pre-deposit ... ... ... ... ..... ion exercised by the Tribunal is in any way illegal or improper or calls for any interference by this Court. 6.There is another aspect of the matter. On 9-11-1995, this Court had while granting time to the learned Counsel for the respondents had fixed 9-1-1996 for the purpose of Admission of this writ petition. The Court had also passed an interim order operative till the date fixed. The case was not heard on 9-1-1996 and no effect has been made by the petitioner to get the interim order extended. Therefore, the interim order passed by this Court stand exhausted and there is no stay for the last two years. 7.Consequently, this writ peititon lacks merits and the same is dismissed. However, as the Court has been informed that the appeal filed in the year 1995 before the Tribunal is still pending, it would be desirable that the same be disposed of as expeditiously as possible preferably within two months of the pre-deposit of Rs. 2 lakhs as directed in the order dated 23-8-1995.
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1998 (1) TMI 79 - SUPREME COURT
Project import ... ... ... ... ..... by the judgment of this Court in Abrol Watches Pvt. Ltd. v. Collector of Customs, Bombay, 1997 (92) E.L.T. 311 (S.C.), wherein this Court has laid down that the exemption granted under the notification dated April 19, 1985 would not affect the exemption granted in respect of customs duty under any other notification and that the two notifications should be read together. 5. We are, therefore, in agreement with the view of the Tribunal that the assessee was not precluded from claiming the benefit of the lower rate of customs duty on the basis of the Notification No. 40/78-Cus. (as amended). Civil Appeal No. 526 of 1993 filed by the Revenue is, therefore, dismissed. No order as to costs. 6. Shri Harish N. Salve, the learned senior Counsel appearing for the assessee in Civil Appeal No. 155 of 1994, submits that in view of the order dismissing Civil Appeal No. 526 of 1993, this appeal does not survive. Civil Appeal No. 155 of 1994 is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.
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1998 (1) TMI 78 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the Collector as well as the Tribunal have erred in placing reliance on the Test Report dated December 9, 1986 wherein the Gum Rosin imported by the appellants has been graded as `WG' Grade?
Held that:- The finding in the test report was supported by other material on record, viz., the statement of Shri Saigal, the proprietor of the indenting agents M/s. Appollo International, the telex message seized from the office of the indenting agents and the letter of M/s. R.R. Mewani Ltd. which show that the Gum Rosin imported by the appellants was of `WG', `WW' and `N' Grade and the price of the Gum Rosin of these grades was US $ 465 per M.T. The finding recorded by the Collector of Customs which has been affirmed by the Tribunal is thus a finding of fact based on material on record. No ground is made out for interfering with the said finding. Appeal dismissed.
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1998 (1) TMI 77 - SC ORDER
Surje - Edible preparations ... ... ... ... ..... ons of the parties come to the conclusion that the product in question would come under the Heading 21.07. Learned Counsel for the parties have taken us through the relevant portions of the Tribunal s decision and also the entries in question and in our opinion in this particular case, we see no reason to interfere with the order of the Tribunal. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs.
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1998 (1) TMI 76 - SUPREME COURT
Ascertainment of value of goods - Held that:- the value of the goods is to be ascertained on the basis of the price at which such or like goods are ordinarily sold or offered for sale for delivery at the time and place of importation and exportation in the course of international trade. The relevant date would, therefore, be the date of importation or exportation. Shri Mehta has laid stress on the words "ordinarily sold or offered for sale" and has submitted that in view of these words the date of contract is the relevant date. We are unable to agree. The words "ordinarily sold or offered for sale" have to be read along with the words which precede and the words that follow these words. If thus read these words mean that for the purpose of assessing the value it is necessary to ascertain the price at which the said or like goods are sold or offered for sale for delivery at the time and place is importation and exportation in the cases of international trade. The words "ordinarily sold or offered for sale" do not refer to the contract between the supplier and the importer, but to the prevailing price in the market on the date of importation or exportation. We are, therefore, unable to accept the contention urged by Shri Mehta that the Tribunal has committed any error in proceeding on the basis that value has to be assessed according to the price as on the date of importation and not on the basis of the date of contract.
The price of the goods imported by M/s. Hibotex Pvt. Ltd. could, therefore, provide the basis for assessing the value of the goods imported by the appellant. The price of the goods imported by M/s. Hibotex Pvt. Ltd. was 7,00,000 Japanese Yen per set. Having regard to the fact that the appellants had contracted for a larger quantity, the Additional Collector has allowed quantity discount of 1,00,000 Japanese Yen per set on the basis of the letter of suppliers dated September 7, 1988 and he assessed the value of the goods at 6,00,000 Japanese Yen per set. The said assessment has been upheld by the Tribunal. We do not find any infirmity in the said approach of the Additional Collector. In the circumstances, we do not find any merit in the appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed.
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1998 (1) TMI 75 - SC ORDER
Rubber Blankets ... ... ... ... ..... its earlier decision, has come to the conclusion that the goods in question did not fall under Entry 40.08 and were correctly classified under Entry 40.16. We have gone through the Judgment of the Tribunal and we do not find any infirmity calling for an interference. The appeal is dismissed with costs.
