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Case Laws
Showing 341 to 360 of 382 Records
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1998 (1) TMI 42 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Accrual, Liability, Collaboration Agreement, Surtax ... ... ... ... ..... as a deduction in the computation of income of that year. Following the ratio of the above decisions, it is clear that in the instant case, the liability of the assessee to pay the compensation to Dorr-Oliver Inc., Stamford, U. S. A., accrued only on the grant of approval by the Government of India in the year 1980. The liability cannot be said to have arisen from any date prior to the date of approval of the Government of India as the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act contains an absolute prohibition against such accrual. Learned counsel for the assessee referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Coca-Cola Export Corporation v. ITO 1998 231 ITR 200. We have perused the said decision. We are, however, of the opinion that the said decision has no relevance to the controversy before us in this case. In view of the above, questions Nos. (1) and (2) are answered in the negative and in favour of the Revenue. This reference is disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs.
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1998 (1) TMI 41 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Assessed Tax, Advance Tax, Interest, Regular Assessment ... ... ... ... ..... he above conclusion, this court dissented from the contrary view taken by the Calcutta High Court in Chloride India Ltd. s case 1977 106 ITR 38 which now stands impliedly overruled by the decision of the Supreme Court in Modi Industries Ltd. s case 1995 216 ITR 759. It is clear from the above discussion that the expression regular assessment appearing in section 215 of the Act has been used in no other sense than the first order of assessment passed under section 143 or 144 of the Act. That being so, the Tribunal was not justified in this case in holding that interest under section 215(1) of the Act cannot be maintained when the advance tax paid by the assessee is not less than seventy-five per cent. of the tax assessed in pursuance of the order of the appellate or revisional authority. The question referred to us is, therefore, answered in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. Reference is disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs.
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1998 (1) TMI 40 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Agricultural Income Tax, Limitation, Orders Prejudicial To Interests, Revision ... ... ... ... ..... whether the exercise of power is within the limitation prescribed under sub-section (2) or not. The order passed by the assessing authority carrying out the directions given by the appellate authority is only consequential. Therefore, the period of limitation has to be counted from the date of the order of the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals), i.e., November 28, 1977. Therefore, the exercise of power by the revisional authority under section 35 of the Act is beyond the period of four years. So the bar prescribed under section 35(2) that the revisional authority shall not exercise the power after the period of four years ousts the jurisdiction of the revisional authority to exercise the power. In view of the circumstances, the impugned order passed by the revisional authority is beyond the period of limitation prescribed under section 35(2) of the Karnataka Agricultural Income-tax Act, and is, therefore, without jurisdiction. Accordingly, the revision is allowed. Order quashed.
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1998 (1) TMI 39 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... assessee, and it cannot be construed that what was gifted to the assessee was only the right to enjoy the income of the properties during his life time. Therefore, the gift would take effect as if there was no condition attached to it and the assessee became the absolute owner of the properties. We, therefore, hold that there are no errors in the order of the Tribunal in holding that what was gifted to the assessee was the corpus of the properties and not the life interest of the properties. The Tribunal was also right in holding that the intention of the original settlor was not to give the properties to the children of the assessee existing at the time of the execution of the deed of the year 1953. Therefore, the Tribunal was correct in upholding the order of the GTO levying gift-tax. 22. In the result, we answer all the questions of law referred to us in the affirmative and against the assessee. However, in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
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1998 (1) TMI 38 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Undistributed Profits ... ... ... ... ..... the profits as dividend. Since the assessee-company has taken a commercial decision in view of its financial position and the overall liability it had to face, it cannot be stated that the Tribunal has come to an erroneous conclusion in cancelling the order under s. 104 of the Act. In our view, the Tribunal has come to a correct conclusion that it was not commercially possible for the assessee-company not to distribute larger dividend without jeopardising the interest of the assessee-company. The conclusion arrived at by the Tribunal on the basis of the materials on record, in our opinion, is a finding of fact and we are of the opinion that there is no infirmity in the order of the Tribunal and accordingly, the questions of law referred to us are liable to be answered against the Revenue. 11. In fine, both the questions of law referred to us are answered in the affirmative and against the Revenue. However, in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
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1998 (1) TMI 37 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Capital Gains, HUF, Cost Of Acquisition, Hotchpot ... ... ... ... ..... the property by any of the modes specified in clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) of section 49(1) and, thus, the Explanation is held to be applicable to the assessee. We are, with respect, unable to agree with the view taken by the Bombay High Court in Kanubhai R. Shah s case 1993 201 ITR 1050. In that case, the effect of the Explanation below section 49(1) and the question of finding the cost in the hands of the last previous owner were not considered. As stated earlier, the Explanation below section 49(1) would be attracted where the last previous owner acquired the property by any of the modes other than those referred to in clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) of section 49(1) of the Act. In the result, the question is answered in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the Department and against the assessee. It is held that the cost of acquisition of the property shall be deemed to be the cost for which the property was acquired by purchase by the last previous owner, i.e., the assessee.
