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Showing 1 to 20 of 509 Records
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1998 (8) TMI 649
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... ... ..... public corporations like Bank, public interest should not be permitted to be defeated on mere technicalities. Further, that procedural defects, which do not go to the root of the matter, should not be permitted to defeat a just cause. The present case is between two private parties, where the appellant had instituted a suit for recovery of an advance of Rs. 31,586/- lent to the respondent together with interest on 2.5.1988. The said suit was dismissed on 4.7.1992 and the present appeal was preferred on 1.9.1992. The appellant was fully conscious of the defects and the short-comings of his case, specially after the impugned judgment. Yet the appellant took no-steps to file any application on record under Order XLl, Rule 27, CPC for leading additional evidence to prove either the Power of Attorney or the Resolution of the Board of Directors. 12. In view of the foregoing discussion, we do not find any merit in the appeal and the same is dismissed, but with no order as to costs.
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1998 (8) TMI 648
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... ... ..... the Bihar Service Code, the age of superannuation should be different from the age of superannuation for all other government servants governed by the Bihar Service Code. The High Court ought not to have equated the service conditions in the three State colleges with the service conditions in a University college. Application of Article 14, in these circumstances, is misconceived, when there are valid criteria for differentiating between the service conditions in the two sets of colleges. In the premises the impugned judgment of the High Court insofar as it directs that the age of superannuation of teachers working in the three engineering colleges other than Bihar College of Engineering, Patna should be brought on par with the age of superannuation of those working in Bihar College of Engineering at Patna, is set aside. The further direction to pay arrears or give benefits flowing from the extended age of superannuation is also set aside. The appeals are allowed accordingly.
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1998 (8) TMI 647
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... ... ..... he wording in the corresponding provision in the former P.C. Act was materially imported in the new P.C. Act, 1988 without any change in spite of the change made in Section 197 of the Code. 14. The result of the above discussion is thus A public servant who committed an offence mentioned in the Act, while he was a public servant, can be prosecuted with the sanction contemplated in Section 19 of the Act if he continues to be a public servant when the court takes cognizance of the offence. But if he ceases to be a public servant by that time the court can take cognizance of offence without any such sanction. In other words, the public servant who committed the offence while he was a public servant, is liable to be prosecuted whether he continues in office or not at the time of trial or during the pendency of the prosecution. 15. The Special court and the High Court have, therefore, rightly repelled the preliminary objections of the appellant. Accordingly we dismiss this appeal.
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1998 (8) TMI 646
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... ... ..... f committing the murder, they, being members of the unlawful assembly certainly knew that the murder was likely to be committed by A1 in prosecution of the common object so as to make them liable under Section 302 read with, the second part of Section 149 IPC. In either view of the matter, therefore, we are of the opinion that the High Court was not at all justified in acquitting A2 to A5 and A9 of the charges under Sections 148 and 302/149 IPC. 22. On the conclusions as above, we dismiss the appeal preferred by Edla Bhoomreddy (A1), son of Gopal Reddy, and allow the appeal of State of Andhra Pradesh and restore the convictions and sentences recorded against Thakkidi Ram Reedy (A2), Kasam Kanka Reedy (A3), Mothey Narayana Reddy (A4), Gunukulla Malla Reddy (A5) and Edla Bhoom Reedy (A9), son of Narsimha Reedy, by the trial court under Section 148 and 302/149 IPC. A2 to A5 and A9 are directed to surrender to their bail bonds to serve out the sentence imposed by the Trial Court.
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1998 (8) TMI 645
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... ... ..... nnot be made liable for punishment under Section 4 of the Act. Likewise, no person connected with the affairs of the management of the first petitioner-club can be punished under Section 3 of the same Act. 17. No other question arises for consideration. 18. For all the aforesaid reasons, the proceedings in Cr.No.406/97 of P.S., Machavaram, Vijayawada City (in the Court of the III Metropolitan Magistrate, Vijayawada) cannot be allowed to go on, as against petitioner Nos. 2 to 52 in any manner whatsoever. Any further proceedings would mean nothing but abuse of legal process. 19. In such view of the matter, the petition is allowed and the proceedings in Cr.No.406/97 on the file of P.S., Machavaram, Vijayawada City (in the Court of the III Metropolitan Magistrate, Vijayawada) are accordingly quashed. 20. Accordingly, there shall be a direction to the respondent to return the seized amounts to the first petitioner herein in connection with the above crime. 21. Ordered accordingly.
