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Case Laws
Showing 421 to 436 of 436 Records
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1999 (12) TMI 17 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Kar Vivad Samadhan Scheme ... ... ... ... ..... . Thus, it is clear that section 67 does not embody a totally inflexible rule. When things are beyond the control of the citizen, certain moving space is normally allowed. This is precisely what the petitioner is wanting in the present case. I am of the considered view that the said ratio would also be applicable in full force to the scheme in question. Shri Nema submits that there is one day s delay, whereas Shri Rohit Arya submits that there is two days delay. Be that as it may, there is not much delay which warranted rejection of the declaration. It is not disputed that March 25, 1999, was a bank holiday and the amount was deposited on March 27, 1999, for which proper explanation has been given. Accordingly, respondent No. 1, should have condoned the delay. Accordingly, the order passed by the Commissioner vide annexure P-7 is quashed and it is directed that the Commissioner shall pass appropriate orders accepting the declaration. The writ petition is accordingly allowed.
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1999 (12) TMI 16 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Firm, Assessment, Dissolution Of Firm ... ... ... ... ..... onstitution of a firm within the meaning of sub-section (2) of section 187 of the Act and the Tribunal has not held that a single assessment was justified. We, therefore, reframe the question as under Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that a single assessment for the periods April 1, 1975, to January 4, 1976, and January 6, 1976 to March 31, 1976 was not justified ? The controversy now stands settled by the Supreme Court in CIT v. Empire Estate 1996 218 ITR 355in which it has been held that where there is no provision in the partnership deed that the firm would not be dissolved on the death of a partner, the death of a partner dissolves the firm in terms of section 42 of the Partnership Act and, therefore, two assessments have to be framed. Following the law as declared by the Supreme Court, the question, as reframed by us, is answered in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Commissioner.
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1999 (12) TMI 15 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Interest On Borrowed Capital ... ... ... ... ..... the same rate at which the moneys had been borrowed from the banks and to determine this the Tribunal remitted the matter back to the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals). In the question as aforesaid, it is not in dispute that the interest proportionate to the interest-free advances made to the directors is disallowable. In fact it has been so held by this court in the assessee s own cases in CIT v. Saraya Sugar Mills (P.) Ltd. 1992 193 ITR 575 and CIT v. Saraya Sugar Mills (P.) Ltd. 1993 201 ITR. 181that part of the interest paid to the bank can be disallowed to the extent to which the money has not been utilised for the purposes of the business. The Tribunal s direction that the disallowance be made by calculating the amount of interest at the same rate at which interest was paid by the assessee-company on the loans taken by it, is in accordance with law and we answer the aforesaid question in the affirmative, i.e., against the assessee and in favour of the Commissioner.
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1999 (12) TMI 14 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Interest Tax ... ... ... ... ..... ot or it may be agreed it applies, but the difference arises to its application. The title and general scope of the Act constitute the background of the contest. If the interpretation suggested by learned counsel for the assessee is accepted, the very charging section would be rendered inoperative and ineffective, which is impossible to be done. The machinery provisions cannot be interpreted in such a way as to restrict the scope of the charging section. As a matter of fact, the courts are expected to construe the machinery provisions in such a manner that a charge to tax is not defeated (see Associated Cement Co. Ltd. v. CTO 1981 48 STC 466 (SC)). The conclusions of the Tribunal are in order. The first question, therefore, is answered in the affirmative, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. In view of this answer, the second question, which is really of academic interest, shall be treated to have been answered in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee.
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1999 (12) TMI 13 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... filing of any suit against the company, whose management has been taken over under the Ordinance nor has any liability, by operation of law ceased to exist. Viewed thus we have no doubt whatsoever that the assessee could have proceeded against the Tata Mills for recovering the amounts due to it and if the amounts, despite such proceedings, could not have been recovered, it had the option to apply to the Assessing Officer in terms of section 36(1)(vii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, for such relief as could be found due to it. When we look to the judgment of the Tribunal we found that the Tribunal has itself permitted the assessee to take recourse to such action, leaving all such questions open. The Tribunal s judgment, therefore, cannot be faulted with nor does it call for any interference whatsoever. We accordingly while disposing of the reference answer the question in the affirmative. All parties to act on a signed Xerox copy of this dictated order on the usual undertaking.
