Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 675 Records
-
2000 (11) TMI 1244
... ... ... ... ..... has a case that the car has been lost by reason of want of title in the vendor. It is also held that in the absence of a categorical case that the plaintiff lost title to the vehicle the plaintiff may not be entitled to damages. We are of the view, plaintiff has no such case that he lost title to the vehicle. In the petition for amendment, there is absolutely no averment to establish the same as well. In the absence of any pleading and in the absence of any evidence we are of the view that this court in this jurisdiction cannot discard the earlier ruling of the Division Bench. We therefore hold that the plaintiff cannot successfully lay a claim for damages against the defendant in the absence of any pleading or proof thereof that he had lost title to the vehicle. In view of this finding we need not go into other disputed questions of facts. We therefore concur the finding of the learned Single Judge and dismiss the appeal. In the circumstances of the case we order no costs.
-
2000 (11) TMI 1243
... ... ... ... ..... Mr.B.K. Prasad, Adv., Mr. P. Parmeswaran,Adv ORDER Delay condoned. The Special Leave Petition is dismissed.
-
2000 (11) TMI 1242
... ... ... ... ..... under the notice and therefore are guilty of offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, would be sufficient to bring their case within the fold of Section 141(2) of the Negotiable Instruments Act. 14. In the instant case, the complainant had stated in the complaint that the petitioner is a director in charge of the day-to-day affairs of the first accused company. This averment is sufficient to satisfy the provision of Section 141(1) of the Negotiable Instruments Act. I feel, it is not necessary that the petitioner should specifically aver the overt act committed by the petitioner as a director of the company. The mere fact that he is a director is sufficient to show that he is responsible for the affairs of the company and it is for him to prove that he comes within the proviso to Section 141(1) of the Negotiable Instruments Act. This criminal original petition is therefore dismissed. Consequently, Crl. M. P. Nos. 10794 and 10799 of 1999 are also dismissed.
-
2000 (11) TMI 1241
... ... ... ... ..... would only escalate further disputes between the parties and therefore we are not giving any directions. However, with a view to put an end to further disputes between the parties, we give the option to the petitioners to sell their shares in the company to the respondents for a fair price to be determined by the statutory auditors of the company as per the balance sheet as at 31-3-1997, being the proximate date to the filing of the petition. In case they exercise their option, they should give a notice to the company/2nd respondent latest by 31-12-2000. Once such a notice is received by the company/2nd respondent, then the notice will be binding on them. The company should proceed with the determination of the fair price for the shares within a month thereafter and the 2nd respondent will be bound to purchase the shares of the petitioners at the value so determined with- in a month thereafter. 10. With the above directions, we dispose of this petition. No order as to cost.
-
2000 (11) TMI 1240
... ... ... ... ..... Government. As seen, under Section 3 of the Road Transport Corporation Act, it is the State Government who may either perform the function itself or establish a Corporation, which would be performing functions which are basically public functions. Merely because the State Government establishes a Corporation and that Corporation is an establishment distinct from the State Government does not ipso facto mean that that Corporation is not under the control of the State Government. This very vital aspect appears to have been lost sight of by the learned Judge. In our view, it is clear that the Appellant Corporation is under the control of the State Government. o p /o p Therefore, the provisions of the said Act would not be applicable to it by virtue of Section 11(1)(c) of the said Act. In this view of the matter, the Judgement of the High Court cannot be sustained and is hereby set aside. o p /o p Accordingly the Appeals are allowed. There will be no order as to costs. o p /o p
-
2000 (11) TMI 1239
... ... ... ... ..... n transit and the time of checking was incomplete in some respects. The respondent has produced all the relevant documents. There is no evasion of tax or mens rea on the part of the respondent to evade the tax. 27. We are of the opinion that the proceedings' for imposition of penalty is clear misconceived. We have, therefore, no hesitation to declare that the proceedings initiated by the petitioners under Section 78 of the Act is clearly misconceived. 28. The above discussion itself will indicate that the respondent cannot be held guilty of tax evasion or mens rea. The proceedings are, therefore, initiated by non-application of mind and the same is liable to be set aside as arbitrary and unreasonable. 29. For all the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion that the order passed by the Taxation Tribunal is correct and there is no warrant for any interference with the said order, quashing the penalty proceedings. 30. The writ petition fails and is dismissed. 31. No costs.
-
2000 (11) TMI 1238
... ... ... ... ..... al, the application under Order XLI, Rule 27 CPC could have been dismissed. But the argument ignores the fact that if the first appellate court had deemed it necessary to allow the parties to adduce additional evidence, it ought to have examined the entire evidence and when it was rejecting the application, it felt that the evidence already on record was sufficient one way or the other. In that view of the matter, we do not wish to express any opinion on this matter as it is open to the parties to urge that aspect of the case in the appeal that is pending before the High Court. We, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the order made by the High Court and restore that of the first appellate court. However, we are making it clear that its correctness can be challenged by the aggrieved party in the appeal that is pending before the High Court, if permissible under law. The appeal is allowed accordingly. However, in the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs.