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1998 (8) TMI 644
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... ... ..... retaries to the number of officers of the rank of Chief Secretary, Additional Chief Secretary and equivalent officers in the State of Gujarat were given the same pay-scale of Rs. 3000-4500. On this basis as well the Chief Justice of the Gujarat High Court rightly, therefore, came to the conclusion that Private Secretaries working/attached with the High Court Judges are entitled to pay-scale of Rs. 3000-4500. 53. Whatever that may be, here I find that the stand of the State Government is a clear case of discrimination with arbitrariness writ large on the face of it. It cannot be allowed to stand otherwise it will amount to putting stamp of approval on what is patent disparity. Private Secretaries to the Judges of the Gujarat High Court are all entitled to pay scale of Rs. 3000-4500 w.e.f January 1, 1986. 54. In this view of the matter, I would rather dismiss the appeals filed by the State Government with costs. I, however, agree that appeal filed by C.G. Govindan be dismissed.
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1998 (8) TMI 643
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... ... ..... t is given on a wrong premise of law, certainly it would be open to the revisional court to interfere with such a matter. In this case, the Rent Controller proceeded to analyse the matter that non-disclosure of a particular information was fatal and, therefore, dismissed the claim made by the landlord. It is in these circumstances it became necessary for the High Court to re-examine the matter and then decide the entire question. We do not think that any of the decisions referred to by the learned counsel decides the question of the same nature with which we are concerned. Therefore, detailed reference to them is not required. In the result, this appeal stands dismissed, but in the circumstances of the case, parties shall bear their own costs. 13. In the facts and circumstances of the case, it would be appropriate that the appellant be allowed time to vacate the premises till 31.05.1999 subject to his furnishing the usual undertaking in the Court within four weeks from today.
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1998 (8) TMI 642
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... ... ..... that the delay deserves to be condoned as the appellant has been able to show sufficient cause. The delay, in the; facts and circumstances of the case, is not such which may show negligence or total inaction on the part of the appellant. In the present case we need not go into the question whether the limitation would start commencing from the day the appellant learnt about the order made dismissing the objections or from the date of the order as in our view assuming the time is to be computed from the date of the order, then too the appellant would be entitled to get an order condonIng delay in filing restoration application. 5. For the aforesaid reasons, we set aside the impugned order on both the applications. We allow I.A.6302/93, condone the delay in filing application (I.A.6301/93) for restoration which would now be decided on its merits. The parties are directed to appeal before the learned Single Judge on 8th September, 1998. The appeal is allowed in the above terms.
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1998 (8) TMI 641
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... ... ..... he petitioner is predominantly a cotton fabric with the use of resin which is also used in production of plastic material. The Excise Authorities are directed to hear the petitioner and decide the matter afresh on consideration of relevant items contained in Chapters 50 to 55. 12. In the premises, I hold that no excise duty can be levied on the petitioner's product under Heading 59.03 or 59.01. As per the circular dated 13th June, 1986 referred to above, which is binding on the excise authorities, Chapters 50 to 55 should be made applicable considering the predominance of the taxable materials by weight. In that view of the matter, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dated 22-12-1994, passed by the Collector (Appeals), Central Excise and Customs, Ghaziabad, Annexure No. 1 to the writ petition, is hereby quashed and set aside. The matter is remanded back to the Assessing authority for making an assessment under relevant items of Chapters 50 to 55.