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1998 (1) TMI 74 - SUPREME COURT
Period of limitation - Held that:- While the period of limitation is prescribed for issue of a show cause notice under sub-section (5) of Section 131 when the Central Government seeks to annul the order passed by the original assessing authority, no period of limitation with regard to show cause notice issued under sub-section (3) of Section 131 where the order sought to be annulled is that of the appellate or revisional authority. In the present case, the Show Cause Notice dated August 13, 1981 has been issued in exercise of the power conferred under sub-section (3) of Section 131. Since no period of limitation is prescribed for exercising the power under sub-section (3) of Section 131, the proceeding initiated on the basis of the said Show Cause Notice could not be held to be not maintainable as being barred by limitation. Thus unable to uphold the impugned judgment of the Tribunal. Appeal allowed.the impugned judgment of the Tribunal is set aside and the matter is remitted to the Tribunal for consideration on merits in accordance with law.
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1998 (1) TMI 73 - SUPREME COURT
Whether notional interest on the interest free security deposit received should be considered for the purpose of arriving at the assessable value under the Excise Act by including interest at the rate of 12% per cent per annum on such security deposits?
Held that:- The additional Collector was right in coming to the conclusion that Rule 5 of the Valuation Rules was not applicable in the present case as it was not shown that the price charged was not the sole consideration. When the appellants are not requiring all the dealers to give security deposit and it is only those who avail of credit facilities who are required to give the security deposit but get no discount or pay a reduced price then in such a case excise duty can be charged only on the uniform price paid by the dealers without any addition of notional interest. Appeal allowed.
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1998 (1) TMI 72 - SUPREME COURT
Whether a Central Excise notification comes into force with effect from the date on which it is printed in the Government Gazette or from the date it is made available to public?
Held that:- We hold that a Central Excise Notification can be said to have been published, except when it is provided otherwise, when it is so issued as to make it known to the public. It would be a proper publication if it is published in such a manner that persons can, if they are so interested, acquaint themselves with its contents. If publication is through a Gazette then mere printing of it in the Gazette would not be enough. Unless the Gazette containing the notification is made available to the public, the notification cannot be said to have been duly published.
View taken by the Tribunal is correct Civil Appeal filed by the Collector of Central Excise, is dismissed with a direction that entitlement of the respondent company to the refund shall be determined by the Assistant Collector of Central Excise in accordance with Section 11B of the Central Excise Act.
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1998 (1) TMI 71 - SUPREME COURT
Whether tanks and vats manufactured by the assessee would be classified under sub-heading 3926.90 of the schedule to the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 as "other articles of plastics" and not under Heading 39.25 and sub-heading 3925.10 as "builders ware" of plastics?
Held that:- It is true that since both the appeals of the respondent were allowed by the Tribunal on the ground that the goods manufactured by the respondent are classifiable under sub-heading 3926.90, there was no occasion for the Tribunal to deal with the question of extended period of limitation. Under such circumstances, we feel that this question requires to be considered by the Tribunal.
Set aside the orders of the Tribunal and remit the appeals to the Tribunal for deciding the question relating to application of proviso to Section 11A of the Act in the present case. Appeal allowed.
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1998 (1) TMI 70 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the sum of Rs. 3,39,000 declared as dividends on December 6, 1962, by the board of directors, but payable only on January 16, 1963, could be taken into account in withdrawing the rebate admissible under the first proviso to the Finance Act of 1964 by reference to sub-clause (c) of clause (i) of the second proviso to the same Act read with Explanation 3 to the same Act ?
Held that:- The nature of the interim dividend is such, that it gives no right to the shareholders to receive it merely on the passing of the resolution by the board of directors, whereas on a dividend being declared by the company in general meeting, a vested right accrues to the shareholders. This being so, if the company in general meeting had declared a dividend on December 6, 1962, and the same was distributed in January, 1963, then the aforesaid Explanation 3 would have been applicable. But, in the present case, the decision of the board of directors on December 6, 1962, to pay interim dividend cannot be construed as meaning declaration of dividend by the company. This being so, what would be relevant is the distribution of the dividend in January, 1963, thereby attracting the provisions of sub-clause (c) of clause (i) of the second proviso and the income-tax authorities were therefore right in reducing the rebate in the manner in which they did for the assessment year 1964-65.
For the aforesaid reason, the appeals are allowed. The judgment of the High Court is set aside. The question of law, as reframed by the High Court, is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the Revenue.