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1998 (1) TMI 36 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Question Of Law, Penalty, Concealment, Reference ... ... ... ... ..... ibunal and the Tribunal after considering the matter allowed the appeal of the assessees and set aside the penalty. While disposing of the appeal, the Tribunal observed that in order to justify levy of penalty, there has to be some material or circumstances leading to the reasonable conclusion that the amount represented the income of the assessee of the particular assessment year. It was also observed that there cannot be levy of penalty as a matter of course. Accordingly, the Tribunal set aside the penalty for all the ten assessment years. We have gone through the matter and we are of the opinion that levy of penalty is a discretionary order and the Tribunal has exercised its discretion setting aside the penalty after satisfying itself that there was no conscious concealment on the part of the assessees. No question of law arises in this case to call for the statement of the case from the Tribunal. Consequently, this application under section 256(2) of the Act is rejected.
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1998 (1) TMI 35 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Export Market Development Allowance, Weighted Deduction ... ... ... ... ..... ure is, however, clear and does not call for any further details. In Stepwell Industries case 1997 228 ITR 171, the Supreme Court, while considering a similar claim of the assessee regarding payment of commission to the State Trading Corporation of India, declined to allow deduction under section 35B. In Civil Appeals Nos. 1624-25 of 1988, the question relating to commission paid in India to a middleman was examined and it was held that the commission to the middle man, who approached the assessee for the purchase of the assessee s goods for and on behalf of a foreign buyer, was not eligible for deduction under sub-clause (ii) of section 35B(1)(b) of the Act. In these circumstances, service charges paid to the assessee s representative at Bombay do not qualify for deduction under section 35B of the Act inasmuch as none of the sub-clauses of section 35B(1)(b) is attracted. Both the references (Income-tax References Nos. 60 and 131 of 1982) stand disposed of in the above terms.
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1998 (1) TMI 34 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Agricultural Income ... ... ... ... ..... of controversy that the income of the previous year of the assessee, i.e., to say 1991-92, is sought to be assessed for the assessment year 1992-93, The previous year commences from April 1, 1991 and ends with March 31, 1992. The assessment year commences on April 1, 1992. The Amendment Act 40 of 1991 had admittedly come into force on April 1, 1992, the date on which the assessment year commenced. In such a situation, it goes without saying that the Amendment Act 40 of 1991 has to be made applicable to the assessee in determining its income for the assessment year 1992-93. The Tribunal somehow or other, made a grievous error in applying the ratio laid down in the case of Kausalya Santhanam 1978 111 ITR 469 (Mad). The order of the Tribunal, therefore, deserves to be set aside. This point is answered accordingly. In fine, the revision is allowed. The order of the Tribunal is set aside, restoring the order of the Assistant Commissioner of Agricultural Income-tax, Coimbatore-18.
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1998 (1) TMI 33 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Income, Business Income, Law Applicable ... ... ... ... ..... der, 1955, made under the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947, is income chargeable under the head Profits and gains of business or profession . An amendment has also been effected in the definition of income in clause (24) of section 2 of the interpretation clause of the Act whereby any sum chargeable under clause (iiia) of section 28 is included in the definition of income . These amendments, though inserted by the Finance Act of 1990, have been given a retrospective effect from April 1, 1962. The assessment year 1974-75 (sic) is clearly covered by the amendment. Thus, whatever might have been the controversy earlier, the same does not survive for decision in view of the amendments referred to hereinabove, according to which the premium earned by the assessee is liable to be taxed as income under the head Profits and gains of business or profession . For the foregoing reasons, the reference is held to have been rendered academic merely and hence is returned unanswered.