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1998 (8) TMI 640
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... ... ..... ned Chief Justice of the Allahabad High Court is requested to nominate the Bench to hear and dispose of the above contempt proceedings. It is needless to state that the procedure prescribed under Chapter XXXV-E of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 will be followed. We also request the High Court to dispose of the case as early as possible and preferably within six months from the date of receipt of the copy of this order. 12. For the foregoing conclusions, the Criminal Appeal No. 483 of 1994 and other connected criminal appeals filed by the contemners are partly allowed. The impugned order dated 15th July, 1994 passed by the High Court in Criminal Misc. Case No. 2058 (C) of 1994 is set aside and the proceedings are remitted to the principal seat of the Allahabad High Court, Allahabad. The Registry is directed to send the copy of this order to the learned Chief Justice of Allahabad High Court for appropriate action. All the criminal appeals to stand disposed of accordingly.
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1998 (8) TMI 639
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... ... ..... that son has expired lately. According to the learned counsel the maximum difference between sustaining the order of the Tribunal and sustaining the order passed against him by the Government would be a piffling so far as the Government is concerned, but in the present circumstances that small amount would be of great utility to the respondent. 6. Having found that the Tribunal had gone wrong in interfering with the quantum of punishment, we persuade ourselves in exercise of our jurisdiction, under Article 136 of the Constitution, to show some leniency to the respondent on account of the facts projected by the learned Counsel which have not been controverted by the other side. We, therefore, leave the respondent's right to get the superannuation benefits as they are without changing the direction issued by the Tribunal. We make it clear that the respondent will not be entitled to any benefit other than the superannuation benefits. 7. The appeal is disposed of accordingly.
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1998 (8) TMI 638
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... ... ..... and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal (CEGAT) dated January 3, 1992. We do not find any merit in this appeal. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.
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1998 (8) TMI 637
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... ... ..... ourt could not give any direction or relief to the petitioners on the basis of a modification of approved scheme during the pendency of the appeal and they directed the parties to approach the RTA or STA for appropriate reliefs if they had any right thereto. The ruling has no relevancy in the present case. Nor does Section 72 of the Act help the respondents in any manner. 20. In the result, we answer the second question in the negative and hold that the power of the Transport commissioner to extend a town service route more than 8 Kilometres beyond the limits of the municipality or town is to be exercised in an appropriate manner in accordance with the guidelines set out in para 18 above. 21. Consequently, the appeals are allowed and the orders of the High Court as well as those of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal are set aside. The orders of the Regional Transport Authority rejecting the applications of the respondents are restored. There will be no order as to costs.
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1998 (8) TMI 636
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... ... ..... reatly prejudiced. It is well known that the rules of procedure are meant to subserve and not to govern the cause of justice. Technicalities should not be allowed to come in the way of dispensation of justice. The maxim "Jus Summun Saepa Summa Est Malitia" suggests that taw strictly enforced sometimes becomes the severest injustice. 7. For the reasons stated above, the impugned judgment of the appellate authority cannot be sustained. 8. The writ petition is allowed. The judgment of the appellate authority dated 7.8.89 is quashed and the case is sent back to the appellate authority to decide the appeal afresh in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made above. Since the matter has been pending since 1985, the appellate authority shall make every endeavour to decide the appeal expeditiously preferably within two months from the date a certified copy of this order is produced. In the circumstances of the case the parties shall bear their own costs.
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1998 (8) TMI 635
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... ... ..... ible. 10. The contention of the Revenue in regard to Entry 23 is that it refers to that which may germinate. It is said that the entry refers to the seeds of flowers, fruits, vegetables, lucerne grass and hemp; and bulbs fall in the same category. There is no doubt that this is so, but the entry also goes on to mention "tubers and plants other than orchids". Plants, as such, do not germinate. Tubers are linked to plants in the entry and must be similarly construed. Therefore, there being no dispute that chicory roots are tubers, they would, in our view, fall within the ambit of Entry 23 and must be subjected to tax accordingly. 11. The second question that arises in the appeal has not been pressed in view of the conclusions in regard to the chicory roots stated above. 12. The questions that were before the High Court shall be deemed to have been answered accordingly. 13. The appeal is allowed. The judgment and order under appeal is set aside. No order as to costs .