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1999 (12) TMI 12 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Kar Vivad Samadhan Scheme, Words And Phrases ... ... ... ... ..... rder is complete only when it is served or otherwise communicated to the declarant and the direction at the foot of Form No. 2A directing the declarant to make the payment of the sum payable within 30 days from the date of this certificate is not in accordance with the scheme and is, therefore, illegal. We, therefore, allow this writ petition and hold that the declarant petitioner having paid the dues determined under section 90(1) within 30 days of the communication to him of the order made under sub-section (2) of section 90, the designated authority is obliged to issue to the petitioner the requisite certificate in Form No. 3. We, therefore, allow this writ petition and quash the communication F. No. CIT/Alld/Tech/KVSS/98-99, dated June 22, 1999, issued by the designated authority respondent No. 1 to the petitioner and direct the designated authority to issue to the petitioner a certificate in Form No. 3 as required under the scheme. The parties will bear their own costs.
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1999 (12) TMI 11 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Offences And Prosecution ... ... ... ... ..... gs are given The omission of sections 276DD and 276E of the Act with effect from April 1, 1989, will not affect the proceedings already initiated by the Income-tax Department. It is open to the court to impose punishment on the accused notwithstanding the fact that the penal provision was deleted before the date of the judgment. The order of acquittal passed by the trial court in cases which are the subject-matter of C. A. Nos. 279 to C. A. No. 288 of 1990 have to be upheld. The finding of the trial court, in cases relating to C. A. No. 249 batch (Table I) that the court is not empowered to impose punishment since the penal provision is deleted is set aside. As the trial court has not given finding on other aspects of the case and as it is not desirable to remit the matter to the trial court for fresh disposal after a lapse of 13 years, no further directions are given for remitting the cases. For the reasons stated above, all the criminal appeals are disposed of accordingly.
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1999 (12) TMI 10 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Kar Vivad Samadhan Scheme ... ... ... ... ..... ovision of section 245 of the Act. The said adjustment cannot be treated as a valid adjustment in the eye of law. Accordingly, the tax liability was outstanding on the date of filing of the application under the scheme and the respondent-Commissioner has wrongly rejected the application on the ground that no demand was outstanding against the petitioner. However, I may clarify that no direction can be given for refund of the amount already adjusted as the Department has power under section 245 of the Act to adjust the amount. However, for the purpose of benefit of the scheme it has to be treated that the assessee was in arrear of tax on the date of filing of the application. In the result, the application being C. W. 1. C. No. 3317 of 1999(R) is dismissed and the application being C. W. J. C. No. 3318 of 1999(R) is allowed and the order contained in annexure 2 is quashed and the Commissioner is directed to consider the matter in terms of the scheme. A. K. SINHA J.---I agree.
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1999 (12) TMI 9 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Voluntary Disclosure Of Income ... ... ... ... ..... mber 31, 1997, and the respondent paid the tax on March 31, 1998. It is true that the declarant should have paid the tax within three months from the date of filing the declaration. The respondent s application was filed on December 29, 1997, and therefore, the tax ought to have been paid on March 28, 1998, but the same was paid only on March 31, 1998. The respondent had applied for a bank loan since he had to pay Rs. 9.75 lakhs by way of tax as the amount declared by him under the Scheme was Rs. 38.36 lakhs. The learned judge (see 20001 241 ITR 457 has exercised his discretionary power and we do not think that it was contrary to the express provision of law. An appeal against such an order could be interfered with only if the power exercised is irrational or illegal. We do not think that this is a fit case for this court to interfere in appeal. Therefore, the writ appeal is without any merit. The writ appeal is dismissed. Consequently, C.M.P. No. 20707 of 1999 is dismissed.
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1999 (12) TMI 8 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Reassessment, Search Operation ... ... ... ... ..... d by the appellate authority. Even after initiation of the proceedings the assessee may satisfy a particular document or transaction that there is no escapement of income and the Assessing Officer may drop the proceedings. Similarly, even if the addition is made the appellate authority may come to a different conclusion on the basis of the facts and law, but that would not affect the jurisdiction of the Assessing Officer to initiate the proceedings under section 147(a). In these circumstances, we are of the view that the Tribunal was right in holding that failure of the assessee at least to indicate the presence of the closing stock relating to the chips could give rise to a reasonable belief as envisaged under section 147(a) of the Income-tax Act, and in that view in concluding that the Assessing Officer had the jurisdiction to initiate proceedings under section 147(a) of the Act in a valid manner. The reference is answered in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee.
