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Showing 1 to 20 of 432 Records
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1999 (10) TMI 764
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... ... ..... otiable Instruments Act. Yet another infirmity is found in this case, viz., that the averment in the complaint would be that the. cheque was issued only by the petitioner. On the other hand, a notice issued by the second respondent to the petitioner, annexures II and III, would disclose that the cheque was issued by the petitioner along with two other persons, viz., Ashok and Kamashi. In these circumstances, as rightly pointed out by learned counsel, I find no merit on the side of the second respondent to launch a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Therefore, no purpose will be served by permitting the magistrate to proceed with the criminal prosecution. Therefore, it can be rightly interfered with by this court under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. 4. In the result, the proceedings in C. C. No. 387 of 1998 on the file of the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court No. 1, Fort Cochin, stand quashed. Criminal miscellaneous case is allowed.
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1999 (10) TMI 763
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... ... ..... ondent having failed to prove the only plea of tenancy put forward by him is not entitled to get any relief in this suit. 24. As already pointed out, the decree passed by the Trial Court as affirmed by the High Court travels beyond the prayer in the plaint and also the scope of Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act. Apart from granting a decree for possession as prayed for by the respondent, the trial court has granted an additional relief which was not prayed for by him in that the trial court has directed the appellant to remove the construction put up by him including the dismantling of the glass. Such a relief cannot be granted under the provisions of Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, particularly when there is no prayer therefor in the plaint. 25. In the result, the appeals are allowed. The judgment and the decree of the Courts below are set aside. The Suit No. 793/86 on the file of the Subordinate Judge stands dismissed. The parties shall bear their respective costs.
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1999 (10) TMI 762
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... ... ..... im Aides Silk Exporters, Bangalore. 14. Reliance was placed by Shri Singh in support of his submission on (Orissa) Janardhan Mohapatra v. Saroj Kumar Choudhary. This judgment is not at all attracted to the facts of the case under consideration. 15. It may also be noticed here even if what was urged in the complaint as well as during the course of hearing of this appeal that cause of action accrued in favour of the appellant on 20-4-92 the date when cheques were dishonoured. Thereafter notice was issued to respondent. It may be clarified that 15 days clear time has to be allowed to the accused like respondent for making payment after receipt of such notice. What to talk allowing this period of 15 days, the complaint itself was filed in the instant case on 9-5-93 on the 14th day. Thus on this ground also the complaint was premature. 16. No other point is urged. 17. As a result of aforesaid discussion, it is clear, there is no merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed.
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1999 (10) TMI 761
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... ... ..... There is a clear finding of fact rendered by the trial Court that a blank signature on stamp paper was given and the document now produced before the Court satisfies the conditions of a promissory note. There could be no impediment to grant a decree and the trial Court, not following the principles of law, has committed an error apparent on the face of the record. 17. No doubt, the learned counsel for the respondent relies on the authorities mentioned above to indicate the powers of this Court sitting in revision to interfere, with reference to the finding of fact rendered by the Small Causes Court, but those powers do not restrict interference in cases where the law is misunderstood and the finding is an error apparent on the face of the record. 18. In this view of the matter, setting aside the decree of the trial Court, all the civil revision petitions, i.e. 1574/95, 1590/ 95 and 1591/95 are allowed, and the suits are decreed with costs as prayed for. No order as to costs.
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1999 (10) TMI 760
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... ... ..... e are, prima facie, of the opinion that the lapse was on the part of the defendants who were not possessed of sufficient funds for completion of the work. The allegation of the defendants that HCCL itself had abandoned the work does not, prima facie, appear to be correct and it is for this reason that we are of the positive view that the "special equities" are wholly in favour of HCCL. 23. For the reasons stated above, the appeal arising out of SLP(C) No. 6985/98 is allowed. The judgment and order passed by the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court insofar as it purports to vacate the injunction order, granted by the Single Judge in respect of "Performance Guarantee", is set aside and the injunction order granted by the Single Judge in respect of both the Guarantees, namely, "Mobilisation Advance" and "Performance Guarantee" is maintained. The appeal arising out of SLP(C) No. 12143/98 is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1999 (10) TMI 759
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... ... ..... We do not find any substance in this contention. The explanation to Section 43 makes it clear that for the purpose of that section public place includes any public conveyance, hotel, shop, or other place intended for use by, or accessible to, the public. It is not in dispute that the said hotel was intended for use by, or accessible to, the public. Merely because a customer is allowed to occupy a room in the hotel, it would not cease to be a hotel. Even after occupation by a customer it would remain a hotel and not a private property of the occupier. It would not cease to be a public place as contemplated by Section 43. For that reason, we cannot accept the contention that because the raid was made after sunset and no grounds as contemplated by Section 42 were recorded, the search was illegal and the evidence regarding recovery pursuant to that illegal search was not admissible. 4. As we do not find any substance in the only contention raised in this appeal, it is dismissed.