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1998 (8) TMI 634
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... ... ..... 843/97 can be regarded as a nullity and whether a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution can be maintained to question the validity of a Judgment of this Court after the petition for review of the said Judgment has been dismissed are, in our opinion, questions which need to be considered by a Constitution Bench of this Court. In the circumstances it is directed that this matter may be placed for consideration before a Constitution Bench. 5. Shri Venugopal states that in pursuance of the direction contained in the Judgment of this Court dated March 10, 1997 the respondent has deposited in this Court a sum of ₹ 10,50,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh Fifty Thousand only). He submits that the respondent may be permitted to withdraw the said amount subject to his furnishing the bank guarantee for the said amount to the satisfaction of the Registrar of this Court and that this will be without prejudice to the contention of the parties. The respondent is permitted to do so.
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1998 (8) TMI 633
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... ... ..... m 2-9-1981 till the date of suit and at 12 from the date of suit till date of realisation. 12. In the result, CCCA 196 of 1994 is allowed partly to the extent indicated above and the first defendant is entitled to refund of a sum of a ₹ 4,500/- being the deposit of rent for three months with the plaintiff and the cross-objections filed by the plaintiff are dismissed. CCCA 64 of 1995 is dismissed so far as relief of eviction of the defendants is concerned, and the cross-objections filed by the respondent in this appeal are dismissed, but mesne profits arc restricted to the extern indicated above. CCCA 177 of 1995 is filed by the tenant questioning the decree granting arrears of rent from 2-9-1981 to April, 1983 at the rate of ₹ 1,500/- per month. As there is no proof of payment of any rent during this period, the plaintiff is entitled to a decree. Accordingly, we confirm the decree passed in OS No.922 of 1991. Time for vacating the premises three months. No costs.
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1998 (8) TMI 632
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... ... ..... the consent or connivance of, or was attributable to any neglect on the part of the petitioners. In the absence of such an averment/evidence, in my view, the petitioners cannot be roped in under Section 141 of the Act. 11. With utmost respect, I am unable to subscribe to the view expressed by a learned single judge of the Madras High Court in N. Doraisamy v. Archana Enterprises 1995 2 CCC 378 ; 1999 97 CC 129 to the effect that even in the absence of specific averments in the complaint with regard to the responsibility of a person vis-a-vis the company, in relation to its business, a prosecution can be launched against those, who had been just named in the complaint. 12. For the foregoing reasons, the impugned order dated August 17, 1996, to the extent it proceeds to frame charge against the petitioners under Section 138 of the Act is set aside and the petitioners are discharged. 13. The petition stands disposed of. 14. The file of the trial court may be sent back forthwith.
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1998 (8) TMI 631
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... ... ..... e dishonoured by the bank. The accused-firm, for the purposes of section 138 of the Act, is a company and the petitioners are the directors thereof. The offence is alleged to have been committed by the accused-firm. The petitioners are, therefore, deemed to be guilty of the offence and are liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. As discussed hereinabove, neither of the petitioners was required to be given individual notice envisaged under section 138 of the Act. The action of the trial court in arraigning the petitioners as accused persons in the above referred criminal cases is, therefore, legal and is in consonance with the provisions contained in sections 138 and 141 of the Act. Same, therefore, does not call for interference by this court. 9. In view of the above discussion, the applications are dismissed. Rule Nisi issued in each of the applications is discharged. Interim orders stand vacated. The parties shall bear their own costs. 10. Rule discharged.
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1998 (8) TMI 630
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... ... ..... the decree holder sought for attachment of the suit property independent of the so-called charge under Ex. A-6. If really the decree holder in the proceedings wanted to proceed on the basis of the security arising out of charge under Ex. A-6. The requirement of attachment was superfluous. Whether the claim under Ex. A-6 arising out of charge was given up or not what was pursued is the execution proceeding was only to attach the suit property without recourse to charge under Ex. A-6. Therefore, the appellant could not have acquired any rights of mortgagee under Ex. A-6, the Security Bond. For this reason also appellant's suit is liable to be dismissed and the finding of the High Court, therefore, stands affirmed. 19. The other question raised and elaborately argued do not assume any importance in the view we have taken. Hence we do not propose to answer them. 20. In the result the appeals stand dismissed and in the circumstances of the case shall be no order as to costs.
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