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1999 (12) TMI 7 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the persons and, as may be, only one of the assets of the family, namely, its interest in Sharvan Cold Storage and General Mills was partitioned. Therefore, it was a valid partition within the meaning of section 171 of the Act. It is important to bear in mind that it was not the case of the Commissioner that the interest of the family in Sharvan Cold Storage and General Mills was not divided by metes and bounds and it remained the joint asset of all the four persons. In view of the above discussions and following this court s earlier judgment in CIT v. Sharwan Kumar Swarup and Sons 1998 232 ITR 123 and the judgment dated December 1, 1999 in ITR No. 303 of 1980, we answer question No. 2 in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Commissioner. In view of the answer to question No. 2, question No. 1 becomes redundant and we decline to answer the same. An authenticated copy of this judgment be transmitted to the Appellate Tribunal in accordance with law.
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1999 (12) TMI 6 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... under section 264 of the Income-tax Act before the Commissioner of Income-tax requesting him to pass such order thereon not being an order prejudicial to the assessment, so that their assessed returned incomes for the relevant assessment years, which have been included in the hands of the present applicants, are excluded from their assessments. Considering the principles of natural justice, we hope that the Commissioner would condone the delay in filing the revision applications as per the proviso of section 264(3) of the Income-tax Act. The Settlement Commission has computed the income of the petitioners only on the basis of the annexures to the order. In the order, it is specifically stated that the petitioners offered the unaccounted incomes of the concerns of their own in the respective settlement applications. Hence, I do not find any merit in the writ petitions and the same are dismissed. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petitions are also dismissed. No costs.
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1999 (12) TMI 5 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
New Industrial Undertaking, Special Deduction, Trust - "(1) Whether the Appellate Tribunal is right in law and on facts in allowing the deduction under section 80L to the assessee-trust treating the status as individual? - (2) Whether the Appellate Tribunal is right in law and on facts in deleting the addition of Rs. 1,99,12,300 being interest paid by the assessee-trust to its beneficiaries? - (3) Whether the Appellate Tribunal is right in law and on facts in deleting the addition of Rs. 8,40,000 made on account of estimate of earned interest at the rate of 12 percent, on bank fixed deposits of Rs. 70 lakhs existing in the name of the beneficiaries? - (4) Whether the Appellate Tribunal is right in law and on facts in deleting the addition of Rs. 6,49,726 made on account of interest on deposits amount to Rs. 1.70 crores made by the assessee-trust with Norma Detergent Pvt. Ltd., and on behalf of the beneficiaries? - (5) Whether the Appellate Tribunal is right in law and on facts in allowing the deduction under section 80-I of the Act - we find that there is no merit in the appeal, and the appeal stands dismissed.
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1999 (12) TMI 4 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, New Industrial Undertaking, Special Deduction, Computation Of Capital, Actual Cost, Subsidy From Government - "(i) Whether, on the facts and circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was right in law in holding that the contribution paid as per the provisions of section 69 of the Gujarat Rajya Co-operative Societies Act, 1961, is not deductible in the computation of the total income? - (ii) Whether, on the facts and circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was right in law in holding that depreciation was not admissible on 30 percent value of the plant and machinery received from Indian Dairy Corporation? - (iii) Whether, on the facts, the Appellate Tribunal was right in law in holding that 30 percent of value of the plant and machinery received from Indian Dairy Corporation was not to be included in the computation of the capital employed for the purpose of granting relief under section 80J?"
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1999 (12) TMI 3 - SC ORDER
It is contended that Sikkim was not a part of India and at that time the Income-tax Act was not applicable in respect of the assessment year for which notice was served at New Delhi - held that notice section 148 of the Act issued in relation to income which is stated to have arisen in India was valid even if petitioner company had its head office at Sikkim
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1999 (12) TMI 2 - SUPREME COURT
Business of manufacture of yarn - claim for higher rate of initial depreciation on the machinery employed in the manufacture on the ground that its manufacturing product, viz., "yarn" falls under item No. 21 of the Ninth Schedule to the Income-tax Act - Tribunal is justified in law in holding that the manufacture of yarn would amount to manufacture of textile within the meaning of Entry 21 of the Ninth Schedule and, therefore, the assessee is entitled to higher rate of initial depreciation
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