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1998 (1) TMI 69 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Application For Reference, High Court, Question Of Law, Supreme Court ... ... ... ... ..... ous year in which the liability to pay such income was incurred by the assessee according to the method of accounting regularly employed by him) only in computing the income referred to in section 28 of that previous year in which such sum is actually paid by him. There is no dispute about the fact that the deduction is claimed only in respect of the duties actually paid by the assessee. In the context of the provision of section 43B(a) and on carefully going through the decision in Lakhanpal s case, 1986 162 ITR 240 (Guj), we are of the view that no ground is made out for reconsideration of the ratio of the decision in Lakhanpal s case, 1986 162 ITR 240 (Guj). We, therefore, are of the view that no question of law arises from the decision of the Tribunal for our opinion, in view of the fact that Lakhanpal s case, 1986 162 ITR 240 (Guj), has already concluded that question. In this view of the matter, the application is rejected. Rule is discharged with no order as to costs.
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1998 (1) TMI 68 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Change In Method, Question Of Law, Supreme Court, Travel Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... ng from the order of the Tribunal. Such is the view taken by two Division Bench decisions of this court. (see CIT v. Modipon Ltd. (No. 1) 1995 212 ITR 656 and CIT v. Modi Rubber Ltd. (No. 1) ITC No. 55 of 1995 decided on September 16, 1997 ( 1998 230 ITR 817). For all the foregoing reasons, ITC No. 57 of 1995 is allowed in part. The Tribunal is directed to draw up a statement of the case and refer the following question for the opinion of the High Court arising out of assessment year 1981-82 Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was justified in holding that for the purpose of applying rule 6D a disallowance should have been made by aggregating expenditure incurred on various tours undertaken by an employee in a year. I.T.C. No. 57 of 1995 to the extent of questions Nos. 1 and 2 and ITC No. 48 of 1995 and ITC No. 40 of 1995 are dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of the case there will be no order as to the costs.
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1998 (1) TMI 67 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Excise Duty ... ... ... ... ..... m the following observation in that case Where these entries relate to ascertained and/or crystallised liabilities, the amounts thereof must justly be allowed as deductions for computation of income. There was agreement that where these debit entries made are in respect of contingent liabilities, the amounts mentioned in the debit entries could not be allowed as expense. In view of the above, the question referred to us is answered in the negative and in favour of the Revenue. Mr. Mehta, learned counsel for the assessee, submits that the Revenue should be directed to revise the case of the assessee for the subsequent assessment year in which this amount had been added to its income under section 41(2) of the Income-tax Act. We do not think it necessary to give any such direction. The assessee may point out this fact to the Tribunal at the time of giving effect to the opinion of this court. Reference disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs. Certified copy expedited.
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1998 (1) TMI 66 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Question Of Law ... ... ... ... ..... uestion for the opinion of this Court Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, is the studio a plant for the purpose of depreciation under the IT Act, 1961 ? 3. Inasmuch as the abovementioned question in our opinion is a question of law, we direct the Tribunal to draw up a statement of the case and refer the aforementioned question for the opinion of this Court. 4. The application is, accordingly, allowed.
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1998 (1) TMI 65 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Capital Gains ... ... ... ... ..... edings and the hearing of the appeals preferred against the order of assessment. We cannot entertain the contention for the first time while hearing the present reference as the same is not found reflected in the order of the Tribunal and hence cannot be treated as one arising from the order of the Tribunal. 5. For the foregoing reasons, question No. 1 framed and referred at the instance of the Revenue is answered in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. So far as questions Nos. 2 and 3 framed and referred at the instance of the assessee are concerned, the same are rendered academic merely and hence are refused to be answered. 6. By way of abundant caution, we would like to state that the question whether such receipt though held not liable to tax as capital gains would be liable to tax as casual income is being left open to be taken up for consideration in an appropriate case. 7. The reference is answered accordingly. No order as to costs.
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1998 (1) TMI 64 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Assessing Officer, Compulsory Audit ... ... ... ... ..... ct of the Legislature qua a certain class will not be lightly made and in K. P. Varghese v. ITO 1981 131 ITR 597 (SC) holding that speeches by the members of the Legislature on the floor of the House when the Bill was debated can be referred to for ascertaining the mischief sought to be remedied by the Legislature and that the circulars of Central Board of Direct Taxes explaining the amended provisions are in nature of contemporanea expositio furnishing legitimate aid in construction of their provision, cannot assist the Revenue. In fact, in the last mentioned case the Supreme Court in terms held in para 11 of the judgment that the rule of construction by reference to contemporanea expositio must give way where the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous . In the above view of the matter, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. The reference stands disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs.
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1998 (1) TMI 63 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Agricultural Land, Capital Asset ... ... ... ... ..... e preferred an appeal to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal which has been dismissed. The controversy stands resolved by the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of G. M. Omer an v. CIT (Addl.) 1992 196 ITR 269. Their Lordships have approved the decision of the Madras High Court in S. Hidhayathullah Sahib v. CIT 1986 158 ITR 20. According to the Madras High Court, it is the population of the municipality that has to be taken into account for the purpose of section 2(14)(iii)(a), and not the population of any area within the municipality. In other words, the part of the sentence---- which has a population of not less than 10,000 , refers to municipality or a cantonment board, and not to any area comprised in the erstwhile village or any fraction of the area constituting the municipality or cantonment board. Consistently with the law laid down by the Supreme Court, both the questions are answered in the negative, i.e., in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee.
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