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1998 (1) TMI 32 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Gratuity ... ... ... ... ..... of the section had effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other provision of the Act relating to the computation of income under the head Profits and gains of business or profession . In other words, section 40A had effect notwithstanding anything contained in sections 30 to 39 of the Act. In the instant case, what is sought to be deducted is the insurance premium paid by the assessee to the Life Insurance Corporation of India under the group gratuity scheme for the relevant assessment years 1974-75 and 1975-76 under section 37 of the Act. In view of the decision in Shree Sajjan Mills Ltd. s case 1985 156 ITR 585 (SC), the deduction sought to be claimed in the case on hand, as stated above is impermissible. For the reason as abovestated, there is no other go for us except to answer the question in the negative as against the assessee and in favour of the Department and the same is answered accordingly. These tax cases are thus disposed of. No costs.
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1998 (1) TMI 31 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Disallowance, Firm, HUF ... ... ... ... ..... rofits and gains of business of the firm. Though the earlier two decisions were doubted by the Supreme Court in Rashik Lal and Co. v. CIT 1998 229 ITR 458, it is seen that the Supreme Court was dealing with the case of commission paid to the partner in that case. But in the other two decisions, the Supreme Court dealt with the payment of interest. Since in the earlier two decisions, namely, Brij Mohan Das Laxman Dos v. CIT 1997 223 ITR 825 (SC) and Suwalal Anandilal Jain s case 1997 224 ITR 753 (SC), where the Supreme Court dealt with the case of interest directly paid to the partner in his individual capacity, we are of the view that the earlier two decisions of the apex court, will apply to the facts of the case. Accordingly, following the two decisions of the Supreme Court in Brij Mohan Das Lax man Das v. CIT 1997 223 ITR 825 and Suwalal Anandilal Jain s case 1971 224 ITR 753 we answer both the questions of law referred to us in the affirmative and against the Department.
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1998 (1) TMI 30 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Gift Tax, Exemption ... ... ... ... ..... consider whether the conditions contained in section 5(1)(xiv) are fulfilled in the instant case. Though we are of the view that the Tribunal may not be quite correct in holding that the Board circular would apply to the case of the company making donations to political parties by virtue of the general power conferred by the memorandum and articles of association, still in view of the negligible tax effect involved in the case and in view of the fact that the matter is not likely to recur by reason of the withdrawal of the earlier circular by the Board, we are of the view that the order of the Appellate Tribunal need not be disturbed in this, case. Though we technically answer the questions of law referred to us against the Revenue, it does not mean that we are upholding the order of the Appellate Tribunal on the merits of the case. In this view of the matter, we answer the questions of law in the affirmative and against the Department subject to the observations made by us.
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1998 (1) TMI 29 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Revision, Draft Assessment Order, Powers Of Commissioner ... ... ... ... ..... to pass an order under section 263 of the Income-tax Act to revise an order of the Income-tax Officer, passed with the approval of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner under section 144B of the Act. A similar question of law came up for consideration before this court in T. C. No. 1090 of 1980 (CIT v. V. V. A. Shanmugam 1999 236 ITR 878) and this court by the judgment dated January 7, 1997, in the above tax case held that the order passed by the Income-tax Officer on the basis of the direction given by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner is also amenable to the revisional jurisdiction under section 263 of the Act. Following the unreported judgment of this court in TC No. 1090 of 1980-since reported in CIT v. V. V. A. Shanmugam 1999 236 ITR 878, dated January 7, 1997, the second question of law is also liable to be answered in favour of the Department. Accordingly, we answer both the questions of law referred to us in the negative and in favour of the Department. No costs.