-
2000 (11) TMI 1237
... ... ... ... ..... resulted any further development and in that perspective the conduct of Shri Khanna can not be faulted in any way. These are the instances which the High Court ascribed to be not in accordance with the known principles of law and attributed motive as regards initiation of the chargesheet. OPINION OF THE COURT As noticed above malafide intent or biased attitude cannot be put on a straight jacket formula but depend upon facts and circumstances of each case and in that perspective judicial precedents would not be of any assistance and as such we refrain from further dealing with various decisions cited from the Bar since facts are otherwise different in each of the decisions. On a perusal of the matter and the records in its entirety, we cannot but lend concurrence to the findings and observations of the High Court. The judgment under appeals cannot be faulted in any way whatsoever and in that view of the matter these appeals fail and are dismissed without however any order as.
-
2000 (11) TMI 1236
... ... ... ... ..... is known as "Income Tax Refund Order". Therefore, it is proper to assume that the words "on which the refund is granted" in s. 244A mean the date of signing the Income-tax Refund Order i.e., the refund voucher. We, therefore, direct the AO to calculate interest payable to the assessee from first day of April of the assessment year to the date on which the refund voucher is signed. Considering the circumstances of the case, we are also of the view that it is a fit case for awarding costs to the assessee under s. 255(2B) of the Act. In our view, awarding cost of ₹ 3,000 would meet the ends of justice and we hereby direct the respondent to deposit the cost with the Dy. Registrar, Tribunal (Mumbai Zone) within one month from the date of receipt of the order and the Registry is further directed to collect the cost and pay the same to the assessee upon presenting an application to that effect. 8. In the result, the appeal filed by the assessee is allowed.
-
2000 (11) TMI 1235
... ... ... ... ..... in Hindi and going through the same, we are persuaded to hold that the circular says the same thing that we have indicated earlier in this judgment. In the aforesaid premises, we set aside the impugned judgments of the Punjab and Haryana High Court and allow these appeals and writ petitions and direct that these four persons, who had appeared at the competitive test in the year 1993 pursuant to the advertisement dated 24/12/1992 should be considered for being appointed to the Haryana Civil Services (Executive Branch). We make it clear that if any other persons, who had appeared at the said examination and who had not approached the Court till today, will not be entitled to file any such application for getting this relief in question so far as the examination of the year 1993 is concerned. (4) IT is also made clear that the appellants will get the benefit of this order prospectively i.e. from the date of appointment. The Government may decide the matter within three months.
-
2000 (11) TMI 1234
... ... ... ... ..... e between persons who are not members and the Union would not be covered by Section 28(1A). Further a dispute between a person who is not yet a member and a union would not be an internal dispute of the union. Under Section 28(1A) the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred only in respect of matters which have been referred to an Industrial Court under Section 28(1A). If a dispute does not fall under Section 28(1A) then that dispute can always be taken to a Civil Court. As a dispute whether a person should or should not be admitted as a member is not a dispute falling within Section 28(1A), it would always be open to such persons to approach a Civil Court for resolution of their dispute. Needless to say that if the law permits they may also raise an industrial dispute before the Industrial Court in that behalf. In our view, therefore, the Judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained and is set aside. Accordingly the Appeal is allowed. There will be no order as to costs.
-
2000 (11) TMI 1233
... ... ... ... ..... material, which had not been properly examined in the earlier inquiry. In fact from the order made by the Railway Board as well as from that part of the file where the inquiry report made earlier is discussed, it is clear that specific findings have been given in respect of each of the charges after discussing the matter and, if that is so, we fail to understand as to how there could have been a remit to the inquiry authority for further inquiry. Indeed this resulted in second inquiry and not in a further inquiry on same set of charges and the material on record. If this process is allowed the inquiries can go on perpetually until the view of the inquiry authority is in accord with that of the disciplinary authority and would be abuse of the process of law. In that view of the matter, we think that the order made by the High Court affirming the order of the Tribunal is just and proper and, therefore, we decline to interfere with the same. The appeal is dismissed accordingly.