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1999 (10) TMI 758
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... ... ..... High Court and Tribunal's decision in Intercity Cable System's case, we hold that the appellants were not eligible to avail the benefit of exemption under notification No. 175/86. We also find that the extended period of limitation is invokable as the fact of affixing brand name was not disclosed by the appellants to the Department. A letter written on 13.4.1981 to intimate the names of persons authorised to sign the excise gate-passes cannot at all be an intimation to the Department that they were affixing the brand name of Havell's on their product. We agree with the findings of the Commissioner that "mention in RT-12 of 'Elymer Havells' will not automatically allow the department to come to a conclusion that someone else is the owner of this brand name and also the fact that the brand name owner is not eligible for exemption under notification No. 175/86." In view of these facts and circumstances we reject the appeal filed by the appellants.
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1999 (10) TMI 757
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... ... ..... visions should be to find out whether the accused is guilty or not on the basis of evidence on record. If he is guilty, appropriate sentence is required to be imposed or maintained. If the appellant or his counsel submits that he is not challenging the order of conviction, as there is sufficient evidence to connect the accused with the crime, then also the Court's conscious must be satisfied before passing final order that the said concession is based on the evidence on record. In such cases, sentence commensuration with the crime committed by the accused is required to be imposed. Mere acceptance or admission of the guilt should not be a ground for reduction of sentence. Nor can the accused bargain with the Court that as he is pleading guilty sentence be reduced. 9. In the result, appeals are allowed. Impugned order dated 28 November, 1997 passed by the High Court is quashed and set aside. The High Court is directed to decide the appeals on merits in accordance with law.
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1999 (10) TMI 756
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... ... ..... above complaint given by the Union. In the absence of the above document, it is not open to the Courts below to come to a conclusion that the accused already anticipated the closure of the Unit and that therefore, they ought to have given notice to the Government. As the company was taken over by SIPCOT with effect from a particular date, it cannot be said that the accused intended to close the unit. If that is so, the accused cannot be convicted for violation of Section 25FFA of the Act. As the company was not closed by the accused on their own accord, it is not incumbent on them to comply with the provisions of Section 25FFA of the Act. For the above reasons, I hold that the reasons assigned by the appellate Court for convicting the accused cannot be sustained. 13. In the result, the criminal revision case is allowed. The conviction and sentence imposed on the accused/revision petitioners are set aside. The fine amount if paid shall be refunded to the revision petitioners.
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1999 (10) TMI 755
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... ... ..... he most, he should have set aside the assessment with a direction to the Assessing Officer to allow the assessee an opportunity of making good the reserve. In the alternative, he could have given such opportunity himself. Admittedly, this was not done. In the circumstances, we are of the view that the action of the CIT(A) withdrawing the excess deduction under section 80HHC is not justified. We are persuaded to take this view in the light of the remarks of the Apex Court in the case of Bajaj Tempo Ltd. v. CIT 1992 196 ITR 188/ 62 Taxman 480 to the effect that an incentive provision has to be interpreted liberally. There is also the principle of harmonious construction between the various provisions of the Act. The view we have taken is the only way to reconcile the provisions of section 139(5) and the language of the proviso to section 80HHC. 8. For the foregoing reasons, we set aside the order of the CIT(A) and restore that of the Assessing Officer. 9. The appeal is allowed.
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1999 (10) TMI 754
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... ... ..... 23. Ms. Iyer, appearing for the respondents, seeks stay of my order for a period of 8 weeks. Mr. Shah opposes the request. Inasmuch as a question of jurisdiction has been raised and a point of law has sought to be agitated, it would be desirable that the plaintiffs-respondents ought to be given an opportunity, if they want to avail of. Hence this order will remain stayed for a period of 8 weeks from today. That will mean that in the meanwhile the ad interim injunction, which was granted in that matter and which was continued subsequently by the order dated 21st April, 1999 by dismissing Appeal From Order, will continue to be available to the plaintiffs-respondents. 24. Mr. Shah presses for costs of this revision. Costs will be cost in the cause. 25. In the event, the respondents seek to challenge this order, they will give a notice of clear 4 days in advance to the petitioners. 26. Parties to act on the copy of this order authenticated by the Personal Secretary of this Court.
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1999 (10) TMI 753
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... ... ..... of wire does not amount to manufacture, he relied upon the decision in the case of Commissioner of Central Excise, New Delhi v. Mithan Wires, reported in 1999 (34) R.L.T. 252 (CEGAT) wherein it was held that redrawing wire of thicker gauge into thinner gauge does not amount to manufacture. We also heard Shri Ashok Kumar, learned Departmental Representative. 3. We have considered the submissions of both the sides. There is no rebuttal from the Revenue that the inputs which are brought by them are classifiable under 7408.11 being in the coil form. In view of this position it cannot be said that the inputs were copper bars and copper rods. The issue therefore, involved in the matter about redrawing is squarely covered by the decision of the Tribunal in the case of Commissioner of Central Excise, New Delhi v. Mithan Wires (supra) and C.C.E., Calcutta, II v. Indian Pin Mfg. Co., reported in 1999 (34) R.L.T. 321 (CEGAT). Following the ratio of these decisions, we allow the appeal.