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1998 (1) TMI 28 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Reference, Industrial Company, Cotton Ginning ... ... ... ... ..... pect of the same assessee in Income-tax Reference No. 10 of 1979. A Division Bench of this court, by its judgment and order dated March 4, 1986, decided the question in the affirmative and against the Revenue following an earlier decision of this court in CIT v. Lakhtar Cotton Press Co. (Pvt) Ltd. 1983 142 ITR 503. In that decision, it was held that, where loose cotton in bulk quantity with lighter density was, as a result of pressing, converted into cotton bales and to that extent it underwent a change, the assessee-company fell within the definition of an industrial company because it processed cotton into cotton bales and was entitled to the concessional rate of tax as provided under the law. In view of this settled legal position which was applied in the case of the petitioner-company itself, there does not arise any question as suggested by the applicant for an opinion of this court which, as noted above, is already given. All these applications are, therefore, rejected.
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1998 (1) TMI 27 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Penalty, Concealment Of Income, Marriage Expenses, Profit And Loss Account, Penalty For Concealment
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1998 (1) TMI 26 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Previous Year, Financial Year ... ... ... ... ..... ell in the accounting period 1971-72 relevant for the assessment year 1972-73 and not for the assessment year 1973-74. This court also held that the Appellate Tribunal was right in excluding the income from race winnings from tax for the assessment year 1973-74. As the earlier order of the Appellate Tribunal was upheld by this court in CIT v. Rashmi Kamdar 1996 217 ITR 559, and the Appellate Tribunal in the instant case followed his earlier order in Rashmi Kamdar s case, we are of the view that the same result should follow here also, the factual situation obtaining in the two cases being not in any way different and consequently the question of law referred to us should be answered against the Department. Consequently, by following the earlier decision of this court in CIT v. Rashmi Kamdar 1996 217 ITR 559 we answer the question of law referred to us in the affirmative and against the Department. However, in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
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1998 (1) TMI 25 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... ter concerns relatable to the relevant assessment years were all heard together by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and also by the Tribunal. The same rationale or reasoning was adverted to by the said authorities, while disposing of the said appeals. Pertinent it is also to note that the same common question of law had been referred to us for our opinion in all those references. Today (January 20, 1998), we have disposed of T. C. Nos. 297 and 298 of 1984 (Chennai Murasu P. Ltd. v. CIT 1999 239 ITR 269 (Mad), relatable to the sister concern Chennai Murasu (P.) Ltd., Madras, by a detailed common judgment. The rationale or reasonings adverted to in the said common judgment will also hold good in both these actions Tax Case (Reference) Nos. 299 and 300 of 1984 also. In this view of the matter, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and against the assessee. There shall, however, be no order as to costs, on the facts and in the circumstances of these cases.
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1998 (1) TMI 24 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... consideration during the course of the original assessments he had made. Further, though the facts gathered relate to subsequent assessment year, yet, it could not be stated that from those facts, it is well nigh not possible to legitimately infer that the assessee claimed wastage far in excess of the real wastage or permissible limit of wastage incurred by similar concern, when especially, the information related to the modus operandi of the business, which admittedly remained the same not only for the relevant assessment years 1973-74 and 1974-75, but also for the subsequent year 1975-76 as well, In such a situation, we rather feel that we are not far wrong in stating that the facts of the instant cases fall within categories 3 and 4 of Kalyanji Mavji s case 1976 102 ITR 287 (SC). We, therefore, answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and against the assessee. There shall, however, be no order as to costs, on the facts and in the circumstances of these cases.
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1998 (1) TMI 23 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Reassessment, Information, Company, Surtax, Computation Of Capital, Tax Credit Certificates ... ... ... ... ..... onably believe that income has escaped assessment. The basis of his belief must be the law of which he has now become aware. The opinion rendered by the audit party in regard to the law cannot, for the purpose of such belief, add to or colour the significance of such law. The true evaluation of the law in its bearing on the assessment must be made directly and solely by the Income-tax Officer. No doubt, this decision had been cited before the Tribunal and the Tribunal wrongly applied the decision to the facts of the present case. In view of the discussions, as above, we are of the view that the Income-tax Officer has valid jurisdiction to initiate reassessment proceedings in the assessee s case for the assessment year 1972-73 and answer question No. 1 accordingly. Question No. 2.---This question does not at all arise for consideration, in view of our answer on question No. 1 and we answer this question No. 2 accordingly. The tax case (reference) is thus disposed of. No costs.
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