-
2000 (11) TMI 1232
... ... ... ... ..... each candidate for completion of medical course. No doubt, one Scheduled Tribe candidate was deprived of joining medical course by the admission given to respondent no. 1. If any action is taken against respondent no. 1, it may lead depriving the service of a doctor to the society on whom public money has already been spent. In these circumstances, this judgment shall not affect the degree obtained by him and his practicing as a doctor. But we make it clear that he cannot claim to belong to the Scheduled Tribe covered by the Scheduled Tribes Order. In other words, he cannot take advantage of the Scheduled Tribes Order any further or for any other constitutional purpose. Having regard to the passage of time, in the given circumstances, including interim orders passed by this Court in SLP (C) No. 16372/85 and other related affairs, we make it clear that the admissions and appointments that have become final, shall remain unaffected by this judgment. o p /o p No costs. o p /o p
-
2000 (11) TMI 1231
... ... ... ... ..... t suffer from any constitutional infirmity or lack of legislative competence. The challenge therefore of Para (iv) or sub-clause (iv) of clause jj(a) also therefore fails. o p /o p 39. Having thus considered all the grounds urged on behalf of the petitioners, we record our conclusion thus The impugned legislation contained in clause (jj)(a) of sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 40 is a valid piece of legislation and the challenge to the same by the petitioners based on Art. 14 and Art. 300A of the Constitution fails. The petitions partly succeed on the interpretation of the provisions of Sec. 40 read with Sec. 20 of the Act. The contention advanced on behalf of the petitioners is accepted that the impugned clause (jj)(a) of sub-sec. (3) of Sec.40 is operative for the land other than the land mentioned in sub-sec. (2)of Sec. 20 of the Act. The group of petitions thus stand disposed, but without any order as to costs. The Civil Applications shall also stand accordingly disposed of. o p /o p
-
2000 (11) TMI 1230
... ... ... ... ..... learned counsel relatable to comparison between 215(5) of the I.T. Act. We are of the opinion that section 209(1)(d) is clear on the given situation. The explanation of the provision in simple language is whether or not the person who has to deduct tax at source makes deduction, the appellant has to reduce the tax deduction at source which is deductible from the estimate of his income and estimate of his tax. Under those circumstances, the impact on section 234B Explanation (1) will be that such amount will logically be reduced from the assessed tax because in section 234B, there has to be finding that advance tax was payable as envisaged under section 210. In the case of the appellant, however, even tax deducted at source from the salary was, in fact, deducted. Keeping in view, we are of the opinion that the authorities below were not justified in recording finding that the appellant is liable to make payment under section 234B of the I.T. Act. The appeal is partly allowed.
-
2000 (11) TMI 1229
... ... ... ... ..... rvations with the observations of Thomas, J. that the courts had not been sympathising with the Bar during the strikes or boycotts. Some courts might have conducted the cases even during the strike or boycott periods or adjourned due to helplessness for not being in a position to decide the lis in the absence of the counsel but majority of the courts in the country have been impliedly sympathisers by not rising to the occasion by taking positive stand for the preservation of the high traditions of law and for continued restoration of the confidence of the common man in the institution of judiciary. It is not too late even now for the courts in the country to rise from the slumber and perform their duties without fear or favour particularly after the judgment of this Court in Mahabir Singh's case(supra). Inaction will surely contribute to the erosion of ethics and values in the legal profession. The defaulting courts may also be contributory to the contempt of this Court.
-
2000 (11) TMI 1228
... ... ... ... ..... ing recorded by the Income tax Appellate tribunal is a finding of fact. No referable question of law arises from the order of the tribunal Dismissed.
-
2000 (11) TMI 1227
... ... ... ... ..... it can be regarded as a special reason. Yet another reason is that appellant was put to notice by the prosecution in the High Court that the offence committed was that he sold an article which was not edible. We also take into account the fact that the appellant was not given any opportunity to say anything regarding the sentence. Of course, there was no need for the trial court to do so since appellant was acquitted by that court. But when the High Court had chosen to reverse the acquittal and convicted him he should have been heard on the sentence. Now it is too late in the day for us to send the case back to the High Court for that purpose alone. Any further delay in disposing of this matter would cause irreparable damage to him. For all the above reasons we reduce the sentence to imprisonment for 3 months and a fine of ₹ 500/-, default in payment of which the appellant will undergo imprisonment for a further period of 15 days. The appeal is disposed of accordingly.
-
2000 (11) TMI 1226
... ... ... ... ..... dy Builder’s case (supra) held that contract for construction of coaches on the under frame supplied by Railways was a contract of works and labour. Facts of the case of Sentinel Rolling Shutters & Engineering Co. (P) Ltd. v. CST (supra) are also materially different and therefore, ratio of that decision cannot be applied to the case before us. Similar is the position in regard to the cases of Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. v. State of Karnataka 55 STC 314 (SC) and Kumudam Publications (P.) Ltd. (supra). 20. Therefore, we quash the orders passed by the authorities below and hold that appellant-corporation was not liable to deduct tax at source under section 194C. Therefore, there was no question of the appellant-corporation being treated as "assessee in default" and fastening the liability of tax and interest levied by learned AO and therefore, we delete the demand and reverse the orders passed by the authorities below. 21. In the result, appeals are allowed.
-
2000 (11) TMI 1225
... ... ... ... ..... s arose on the sale of shares in EPRO to Ashok Sampat and that is how it has to be considered. The claim has to be examined on the basis of the facts as they are stated to have happened and not on any hypothetical notions. We therefore do not consider it proper to examine the claim after breaking it up artificially. 29. For all the above reasons, we are in agreement with the view taken by the Income-tax authorities that the capital loss of ₹ 6,32,62,694 cannot be allowed to be adjusted against the capital gains of ₹ 7,10,99,252. The ground is dismissed. 30. The appeal of the assessee is partly allowed. But since in the main issue, the assessee has failed, the Revenue shall be entitled to costs, which we assess at ₹ 10,000. The costs shall be deposited by the assessee with the Registry of the Tribunal within 120 days from the date of the service of this order and shall be paid to the respondent, on its making an application for withdrawal of the same. 135/11
........
|