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1999 (10) TMI 752
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... ... ..... med Quadri, JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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1999 (10) TMI 751
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... ... ..... ore us cannot be entertained as no foundation thereof was laid before the Tribunal, It was open to the first respondent to make proper application under Section 21(3) of the Act for condonation of delay and having not done so, he cannot be permitted to take up such contention at this late stage. In our opinion, the O.A. filed before the Tribunal after the expiry of three years could not have been admitted and disposed of on merits in view of the statutory provision contained in Section 21(1) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. The law in this behalf is now settled, see Secretary to Government of India and Ors. v. Shivam Mahadu Gaikwad . 8. For the reasons stated above, the impugned order passed by the Administrative Tribunal on August 6, 1996 in O.A. No. 631 of 1994 is set aside and the said O.A. is dismissed on the ground of limitation. The Civil Appeal Nos. 3119 of 1997 and 3120 of 1997 are allowed. In the circumstances, parties are directed to bear their own costs.
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1999 (10) TMI 750
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... ... ..... ) E.L.T. 353 (S.C.) 1999 (4) SCALE 669 titled Collector of Central Excise, Pune etc. etc. v. Dai Ichi Karkaria Ltd. etc. etc.
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1999 (10) TMI 749
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... ... ..... 6 . 5. Bearing in mind the law laid down by this Court in the cases referred to earlier and the contentions raised by the learned Counsel appearing for the parties and on examining the allegations made in the FIR, we are persuaded to accept the submission of Mr. H.N. Salve and Mr. Arun Jaitley, appearing for the respondents that necessary ingredients of the offence of cheating or criminal breach of trust have not been made out and on the other hand the attendant circumstances indicate that the FIR was lodged to pre-empt the filing of the criminal complaint against the informant under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The High Court, therefore, was well within its power in quashing the FIR as otherwise it would tantamount to an abuse of process of Court. We, therefore, see no justification for our interference with the impugned decision of the High Court in exercise of power under Article 136 of the Constitution. 6. This appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed.
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1999 (10) TMI 748
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... ... ..... were also ordered to be returned under Rule 5A, with the consequence that the mortgage was treated as discharged, the obvious conflict can be removed by allowing both the appeals, namely, C.M.A. Nos. 19 and 74 of 1984, which are hereby allowed, so as to bring in harmony the earlier part of the judgment with the latter part. The objection that the respondent had not filed any appeal in this Court against that part of the judgment of the High Court by which C.M.A. Nos. 19 and 74 of 1984 were dismissed, cannot be entertained as the principles contained in Order 41 Rule 33 can be invoked in the instant case so as to do complete justice between the parties. For the reasons stated above, we find no merit in this appeal which is hereby dismissed with the observation that the amount deposited by the appellant from time to time in the High Court or any other Court, in this case, shall be refunded to him together with all interest accrued thereon. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1999 (10) TMI 747
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... ... ..... roceed in any other manner stated in Section 10 (6) in case of denial of landlord's title by the tenants. If the Rent Controller is of the opinion that the denial of landlord's title is bona fide, then he shall dismiss the eviction petition filed by the landlord. If on the other hand he is not satisfied about the bona fides of the denial of title raised by the tenants, then he shall order the tenants to put the landlord in possession of the building." 9. Further, as rightly pointed out by the learned Counsel for the respondent, even if eviction is ordered by the Rent Controller and subsequently the suit is decreed, the plaintiffs in the suit suit can recover possession pursuant to the decree granted to them. As such, there cannot be any prejudice to the petitioner by not staying the RCC. 10. For all the foregoing reasons. I do not find any merit in the CRP. It is accordingly dismissed but without costs. Interim stay granted on 16-9-1999 stands vacated. No costs.
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1999 (10) TMI 746
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... ... ..... of the groups should go out of the company for proper consideration, In this case, both the groups have expressed their inability to purchase the shares of the other group for want of financial resources. Therefore, no directions in this regard could be given. However, we find that the petitioner has given certain personal guarantees to the financial institutions. Now that he is no longer a director on the board of the company, equity demands that he should be released from his personal guarantees. We find from the letter of PICUP at page 79 of the additional documents that PICUP would be prepared to release the personal guarantee of the outgoing directors once proper personal guarantees are given by the incoming directors. In view of this, we direct that the respondents should take expeditious action to get the personal guarantees given by the petitioner released by the financial institutions. 19. With the above direction, we dispose of this petition. No order as to costs.
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1999 (10) TMI 745
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... ... ..... oes not lie without the sanction of the High Court, in view of the appointment of a special officer. 16. The facts and circumstances of the case in West Bengal Pharmaceutical and Phytochemical Development Corporation Ltd.'s case, AIR 1982 Cal 94, cited by counsel for the petitioners can be distinguished from the facts of the present case especially in the former case, the High Court has held that the reliefs asked for in the civil suit are different from the reliefs sought in the company petition. 17. In view of the foregoing, since the civil proceeding before the Calcutta High Court is prior in time to the filing of the petition before us, to avoid conflict of decisions, we are inclined to stay the proceedings before the Company Law Board till disposal of the Civil Suit in No. 245B of 1996 on the file of the High Court of Calcutta, and accordingly the proceedings in the company petition are stayed. 18. Accordingly, application in C. A. No. 22 of 1999 stands disposed of.
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